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Abstract
The politicisation of environmentalism (the founding of green parties and permanent 
national and international campaigning organisations) was quickly followed by an 
attempt to identify the roots of the movement. In France, this search has had a 
comparatively narrow focus. That is, the origins of French green politics have 
generally been identified in either the science of ecology, or events of the late 1960s, 
when ‘green’ movements began to become more obviously political. This thesis will 
argue that, as Anglo-Saxon authors have already claimed, the origins of modern 
environmental politics are in fact more diverse. There is a remarkable degree of 
shared ground between modern environmental politics and certain points in the 
history of France, particularly the 1930s. In order to demonstrate the links between 
the two, the politics, literature and ideas prominent in the 1930s in France will be 
examined and contrasted to key themes now stressed by green political movements, 
both in France and elsewhere.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Why consider French history, specifically that of the 1930s, in relation to modern 
green politics*? This introduction will explain the approach taken in the thesis, and 
some problems it raises.
The direct origins of the political ecology movement have already been widely 
studied. In France, the development of the movement has been amply catalogued, 
particularly since the 1980s. Politicians who established the first green parties in 
France, notably Brice Lalonde and Antoine Waechter have written accounts, as have 
prominent members of the new movements (Didier Anger, Yves Cochet, Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit, René Dumont, among others).^ Recent sociological and political 
studies also emphasise the development of green politics.
All the above argue it is important to establish exactly when and how the modern 
political ecology movement began, and offer suggestions as to where these origins 
might be found. Many argue with Lalonde, for example, that the events of May 
1968 were the catalyst for the movement which finally assumed permanent 
structures in the 1980s in France.^ Indeed, they further claim that modern 
environmental politics were therefore a French invention:
Nous avons inventé Pécologie politique par rapport à l’Amérique ou à 
l’Angleterre où il y a une attitude d’association, de syndicat de la nature 
parce que nous pensions en soixante-huitards que cela avait une grande 
influence sociétale. (1, p.39)
Others have highlighted the effect of various doom-laden warnings of impending 
ecological disaster, usually written by scientists. The effects of these texts in France 
were slightly different than in English-speaking countries, as they were sometimes 
translated some time after the original versions appeared; and their titles often 
became more sensational or emotive in ‘translation’.'* Carson’s Silent spring was the 
first such text to be widely-read in France, in 1962. The title refers to a future spring 
without the noises of birds, insects and other wildlife, annihilated by use of artificial 
pesticides. Others followed several years later, notably Commoner’s Science and 
survival (Quelle terre laisserons-nous à nos enfants?, translated in 1969, 3 years after 
the American edition); Dubos’ Man adapting (translated in 1973, 8 years after the 
U.S. edition); The Ecologist magazine’s Blueprint for survival (Changer ou 
disparaître. 1972); the report funded by the Club of Rome, the Limits to growth 
(Halte à la croissance!, 1972); and Taylor’s The Doomsdav book (Le jugement 
dernier. 1970). French authors also published similar warnings around this time, for 
example Bonnefous’ L’FIomme on la Nature! (1970), Dorsf s Avant que Nature 
meure (1969), Dumont’s L’Utopie ou la mort! (1973), Heim’s L’angoisse de l ’an 
2000: quand la nature aura passé, l’homme la suivra (1973), and Sla-otzky’s La 
nature n ’en peut plus (1971).^
Others still underline the role of modern media in the development of public 
awareness. Discussion in the media of ideas expressed in texts such as those listed 
above led to their popularisation, and awareness of their arguments thus spread far 
beyond those who had actually read the texts. As well as the spread of ideas and 
theories, television in particular enabled viewers to witness key images which would 
be seized on by the nascent green movements. Waechter is one of many who 
describe the impact of television footage of the earth from space in sentimental 
terms:
Certes, depuis Copernic, on sait que la planète est ronde, mais les images 
envoyés par les satellites, et les premiers hommes dans l’espace, vont peut- 
être marquer bien davantage l’esprit humain. Parce qu’ils indiquent très
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concrètement les limites de cette petite boule bleue et verte dans 
l ’immensité de l’universT
Television footage of environmental disasters (both natural and man-made) is also 
seen by environmentalists as a key factor in raising awareness. In France, this was 
particularly true after the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967/ Media coverage of early 
environmental protests in France (eg. at the Larzac plateau) is again represented as 
motivating later groups. Specialist publications, such as Sauvage, La gueule ouverte 
and Nature et progrès appeared for the first time during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, often as a way of organising and mobilising support for these direct protests, 
or in response to them.
Of course, the diversity of the recent origins of the political ecology movement is 
usually acknowledged, and most of these studies accept that a combination of the 
events which influenced them with other factors was necessary for its development.
In tracing these direct origins of the modern political ecology movement, French 
environmentalists and authors are no different to those in other countries. Most 
British or American texts on modern green politics also give some account of such 
direct origins.® However, these studies have also consistently argued that an 
examination of the less recent ‘roots’ of political ecology is equally necessary. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there have been few, if any, serious sustained attempts by their 
French counterparts to linlc the political ecology movement with its more distant past 
in this way.^ Outside France, even as early as the 1970s, the American 
environmentalist Roszak expressed his surprise at this omission. The evident 
similarities between the example of the French Personalist movement in particular 
and the ideas of modern green thinkers were commented upon in English-language 
texts like Roszak’s Person/Planet*^  much earlier than in French studies. Others, 
notably Bramwell (8) have looked further back and demonstrated the influence of the
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ideas of Rousseau and the French Enlightenment philosophers on anglo-saxon 
political ecology.
The attempt to trace the more distant roots of green politics is one which has been 
attempted in anglo-saxon countries rather than in France thus far, then. The two 
principal studies in English have been by Coates and Pepper. Their approaches will 
be outlined in the next section.
1.1 The roots of modern environmentalism
Coates disagrees that environmentalism is a comparatively recent phenomenon. 
Focussing on the inter-war period in Great Britain, he catalogues growing concern 
for the environment, and concludes that ‘many of the environmental concerns 
expressed today are hardly new’(9, p.l). As evidence, he points out that many key 
‘environmental’ acts were discussed in Parliament or became law during this period.
The rise in number and increasing membership of various broadly-environmental 
social movements during this period are also cited as evidence for his position.
Some of the groups which were founded in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s and 
which Coates argues had similar concerns to modern environmentalists are the 
Forestry Commission, the Council for the Protection of Rural England, the Youth 
Hostels Association, the Ramblers’ Association, and the Soil Association.
Similar developments can be traced to France in the period identified as important 
by Coates, both in the law and the development of new associations. The law of 2 
May 1930, for example, aimed to ensure ‘la protection des monuments naturels et 
des sites de caractère historique, scientifique, légendaire ou pittoresque’;** it created 
the first French nature reserves and covered more than 7,500 sites. By 1936, there 
was official governmental support for a national network of Auberges de jeunesse.
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The first auberge had been founded by Sangnier in 1929; by 1935, 90 auberges had 
been established, and following Lagrange’s encouragement, there were 229 only a 
year later (11, p. 158). We can see evident links between these developments in 
France and the founding of Coates’ ‘green’ organisations in Britain, such as the 
Youth Flostels’ Association and the Ramblers’ Association.
Other similarly ‘ environmentally-concerned’ organisations were also founded in 
France during the inter-war period. Many groups were established to help or protect 
the interests of rural workers, for instance - the Office National du Crédit Agricole 
(1920), the first Chambres d’Agriculture (1924), the Conseil Paysan Français (1925), 
the Comités de Défense Paysanne (1928), the Jeunesse Agricole Catholique (1929), 
the Confédération Nationale Paysanne (1933). Animal protection organisations were 
founded (eg. the Société Centrale Féline, 1933).
Flowever, some important distinctions between France and Britain of the 1930s must 
also be borne in mind here. First, a higher proportion of French people still lived in 
a rural environment in the inter-war period. Over a third of the active population of 
France were considered to be paysans on the eve of the Second World War (13, 
p. 139); the urbanisation process had been slowed down by the economic crisis and 
was not to take off again until the Occupation was over. It could be argued that the 
growth of the kinds o f ‘environmental’ and conservationist associations which 
Coates notes in the case of Britain was less necessary or likely in France as long as 
the majority were still in close contact with rural traditions. Second, certain 
‘environmental’ laws and protection measures date back much further in France than 
in Britain. The legal framework for protection of the French forests, for instance, 
dates back to Colbert and the Code Forestier - though, as Mathieu points out, the 
existence of laws does not always lead to the actual protection of the environment 
(10, p.76). Even if some of the legal framework already existed in France by the 
1930s, it is clear that many of the same ‘green’ issues were being identified as 
important. It is these issues which will be studied in more depth in subsequent 
chapters.
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So what does Coates’ approach bring to the study of modern green politics? At its 
weakest, it ‘allows us to demonstrate striking parallels between environmental 
concern in the past and that of the present’ (9, p.l). Coates argues that it also shows 
that the range of modern environmental concerns can be attributed to the past:
Looking back at the diversity of forms taken by environmental concern in 
the inter-war period, it can be seen that this is paralleled by a comparable 
diversity in the present. (9, p. 15)
A second British author makes stronger claims for the historical approach. Pepper 
argues, in his study The roots of modern environmentalism. that, without such an 
approach, and the awareness it brings, political ecology movements will fail in their 
attempts to change our attitudes and ultimately society itself. His starting point is 
that evidence of environmental problems alone has not been enough to bring about 
the changes greens feel are needed. He sees the attempts to amass proof of the 
extent of global environmental damage in the 1960s and 1970s by groups such as the 
Club of Rome as necessary, but mistakenly idealistic in their belief that, if only the 
extent of environmental damage were known, people would change. He concludes:
The spread of detailed knowledge about how man degrades and tlmeatens 
his own planet has not of itself produced the likelihood of serious or 
permanent remedial action. (14, pp. 1-3)
Indeed, he argues that the attempt to raise awareness has had negative rather than 
positive effects: a common reaction to cataloguing of environmental problems is to 
dismiss it as ‘yet more gloom and doom’ (ibid., p.3). Pepper holds that if the aim of 
green political groups is to achieve change, they must first take account of the ideas, 
perceptions and attitudes on which our actions are based. Thus what is needed is a 
study both of the attitudes which led to environmental problems and resulted in our
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present ‘predicament’, and of the history of environmental ideas themselves. In his 
view, such a study of the history of environmental ideas will provide ‘an invaluable 
perspective to those who are attempting to find a way out of our predicament’ (ibid., 
p.3).
This thesis will address both these aspects. As the ideas of modern 
environmentalists are contrasted to the ideas of the 1930s, we will see evidence of 
some of the former attitudes which led to our current ‘predicament’, to use Pepper’s 
term, but also how modern environmental ideas and key aspects of French society in 
the 1930s actually have much in common. What is striking is how many French 
writers, politicians and philosophers in the 1930s were making the same points that 
modern environmentalists do today, only to have their ideas and warnings ignored, 
perhaps for the same reasons as we would later decline to act on the evidence 
presented in reports like the Limits to Growth.
While Coates’ study is limited to associations and social movements, and Pepper 
concentrates on science, philosophy and politics throughout modern history to trace 
the roots of modern anglo-saxon green politics, this study will focus on some 
different sources and a much narrower period for the case of France.
Why, then, can 1930s France be considered especially suitable for tracing the history 
of green ideas?
1.2 The 1930s in France
Coates’ main reason for studying the inter-war period is that it was a period of 
‘ structural change which had a profound effect on the environment and on attitudes 
towards i f  (9, p.l). The changes which affected the environment during this period
44
were matched in France by change, fear and uncertainty in almost every other field. 
For Borne, the entire decade is best described as a ‘crise’ (the same term now used 
for the idea we are living through ecological crisis). The most radical changes in the 
1930s relevant for this study will now be summarised.
Some of these changes and fears were inevitable. The effects of World War 1 would 
continue to be felt in France throughout the 1930s. The war, fought on French soil, 
had long-lasting consequences for the population, in particular. Although the figure 
for the total percentage of the French population killed during the war was below 
4%, a quarter of all males under 40 had died, and estimates of the number killed who 
were from rural or paysan backgrounds go as high as 80% of the total figure (13, 
p. 142). Thousands more had been severely injured and could not return to work on 
the land. While the destruction caused to the infrastructure had not reached the 
levels of WW2, France was to have less outside help (no Marshall Aid), lacked a 
strong, unifying leader (due both to the lack of a clear figurehead able to mobilise 
the majority, as de Gaulle would in the aftermath of WW2, and to the nature of the 
regime of the 3rd Republic, which discouraged such individual leadership) and 
overall had less time to recover from the effects of W W l. Just over a decade after 
the war ended, the Wall Street Crash and subsequent world economic crisis made 
their mark, notably on levels of unemployment in France. Along with the economic 
crisis came the realisation that France no longer had the same level of independence 
and power in the modern world.
International developments led to further uncertainty for many French people. The 
effects of the economic crisis on national self-esteem were followed by (albeit 
tentative) demands from some of her colonies and dependencies for greater freedom, 
and even independence (it is often forgotten that Syria and the Lebanon, though they 
were not full colonies, were promised independence before the invasion of France in 
1940). The influence of both the USA and USSR was also growing. Totalitarianism 
was feared, with rising support for fascism and communism. By 1933, Hitler was in
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power in Germany, and her economy and population were being rebuilt much more 
quickly from WWl than was the case inside France.
By the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain in July 1936, a major source of fear and 
uncertainty was the aclmowledgement that further wai's involving the French were 
possible, and indeed likely. The one clearly positive reaction to WWl inside France 
had been that the war at least represented Ta der des ders’. Horrific though the 
experience had been, many felt that its horrors would at least serve to prevent French 
involvement in any future conflict. With the debate over Popular Front intervention 
in support of the Spanish Republicans came the realisation that war remained likely, 
a realisation made more chilling by concerns over the rise of the extreme left and 
the extreme right in Europe.
Extremism was on the rise inside France too. Following the split of the left at the 
Congress of Tours in 1920, the SFIC (later the PCF) became one of the most radical 
left-wing parties in Europe and was to remain a Stalinist party tliroughout the 1930s 
(and indeed beyond). The apparent strength of the extreme-right leagues added to 
fears by February 1934.
Although the war and economic crisis were to slow down the move to the towns 
during the 1930s, the process had already gathered momentum before W W l, and the 
urbanisation and industrialisation of the French population became a focus for fear 
of change during the inter-war period. Related to this new way of life were fears 
over the future. Whereas other European powers, particularly Germany had rebuilt 
quickly after W W l, the French population had been so severely affected that both 
her demographic weaknesses (‘un comportement démographique malthusien’) (11, 
p.7) and the health of French youth were questioned. For many in France, both on 
the left and on the right, their country’s ‘décadence’, symbolised by the low birth­
rate and poor physical fitness of their young people was a source of fear, confirmed
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by the poor performance of French athletes on the world stage at the 1936 Olympic 
Games in Berlin.
A clear result of this degree of change in their society over a short period was that 
French people from a huge range of fields - literature, intellectual or academic life, 
journalism, youth groups, cinema, politics, philosophy - seriously posed the 
question: what is wrong with modern society, and particularly with modern France? 
As environmentalists would also do later, they examined the recent past and 
dominant attitudes to try to establish where a wr ong turn had been taken. And like 
their modern counterparts, the answers they seized on would be diverse, indeed 
contradictory depending on ideology, beliefs, background, class and many other 
factors. Despite this diversity, and once again like modern environmentalists, they 
tended to focus on the same areas and themes when attempting to define criticisms 
of their society.
One effect of this degree of change, however, was that, as well as provoking fear and 
uncertainty, the atmosphere in the 1930s was often one of great hope. The 
destruction of W W l, the birth of new movements and ideologies, the belief that 
nothing was unchangeable meant, for many, that a new and better society could be 
built, one which would start from scratch and learn from the mistakes of the past.
The degree of wide-ranging debate, the feeling that real positive change could be 
achieved and that all could contribute and be involved in building a new world led 
many, particularly in the early 1930s to agree with Malraux that the result of the 
disasters of the recent past would be a rebirth of hope.
Long-accepted assumptions about the nature of society, human relations, traditional 
ways of living and working, politics could be challenged. If the spread of relatively 
new political ideologies led to uncertainty and fear for many French people, for 
others they represented a new chance, new freedoms, and a collective strength they 
had never before thought possible. The mobilisation of French workers into
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collective organisations gave them new bargaining power. ‘Engagement’, 
commitment to a political cause was not as tarnished with revelations of corruption 
or totalitarianism as it would be after WW2 and many young people, in particular, 
felt they had the chance to be involved in the birth of a new and better society 
tlmough such commitment. Both on the left and the right, images of the New Man 
influenced many in France. Youth organisations flourished. Secondary education 
was more widespread, meaning the young were more often qualified to discuss and 
react to political events and ideas. The development of modern teclmologies and 
ways of working led many to fear for their future, but others saw these developments 
as exciting possibilities, leaving human beings more free to take advantage of the 
new ‘loisirs de masse’.
The 1930s in France also saw a cultural renaissance. The role of intellectuals was 
emphasised in the rebirth of the society. New art forms - cinema, radio - took off; 
the publishing industry expanded massively, with hundreds of new reviews and 
journals; works by key thinlcers of the 20th Century were published; famous artists 
from all over Europe were drawn to Paris, and inspired by contemporary events and 
politics (cf works like Picasso’s Guernica, first presented at the 1937 Exposition 
internationale de Paris).
The seeming contradiction of the presence of hope in such extreme circumstances is 
another factor the 1930s share with modern environmental thought. If all were 
asking what was wrong with modern society, many were also asking what could be 
changed to rescue it. There was an awareness of being present at the birth of a new 
way of life. Another parallel between the 1930s and modern green movements was 
the level of public debate, and the prominence given to ideas and intellectuals at this 
key moment.
The main reason for focussing on the 1930s in this study then, is the coming together 
of three factors: mounting fears about the present, new ideas about how to change
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society and, crucially, the willingness to accept commitment, an involvement in such 
change. This last factor in particular differentiates the 1930s from previous points in 
20*'hcentui7 French histoiy, and we can see the obvious similarities with the points 
in the late 1960s and 1970s when modern green politics were to begin to gain 
strength. For Loubet del Bayle,
Le fait nouveau, dans les années 1930, c’est que cette idée de crise de 
civilisation débouchait avec [de nouveaux] mouvements sur le forum [qui] 
avaient la ferme volonté de réagir et de reconstruire un ‘ordre’. (15, pp.267-9)
Loubet del Bayle based his study of the 1930s on organised youth movements, and 
the traditional hunting ground for the roots of modern green politics has also been 
organised, broadly-political groups, such as the 1970s anti-nuclear movements. 
While this thesis will consider such groups for the 1930s to some extent, it will also 
focus on quite different sources, which will now be outlined.
1.3 Sources
One aim of this study will be to demonstrate that the roots of modern green politics 
can be traced in sources other than the traditional ones of organised political action. 
Anglo-saxon studies have already made similar attempts, notably those of Pepper 
and Bramwell. Some have implied linlcs between non-political sources and modern 
green thought by compiling anthologies of ‘green’ literature, dating back as far as 
Ancient Roman and Greek fables and myths. Taplin even argues that most literary 
depictions of trees can be considered ‘green’ (16, p.2).
In France too, the anthology is considered an appropriate approach. Antoine goes as 
far back as 1548 in his search for ‘ceux qui ont pensé l’environnement et tenu sa 
plume, même lorsqu’ils n ’en ont pas prononcé le mot’ (17, p. 19), reproducing
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extracts from Rabelais and Baudelaire, among others. However, a sustained 
comparative study is lacking. These anthologies stress the importance of looking for 
environmental views in non-traditional sources, then simply present these sources 
without comment. Readers are left to note the similarities (and frequently, the 
contradictions) themselves.
Unlike such anthologies, this study will both look for evidence that some of the 
same themes were seen as important in the 1930s, and will attempt a detailed 
contrast between 1930s and 1990s attitudes. Were there many in France in the 
1930s who came to the same conclusions as modern environmentalists when they 
asked what was wrong with their society? Did they believe that the answer to such 
problems was to change society in ways similar to those now urged by 
environmentalists?
There will therefore be two sets of sources for this study. First, the ideas and 
position(s) of the modern green movement (covering the period from the end of the 
1960s to the 1990s), and second, 1930s sources which will enable us to make a 
comparison between the two. Which sources are used to trace the ideas of the 1990s 
and 1930s, then?
The ideas of the modern green movement are comparatively easy to catalogue.
Polls, the documents of political groups and parties, speeches, manifestos abound. 
Yet herein lies an obvious difficulty. Often this abundance of material presents 
ambiguous, if not openly contradictory opinions. There is generally no single, united 
green stance, just as there is no one body (and this is particularly true of the 
dominant French green party. Les Verts) which can claim to represent the views of 
all environmentalists. Some argue that this diversity is the strength of the modern 
green movement, just as biodiversity is the strength of any ecological system. This 
means that it will usually be necessary to detail a variety of green positions for each 
issue under discussion. Where possible, the dominant view will be made clear.
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A comparable diversity of views is found in 1930s sources. However, whereas 
1990s views are found easily in political sources, those of the 1930s will be sought 
in selected works of literature and contemporary ideas as well as in the political 
domain. The relevance of each of these tlnee sources will now be summarised 
briefly.
First, the politics and history of the 1930s. The period Imown with hindsight as the 
entre-deux-guerres, and the 1930s in particular, has fascinated political scientists as a 
kind of hothouse for new political theories and action for over fifty years. Many, as 
we have already noted, see the period as one of interest because it was a time of 
extreme crisis (with Touchard referring to the resulting ‘esprit des années 30’). For 
Loubet del Bayle, the exchange of ideas and political actions based on new theories 
by youth groups made the period worthy of detailed attention. Winock goes one step 
further, and points out some comparisons between the 1990s and 1930s (‘chômage, 
déclin démographique, usure politique, franc fort, montée de l’extrême droite...’) 
because ‘les leçons de l’histoire sont toujours bonnes à prendre’ (18, p.54).
Winock sees the 1930s in France in three distinct phases, based on political and 
economic developments. The distinctions he makes are useful for this study, as the 
politics and events of the 1930s will be one of the key sources consulted;
II y a les premières années, jusqu’à la journée du 6 février 1934, dominées 
par le choc de la crise économique qui frappe, avec un peu de retard, [la 
France] après le krach de Wall Street de 1929; l’émeute du 6 février place 
soudainement les Français face au danger fasciste [...] La France se scinde 
de nouveaux en deux camps, les communistes rompant leur isolationnisme 
ajDrès que Staline eut enfin aperçu le danger hitlérien, d’où s’ensuivent la 
formation du Front populaire et sa victoire en 1936; enfin, à partir de 1937-
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1938, une nouvelle redistribution des cartes face au danger imminent que 
font courir à la paix les entreprises de T Allemagne nazie.(18, p.54)
As well as these aspects mentioned by Winock, and the historical developments 
already noted in Section 1.2, the politics of the 1930s provide interesting source 
material for this study because of the degree of political debate and the extreme or 
groundbreaking positions taken. This was exacerbated by the political system of the 
3rd Republic, with its short-lived governments, diversity of political groups and 
coalitions. The first French Socialist premier (in Blum), the new strength of the left 
in the Popular Front and the degree of influence now held by the communists also 
led to new hopes, fears and debates (for instance, how would a revolutionary, 
international political movement work inside a national democratic*^ system?).
The clash between new and established political groups led to an unusual emphasis 
on intellectuals and ideas, the second source chosen for this study. As with modern 
green politics, groundbreaking theories were being outlined and debated for the first 
time. New philosophical movements, in particular the Personalists, were forwarding 
ideas which would find parallels in environmental political theory decades later. 
Parallels between 1930s and later groups are also found in their willingness to act on 
new ideas, since they saw the need to change society as an urgent one. Here, sources 
such as Loubet del Bayle’s seminal study of youth groups, Les non-conformistes des 
aimées 30. and various accounts of the key left- and right-wing groups will be 
important. The ideas and influence of contemporary figures such as Mounier will 
also be examined.
The final source used for this comparison of 1930s and 1990s ideas on ‘green’ issues 
will be selected literature of the period. The growing sense of crisis, and the 
simultaneous presence of hopeful attitudes were the background for an extraordinary 
degree of politically-inspired artistic creativity in France during the entre-deux- 
guerres, with Winock (who presents an exhaustive list of politically-inspired creative
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figures from the 1930s) concluding ‘Je souhaite aux autres décennies à venir, à celle 
que nous vivons, autant de créativité et de talents multiples’ (ibid., p.58). 1930s 
literature is a particlarly rich source of ideas for this study because of the emphasis 
on criticisms of society and hope for the future, and its ability to present alternative, 
even utopian visions. In Taplin’s view.
It is only art [...] that can bring terrible things home to us without causing us 
to despair. Its consoling power lies in its affirmation of the possibility of 
rebirth and regeneration. (16, p.20)
Unlike the political and philosophical movements, which, no matter how ambitious 
or hopeful for the future, had to emphasise practical considerations, the authors of 
the period faced no such constraints. And if the importance of imagination was 
stressed by 1930s authors, the modern green movement would also note its key role, 
seen for example in the enthusiasm during the 1970s and 1980s for utopian ‘green’ 
fiction like Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1975).
Which 1930s French authors represent the most useful sources of ideas on ‘green’ 
issues? The most important source will be the 1930s works of the novelist Jean 
Giono. Born in Provence in 1895, he spent his entire life there apart from the years 
when he was called up to the army in World War 1, an experience which deeply 
marked his beliefs and his work. By 1930, Giono was sufficiently successful to 
make his living as a writer. It was during the 1930s that he developed the themes 
and attitudes his works would later become known for, and which will be most 
relevant for this study: the effects of war, the power of nature, the importance of a 
more natural way of life and work, criticisms of modern society, a certain anarchism, 
pacifism, relationships between men and women, and between human beings and the 
natural world. Giono’s works were widely-read throughout the decade, as indeed 
they are today. Importantly, during the 1930s he also agreed on the need for some 
degree of ‘engagement’ (though with many reservations, as we shall see), notably in 
the infamous Contadour experiment. This was an attempt actually to recreate the
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‘conditions for peace and joy % as portrayed in Giono’s 1935 novel, Que ma joie 
demeure.
The second author whose 1930s work is a useful source for this study is Louis- 
Ferdinand Céline. Born in 1894, Céline lived through and was marked by the same 
events as Giono. From a modest background, he fought and was injured in W W l. 
Unlike Giono, however, he had travelled abroad (to the United States, Cameroon, 
Germany, the USSR and Great Britain) by the 1930s, and was medically-trained. 
These factors were clearly to influence the content and approach of his works of 
literature, resulting in a groundbreaking (though now-familiar) analysis of the 
problems of contemporary French society. Flis first success and best-known work, 
Voyage au bout de la nuit (published in 1932) addressed many themes which would 
later be adopted by environmentalists: the stress of modern life, particularly in cities; 
the effects of urbanisation and industrialisation on society and on individuals’ 
health; work; poverty; politics; war; the role of women, among others. Céline’s 
collaboration during World War Two, and particularly the anti-semitism of his later 
works led many to re-assess his work; but it is important for this study to note that 
during the 1930s, (and particularly the early 1930s) his ideas and criticisms of 
French society were not clearly identified with any political tendency.
Other 1930s works and authors will also be referred to in this study, a notable 
example being Saint-Exupéry. However, the works of Giono and Céline will be the 
most important source, for several reasons. First, this study takes as its focus the 
1930s in France; consequently, some works which might be considered relevant (for 
example, Giono’s pre-1930s and post-war writings, or the works of Ramuz) fall 
outwith its scope, thought they may be referred to on occasion. Second, by choosing 
two sources in particular, a more detailed analysis of the views they present, and 
comparison with contemporary positions is possible. Finally, the range of themes 
these two authors chose to address in their 1930s works is the most relevant for this 
study. Other writers clearly also made relevant criticisms of their society at the time,
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but few were to make their positions as clear as did Giono and Céline, and none 
addressed as many of the ‘green’ themes studied here in a more sustained manner.
The decision to focus on these sets of sources will allow a demonstration that 
modern green attitudes are based not only on the scientific analyses made public in 
the 1960s and 1970s, but also on long-established positions and ways of looking at 
modern society, ones found not only in the political sphere. Contemporary 
environmentalists have stressed the importance for green politics today of visionary 
or utopian thinkers, not just scientists and politicians. This study will suggest that 
such thinlcers can be traced further back in the history of France than many present- 
day environmentalists might imagine.
1.4 Approach
Common ground is found in the questioning by greens and 1930s sources of their 
society, and in their attempts to build a different one:
De [leur] critique du désordre établi, ces mouvements concluaient à la 
nécessité d’une révolution dont ils s’attachaient à préciser les modalités avant 
de définir des propositions constructives destinées à permettre de bâtir un ordre 
nouveau. (15, p. 181)
While many of the sources chosen for this study would not go so far as to demand a 
revolution in the traditional political sense, it is clear that the desire for a revolution 
in attitudes and lifestyles would be another example of common ground between 
them. This study will attempt to demonstrate the extent of this common ground by 
focussing throughout on tlnee points, that is: how similar were the criticisms made
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in the 1930s and 1990s, the proposed alternatives and the approved methods for 
achieving change?
In each chapter, one theme which is important for both groups will be examined.
The 1990s green criticisms with regard to this chosen theme will be presented first; 
and the views presented in the 1930s sources will then be explained, and contrasted 
with 1990s positions. The remaining two questions (how should society be changed 
for the better?; and what methods should be used to achieve change?) will finally be 
examined in sections on 1990s and 1930s solutions. The next section will now 
explain the themes which will be studied in this way.
1.5 Environmental themes
The themes on which this study is based are of necessity broad in scope One reason 
for this breadth is that certain specific issues now automatically identified with the 
green movement cannot be discussed in the context of the 1930s because it was 
simply not possible to be aware of them then. An obvious example of such a theme 
might be nuclear power. The broader approach taken in this study allows 
comparisons between modern attitudes to nuclear power and 1930s attitudes to 
comparable or related issues - new teclmology in general, and the fears it raises, 
pollution, new ways of living, human dépendance on machines, for instance. A 
second reason for breadth of scope is that it enables a wider range of comparisons to 
be drawn between 1930s and 1990s views. This will show how 1930s and 1990s 
views are similar across many areas - we will thus see that we are not simply 
considering a eoincidental shared view on a selected topic; rather, the similarities 
across a wide range of themes imply their entire outlook (‘worldviews’) are similar.
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The chosen themes are identified as important for green politics by political groups 
themselves, and by environmental philosophers and political scientists. An 
understanding of the distinction betvyeen different kinds o f ‘green’ politics is 
essential here, and is addressed in the next section; for the moment, it is sufficient to 
note that, even if we might be tempted to see green politics as limited to 
environmental concern, their scope is in fact much wider. As Porritt puts it, whereas 
a concern for the environment is an essential part of being green, ‘it is by no means 
the same thing as being green’ (19, p.5). Green politics addresses a vast, and 
perhaps surprising range of themes. Those which have been selected as chapters for 
this study are:
•Work
•Ni droite, ni gauche (the left-right divide)
•War 
•The city
Other possible themes (nature, agriculture, resource depletion, spirituality, political 
strategies etc) cross over various areas and will be studied in relation to the chosen 
themes (for example, agriculture is considered to some extent in virtually all 
chapters).
Again, one difficulty which must be borne in mind is that there is often no single (or 
even dominant) view on these issues, either in the 1990s or the 1930s sources. We 
will therefore be looking for parallels within these selected themes across a range of 
diverse positions. The final section of this introduction will now consider the other 
main difficulties or problems involved in the approach taken for this study.
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1.6 Problems
The first problem is raised by the selection of themes for study. As already 
mentioned in Section 1.5. it would have been possible to adopt the same approach, 
but to focus on other themes important for environmental ism. This is due in part to 
the focussed nature of any such study: not all relevant themes can be discussed in 
sufhcient detail, therefore it is necessaiy to seleet the ones which are seen as most 
important or which lead to the most fruitful comparisons. As already noted, a 
second explanation for the need for selection is the (perhaps unexpectedly) 
comprehensive nature of green politics. Although green politics are popularly seen 
as restricted to concern for the environment, or even ‘single-issue politics’, such a 
restrictive description is inappropriate.
The comprehensive nature of green politics also leads to to the second key problem 
for this study, that of definition. What are we to understand by key terms such as 
‘green’? We have already noted that this term refers to a range of positions, rather 
than one clear, widely-accepted view. Most political theorists have reacted to this 
diversity by categorising ‘green’ approaches into two broad camps, using a variety of 
terms to do so. The most common distinctions'"^ are those made between:
dark green <=» light green
ecologism environmentalism
deep ecology shallow ecology
Green green
What is meant by both sets of terms, and why has this distinction been considered 
important? First, the two approaches do start from the same analysis of what is 
wrong with modern soeiety, differing principally in reaction to the perceived 
problems. Generally, light green, environmentalist or green (small ‘g’) approaches
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argue for relatively minor changes to society. Darker greens, ecologists or Greens 
(capital ‘G’) argue for more radical changes to society and in attitudes. For Dobson, 
light greens can be described as ‘managerial’ in their response to environmental 
problems, whereas
ecologism argues that care for the environment presupposes radical changes 
in our relationship with it, and thus in our mode of social and political life. 
(20, p. 13)
However, the final terms, ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ green, have somewhat different 
connotations. The term ‘Deep Ecology’ was first used by Naess in 1973 (21), and 
the distinction he made (and made popular) has been criticised within the green 
movement. Some argue it has had a disproportionate influence, leading to ‘the 
undermining of green politics, [...] creating a major ideological schism within green 
political theory and hampering its political effectiveness’(22, p.41). Goodin believes 
that the very choice of the terms ‘deep’ and ‘ shallow’ has distorted popular views of 
green politics;
Implicit in the shallow/deep dichotomy is, in effect, an assertion that the 
deeper view of the matter contains all the truths of the shallower view, plus 
some additional ones as well. The truth of the matter is, of course, 
otherwise. (23, p.45)
Naess’ starting point in 1973 was to criticise the contemporaiy green movement as 
‘shallow’, as for him it was concerned with only one central objective: ‘the health 
and affluence of people in the developed countries’ (21, p.95). Naess’ alternative 
was to be far more extreme than the ‘dark’ or ‘Green’ positions defined by Dobson, 
Goodin and others. Instead, Deep Ecology is based on a rethinking of the human- 
nature relationship. The key idea is that of ‘reenchanting’ the natural world and 
anthropocentrism is severely criticised:
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[Humans] are but ‘a plain member’ of the biotic community and our 
arrogance with respect to this community threatens not only ourselves but 
all of life. (24, pp.9-10)
For Deep Ecologists, the environmental crisis is attributed to human actions, and in 
paiticular to modern ways of looking at the world, based on Enlightenment 
philosophy, rationalism and attempts to dominate nature. If these have led to our 
current predicament, Deep Ecologists argue that we should reject such approaches. 
To this end, they propose ‘a completely new Weltanschauung' (22, p.44) to replace 
the Western rationalist one. They suggest replacing political strategies and rational 
scientific approaches with a direct return to a more natural way of life, in societies 
apparently based on a pre-industrial age. Instead of persuading people thiough 
rational debate, they emphasise spiritual awareness, a change in attitudes which will 
apparently follow inevitably from embeddedness in nature.'^
The distinction between different green positions is an important one for modern 
green politics because it leads to very different strategies and policies. For Deep 
Ecologists, for instance, political parties or democratic elections are not suitable 
methods of achieving change. As well as the distinction between two broad types of 
green politics (darlc/light etc) - or arguably thi'ee, with Deep Ecology as a separate 
‘type’ in its own right - many green theorists have therefore presented the green 
movement as a broad church, an ‘umbrella’ or ‘rainbow’ movement that is both 
willing and able to accommodate a broad scope of different stances. Interestingly, 
many 1930s movements used similar arguments, and like modern greens, claimed 
that diversity was a strength of their movements:
Tout en parlant, pour la commodité, du personnalisme, préférons-nous dire 
qu’il y a des personnalismes, et respecter leurs démai'ches diverses (26,
p.6).
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To what extent is the distinction between these different green approaches relevant 
for this study? The often radical nature of modern green political theory and its vast 
scope need to be understood when we consider the themes selected for this study; as 
already noted, we will often be contrasting a range of modern political attitudes to a 
similar range of 1930s views.
Which of the terms defined above are most appropriate for this study? When 
discussing modern green ideas, it will be possible to differentiate between the 
different types of green politics by using the range of terms. However, when 
discussing the 1930s, some of the terms are inappropriate. Dobson points out that 
before 1972,'^ it was impossible to be truly ‘Green’, as there was no coming together 
of the preconditions for darlVGreen politics before the report to the Club of Rome. 
When referring to the 1930s, then, it will be most appropriate to refer to nascent 
attitudes which would later be identified with green politics by using the terms 
‘environmental’ rather than ‘ecologist’. This term will also be used as a sort of 
‘catch-all’ phrase to cover the range of green positions, when distinctions are 
unnecessary or unwieldy.
The terms ‘environmental’ or ‘green’ (small ‘g’) are arguably also more appropriate 
when discussing the specific case of France. As we have seen, many argue that 
France was the birthplace of political ecology. While a range of green positions 
undeniably exists inside France, the dominant view has been that political parties 
and election campaigns are appropriate methods of changing society, and the debate 
over ‘deep’ and ‘dark’ green positions has not had the same influence as in the 
United States, for instance.
The third problem with the approach taken in this study is related to that of the 
necessaiy conditions for modern green political analyses. Dobson acknowledges the 
contribution made by the ideas of pre-Limits to growth thinkers by seeing them as
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‘green’ rather than ‘Green’ (in the same way that precursors of socialism, before the 
Industrial and French Revolutions can be seen as ‘socialistic’ rather than socialist). 
Similarly, the aim here is to draw parallels and trace the roots of modern green 
politics.
A fourth problem, that of hindsight, involves two main dangers. First, there is a 
temptation to judge others living through extreme times. While we now know that a 
second World War and the invasion of France by Nazi Germany was to end the 
1930s, for those living through the period there was no such knowledge, even if the 
dominant mood was one of uncertainty and fear. A second problem relating to 
hindsight is the temptation to associate 1930s authors and thinkers with a future 
movement they could not even have imagined. While we can see their ideas as 
linleed to or influencing modern environmentalism, we cannot assume that, it they 
were alive today, they would choose to be associated with green political 
movements. Indeed, both Giono and Céline (and many Personalists) actually made 
clear at various points their distrust of all political organisations - ‘II ne faut y entrer 
sous aucun prétexte’ (27, p.261). Of course, we could say the same of many modern 
greens, who argue that permanent political parties and organised groups are 
inappropriate or insufficient ways to achieve the sort of drastic change they desire.
A fifth problem involved in this approach relates to the sources chosen for study. 
Unlike modern political movements, 1930s authors of fiction and philosophers were 
not generally offering concrete, detailed prescriptions for change. We are not always 
comparing like with like. This will sometimes mean that concrete suggestions made 
by modern enviromnentalists will be compared to ideas contained in fictional 
accounts. However, at times the authors studied did make more concrete criticisms 
and suggestions, particularly in the later years of the 1930s (when, for instance, 
Giono wrote only non-fiction).
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A final difficulty involved in this approach is the reliability of some of the chosen 
sources. Whereas political movements must be broadly consistent, novelists do not 
face the same constraints. At times, their positions will change during the period 
studied, or there will be inconsistencies. Céline criticised his own Voyage au bout 
de la nuit after WW2, (‘Le seul livre vraiment méchant de tous mes livres’) (28, 
p. 14) though, as is always the case with Céline, we might be wary of taking his 
views at face value. Giono too repeatedly expressed his amazement that anyone 
would expect a writer, whose job is invention, not to embellish the truth. A degree 
of caution will sometimes be necessary. However, the imaginative nature of the 
sources consulted can also be seen in a positive light. Without their imagined 
versions of better or alternative societies, or the ability of fiction to exaggerate real 
life for comic or dramatic effect, the comparisons drawn in this study between 
modern green ideas and those of the 1930s would be more restricted.
To summarise, then, we must bear in mind certain difficulties relating to the chosen 
approach and sources. Where they are important, these difficulties will be 
mentioned in the body of the thesis. However, even with such an awareness, there 
are many fruitful comparisons to be drawn between the two sets of ideas.
The first theme considered in the way outlined above will be that of work.
' The term ‘modern green politics’, though ambiguous, has been used throughout this thesis to refer to 
French and international green campaigning organisations and political parties. The formation o f  
such organisations in France is frequently described (eg. by Sainteny (3, p. 13)) in three clear stages, 
which will be briefly outlined here for sake o f clarity. Initial green campaigns and movements, which 
were to become visible in the aftermath o f the ‘events’ o f May 68, are often referred to as Ta 
nébuleuse écologiste’, as they were short-lived, mostly local or regional in scale, often refused 
permanent structures or leaders, and frequently mobilised support around single-issue campaigns, 
notably nuclear power. This early stage in the development o f political ecology soon led to a second 
period, during which several key figures began to argue that a national political presence for green 
ideas was essential in the political system o f the French Fifth Republic. Such figures, and many local 
grassroots organisations were to support René Dumont’s candidacy for the Presidency in 1974, 
though an overwhelming distrust o f permanent political structures was still apparent: Dumont would 
only agree to stand at all if  his campaign group promised to disband as soon as the election was over. 
By the early 1980s, however, frustrated at the lack o f progress and lack o f publicity for green ideas, 
some greens decided that a permanent political party would better achieve the aims o f political 
ecologists, and by 1983, two green ‘parties’, Les Verts-Conféderalion écologiste and Les Verts-Parti 
écologiste had been formed. These two groups were to merge one year later to form the party
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currently known as Les Verts. While the acceptance and establishment o f a permanent party clearly 
marked the third and final stage in the development o f French green organisations, we should note, 
however that a consensus on the most appropriate forms for expression o f green ideas has by no 
means been found even today, with a multitude o f smaller green groups, and even national parties 
such as Génération Ecologie and the Mouvement Ecologiste Indépendant, currently existing alongside 
Les Verts and often arguing for different approaches.
^For details o f these texts and others referred to here, see Bibliographv.
Brice Lalonde was one o f the first to be involved in the French political ecology movement, for 
example as a member o f the Comité de soutien à René Dumont (for the presidential elections) in 
1974, as first leader o f the French branch o f  Friends o f the Earth, Les Amis de la Terre, and as a green 
presidential candidate in 1981. He was the first (and until Dominique V oynef s appointment in June 
1997, the only) ‘green’ Minister (as Ministre de l’Environnement in the Socialist government under 
Michel Rocard, h om 1988 until 1989) and became the founder/leader o f the second French ecology 
party, Génération Ecologie in 1990.
Antoine Waechter was also an early member o f the French political ecology movement, becoming 
particularly associated with Les Verts as the most prominent o f their four ’‘porte-paroles’ in the 
1980s. He was head o f Les Verts’ electoral lists until the mid-1990s and presidential candidate in 
1988. Associated with their ‘ni droite, ni gauche’ stance, he left the party in 1996 after his defeat in a 
key debate by Dominique Voynet and others, who have since taken the party from Waechter’s 
position ( ‘L’écologie n’est pas à marier’) to a more cooperative one, collaborating with the PS and the 
PCF from 1996 and gaining seven seats in the Assemblée Nationale in the 1997 legislative elections 
following an electoral alliance with the left.
Didier Anger and Yves Cochet were both ‘porte-paroles’ who argued within Les Verts for over a 
decade that a more collaborative stance was necessary. For example in May 1985, they published 
their Appel à la convergeance des forces alternatives et écologistes with Jean Brière, and in 
November 1986, they presented a motion (Construire) to Les Verts’ Assemblée Générale, arguing the 
paity should break away from Waechter’s position.
Daniel Cohn-Bendit was the best-known student leader o f the ‘events’ o f May 1968. He was an early 
member o f the German green party, die Griinen, for whom he was elected to the Bundestag. He has 
since applied for full French citizenship, following the success o f the list he led for les Verts in the 
1999 European elections.
René Dumont worked as an agronomist in developing countries, an experience which led him to 
publish key texts for modern French environmentalists, such as L’Utopie ou la mort! He was the first 
‘green’ presidential candidate, in 1974, gaining 1.32% o f the vote in the first round, but was opposed 
to the idea o f a permanent ecology party.
^By 1982, the idea o f a permanent political ecology party was being seriously discussed. In 
November 1982, the Mouvement d’écologie politique, formed in November 1979, changed their 
name to Les Verts-parti écologiste, thus creating the first permanent French green political party. Les 
Verts-confédération écologiste, agreed to cooperate with the new party at their Congrès National in 
May 1983. Finally, at Clichy in January 1984, both organisations merged to become a permanent 
green political party. Les Verts,
"*René Dumont points out how such mis-translations could be seen as scaremongering. the translation 
o f  Limits to Growth as Halte à la croissance!, for instance, is ‘plus brutal et moins exact’, (2, p. 13). 
T or further information on publishers, dates o f publication etc, see Bibliographv and (3, p.60); c f  also 
(4 ,p .9912).
^(5, p.42). Other modem environmentalists who also emphasise the impact o f  such footage are Hervé 
in his introduction to (6) and Alphandéry (in 7). The idea o f the planet as a ‘vaisseau spatial’ is a key 
theme in the literature o f the period - Alphandéry quotes MacLuhan: ‘II n’y a pas de passagers sur le 
vaisseau spatial Terre, nous sommes tous l’équipage’. Hervé’s argument is similar; “Le séisme 
culturel qui par ébranlements successifs va remettre en cause toutes les valeurs des sociétés humaines 
et de l’espèce entière conuiience sur la lune. La terre est ronde et petite et bleue et seule et fragile
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dans l’espace... et elle ressemble à sa manière à un vaisseau spatial avec son équipage de six milliards 
d’hommes”, (ibid., pp. 16-17).
’ 120, 000 tonnes o f oil were spilt, affecting 400 km o f French and British coastlines (4, p.9640).
® Dobson’s Green Political Thought, pp.37-72 would be one example.
^That the attempt to trace the history o f politica/ ecology has not been made in France is especially 
surprising, since the science o f ecology and its philosophical origins have been closely studied. See, 
for example, such texts as J.-P. Deléage, Histoire de l’écologie - une science de l’homme et de la 
nature or J.-M. Drouin, L’écologie et son histoire, réinventer la nature.
See, for example, pp.206-211.
'Tor further details, see (10, pp. 93-4).
C f the title o f his study o f  the 1930s, La Crise des années 30.
Albeit a democracy which still denied the vote to women.
''' Two other terms which are used in a sinilar manner when referring to European green politics are 
‘fundi’ and ‘realo’. Many o f the early debates on darUlight green politics took place in the German 
context, as this was the first country where green political parties gained any real power.
Deep Ecology gained publicity, particularly in the USA through the direct action campaigns o f  
Earth First! and incendiary statements by leaders like Foreman - notoriously, in 1984 ‘the worst thing 
we could do in Ethiopia is to give aid - the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, 
to let the people there just starve’ (25, p. 108).
When there was the first ‘description o f the limits to growth, the prescription o f a fiindamental 
change o f political and social direction in response to this description, and the ready availability o f the 
message to a wide audience’ (20, pp.23-24).
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C hapter 2 
W ork
2.1 Introduction
This debate has had particular impact in France, where green theorists such as Gorz 
have taken work as their central theme. The rise of French green parties has 
coincided with a more general debate about working conditions, working hours, and 
worker self-management (autogestion). In exploring this debate and the criticisms 
made by modern French environmentalists, we will note clear parallels between 
modern green positions and the forward-thinlcing criticisms and solutions discussed 
in our 1930s sources. However, one interesting distinction can be made between the 
clear emphasis on positive portrayals of work by Giono and Ramuz, and in
Beyond the simple connection between industrial production and environmental 
degradation, the relevance of work for green politics is not immediately apparent. 
However, greens’ attempted remise en cause of the very concept of production, and 
their consistent focus on the individual or person have combined to make this a key 
area of concern. Indeed, the focus on work is a defining feature of modern green 
politics. A ‘reconceptualisation of the nature and value of work’ is a principal 
element of green policy, and Dobson even argues that it is what distinguishes green 
politics: ‘ecologism can be marked off from most other modern political ideologies 
by its attitude to the subject’ (20, pp. 107-8). For greens, the effects of current 
production and working patterns on both the environment and the person are wholly 
negative; this means they question very basic assumptions upon which modern 
industrialised societies are founded. They aim for ‘not only a redistribution of work 
tasks but also a thorough redefinition of work itself (29, p.88).
'
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contemporary political life, and the more negative focus of other selected sources 
(particularly Céline). This distinction will be highlighted at various points.
2.1 Green criticisms
Modern green criticisms of work will be addressed in two key areas - the 
environment and the person. It will become apparent that their criticisms focus more 
on the effects of work on the individual or on society than on environmental 
degradation, the area most would perhaps expect modern green theorists to stress.
2.1.1. Work and the environment
Basic green criticisms do focus on the immediate or direct effects of work in 
industrialised societies on the planet’s resources, and of course, are widespread in 
green critiques. Their relevance for green theory is made strikingly clear in the 
Limits to Growth report:
If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, 
pollution, food production and resource depletion continue unchanged, the 
limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next 
100 years. (30, p.24)
Work, of course, is implicated in all of these critical areas - populations grow or 
move to meet demands for labour; this necessitates a rise in food production; and 
industrialization involves pollution and depletion of world resources. French 
sources discuss such ‘contraintes écologiques’ to work and production, particularly 
those of natural resources (‘raretés, nuisances, encombrements et impasses de la
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civilisation industrielle’) (31, p.43). Gorz points out that certain limits are already 
being reached, and industry is now ‘obligée de filtrer ses fumées et ses effluents’, in 
other words to ‘reproduire des conditions et des ressources qui, jusqu’ici, passaient 
pour “naturelles” et gratuites’ (32, p .11).
However, while virtually all green analyses of work in industrial societies will 
mention direct effects of production on the environment (effects on both ‘sources’ 
and ‘sinks’),' it would be difficult to find even one which does so in isolation, as is 
evident in the sources quoted above. Green criticisms of the effects of work on the 
environment aie mostly based on or included in a more wide-ranging critique of 
capitalist/industrial societies - societies termed ‘productivistes’, that is, ones which 
‘poussent à “produire pour produire” sans souci des besoins réels des populations et 
de la “soutenabilité”’ (34, p.35). For Prendiville, the extent of their ‘critique globale 
de la société de consommation’ is what sets greens apart from all other political 
groups (35, p. 139).
Of course, the left would point out they too emphasise work and production. Both 
greens and the left do indeed start from the same basic analysis of capitalism, of the 
‘disponibilité de “la terre et le travail”, “conditions de production’” (36, p.64). 
However, the different analyses by the greens and the left of the use of these 
‘conditions of production’ represent one of the most striking distinctions between 
the two.
Rouges et verts se focalisent sur un secteur bien précis du réel; le rapport 
humanité/nature [...] Bien sûr, les rouges et les verts vont s’opposer 
radicalement sur l’appréciation globale de ce rapport: positive pour les 
premiers, négative pour les seconds. (34, p.33)
A clear distinction can therefore be made between left and green analyses of 
production - while the left has traditionally seen increases in production as positive
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(growth as the answer to unemployment, for instance), greens reject this view, 
arguing that answers need to be found without increasing pollution levels or 
demands on natural resources. There are several other important green criticisms of 
work which are based on its effects on the environment. First, there is a consistent 
focus in green political theoiy on the unequal distribution and use of finite resources. 
The possible problems of unequal development in terms of sustainability are 
particularly apparent in the field of work. Developed countries’ unsustainable use of 
resources, whether in the past or today, is criticised not only for its direct effects on 
the environment, but also for the indirect negative effects it has on work and the 
availability of resources in developing countries. Sustainability is behind such green 
criticisms of work with reference to the environment. Greens commonly point out 
that in modern industrialised nations, it is logical for individual companies to 
(mis)use resources like air and water as these currently have no direct cost.
Another central area of concern for the green movement with regard to work and the 
environment has been that of agriculture. This sector attracts the attention of the 
greens for obvious reasons - the green focus on pollution, sustainability, food 
resources, population size and distribution, health and so on all make this a key field 
where change can be effective in their terms; and given the size of the French 
agricultural ‘industry’, and its importance to the French economy, it has always been 
at the heart of French green critiques.
Green criticisms of agriculture and the environment focus on three areas: first, 
current methods of agricultural production are damaging and unsustainable. ‘Une 
production maximale sur le minimum de terrain’ is, secondly, illogical, developed 
for a period and a growing French population which no longer exist (38, p.216). 
Instead, ‘les nouvelles raretés, ce sont l ’eau potable, le capital, la variété des 
paysages, certaines ressources naturelles et l’énergie’ (ibid., p.217). Third, greens 
argue that what they see as the ‘agrobusiness industry’ has too much power, 
particularly in France, meaning that more logical and sustainable practices cannot 
easily be introduced.
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Work in industrialised countries is also criticised for its effects on the environment 
because its is seen as having forced millions to move away from an essentially 
sustainable self-reliant (if not self-sufficient) way of life. The need to live in cities 
in order to find work results in environmental problems in itself, as instead of 
producing their own food and so on, city-dwellers need to have supplies imported. 
The experience of industrialisation itself attracts special criticism from the greens, as 
they see it as having been badly planned, particularly in the France of the trente 
glorieuses. The inattention to social and particulaidy environmental factors during 
this key period of French development is often attacked by modern greens as having 
resulted in many of today’s intractable problems: ‘Les pouvoirs publics, dans leur 
ambition de transformer la France en une puissance industrielle de premier ordre’ 
completely ignored ‘les problèmes de l’environnement et de la pollution’ (39, p.47).
Technological developments leading to discussion of a ‘workless future’, where 
machines would carry out unpleasant tasks, leaving human beings free to enjoy a 
new leisure society have also been widely discussed, in particular by Gorz. Modern 
greens are virtually all firmly in the sceptics’ camp. In Dobson’s words, ‘Greens 
have peered into this future and they do not like what they see’ (20, p. 108). The 
effects on the environment of such a future are criticised in particular - the reliance 
on a ‘teclmological fix’ to enable us to carry on an unsustainable way of life is seen 
as not only short-sighted but impossible, due to the planet’s limited resources. A 
related area of concern for the greens is the so-called ‘leisure industry’, which has 
‘degraded soil and vegetation and caused air, water, noise and aesthetic pollution’ 
(37, p.69).
The final focus of these green criticisms may seem comparatively trivial, but has 
actually been a pillar of the French green movement - that of ‘aesthetic pollution’. 
While it is undeniable that such factors mobilise principally those living in the
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vicinity of new developments (the famous NIMBY^ factor), many leading ecologists, 
including Waechter, attribute their politicisation to such campaigns. In France, 
green criticism has focussed particularly on industry and on new kinds of work, and 
once again the failure adequately to plan the location of new industrial sites is 
attacked (39, p.8).
These green criticisms of the effects of modern work on the environment are no 
doubt ones which would be expected. However, green criticisms of work have 
another, perhaps more surprising focus: the person. Indeed, this type of criticism, as 
we shall see, is actually the main focus of the greens in this area.
2.1.2. Work and the person
Greens begin from an outright rejection of a ‘work ethic that no longer works’ (19, 
p.77). Criticisms abound, not only of the effects of modern work on the employed - 
the dehumanising effect of industrial work, monotony, lack of autonomy, distance 
from a more natural or healthy environment, the lack of free time; but also of our 
current work structures and the effects these have on the unemployed, retired people 
and those who cannot or choose not to work. Greens urge the individual to ‘éviter 
de perdre sa vie à la gagner’ (40, p.2). Yet this does not imply a move towards the 
‘workless future’ or leisure society for the greens, since this would lead to the 
‘corrosion of the human spirit’, in their view (37, p.69). This is an idea we will later 
see paralleled in our 1930s sources: there is no questioning of the basic need to 
work. Perhaps surprisingly for a movement commonly caricatured as relaxed 
hippies, the green emphasis on joy in work is an aspect of environmental theory 
which linlcs them to a long-standing tradition:
1 Not In My Back Yard.
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[Greens] insert themselves in the tradition that has it that work is a noble 
occupation; that it uplifts the spirit and helps create and reproduce ties with 
one’s community - even helps to create oneself. (20, p. 109)
Greens agree with More’s stress on the fundamental principle of the need for work 
for all (avoiding the scourge for society of the ‘frelons oisifs’) (41, p. 103). If a 
work-free future is not attractive to the greens, however, current working practices 
(and ways of thinking about work itself) are certainly not seen as desirable.
Clearly, the experience of May 1968 is important in French green analyses of the 
effects of work on the person. The wide-ranging debates on the concept of work, 
criticisms made of contemporary working conditions, and awareness of the need to 
find alternatives have parallels in modern green attitudes, an unsurprising 
phenomenon given that many greens attribute their politicisation to their experiences 
during the events of May 1968.^ Green analyses here have two main themes; first, 
they criticise the kind of work done, and the direct effects this has on the individual; 
second, they criticise the more wide-ranging effects modern working practices and 
ways of thinlcing about work have on society in general. Both types of criticism 
emphasise the idea of alienation. Marx’s original theory of alienation isolated four 
main areas in which human nature is ‘made other than, alien to, what man is really 
capable of being’ (42, p. 12) under capitalism: people can be alienated from ‘their 
own sells’, other people, their ‘working life’ or the ‘product of their labour’ (ibid.. 
p.l2).
Greens would criticise the basis of this marxist definition, arguing that it is the 
division of labour in all teclmologically-advanced industrialised societies (‘bad 
work’) that creates the feeling of alienation in its citizens, rather than the particular 
system of ownership which exists in capitalist economies; thus alienation is (or 
would be) just as present in communist and socialist societies. Nevertheless, the 
idea of alienation tluough work is certainly accepted in green critiques, defined as
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the ‘estrangement’ people experience ‘between themselves and their work, their own 
health, their environment and the workings of their democracy’ (19, p.77).
Perhaps the most basic criticism relating to alienation is of modern working 
conditions. Problems relating to health and safety are seen as inherent in the ‘logic’ 
of any productivist society. If productivity and economic competitiveness are 
stressed, safety standards are likely to be ignored: ‘le fonctionnement parfait des 
machines, qui sont rares et chères’ is more important than ‘la santé physique et 
psychique des travailleurs qui sont rapidement remplaçables’ (32, p.l 1). Work- 
related health problems are particularly criticised because they are seen as avoidable, 
and green attitudes to health generally emphasise prevention of illness and 
responsibility for one’s own health, as a response to what they see as the regrettable 
‘professionalisation’ of modern medicine.^
A second focus of green criticisms is on the common association of work with paid 
employment. Gorz argues that this association arose from the Keynesian confusion 
of the right to work with the right to paid employment (44, p. 134); indeed, it would 
be absurd to claim that the unemployed or the retired do not work. Most greens start 
from the position that ‘le plein emploi est devenu une expression vide de sens dans 
une société robotisée en crise’ (35, p. 139); the conclusion they reach is that work­
sharing, a reappraisal of what work consists of, and a reduction in consumption are 
needed to escape the unemployment ‘problem’.
Greens criticise the assumption that work means a paid full-time job on several 
levels. First, the implications of such a connection are seen as divisive - leading to a 
class of skilled machine operators and employed and a vast underclass of those 
without paid work, simply because the logic of productivist societies is to use 
technology to reduce working hours while increasing productivity. This leads to a 
smaller workforce, even though people are available and willing to do the necessaiy 
work. Thus Gorz points out that over the last fifty years, while the total number of
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working hours has fallen, productivity levels have actually increased/ Second, 
instead of reducing the number of people in work, greens tend to argue that a 
reduction in working hours is the appropriate strategy, hence the stress in les Verts’ 
manifesto on Te droit de travailler moins pour travailler tous et vivre mieux’ (46, 
Point 11(1)).
A final reason for criticising the assumption that work is equivalent to paid 
employment is that the person’s identity and sense of self-worth are consequently 
comiected to the holding of a job. Greens criticise the impact this has for two 
reasons. First, it results in the view that virtually any job is ‘good work’, as a 
salaried job is more valued than even sustainable and fulfilling unpaid work; second, 
it results in negative effects on the health of those who do not have access to paid 
work. Greens frequently point out that a disproportionate number of people die 
shortly after retirement (19, p.78).
A third focus for green criticisms of the effects of work on the person is 
consumerism, which greens hold responsible for the view that work is a necessary 
evil, something to be endured because it is essential if one is to participate in or have 
access to society, rather than a freely-chosen and fulfilling way to spend time.
Greens would agree with Morris’ attacks on ‘mere toiling to live that we may live to 
toil’ (47, p.381). We can see why greens would criticise such attitudes, as the 
impact of such jobs on the environment becomes irrelevant in the eyes of the job­
holder.
The nature of modern paid employment attracts criticism. Greens focus on the idea 
of ‘deskilling’, which they see as inherent in the Industrial Revolution, and which is 
for them at the root of modern workers’ sense of alienation: the industrial division of 
labour is ‘the cause of much of the alienation of modern life’ (19, p.79). Creativity 
and inventiveness are seen as having been sacrificed to efficiency. Greens criticise 
the repetitive tasks and boredom of modern work on two levels: they are damaging
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for the person, who loses a sense of fulfilment in his or her work; and they are 
damaging for society as a whole and for the environment, as individuals no longer 
have any awareness of the effects of their production, and therefore feel less 
responsible for such effects. Attempts to modify such industrial practices are seen as 
futile:
While it might be more fulfilling to be involved in the construction of a 
product from start to finish, real progress depends upon its social and 
environmental value. (37, p.68)
A final focus for green criticisms of modern work is based on scale. Such criticisms 
emphasise the impersonal size of modern workplaces; and the industrial Togic’ of 
growth, based on economies of scale. This industrial ‘mass logic’ or ‘insensitive 
colossalism’ (48, p. 126) is at the heart of virtually all enviromnental criticisms, as it 
is seen as having led to many of today’s other problems. ‘All the elements of society 
begin to change their dimensions’ following industrialisation, with ‘civic and 
political gigantism paralleling] industrial and commercial gigantism’ (49, p. 146). 
Finally, the lack of a spiritual fulfilment in modern work is stressed by critics such as 
Spretnalc and Capra (29, p.90).
While modern work is certainly seen as having negative implications for the 
environment, and as alienating for the individual, the greens also focus their 
criticism on its implications for communities and for society as a whole. One focus 
for such criticisms is again related to scale. For greens, modern industrialised 
countries create a general atmosphere of hopelessness and fear, and an awareness of 
feeling powerless to change society. These effects of modern work are general, and 
not limited to the employed alone, since even industrial architecture is alienating: 
‘before such gigantic, undefmable, bureaucratic entities, the urban dweller feels 
psychically as well as physically dwarfed’ (49, p. 146).
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Green critiques in this area also arise from the observation that full employment as it
is presently understood is no longer a possibility. The first such criticism greens
would make is that society as a whole (and specifically political parties) is refusing
to accept the inevitability of changing work patterns, and to plan accordingly.
Greens are particularly vehement in their criticism of inequalities (which they hold
to be the result of this refusal to accept the need to find new ways of working and
living), and of the alienation and other effects they believe such inequalities have on
communities and on society. Perhaps the most evident of such criticisms is seen in
the emphasis greens place on women. Greens particularly criticise the common and
.long-established separation of women’s work from paid work as having led to the |
impoverisliment and continued lower status of women. They denounce Te temps 
partiel imposé’, and Ta flexibilisation des horaires de travail qui les touchent 
particulièrement’ (46, Point Illa). However, this does not mean that greens 
necessarily want to change the kind of work done by women - in fact, many see the 
sort of unpaid work traditionally performed by women as potentially positive and 
fulfilling. Instead, they criticise the long-standing assumption that Te domaine 
privé’ should be associated only with women, and argue that women’s traditional 4
work could be a possible starting point to revalue unpaid, unofficial types of work 
for all - such work is seen as worthy of being reappraised and extended, rather than
restricted to women.
A second kind of inequality relating to work which is highlighted by the greens in 
their criticisms is between those who are employed in modern industrialised 
societies and those who choose not to work or who cannot find paid employment. 
The effects of unemployment for society are of course criticised by other political 
groups, but perhaps not principally on the grounds that they see work as a good and 
fulfilling thing to do for all. Greens criticise the refusal to accept the ‘informal 
economy’ by other political tendencies, who emphasise the need for work to be paid 
and taxed.
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The final kind of inequality criticised by the greens relates to resources. The unequal 
use of finite resources by industry in the developed world is seen as having both 
actual and future negative effects for society, particularly in developing countries. 
Such inequality is seen as unsustainable; firstly, due to its over-rapid consumption of 
resources; secondly, because of fears that those denied development to industrialised 
societies’ level will not tolerate such inequality. Political instability is presented as 
an inevitable consequence of such protectionist attitudes. Instead of appealing to 
liberal guilt about a colonial past, greens instead emphasise fear and the need to 
change tlu'ough enlightened self-interest.
Greens criticise not only the industrial sector, but also what they see as the 
industrialisation of our leisure activities. Instead of a diverse range of locally- 
sensitive, generally creative and easily accessible pastimes, leisure is seen to be 
increasingly controlled by large service industries, so that access to leisure now 
requires a disposable income. Bookchin has attacked the resulting ‘banalisation and 
impoverishment of experience’ (49, p. 140), a leisure society controlled by the 
‘disabling professions’ (37, p.69).
2.2 1930s criticism s
As we looked at 1990s criticisms of work in relation to both its effects on the 
environment and its effects on the person, so we can see the same focus in our 
selected 1930s sources. We should also note a similar concentration of 1930s 
criticisms on the effects of work on the individual and on society, rather than simply 
on the enviromnent.
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2.2.1. Work and the environment
Even if there was no scientific proof of natural limits in the 1930s, we may still find 
striking parallels in our sources’ criticisms of the effects of changing work patterns 
on the environment. Understandably, we can note a more marked tendency to focus 
on direct, visible effects of modern work on the environment, rather than modern 
greens’ criticisms of potential future problems; this is particularly true of our 1930s 
political sources. However, such potential future difficulties do attract some 
criticisms, particularly in the literaiy sources consulted, where imagination can be 
given free rein with less need for evidence to substantiate what might then have been 
seen as extreme predictions.
One explanation for the early awareness of the environmental impact of modern 
industrialised working methods might of course be the long-standing agricultural 
heritage of France. An awareness of the power of nature, fear of nature, or the 
possibility of natural retribution for human arrogance are dominant themes in most 
of the sources consulted. Ideas about work and the environment which are 
commonplace in today’s green critiques were also prevalent in the 1930s, arguably 
because this was a period when the effects of changing work methods were really 
becoming visible for the first time. Indeed, it was during the 1930s in France that 
virtually all of the focal points of modern green criticisms took hold (Ta production 
de masse’, Temacinement de l’usine dans le paysage français’) (11, p.289).
Between the beginning of the century and 1930, the number of industrial workers 
rose from 4.3 to 6.3 million, and the kind of industry which employed these workers 
also changed, from the traditional dominance of textiles, for example, to the 
electrical, motor, chemical and steel industries (ibid.. p.237). Thus, in the 1930s, 
many were questioning the kind of work being done, and the effects this work would 
have, just as the soixante-huitards and the greens would later.
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Work was also clearly a key foeus in the 1930s due to the economic crisis. Whereas 
the later industrial expansion of the post-war years would take place against a 
background of virtually full employment, with the population arguably eager to 
contribute to the restoration of French ‘grandeur’, industrial development in the 
1930s was aeeompanied by high unemployment and precariousness for the majority 
of workers, leading to the imposition of new types of work and worker. The world 
of work was ‘profondément transformé: déqualification de nombreux ouvriers 
professionnels, mobilité considérable, à la mesure des bouleversements’ (ibid., 
p.237). The massive industrial expansion during the 1920s had actually led to a 
shortage of workers, and immigrant workers had been called on by the Freneh 
‘patronat’. When the crisis hit, it therefore hit a new working class. Arguably, the 
economic crisis and the new kinds of work were analysed by a new intellectual class, 
too, one dominated by youth movements (the post-World War 1 generation) who 
were united in their questioning of the ‘désordre établi’, if not in the solutions they 
proposed. The tone of most 1930s sources on the subject of work is one of fear of 
the effects of (generally undesired) change, and a clear sense of loss. There is a 
sense of helplessness in the face of rapid change:
Le triomphe de l’usine, c’est une sorte de révolution dans un pays qui a 
toujours répugné à la production de masse et aux grandes concentrations 
ouvrières. L’usine s’impose malgré les politiques, elle s’impose malgré les 
mentalités radicales dominantes, (ibid., p.294)
Eveil those ostensibly in power, then, eould only ‘aecept’ change (‘I’Etat reconnaît 
le triomphe de l’usine’) (ibid., p.295) (my italies). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
we can find evidence of fear, impotence, awareness of loss, and a range of criticisms 
of work in the 1930s which would not be as clearly or as consistently stated again 
until the arrival of political ecologists. Such criticisms are omnipresent, particularly 
in the literary sources consulted for this study. Céline, Saint-Exupéry, Giono 
(indeed, virtually all the literary figures prominent during the 1930s: Nizan, 
Bernanos, Malraux,...) were preoccupied with the theme of work in their fiction, and
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in the case of Céline and Giono, in their non-fiction too. Their focus was often 
particularly on changes in the kind of work being done in the 1930s, and these were 
virtually always presented as negative -  Te travail est devenu une puante saloperie’, 
in Giono’s words (51, p.607).
The kinds of activity these writers chose to examine were extremely varied. Céline, 
in his mammoth Vo vase gives no doubt the most wide-ranging consideration of 
different kinds of work (in the French colonies, the army, prostitution, an American 
factory, as a teacher, doctor, tourist guide...). Giono and Saint-Exupéry in contrast 
focus on particular milieux: the first on rural work and the artisanat (indeed, during 
the 1930s Giono’s images are ‘drawn almost exelusively from nature, the equipment 
of work, and details of home life in the countryside’) (52, p. 127); the second on 
modern flight.
A clear focus in the literary aecounts studied is the need to respeet, indeed to fear 
nature, seen nowhere as eompellingly as in the works of Giono. Nature is a 
vengeful, living character in his novels, personifed in the form of hills, trees, rivers, 
the wind. Indeed, at times, Giono seems to predict the Gala hypothesis (‘La Terre 
est un être vivant’) ,^ nearly fifty years before Lovelock would influence modern 
green thought:
Cette terre qui s’étend [...] avec sa charge d’arbres et d’eau, ses fleuves, ses 
ruisseaux, ses forêts, ses monts et ses collines, et ses villes rondes qui 
tournent au milieu des éclairs, ses hordes d’hommes cramponnés à ses 
poils, si c ’était une créature vivante, un corps? [...] Mais, sûr! (54, pp.51-2)
Even those characters who are close to the earth, the mysterious half-(wo)men, half­
beasts like Zulma and Bobi have no choiee but to respect and fear nature. When 
they fail to, or beeome too proud and ambitious, as Bobi does in Que ma joie 
demeure, nature wreaks her revenge. This is partieularly apparent in human attempts
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to control nature, often through work on the land. Logic can’t be applied, and 
human attempts to do so merely demonstrate our arrogance. Even in less romantic 
or free accounts, such as Voyage, we are reminded of the need to be aware of our 
plaee in nature, and nature’s power, for example when Bardamu and Robinson end 
up working in the unsuitable climate of the tropies -  ‘On aura beau dire, ça sera 
toujours un pays pour les moustiques et les panthères. Chacun sa place’ (53, p.221).
The importance of natural resources, and human arrogance in assuming they are 
dependable is a reeurrent theme in French literature of the period. Aceounts of rural 
farming work in particular focus on the essential and capricious resource of water. 
The first step the living hill takes to punish the central characters in Colline is to stop 
the water source -  Ta méchanceté des collines’(54, p. 172). The attempted 
‘colonisation’ of nature, through farming and exploitation of natural resources is 
evidence of man’s arrogance, stupidity and lack of sensitivity. In nature, we see only 
‘les espaces vides eneore d’une colonisation certaine. C’est une vue très froide de 
l’univers (57, p. 125). It is perhaps in what Lipietz later termed the ‘dénonciation de 
ce saccage’ that we can demonstrate the most striking parallels between earlier ideas 
and those of modern greens. Ramuz, in particular stresses the abuse of natural 
resources by ‘l’homme pirate’, for whom ‘la nature ne serait plus alors que 
l’ensemble des réserves d’énergie’ (57, p. 102). Work is the sphere where such 
abuses are most evident;
le matérialisme communiste s’emploiera à supprimer le plus possible chez 
l’homme tout ce qui le met en contact étroit avec la nature, et c’est ses 
mains et l’outil. (57, pp. 115-6)
Similar denunciations of human abuse of natural resources are frequent in Giono’s 
work. In Colline, he writes that ‘La terre c’est pas fait pour toi, unique, à ton usance, 
sans fin’ (54, p.l 11); in Le serpent d’étoiles, ‘Si l’homme devient le ehef des bêtes,
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elle, la terre, est perdue’(58, p. 156). Iii his non-fiction too, he warns of the effects of 
such abuses: T’air, ça va devenir un luxe formidable’ (59, p.71).
In Voyage, we find a elear depiction of industry’s exploitation of the natural 
resources of undeveloped countries or colonies, when Bardamu escapes the war and 
flees to Africa; this is true of human beings just as it is true of natural resourees like 
rubber exploited in the colony -  ‘Pour des prix très raisonnables, on pouvait 
s’envoyer une famille entière pendant une heure ou deux’ (53, p. 168). Of course, 
Céline’s pessimistic view of human nature means he might well argue that such 
plundering of others’ resources is the obvious, logical outcome of our character: 
‘L’homme pratique toute fraternité avec ennui et le pillage et l’assassinat seulement 
avec passion et frénésie’ (61, p . l88).
Perhaps the most recurrent theme in the 1930s sources’ discussion of work, 
however, is the eonstant questioning of the idea of ‘progress’. This is also, arguably, 
the subjeet which most clearly differentiates the views of the left in the 1930s from 
non-conformist movements such as the Personalists. Positive marxist views of ‘le 
progrès continu’ are critieised in terms which would be familiar to modern greens:
Comment ne pas voir que dans la vie on ne gagne rien qu’on ne perde, 
qu’un gain est compensé sans cesse par une perte, c’est-à-dire que tout se 
paie? (57, p. 128)
Similarly, the new emphasis on productivity is strongly criticised; indeed, the term 
the 1930s youth movements preferred is the one we have previously seen used by the 
greens. In their critique of ‘produetivisme’, the non-eonformists questioned an 
economy directed towards ‘le seul développement de la production, la seule 
croissance des rendements, le tout dans une perspective essentiellement quantitative’ 
(15, p.221). Of course, the symbol par excellence of such um*estrained and 
damaging productivism was the arrival in Franee of the factory organised according
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to taylorist principles. Its introduction was widely seen as Tine atteinte à 
r humanisme’ (63, p.247), and led to widespread questioning of the very notion of 
progress in industrialised societies.
Although such questioning and criticisms can be seen in the political discourse of 
the 1930s, or in the ideas of movements like the Personalists, they are eertainly more 
apparent in the literature of the period. Steel offers a possible explanation for this: a 
writer ‘peut donner libre cours à ses réactions viscérales, à ses inquiétudes, à sa 
révolte devant l’absurde industriel’ (63, p.249), in a way that a politician could not. 
This view is borne out by a eomparison of Céline’s presentations of his experience 
of the Ford factory in Detroit in his non-fiction (he visited the factory as an official 
observer, in his capacity as a doctor), then later in his fictional account (Voyage). In 
the first, his overall assessment is far more nuanced; he even appears to argue that 
France must emulate such an approach if she is to be a major industrial force when 
he presents an unfavourable comparison of the number of French man-hours needed 
to produce a car, and the eorresponding figure for Ford employees. In his literary 
account, however, he presents an unforgettable account of the absurdity and cruelty 
of such an enviromiient.
As in the 1990s, the urbanisation needed by modern industry is criticised. Criticisms 
which modern greens would relate to the issue of sustainability ean be foimd in 
1930s critiques, although they would not of course use this term. That self- 
sufficiency is no longer possible in the city is criticised, for example (60, pp.64-5). 
There are repeated references to the obsession with speed, ‘la maladie moderne de la 
vitesse’ (64, p. 123). Céline too presents a vivid description of the energy and speed 
of life in New York, and we see the feeling of loneliness and need for human contact 
this inspires in Bardamu.
Of course, the rapid increase in the demand for industrial workers in France, and the 
dominanee of Paris during the period, meant that the city itself was changing rapidly.
"l!
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Nouveau, for instance (50, p. 176), for whom modern urban-based industiy was 
‘absurde, car tous les perfectiomiements techniques aboutissent aujourd’hui [1934] 
au ehômage’ (15, p.219).
Finally, 1930s sources questioned the ‘progress’ represented by the nascent 
consumer society in France. Awareness of the impact of taylorism, with its high 
wages and use of advertising to encourage consumer spending, was at its apogée 
during this period. It could be argued that consumerism was questioned despite its 
apparent benefits precisely because dramatic changes were happening so rapidly; the 
impact of such changes was thus clearly visible. The Personalists argued that the
and here we find further similarities between contemporary 1930s criticisms and 7
those of today. The effects of industrialisation were clearly visible to those living in
Paris, particularly the new factories ‘qui sentent toutes les odeurs, les unes à peine
eroyables et où l’air d’alentour se refuse à puer davantage’ (53, pp. 124-5). The i
eonsequenees of rapid unplanned industrial expansion were felt by many villages y
■Ïand suburbs surrounding Paris, and we see an awareness of the negative impact this
Ihad in fictional accounts (ibid., p.531). I
?An awareness of the effects of bad planning of the industrial expansion of the 1930s 
is also demonstrated in political sources during the period. Indeed, surprisingly |
perhaps, members of the Popular Front coalition (with the exception of the 
communists) were openly against what was often termed Te triomphe de l’usine’; 
there was a common dislike of the move away from ‘l’échoppe, la boutique ou 
l’usine sur le modèle social artisanal’ (11, p.294). Some (the ‘neo-socialists’ and the 
non-conformists) were attracted to de Man’s ‘plan du travail’ as a potential 
alternative (65, p. 183).
Teclinical progress is also a key focus for 1930s sources. The use made hy industry Y
of technieal advances (to increase profits or to reduce the number of workers rather A:
than making work less onerous) was criticised by the Personalists, and Ordre
A
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excesses of a consumer society should be avoided: ‘A Personalist economy begins 
with an ethics of human needs’ (50, p. 190).
As well as the focus on consumerism, many 1930s work-related criticisms were of 
modern agriculture. The first kind of criticism made of agriculture in relation to the 
environment during the 1930s was based on the very visible changes being made to 
farming methods. Just as in industry, new mechanical developments were being 
encouraged, and successive governments were trying to rationalise traditional French 
farming methods. The traditional small size of French farms, in particular, was 
being challenged by the 1930s; and large-scale agricultural administration was 
steadily being introduced, as for example in August 1936, when the Office national 
interprofessionel du blé was founded.^
Giono shows the most sustained awareness of the potential impact of such changes 
in scale and farming methods, both in his fiction and non-fiction. In his non-fiction, 
he restricts himself to dire warnings about the effects such modern developments 
will have for the earth: ‘La machine tuera l’homme, la joie, l’équilibre, la civilisation 
même’ (60, p. 108); or to disturbing depictions of large-scale agrobusinesses, and the 
‘monstres’ who run them, who are ‘enveloppés de champs mille fois plus grands que 
ceux que nous cultivons’ (60, p. 179). Another aspect stressed in Giono’s non-fiction 
is the need to warn those who might be tempted to aeeept such agricultural 
developments of the dangers involved. He does so in terms which would be familiar 
to modern greens: he criticises the move towards single-crop farms; he indicates the 
precarious nature of such choices; and he effeetively predicts the development of 
French agriculture from self-sufficient small farms to the large-scale businesses 
criticised by greens today for their effects on the environment:
Spécialise-toi, fabrique-toi ta earte à jouer et fais-la la plus grosse possible 
pour gagner le plus possible. Arrache de tes champs la nourriture de ta 
famille. Il n’est plus question de nourriture, il est question de jeu. Avec ce
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que tu gagneras au jeu, tu achèteras de la nourriture et il te restera eneore 
une énorme propriété-papier [l’argent].
Si tu gagnes. (68, p.200)
Giono would agree with the traditional paysan motto: ‘Un bon domaine doit tout 
produire, sauf le sel et le fer’, (69, p.57) as this is the only way to guarantee the 
paysan’s independenee, and also because this is the most environmentally-sound or 
‘natural’ method, proved over centuries. While he certainly exaggerates or 
romanticises his case at times in his non-fiction and polemics, in his fiction he 
demonstrates even more passionately his disapproval of such developments. In 
Lanceurs de graines, a farmer attempts to introduce industrial machinery and more 
‘rational’ methods to his farm (trees are uprooted to make way for more crops); his 
greed is seen to lead to his death thi'ough natural retribution. Modern farming 
methods are represented by ‘pitiless maehinery of the new destructive age’ (52, 
p.63).
The second focus for 1930s criticisms in this field is the potentially negative effects 
on the environment of the loss of the traditional paysans, who are
eeux qui ont de l ’herbe dans le sang, de grandes poitrines en prairies et en 
vergers, des bras comme la branche des chênes, la peau eomme de l’écoree 
de l’arbre, et le chatouillis du vent dessus. (70, p. 120)
‘Le respeet de la vie’ (54, p. 175) is an inherent eharacteristie of sueh beings, in 
Giono’s view. They are therefore aware of the effects on the earth of apparent 
progress, and are presented as less likely to damage the environment. They would 
never attempt to rationalise production, for example, ‘combiner les mathématiques et 
les chimies en une machine qui fera pousser et mûrir [le blé] brusquement en une 
heure’, since they understand that ‘la terre serait contre’ (64, p .123). In contrast, 
both Giono and Céline portray the inability of the eity-dweller even to comprehend a
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more natural kind of work. Thus Bardamu’s mother, on her Sunday visit, sees the 
last paysans near Paris as a kind of alien species: ‘“Ça doit être bien dur la terre!” 
qu’elle remarquait ehaque fois en les regardant ma mère bien perplexe’ (53, p. 126). 
Giono’s depiction of those who work in the city bears some resemblanee to the 
modern green criticism of ‘bad work’, of the tendeney for those in paid employment 
not to care about (or to be powerless to change) the potential effects of their work on 
the environment. They are ‘hommes mécaniques, ineapables de sentir’ (60, p. 197), 
unaware of ‘l’aboutissement logique de leur travail’ (ibid., p.l 13).
Finally, as in the 1990s, the idea of aesthetic damage to the environment was current 
in the 1930s. Indeed, if anything, criticisms were more virulent, perhaps beeause 
dramatie new changes to the traditional landscape were particularly visible, and there 
was a widespread awareness of what was being lost or disfigured. Special criticism 
was reserved for the appearance of new, large-scale industrial developments and 
factories foreign to the traditional French landscape: factories were ‘ces 
monstrueuses constructions de métal machiné’ (64, p.218). Borne and Dubief point 
out that the first large-scale factory in Giono’s home of Haute-Provence had to be 
staffed by a majority of foreign workers, such was local resistance to this new form 
of work (11, p .16). The eity was seen as suffering from the visual impact of industry 
(Giono called the city ‘l’usine de notre m orf ) (60, p. 186), and criticisms of the 
changing appearance of the countryside were also to be found. Just as modern 
greens erltieise ‘la friche’, the regimented appearanee of modern large-scale farms 
and the negative effects on the environment of today’s single-crop ‘logic’, Giono 
was saddened by ‘des immensités couvertes de vignes à perte de vue, des plaines 
chargées de betteraves, ou de blé’ (ibid., p. 179). He gives a clear and critical 
account of the impact on the traditional rural landscape of modern agriculture: 
‘l’emploi de la technique industrielle à la recherche du profit modifia complètement 
le visage de la terre’ with depopulation leading to ‘de grands îlots déserts d’herbes 
sauvages et d’hommes solitaires’ (64, pp. 137-8).
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Surprisingly, given the political climate of the period, with the économie crisis of the 
early 1930s and the growing fear of war with ^Dioduetive countries such as Germany 
during the decade, the emphasis in political debates of the period was not chiefly on 
increasing agricultural production. Even though it was elear at the time that, 
compared to her neighbours, Tes rendements français progressent avec une lenteur 
telle qu’ils paraissent ridicules’ (11, p.216), it seems that the slow evolution of 
Freneh farming was actually generally supported by those in authority: ‘L’Etat, et 
plus particulièrement le Sénat, protège les paysans plus qu’il ne cherehe à les faire 
évoluer’ (ibid., p.217). There was some attempt to encourage paysans to expand, 
tlirough favourable loan rates; but this measure had been introduced as a post-war 
development, in 1918, and did not lead quickly to much larger farms. If anything, 
the literary criticisms we have observed were in advance of their time: fewer than 
1% of farms owned a tractor in the 1930s, for example (ibid., p.221).
Some political groups too stressed the need to safeguard the paysan tradition, 
however, even if this tradition was changing less quickly than some feared. Local 
groups such as l’Office Central de Landerneau also encouraged paysans to mobilise 
against the tlueat of urbanisation, and offered correspondence courses in agricultural 
methods to enable paysans to stay on the land (ibid., p.226). The Jeunesse Agricole 
Catholique took similar measures after its foundation in 1929, and the notorious 
‘chemises vertes’ of Dorgères, though badly-organised, poorly-supported and short­
lived, also attempted to defend this traditional kind of work. Overall, ‘agricultural 
protection was considered a more pressing matter than the promotion of industrial 
growth’ (72, p.450) in the 1930s.
Personalist critieisms here are usually based on a critique of capitalism or modernity 
rather than fears of environmental damage, however. Capitalism was seen as the 
‘enemy of the person’ - indeed, this was the title of one chapter of their manifesto; 
industrialism was ‘like a cancer’ (50, p. 165). Their criticisms of industrialisation 
refer to ‘the whole heritage of the eapitalistic disorder: intensive centralization, 
scientific rationalism, over-industrialization, etc.’ (50, p. 171). Others attribute
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Personalist criticisms in the field of modern work to the ‘avowed anti-Americanism 
of Mounier’ (74, p.266). The most likely explanation would, however, be the 
Personalist emphasis on the individual, and it is to this type of criticism we shall 
now turn.
2.2.2. Work and the person
We have seen that the effects of work on the person and, more broadly, on soeiety 
are given more attention in modern green thought than effeets on the environment. 
Dramatic changes in the kind of work being done during the 1930s led to a similar 
questioning of new types of activity. Just as in modern green sources, the effects of 
changing work patterns on both those who were employed and those who did not 
have access to paid employment were examined. These dramatic changes in the 
kind of activities being performed, along with the eeonomic crisis which affected 
France at the beginning of the deeade, encouraged many to rethink the very notion of 
the word ‘travail’ in an industrial age, just as greens would in the aftermath of the 
trente glorieuses. Thus some 1930s sources argued that ‘le travail socialement 
rémunéré et déterminé’ should be abandoned as the most important ‘facteur de 
socialisation’ (76, p.4).
However, just as modern greens do not question the need to work, many 1930s 
sources saw work as an essential part of life. Thus the Personalists placed the need 
to work at the centre of their manifesto, with their ‘Four Laws of Work’. The first 
states plainly: ‘Labour is a universal obligation. He who ean work and does not do 
so should not eat’ (50, p. 199). If labour can be presented as an obligation, however, 
it is also a right, and ‘not a commodity, but a personal activity’ (ibid., p. 199). This is 
not to say, of course, that non-conformists did not distinguish between different
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kinds of work: they would agree with modern greens that not all work is ‘good
work’ ; an attitude which seems to set them apart from communist contemporaries,
1=who still described industrial work as ‘une affaire de dignité, d ’héroïsme, et de 
gloire’ (77, p.301).
One apparent exception here might be Céline. His portrayal of work is certainly 
more negative than that of eontemporaries like Giono: it is a ‘tare honteuse, véritable 
fléau’ (63, p.247). Yet even Céline never seriously questions the need to work -  it is 
an unavoidable part of life. Indeed, it is the quest for fulfilling work which drives 
the action of Voyage. Céline’s bleak view of human nature no doubt colours his 
fictional portrayal; but in his private life, he chose, of course, to continue working as 
a doctor and writer long after he could have abandoned this ‘fléau’.
Îi
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The clearest resemblanee to modern greens’ insistence on the joy of work is seen in I
Giono’s writing of the period. He would agree with modern greens that work is an 
(even the) essential element of a fulfilled life, and like them, views visions of the 
future in which the individual would not need to work with seepticism.
Qu’est-ee qu’il [‘l’homme socialement technique’] fera le reste du temps, 
lui demandons-nous? Et il nous répond: il se cultivera; quand ce pauvre 
homme a oublié, ne sait pas, ne peut pas savoir, dans sa position 
antinaturelle, que la vraie culture de l’homme c’est précisément son travail.
(68,p.l51)
So the concept of work is a valued one for modern greens and for our 1930s sources; 
similarly, both criticise actual work in industrialised societies for its effects on both 
the person, and, more broadly, on society in general. Once again, the concept of 
alienation is central to the criticisms made. A clear similarity between most of our 
1930s sources and modern greens here would be their basic criticism of Marxist 
attempts to associate alienation purely with a capitalist system of ownership. Both
:
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capitalism and communism/socialism are seen as alienating in their attachment to 
industrialism. Industrial work per se, whether managed by the State or by private 
owners, is alienating.
There were two reasons for such a view. First, industrialism requires mass 
populations to move away from the land, and this was seen as having negative 
effects for the individual, just as for the environment. Industrialism has created ‘une 
planète nouvelle’; ‘Les hommes ont déserté la terre. Ils ne veulent plus fruits, ni blé, 
ni liberté, ni joie’ (60, pp. 19-20). Many wi'ote of the temptations of urban industrial 
work for the rural young in particular. Abandoning the traditional pleasures of the 
‘terre natale’ would mean disaster in their working lives: ‘Leur métier ne sera qu’un 
gagne-pain subi maussadement’ (78, p.40). Second, the kind of activity required by 
industiy was rejeeted. The ownership of the means of produetion was irrelevant, as 
the activity remained the same. Thus, just as the greens do today, Giono argued that 
‘ce n’est pas le eapitalisme qui avilit, c’est l’usine qui avilit’ (79, p. 120). We ean 
now turn to the criticisms made in the 1930s of such ‘avilissement’ or alienation.
The most obvious focus in the 1930s was on the very visible changes to working 
conditions which industrialism required, and the effeets these had on the health and 
safety of industrial workers. Céline offered a similar argument to that of modern 
greens, with typically black humour and a sense of absurdity. At the Ford factory, 
where employing handieapped, blind or ill workers alongside dangerous machinery 
is profitable, and therefore ‘logieal’, he paints a ehaotic picture of working 
conditions, with ‘[des] individus instables, dangereux, parfois incontrôlables’ 
working beside ‘de[s] machines incisives, martelantes et coupantes qui sont de 
véritables tentations pour des semi-fous’ (80, p. 125). Not surprisingly, accidents 
were ‘très fréquents chez Ford’ (ibid., p .143). Film-makers of the period also 
memorably represented the noise, speed and danger of factory conditions, in works 
such as Les temps modernes or A nous la liberté.^  1930s criticisms of new taylorist 
approaches to work and the effects these had on health were not restricted to 
workplaee aceidents, however. The long-term physical and psychological effects of
industrial work were also regularly denouneed. There are direct physical effects of 
industrial work, with workers’ lungs becoming Tine sorte de monstre anatomique’, 
Te poumon-usine’ (60, p.23).
Fatigue too is constantly stressed (63, pp.253-5). Aleoholism is seen to result from 
sueh working eonditions (67, p.238), as is depression. The personal sacrifice 
involved in such work is also deplored. Giono deseribes the tears of a young worker 
due to return to his Tôlerie automobile’ after a break in the mountains (60, p. 107) in 
a pitiful scene. Indeed, the psychological effects of such work are generally more 
vehemently criticised than the obvious physical impact, perhaps because, for wi'iters 
like Céline and Giono, the most depressing aspect of such working conditions is the 
inability to think. The noise in the Ford factory (Te vaearme infernal’), industrial 
employers’ desire for a lack of intelligence in their workers (‘des candidats 
complètement dépourvus d’imagination, dénués de sens critique, des crétins’), ‘la 
plus grande monotonie industrielle connue’ (80, p. 125), are ail shocking to Céline on 
his first visit to the factory set up by ‘le tzar de la voiture à bon marehé’(ibid., 
p.l 19); but he seems most appalled by Ford’s director of ‘le Serviee Social’ who 
stresses the now-infamous view, that ‘l’ouvrier rêvé, c’est le chimpanzé’ (ibid., 
p.123).
These changes to modem work also attraeted the attention of politicians and youth 
groups. By the mid-193Os, there was a growing sense that recent industrial attempts 
to introduee such practices to France eould be halted, that working conditions were a 
necessary focus for improvement through advanced legislation. There was a 
widespread hope that the Popular Front would be able to achieve this, and that 
changes to working methods were not yet sufficiently entrenched to be beyond 
challenge. Measures included in the Accords Matignon, such as the shortest 
working week in Europe, and of course, the first congés payés, for industrial and 
agricultural workers alike represented ‘une législation sociale avaneée’ (18, p.56), in 
a country where there was not even any official unemployment protection yet.
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Broader attempts to taekle alcoholism, a stress on the need for physical fitness, even 
encouraging urban workers to leave the city were radical new measures in this area.
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No matter how radical such measures were, though, modern greens would not see 
them as sufficient, and indeed, most of our 1930s sources were disillusioned by these 
reforms. First, given the rise of fascism and continuing economic problems, even 
those measures whieh had been introduced in law were not in fact fully implemented 
until decades later. Second, for many of our 1930s sources, even if such measures 
had been fully implemented, they did not go far enough to the root of the problem, 
and left industrialism itself unchallenged: they were reforming rather than 
eradicating the problem. Thus, just as in modern green critiques, many of our 1930s |
sources challenged the common assumption that work should be equated with paid 
employment in an industrialised society. Once again, the fact that this new 
development was closely linked to industrialisation was clear during the 1930s: the 
paysan tradition was still strong, and in many areas of the country, paid employment 
was still the exeeption.
Both Giono and Céline focus on the precariousness of paid work, though Giono does 
so more explicitly. Céline does memorably illustrate workers’ misery and inability 
to question employers’ or managers’ whims, even when these are quite obviously 
ludicrous (as in the colonial episode in Voyage); the tlneat of unemployment and 
ruin haunts Bardamu throughout his epie journey. Even when Bardamu finds a job 
as a doctor, an apparently desirable position, his life is more miserable than that of 
his patients in a poor suburb of Paris, as he is dependent on their goodwill in order to 
survive.
For Giono, the assumption that work means paid employment is both incorrect (as 
the paysan or artisan^ is not paid in this way); and dangerous, as it leads to war. 
Indeed, Giono builds a whole pacifist strategy on the need to refuse to accept paid 
employment; he repeatedly calls on the paysan not to move from traditional self-
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sufficient, multi-crop farming to more ‘productive’ methods which Giono sees as 
destroying his freedom. This is a theme to which Giono returns throughout the 
1930s, through both fictional characters (Bobi warning the paysans in Que ma joie 
demeure that, ‘Il y a une partie de ton travail qui est perdue. C’est celle qui s’est 
transformée en papier’(60, p.459)), and polemics, such as his Lettre aux pavsans, 
where he makes his reasoning clear (if simplistic and open to criticism): if  paysans 
produce a wide range of erops, they are self-sufficient, and can choose to ignore the 
demands of government in times of war. If they only produce one kind of crop, then 
they are industrial workers like any others, and dependent on the state; they therefore 
have no choice but to aecept war (68, p. 173).
In keeping with the positive tone of Giono’s work, many of his criticisms of paid 
employment are implied: he contrasts the stresses and lack of fulfilment of paid 
employment with other types of less ‘logical’ or financially rewarding freely-chosen 
work. It is often left to the reader to compare the respective levels of happiness of 
eaeh type of worker and draw his or her own conclusions as to which is best.
Perhaps the most striking picture painted by Giono of a perfectly-fulfilled (and 
perfectly green...) worker is in L’homme qui plantait des arbres, whieh reeounts the 
life of a completely independent shepherd, living high in the mountains, who spends 
his days planting acorns. When a government offieial next maps the area, he finds a 
forest, unexpeetedly: ‘c’était la premiere fois, lui dit cet homme naïf, qu’on voyait 
une forêt pousser toute seule’ (83, p.763). Giono presents Bouffier’s as the good 
life, simple, natural, and at one with the earth. He is ‘un modèle, qui propose 
visiblement une leçon, - une leçon sans paroles, car le vieux berger est un sileneieux’ 
(84, p. 1403): the reader is left to appreeiate the outcome of Bouffier’s life work, the 
joyful renaissance of the hamlet near his ‘forêt naturelle’.
The final reason for an emphasis during the 1930s on paid employment is also to be 
found in the 1990s; that is, a critique of consumerism. This was viewed as having 
negative effects for society as a whole; but it was on the individual that our 1930s 
sourees generally focussed their attention. Some argued that it was the acceptance of
•64
a ‘qualitative’ view of the world which led to discontent for the individual: ‘les 
mêmes vues toutes quantitatives qu’il a portées sur l’univers, il les porte maintenant 
sur lui-même’, leading to an unresolvable jealousy and elass tensions (57, p.84). 
Many sources in the 1930s stress the comparative poverty of earlier, more content 
generations (the paysan in Giono, the earliest Cluistians in Ramuz) and argue that 
happiness is therefore not to be found in acquiring possessions. Ramuz takes the 
development of a consumer society as his foeus in Taille de l’homme, for example. 
This development has a corrupting influence on the individual: ‘II n ’est plus, il veut 
avoir’ (57, p.75). One of the key modern texts which greens see as influential even 
takes a similar phi*ase as its title -  To have or to be.^
Above all, our 1930s sources were conscious of the immediate attractions of 
consumerism, and aimed to warn of the hidden dangers they believed were 
unavoidably linked to these attractions. Giono warns of the apparent attractions of 
consumerism in his Lettre aux paysans. Even he does not deny that such attractions 
exist; but he claims that for the 10% of ‘bonheurs extraordinaires entièrement 
nouveaux’ (68, p .135), there are also 90% of added and hidden disadvantages.
The nature of work in modern industrial societies is the next main focus of 1930s 
criticisms. Creativity and inventiveness were believed to be sacrificed to effieiency; 
and the principal effect of such changes for the individual is the loss of freedom. A 
worker or artisan with a true ‘métier’ was ‘sûr de manger et de vivre n ’importe où’ 
(ibid., p. 190). However, the modem employee could only perform one task; others 
eompleted the product. Thus ‘l’ouvrier ne peut pas quitter sa ehaise chez Bata. S’il 
s’en allait de là, il ne pourrait pas vivre’ (ibid., p. 191). The loss of freedom of the 
modern industrial worker due to deskilling is a constant focus. The Personalists 
talked of ‘une révolution machiniste’ attacking human liberty (15, p.227). Giono’s 
fear o f a ‘machine age’, where ‘soulless’ (52, p.96) maehines dietate the pace of 
work is contrasted with his use of the repeated image of the plough, a tool rather 
than a maehine. Whereas he saw such tools as extensions of the human hand,
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meaning the worker was still in direct contact with earth, Giono viewed modern 
machinery as inhuman in scale.
Even Saint-Exupéry, despite the apparent contradiction of his love affair with 
modern flight, saw the introduction of most machinery as enslaving. He argued, in 
Terre des hommes, that the plane was an exception to this rule, as it was more a tool 
than a machine: ‘Get instrument nous a fait découvrir le vrai visage de la terre’ (86, 
p.54). Even if planes could be seen as an exception by Saint-Exupéry, as liberating 
and ‘bringing out the contemplative side of one’s nature’ (87, p.35), machines were 
generally seen to have precisely the opposite effeet. First, the very noise involved in 
industrial production limited thought:
On cède au bruit comme on cède à la guerre. On se laisse aller aux 
maehines avec les trois idées qui restent à vaciller tout en haut derrière le 
front de la tête. (53, p.288)
The inhuman scale of modem industry is also addressed in the 1930s as in modern 
green critiques. First of all, the modern workplace was criticised as being no longer 
‘à la mesure de l’homme’ (60, p.38). This phrase, and others such as ‘taille 
humaine’, are repeated constantly. Second, the need to live in the rapidly-growing 
eity in order to find work was seen as leading to problems for the individual, as we 
shall see in Chanter 5.
Laek of joy in work was another result of deskilling which was widely criticised. 
Maulnier wrote that modern industrial work involved ‘ni joie, ni fierté’. Again, ‘le 
travail en miettes’ is blamed. Céline vividly describes the effects on the person of 
the monotony of endlessly-repeated gestures on the assembly line (‘une sorte 
d’hésitation entre l’hébétude et le délire’) (53, p.289). There was a widespread view 
that more freedom and joy were essential. The strikes of 1936 were interpreted as 
joyful attempts to reelaim liberty and lost camaraderie, with vivid images of ‘des
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lieux de travail transformés en lieux de fête au son de l’aeecrdéon’ (18, p.56). 
Winock even argues that the aim of the strikes was less T’exigence de 
revendications précises’ than ‘un formidable désir collectif de libération’ (ibid., 
p.56). That the strikes were ‘an assertion of human dignity’ (72, p.452) is stressed in 
eontemporary accounts. Weil saw the strikes as ‘une joie. Un peu de fierté au 
eoeur, un peu de chaleur humaine' (88, p.91). Of course, such joy and freedom were 
portrayed as the exception; workers’ camaraderie had to be represented during 
strikes, as it was rai ely seen to exist in the noise and impersonal environment of the 
modern faetory; or if it was, it was not evident in French literature of the period.
The speed of change was seen as happening on an inhuman scale too. New types of 
work or working environment were encountered suddenly; and for those used to 
working on the land, or in smaller workshops, the move to large industries was 
‘ressenti come épouvantable par ceux qui avaient eonnu l’avant-Taylor’ (11, pp.237- 
8). Eveil Saint-Exupéry, one of the earliest pilots, critieised the speed and seale of 
ehange as inhuman: ‘Tout a ehangé si vite autour de nous: rapports humains, 
conditions de travail, coutumes’ (86, p. 168); ‘Nous avions un peu oublié que nous 
dressions ces eonstructions [voies ferrées, usines] pour servir les hommes’ (ibid., 
p .169).
Overall, the emphasis was on the lack of fulfilment of modern industrial work. 
Indeed, the constant expectation in the 1930s that joy should be the right of workers, 
and elear belief that this is possible are striking for the modern reader. This 
emphasis on joy in work is echoed today by the more utopian wing of the modern 
green movement. It was found in both political attitudes and the art of the period; 
indeed, one seems to have influeneed the other:
La fraternité, la solidarité, l’espoir, la grande illusion du bonheur et de la 
paix: tous ces sentiments qu’éprouvent avec une violence confuse les 
centaines de milliers d’hommes et de femmes*^ qui ont porté au pouvoir le
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gouvernement du Front Populaire se retrouvent dans la littérature et aussi 
dans le cinéma de 1936 (89, p. 168),
Giono in particular, as we have seen, stresses the ‘joie magnifique’ (60, p. 128) of 
human-scale work, and the right of all to have access to this joy: ‘Vous avez droit 
aux récoltes, droit à la joie, droit au monde véritable’ (60, Préface).
Industrial work’s effects on society were seen as dangerous for two, perhaps 
contradictory reasons. First, the outcome of banal repetitive gestures performed 
daily was believed to lead to unquestioning docility. The ‘dépersonnalisation’ of the 
worker, ‘dépassant l’usine où il fait ses huit heures quotidiennes, s’élargira à sa vie 
entière’ (90, p.427). This could lead either to the aceeptanee of totalitarianism (‘II 
sera mûr pour devenir le citoyen d’une république totalitaire’) (ibid., p.427), or to the 
attempt to rebel, probably violently:
The wider implications of changing types of work for society in general were also 
eonsidered. Once again, the inhuman seale involved in modern work was the first 
target for criticisms. The new mass population in cities, which was required by f
industry, had negative effects not only on the individual and the envirormient, but on 
soeiety. The main reason for this view in the 1930s was that the new way of life was 
seen to lead to eomplex problems, summed up in the idea of ‘décadence’. The idea 
that moral, physical and spiritual decay was affecting society was common across 
the politieal spectrum. Various explanations were offered for this phenomenon: the 
move to cities, the kind of work done (the distance from the land and lack of 
physical exercise in the open air, in particular), the effects of the first World War, 
and the low birth rate*^ were all blamed. If this apparent decline had many causes, 
its effects on society were seen as just as varied: the effeets on the nation’s health 
(particular ly of young men) were costly, and implied disaster for the army; nor were 
workers working at full productivity.
68-
The breaking down of industrial production into the endlessly repeated 
mindless gesture further dehumanised factory work, and intensified the 
tendency of the unskilled worker to seek a way out through political 
revolution. (72, p.450)
Giono felt rather that modern work led to a lack of rebellion, which he felt was also 
dangerous for soeiety. He painted an horrific picture of a day in the life of an 
industrial worker in the modern city, noting the worker’s lack of awareness of his 
condition:
Si tu n ’es pas révolté en toi-même, soit que le travail ait tué toutes tes 
facultés de révolte, soit que tu aies pris goût à tes vices, je suis révolté pour 
toi malgré tout pour t ’obliger à l’être (60, pp.42-3).
Unemployment and the social and political instability it involved were greatly 
feared. This was again seen as a problem as a result of industrialisation. Previously, 
the larger population of paysans were generally self-sufficient. The move to the city 
and modern industrial work had not been adequately planned, and France still had a 
very poor level of social protection in cases of imemployment (private 
unemployment insurance was only held by 1 in 10 workers -  see (85, pp. 12-13)); 
divisions in society were therefore marked, and real destitution a clear possibility. 
Insecurity was also feared to result from ‘parcellisation’ -  workers could be made 
redundant in times of hardship as they were easily replaced, because the work they 
performed was unskilled.
Female workers were singled out in some 1930s critieisms just as in modern green 
critiques, particularly because of the impaet the type of work they did could have on 
society. They tended to figure in suggestions for change: many somees, as we shall 
see, held that women represented hope for the future in the field of work. However, 
the Personalists were one group who also prepared a wide-ranging analysis and
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criticism of women’s traditional roles. The failure to include women was argued to 
have negative effeets not only for their sex, but also for soeiety as a whole, whieh 
lost a potentially valuable contribution.
One type of female work which attracted comment and criticism in the 1930s was 
prostitution. Brothels were still legal in France, and Richard’s post-war account of 
the average ‘workload’ gives some idea of the cruelty of the system:
J ’ai demandé à une fille, eombien as-tu fait de clients aujourd’hui? Elle 
m’a répondu: quatre-vingt-deux!... C’est pire que l’esclavage -  le bagne. 
(66, p.3)
Giono describes the misery of one girl (and the shame of her paysan family) when 
she becomes pregnant after enforced prostitution in Un de Baumugnes; Céline, 
however, paints a more nuanced picture. When Molly’s work is juxtaposed with the 
hell of the Ford factoiy, we wonder which is the worse kind of work:
Elle se faisait dans les cent dollars par jour en maison, tandis que moi, chez 
Ford, j ’en gagnais à peine six. (53, p.291)
Céline does however portray Molly’s ultimate aim of leaving her eurrent job 
sympathetically. Neither he nor Giono seem to see prostitution as causing problems 
for society; rather, it is society’s attitude to the women involved which is criticised. 
Céline introduces Molly as Bardamu’s way of escaping after the horrors of industrial 
work: ‘le cinéma ne me suffisait plus, antidote bénin, sans effet réel contre l’atroeité 
matérielle de l’usine’ (53, p.290); and, just as in modem green critiques, leisure time 
in general attracted the attention, and criticisms, of our 1930s sources. The emphasis 
in the 1930s on leisure had a slightly different tone than modern criticisms, however. 
The emphasis was on eriticisms of the existing problem -  summed up in the idea of
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décadence - and on eneouragement to citizens to address this, rather than criticisms 
of the ‘leisure industry’ that we find today. Ultimately, however, as we shall see in 
the final section, this meant that both the 1930s sources and modern greens 
recommended similar changes.
In the 1930s, there was also a high-profile debate over reductions in working hours, 
attributable both to the Popular Front and to the ideas of de Man, who along with 
Walther wanted a shorter working day, though not in order to increase time for 
leisure; rather education and worthy self-development pursuits should replace paid 
employment (90, p.425). The key differenee when leisure was discussed in the 
1930s, however, was a generally more positive tone. The emphasis, as in literature, 
was on the ‘right’ of workers to joy and freedom. While the Popular Front arguably 
failed to deliver ‘le pain’ or ‘la paix’ during their term of offiee, ‘la liberté’ was 
achieved to some degree by the measures taken to grant workers more free time; 
indeed, Léon Blum saw the congés payés as his greatest aehievement:
Par l ’organisation du travail et du loisir, j ’avais malgré tout apporté une 
espèce d’embellie, d’éclaircie dans des vies difficiles, obscures,
The congés payés were not the only step taken in this field. Criticisms of unfit 
French young people in partieular were attributed to the ‘elass divisions’ of sport in 
France. The Popular Front demonstrated an awareness of this problem by their 
attempted ‘demoeratisation’ of sport, commissioning 235 stadiums in 1936 (11, 
p. 158).
Of course, many of these themes stressed in our 1930s sources -  unequal distibution 
of resources and foeus on the ‘masses’, unemployment, the need for a healthy, fit 
population (the New Man), and so on -  would have been emphasised in communist 
(or fascist) critiques of society too. However, for the non-conformists, neither of 
these was seen as the answer. Perhaps the most striking similarity between our
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1930s sources and the views of modern greens in this field was the widespread 
conviction that productivism or industrialism was the root of the problem, rather 
than the ownership of the means of production. Writers like Giono and Ramuz, too, 
while agreeing with communist criticisms of capitalist societies, were 
simultaneously overtly anti-communist; and Ramuz’ justification for this position 
resembles that of many modern greens: Te communisme nie le mystère de la terre’ 
(57,p.99).
The Personalists’ analysis was that modem industrial practices and uses of 
technology had negative effeets for the person, and, just as greens would today, they 
criticised all who hoped to build a new world or civilisation on the worst excesses of 
industrialism. 1930s Personalists were particularly disappointed by
l’apparente incapacité de la gauche institutionnalisée à imaginer autre chose 
que les outils utilitaires et consuméristes du capitalisme comme modèle 
pour une société socialiste future. A cet égard, les éeologistes ont adopté 
des idées vieilles de soixante ans. (35, p. 134)
2.3 G reen solutions
If we consider the solutions proposed in this field by modern green thinlcers, we will 
notice, first of all, a utopian or idealist emphasis. Gorz succinetly expresses the 
general green emphasis when discussing possible alternatives - ‘Changer d’utopie’ 
(92, p.40). Although all greens would agree that a society of produeers in full-time 
paid employment is an ‘utopie passéiste’ (ibid., p.41), they would be divided over 
what changes should be made to the world of work. There are two main types of 
approach, both of which are flavoured by the ‘mixture of idealism and pragmatism’ 
(91, p. 163) which Prendiville feels characterises the movement.
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The first (minority) approach accepts that full-time paid employment is no longer an 
achievable goal; they are eonfident that the use of industrial equipment and 
machinery to reduce human input in production will continue; they stress human 
ingenuity and the ‘technological fix’ as positive charaeteristics; and they therefore 
focus on how society and our attitudes should be changed in order to make sure that 
the future is not an ‘avenir à deux vitesses’. They ask broad questions about what 
the ‘leisure society’ will look like, and discuss uses of free time:
Comment vivre dans une société qui offre de moins en moins de travail 
alors que la distribution du revenu est en principe liée à l’occupation d’un 
emploi? (93, p.423)
The second broad approach (with which most greens would identify) also accepts 
that current levels of produetion and eonsumerism are environmentally 
unsustainable, and that this will affect the kind of work done in our soeiety.
However, they further argue that simply relying on human ingenuity or new 
technologieal discoveries is misguided, and they reject the very idea of a ‘leisure 
society’. Instead, they focus on a revaluing of unpaid work; work-sharing; a 
revaluing of labour-intensive work (rather than labour-saving devices and 
techniques); the question of financial security if paid employment is no longer the 
aim; and more sustainable ways of living (usually not in large eities). We might 
categorise the two approaches as ‘forward-looking’ (the first, which assumes 
answers will be found in new developments in the future); and ‘backward-looking’ 
(the second approach, which argues that new diseoveries are not the answer, and that 
we should instead examine previous, more sustainable ways of living and working in 
order to avoid enviromnental disaster). Indeed, most greens accept that their 
solutions aim to draw on the past: ‘we must invent a new work-ethic - or rather, 
rediscover a much older one’ (19, p.79).
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We will now consider briefly the ‘forward-looking’ approach; we will then 
summarise the more widely-accepted green solutions, before moving on to a 
comparison of modern green approaches and the views expressed in our 1930s 
sources.
The first group of greens base their proposals on acceptance of the principle that the 
number of hours spent in the kind of paid employment which has existed since the 
Industrial Revolution will continue to decline. They sometimes talk of a ‘post-work’ 
society. Their acceptance of the widespread use of technology and industrial 
practices (even if they want these to be made ‘cleaner’ or more environmentally- 
friendly) sets them apart from the majority of greens.
However, they do not argue that the acceptance of teclmology will automatically 
mean a more enjoyable future. Instead, they argue that, in fact, the future for the 
majority will be even more insecure than the present, unless the use of technology is 
accepted and its impact carefully pi aimed. First of all, the impact of technology on 
the kind of work which will still need to be carried out must be considered. Even if 
the amount of time spent ‘at work’ is reduced, working conditions must be 
safeguarded or improved: it is not enough to ‘limiter la durée pendant laquelle un 
homme est esclave pour en faire un homme libre’ (93, p.429). The acceptance that 
working time will continue to be reduced leads to a strong focus on both the balance 
between working life and ‘free’ time; and on how such ‘free’ time should be spent. 
First, such greens have proposed a wholesale reorganisation of working life: they 
suggest a right to life-long education for all; that the working week be shortened, or 
that citizens be able to choose to work full-time for a certain number of years in 
order to have ‘years o ff later. Indeed, a key debate among this first group of greens 
has been how to achieve a balance between choice and constraint: most do not want 
society to be based on ‘un temps de travail contraint et un temps de loisir, simple 
compensation du travail’ (ibid.. p.422).
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Since these greens rely on human ingenuity to avoid future problems, their solutions 
are even more tentative and utopian than those of mainstream greens. Thus they 
state clearly that: ‘We must dare to ask questions we cannot answer and to raise 
problems whose solution remains to be found’ (95, p. 13). In their discussions of 
how new-found free time should be organised, they are at their most idealistic. Gorz 
even calls his suggested changes ‘Une utopie possible parmi d’autres’ (32, pp.53- 
60). Lipietz, too, recognises (and embraces) the utopian approach; indeed, this 
utopian emphasis in the sphere of work and leisure was the main reason for his move 
from left-wing politics (which he sees as having rejected this approach) to green 
politics:
Le rêve des communistes utopiques du siècle dernier, cette communauté 
d’individus librement associés et délivrés de la division du travail, pêcheurs 
le matin, artisans Taprès-midi, et le soir critiques littéraires, ce rêve-là 
restera le mien (34, p.8).
Interestingly, even this first group of greens do seem to see work as a ‘good thing to 
do’, to use Porritt’s term: their descriptions of leisure time in the future in fact 
portray the population engaging in wholesome activities such as DIY, growing their 
own food, making their own clothes and shoes in communally-owned ‘ateliers’.
Gorz even suggests that television might not be available on certain evenings, ‘pour 
favoriser l’imagination et les échanges d’idées’ (32, p.60).
The final emphasis in the first sort of green solutions is on the new technologies of 
the computer age. The possibilities of home computers, the Internet and 
telecommunications reply to many earlier green fears about isolation or the 
impossibility of life-long education of a decentralised population with less work to 
occupy their time. De Rosnay sums up this brave new world of our ‘forward- 
looking’ greens: ‘L’écosociété, c’est la convivialité plus les télécommunications!’ 
(97, p.273).
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Of course, this emphasis on technology is the very reason why most greens reject the 
‘forward-looking’ approach: at the most basic level, they argue that technology 
needs energy for its production and use, and it leads to pollution. They argue that 
faith in teclmology and new developments is inappropriate on other grounds too. 
First, there are insufficient resources to ensure such developments on a planet-wide 
scale, and second, they point out the uneven distribution of those resources which do 
remain. For greens, many of our current social problems were actually caused by 
teclmological advances (they mention loneliness, isolation, uneven development); 
therefore, to look to technology for an answer to these problems is misguided. 
Finally, the bête noire of most ecologists -  particularly in France -  is of course the 
modern technology of nuclear power. Many greens activists first became involved 
in anti-nuclear campaigns. They remember the early official promises of safe, cheap 
and clean electricity, and this experience has influenced their attitudes to other 
technological developments: ‘le discours écologiste est très critique à l’égard de la 
science et de la technique’ (3, p.56).
This (partial or total, depending on how ‘dark’ green the view) rejection of 
teclmology leaves the second group of greens open to criticism, particularly since 
they openly state that they look to the past and to decentralised rural communities for 
more sustainable models of living. Toffler dismisses such critics of industrialism, 
arguing that they see the rural past as ‘warm, communal, stable, organic, and with 
spiritual rather than purely materialistic values’, whereas the reality in his view was 
‘cesspools of malnutrition, disease, poverty, homelessness and tyramiy’ (98, p. 135). 
Greens might of course reply that, if anything, ‘malnutrition, disease, poverty, 
homelessness and tyranny’ are far more widespread in the modern industrialised city 
or developing countries. More seriously, greens are sometimes accused of ‘le 
poujadisme v e rf , or of sympathy for the Vichy régime or far-right authoritarian 
policies, on the basis of their desire to return to a more rural population.
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Such criticisms seem largely unjustified, given the liberal nature of modern green 
movements. In France, where memories of the occupation and the Vichy régime 
remain strong, and where the Front National now have significant support, there is a 
particular awareness of the dangers of looking to the past or to rural communities foi- 
solutions, and this is especially true of solutions in the field of work, given its 
importance under Vichy: ^Travail, famille, patrie... ’ Some have argued that green 
political parties have suffered such criticisms because they arrived on the political 
stage too early, ‘une génération seulement après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et une 
également avant F effondrement des systèmes totalitaires en Europe de FE sf (99,
p .168).
French greens do repeatedly show a clear awareness that looking to the past is not 
without dangers. Thus Caniou stresses the importance of rejecting far-right or 
authoritarian examples when looking to the past, and implies that an awareness of 
such dangers is sufficient to avoid them: ‘II s’agit de bien savoir ce que l’on fait; 
Pétain prônait aussi le retour à la terre’ (ibid., p.7).
A key focus for this second group of greens, then, is how to modernise or 
reformulate older, more sustainable ways of living and working, while emphasising 
the central green ideals of democracy, participation, freedom and diversity. As 
Alphandéry puts it: ‘Comment faire du sol, de l’attachement à la terre et du désir 
d’enracinement des éléments contemporains?’ (100, p.3). Most conclude that the 
answer lies in combining social aspects of the present and backward-looking, more 
enviromnentally sound ways of working. Vollmer argues that greens are faced with 
a double problem: correcting the mistakes of the previous century, when 
industrialism was allowed to develop unchecked; and dealing with the present and 
future environmental consequences of such unchecked industrialism, ‘réussir le tour 
de force de répondre à la fois aux questions du XIXe et du XXIe siècle’.
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So what sort of solutions does this second group of greens propose in the field of 
work? They would first of all argue that their emphasis is on more realistic and 
quickly achievable measures than those of the first group. Indeed, they are often 
pessimistic about what can be achieved, particularly in the field of unemployment:
Ta solution miracle n ’existe pas’ (96, p.226). They therefore tend to suggest a 
combination of strategies, involving work-sharing, ‘voluntary simplicity’ or a move 
away from consumerism, more sustainable and labour-intensive types of work, and 
broader changes to society itself. Their aim is avowedly pessimistic;
On revient toujours à la véritable raison d’être du mouvement écologique:
non pas établir le paradis sur terre, mais y éviter l’enfer. (102, p. 101)
Their first suggestion is that the creation of more jobs, or waiting for improvement 
in the economy is not a possible answer: ‘la création indéfinie d’emplois n’est ni 
souhaitable, ni possible’ (103, p. 13 6). The environmental impact of ever-increasing 
production is one reason for this stance, but greens would also argue that such 
increases in production simply will not be possible anyhow, due to the planet’s 
limited resources. A corresponding suggestion is therefore on reducing 
consumption. ‘An attitude of “enough” must replace an attitude of “more”’ (37, 
p.l5).
Even if these greens do not want an increase in the number of paid jobs, they do 
believe that more work will need to be done in a more ecological society. Green 
theory could be seen as the converse of taylorism: instead of rationalising production 
and labour-saving approaches, they suggest looking to the past for more labour- 
intensive ways of working, particularly in socially and environmentally useful 
sectors: ‘With more people and fewer resources, the capital/labour ratio must start 
shifting back towards labour-intensive production’ (19, p. 129). This is because, as 
resources become more scarce, as greens believe they will, ‘the amount of capital 
available for reinvestment in labour-saving machinery will go down’ (20, p. 109).
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Overall, the kind of work done should change, and the working practices currently 
favoured should be abandoned, with Te choix de techniques plus intensives en 
travail, mais moins prédatrices contre F environnement’ the way forward (34, p.57).
Given the description of ‘greener’ work above, we can see why this second group 
often stress the paysan as a role model. The kind of work done by the paysan farmer 
is autonomous, takes place in a rural setting, and is labour-intensive. Some greens 
stress not only the kind of work the paysan does, but also his assumed traditional 
character traits as positive for the environment:
Flalte au gaspillage, sous toutes ses formes, et elles sont multiples; en 
retrouvant les racines de la morale paysanne: austère, prévoyante, prudente 
et pleine de dignité. (2, p. 150)
A population which included more paysan farmers would necessarily be less 
centralised, responding, in some greens’ view, to problems of déracinement. It is not 
sufficient to encourage more farmers, however: the kind of modern farming practices 
deplored by greens are also attacked. The emphasis is on the paysan because of his 
use of older farming methods which are seen as less damaging for the environment 
and more logical in times of resource scarcity. It is on these grounds that greens 
criticise the use of modern farming machinery: ‘Si F essence venait à manquer, nos 
agriculteurs seraient incapables de labourer, de semer et de moissonner’ (96, p.58).
The suggested partial return to paysan lifestyles is not only found in the more 
extreme reaches of green theory. The 1997 manifesto of les Verts, while not openly 
calling on the population to move back to the land, stresses the need to move away 
from ‘productivisF methods to those of the paysan: ‘Encourager l’agriculture 
paysamie et biologique et convertir les activités productivistes et polluantes’ (46, 
p. 1). The effect of such policies would of course be a higher proportion of the 
population living and working in rural environments, as a far higher number of
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workers would be needed to produce sufficient crops. Greens also argue that old 
methods of farming should be reintroduced, with less reliance on machinery for 
instance. These are not only less damaging for the environment; they create 
employment in a natural setting; and even protect the land with ‘investissements 
cachés’, such as ‘un autre rapport avec la nature et les paysages’ (38, p.218).
Greens stress the need for diversity in particular. They aim to safeguard and 
improve ‘la diversité des productions de terroir, les races locales et les variétés 
régionales’ (46, p.l). They focus also on moving away from the European Union’s 
traditional post-war emphasis on increasing production and protectionism, policies 
which have led to financial aid for freezing land and exports. Finally, a recent 
campaign has focussed on developments in genetically-modified crops. Greens are 
sceptical of their supposed advantages, and tend to emphasise the need to rely on 
agricultural practices which have been proven over centuries not to harm the 
environment (ibid., p.2).
The stress on the paysan as a possible way forward is generally seen as a potential 
future development, however. Given current levels of unemployment and the need 
to address the criticisms they make of industrial work, greens also emphasise the 
need for work-sharing in the meantime:
La seule solution viable, d’après les écologistes, resterait celle du partage de
l’emploi, accompagnée d’une modification des modes de consommation. 
(35,p.l39)
They argue that protection for workers is an essential component of such a strategy, 
partly to safeguard their standard of living, but also in an attempt to address their 
criticism of workplace hierarchies, where workers have little autonomy or control 
over the work they do (ibid.. p.6). It is perhaps in their focus on work-sharing and 
reducing the number of hours worked that this second group of greens appear most
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idealistic. Thus, Voynet sees the impact of a reduction in working hours as wholly 
positive, as it would allow everyone more time -  ‘Du temps pour rêver, réfléchir et 
agir. Du temps pour les enfants, les amours et les amis’ (104, p.l).
While most of the greens’ strategies focus on structural changes to society and to the 
world of work, they do also pay some attention to how workplace experiences could 
be improved. Indeed, this is the most important element of policy in this area for 
some greens:
It is not alienation from the means of production or even from the fruits of 
production that really matters, but alienation from the process of 
production. (19, p.81)
Such greens tend to propose some measure of worker autonomy or autogestion.
They often argue that more autonomous workers will be more likely to consider the 
environmental impact of the work they do (since, for example, they live with their 
families in the vicinity of their workplace). Others argue that this hope is ill- 
founded, pointing out the strong protests by nuclear industry workers when jobs at 
their power plants are tlneatened. However, they tend still to support the green 
stance on worker autonomy, as this is seen as leading to greater worker satisfaction 
and involvement. Greens’ descriptions of the joys of autonomous work (‘la 
réalisation de ce but autant que l’action qui le réalise sont source de satisfaction’) 
(105, p.206) closely resemble 1930s sources insistence on the right to joy in work.
The focus on changing working conditions is also stressed when greens discuss 
women and work. Throughout, greens underline the need to introduce greater 
equality for working women. They suggest changes to working hours and conditions 
to ensure greater equality and justice. More flexibility and greater legal protection 
are demanded (46, p. 10). A final emphasis is on the infamous ‘double journée’, 
whereby women work both outside the home, and at home (household tasks,
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childcare etc). Again, shorter working hours are seen as a potential answer to this 
problem (ibid.. p. 10).
There are two reasons for this focus on women by modern greens. First, they are 
concerned as a movement with social justice, and most greens would identify 
themselves as feminists. The second reason is more controversial, and by no means 
accepted by all greens. That is, certain members of the green movement would 
argue that faith in women is the best way to move forward. They argue that,
women are closer than men to nature and are therefore potentially in the 
vanguard as far as developing sustainable ways of relating to the 
environment is concerned. (20, p. 193)
This group, the ecofeminists, tend to argue that the main focus should be to revalue 
traditional forms of women’s work (caring for others, and so on). Many greens have 
argued that this represents a ‘dangerous strategy’, with women risking ‘being 
sacrificed to the environment’ (20, p.202); however, it is a strategy which finds 
echoes in our 1930s sources.
If less paid  work is done in the green society, this does not mean that less work will 
be done. Greens stress the need to decriminalise activities in the ‘informal 
economy’, and to recognise that the unemployed still work, for example. However, 
such changes mean that fewer people will receive a steady income from their 
employment. Greens have sometimes suggested that the answer here is some form 
of minimum guaranteed income, to be paid to all citizens whether they have paid 
work or not. This idealistic policy places them in a long-standing tradition, which 
holds that freedom depends on access to basic rights. Other greens have criticised 
the idea of an ‘allocation universelle’ (on the grounds that it would do nothing to 
discourage present levels of consumption, that it would be too expensive, that it 
would require a massive administrative body, something which goes against green
#2
ideas about scale and decentralised political structures, and so on), but most agree at 
least that the independence it would offer each citizen is a desirable goal.
The final emphasis in green solutions is on leisure. In a society that operated 
according to ‘an ecologist work ethic’, ‘the distinction between work and leisure 
would obviously be reduced’ (19, p. 128). Green ideas on leisure stress the need to 
use such free time profitably; at times, their pronouncements on the subject of how 
people should enjoy themselves even appear hectoring. The first use of free time 
which they support is education. This may perhaps be attributed to the high 
proportion of members of green parties who are highly-educated (58% have a higher 
degree; the figure for the French population is 10%) (107, p. 120) and who work in 
the education sector (30% of green party members in France). Les Verts have been 
termed ‘le parti des intellectuels’ (ibid., p. 121). The second focus is on the need for 
fitness and healthy leisure activities. Les Verts aim immediately to ‘encourager les 
loisirs et les pratiques sportives en réorientant et en augmentant les budgets des 
ministères concernés’ (46, p.9). They often stress that such activities should take 
place in a more rural setting, and for this reason tourism is a central concern of the 
greens. Modern tourism is seen as hindering the kinds of activities greens would 
prefer citizens to engage in, which would bring ‘des perspectives de libération et 
d’épanouissement individuelles’ (96, p.98). Indeed, some modem leisure uses of the 
countryside are seen as ‘usages pervers’ by the greens, and are even bracketed with 
far more dangerous facilities: ‘golfs, cimetières à déchets industriels et nucléaires, 
résidences secondaires. . . ’ (38, p.218). Instead, greens would prefer the population 
to engage in more self-reliant types of leisure activités (20, p. 108).
Having summarised the solutions which greens stress, we can now consider how far 
the themes in our 1930s sources correspond to the green ‘Good Life’.
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2.4 1930s solutions
Even if the 1930s sources selected for this study make detailed criticisms in the field 
of work which can readily be compared to those of modern environmentalists, when 
we come to consider solutions, more care is needed. 1990s green parties have to 
produce detailed political programmes and manifestos, detailing the precise changes 
they wish to make to society in the short and the long term. Some of the sources we 
have examined for the 1930s had very different aims and formats. However, 
although we are not always comparing two similar sets of sources, similar 
approaches and themes can certainly be found.
We can also distinguish between the kind of detail offered in the various sources 
consulted. Some are far more explicit and concrete in their suggestions than others.
Thus, unsurprisingly, political movements of the period generally make their 
proposed solutions relatively clear. Youth movements of the 1930s even saw the 
need to ‘définir les bases sur lesquelles devait se faire la révolution qu’ils 
souhaitaient’ as a ‘devoir’ (15, p.327). Even if the youth movements recognised the 
need to suggest solutions, however, they too varied in their explicitness. ‘Les projets 
ne brillaient pas par leur extrême précision’ (ibid., p.386). The Personalists, in i
particular ‘se montraient très prudents, préférant définir “l ’esprit” des institutions 
qu’en préciser le contenu’ (ibid., p.336); ‘Il n ’y a pas de doctrine persomialiste, mais 
des aspirations personnalistes’.’^
As for the literary sources consulted, a wide variety of approaches and levels of 
precision can be observed. Levi sums up the dilemma in using literary sources to 
seek solutions or proposals: ‘Giono was a moralist, not a sage, a seer and not a 
plaimer’ (108, p.266). Of course, we cannot expect the sort of detail a political party 
might provide in a literary text. However, Giono’s 1930s works arguably took as 
their main theme the search for, or enjoyment of ‘la belle vie! ’ (70, p. 108), and not 
simply on an individual level: ‘Ma joie ne demeurera que si elle est la joie de tous’
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(60, Préface). There is certainly a reluctance to offer prescriptive or universal 
solutions, however: Giono instead preferred to lead by example, whether practically, 
tlu'ough the Contadour experiment, or in the (generally consistent) stance he took in 
his novels, in his non-fîction and in the polemics he favoured by the end of the entre- 
deux-guerres:
On lie peut pas faire pour tout le monde, mais on va faire pour nous. On 
servira peut-être d’exemple. (51, p.479)
Whereas Giono was ‘warning his generation’ (108, p.266) in the 1930s and 
describing alternatives, Céline seemed to believe that human nature meant they were 
inevitably doomed, and certainly did not suggest that life for the majority could be 
much better. Anderson lists the faults and character defects of both children and 
adults in Mort à crédit, and concludes: ‘Can a happy society be built from such 
stuff?’ (109, p.232). In the field of work, though, Céline does make some relevant 
points for this discussion, though sometimes this is by implication rather than 
explicit.
Saint-Exupéry seems to fall somewhere between Céline and Giono. His emphasis, 
on the whole, is no doubt more positive than that of Céline, but his attempts to 
formulate possible alternatives or solutions are more frustratingly inexact than those 
of Giono. Work is certainly a key focus in his writings, however. D ’Astier de la 
Vigerie even seems to see Saint-Exupéry’s chosen career as the principal reason 
behind his attempts to devise alternatives:
II a une expérience particulière, un beau métier, qui lui ont doimé une 
éthique personnelle. Peut-on en tirer une philosophie? Peut-elle 
s’appliquer au commun des mortels, lui permettre de passer du particulier à 
l’universel? (110, p. 107)
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He concludes that, at least to some extent, Saint-Exupéry does achieve this 
‘universal philosophy’, particularly in Terre des hommes, though to a somewhat 
unsatisfactory degree: ‘Terre des hommes, le seul ouvrage philosophique achevé 
[...] vous laisse l ’esprit confus et parfois irrité’ (ibid., p.l 10).
Ramuz had earlier addressed the question of the writer’s responsibility to propose 
alternatives in some detail, and argued that this posed a difficult dilemma:
Le poète est condamné à se taire ou à devenir médecin, [...] alors qu’il est 
si malade lui-même: et qu’il n’est poète que précisément parce qu’il est 
malade, et qu’il n’y a plus de poésie quand tout va bien. (111, p. 152)
Bearing in mind these diverse aims, and less precise nature of our chosen sources, 
we can now consider the actual proposals made in the 1930s, and how far these 
stress the same themes and approaches. We have already noted that a minority of 
modern greens stressed a forward-looking approach; usually this meant a reliance on 
teclmology or human ingenuity to solve the problems currently caused by modern 
work. There are instances of such an approach in the 1930s, too.
In the 1930s, the ‘bénéfices du machinisme’ were sometimes mentioned in glowing 
terms. Although most of the sources consulted were critical of then-current uses of 
teclmology, it was often argued that, if differently controlled or used for the benefit 
of workers rather than employers, teclmology could be liberating, whether in terms 
increasing French economic power, or in improved conditions for workers. Such 
views are particulaiiy evident in the political sources of the period. Many felt that, 
with the arrival of the Popular Front, its ‘défense des petits contre les gros’ and 
greater equality, new forms of work could be made joyful, and hope remained 
possible. Guéhenno seemed to see the election of the Popular Front as the logical 
continuation of humanldnd’s positive development, and presumably many saw no
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reason for this positive development to stop: ‘La révolution [de 1936] n ’est que 
1 ’accomplissement de la raison et la dernière exigence de la sagesse’ (65, p.231).
In France, it could be argued that such views were the inheritance of the 1789 
Revolution and the Enlightenment belief that, through logic, human rationalism, and 
the application of scientific techniques and discoveries, progress was inevitable. 
Blum seemed also to subscribe to such a belief in human progress through 
technology. Fie felt that ‘la condition humaine’ could be improved through 
economic growth and new ways of working (89, p. 168).
The Personalists, as we have seen, have been criticised by modern greens for their 
apparent hope in industrial technology as a way of improving living standards 
generally. Mounier indeed did seem to see (a differently-managed and owned) 
industrialised work and technology as potential benefits for society, indeed as the 
only way forward.
Personalism does not look for its economic structures to a pre-teclmical 
civilization, but to the future. To enlarge and diversify technique to the 
stature of man, to liberate teclmique from the economic and social 
organization of capitalism, and to see finally that it neither absorbs nor 
deforms personal life -  that is the only reasonable way to proceed. (50, 
p. 178)
His emphasis was certainly on the ability of humankind in future somehow to 
overcome current abuses of technology. Just as ‘forward-looking’ greens criticise 
actual uses of teclmology rather than technology itself, so Mounier’s emphasis was 
also on improving conditions in the modern workplace. He talked of workers 
making their factories ‘handsome’ (112, p.82), of smaller communities of workers 
with greater freedom than in the taylorist workplace. Much as Gorz and others 
suggest today, Mounier felt that it was important to hope that in future, humankind
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would be able to find answers that were as yet ‘beyond grasp’: ‘We risk more by 
restricting ambitions than by seeking to reach out a bit beyond our grasp’ (50, p. 10).
Human ingenuity and a faith in human ability ai e the keystones of such an approach, 
just as they are for forward-looking greens today. Mounier stressed both the benefits 
of technological progress for society and for the individual: ‘technical progress is for 
man a powerful means of liberation provided he dominates it (my italics), (ibid., 
pp. 173-4). Even the positive Personalists, then, did see some problems related to 
technical progress: it had to be ‘dominated’, or ‘humanized’ (ibid., p. 175). This sort 
of double-edged view is identified by Touchard as representative of the general 
atmosphere of the 1930s: ‘d’une part l’espoir, d’autre part la peur’ (65, p.230). Most 
sources in the 1930s, just as in the 1990s, tended towards ‘la peur’ rather than 
‘I’espoir’ when discussing technology. The awareness that technology or future 
solutions were not sufficient answers is as widespread in our 1930s sources as it is in 
modern green thought.
Giono, in particular, was a techno-sceptic. Indeed, the industrial society needs to be 
destroyed before human happiness can be achieved, in his view (60, p.207). Instead, 
nature should be the model on which we organise human society -  and changing the 
way we work would seem to be the most important step. When Giono depicts joy in 
his 1930s works, it is invariably related to work: ‘on est tranquille, puisqu’un beau 
travail se fait paisiblement tout seul’ (ibid., p. 128). Such joy is to be found in the 
work done by his characters, or in festivals and celebrations of natural cycles.
Again, these festivals are closely related to the seasons of agricultural work (such as 
the ‘Mère du blé’ ceremony in Le chant du monde); they are a deserved reward for 
work accomplished. Indeed, joy in work is not only a possibility in Giono’s view; it 
is a right. Giono’s scepticism about faith in technology as the way forward is also 
based on traditional forms of work: faith in technology is misplaced, as teclmology 
will simply never be able to carry out human work: ‘On n’a pas encore inventé de 
machine à garder les moutons et [on] n ’en inventera jamais’ (51, p.760).
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Céline is equally sceptical. Voyage has even been described as Te roman de 
l’homme malade de civilisation’ (113, p .19). Science and teclmology are seen to be 
fallible, and human faith in them misplaced. Bardamu’s eminent medical colleagues 
fail to save Bébert in Voyage; and in Mort à crédit, Céline scathingly describes the 
ludicrous attempt to revolutionise agriculture through ‘scientific’ principles 
(exposure to electromagnetic fields) in Blême-le-Petit, For Céline, Revolutionary 
faith in continual progress fails to take account of human nature; and attempts to 
control or ‘humanize’ teclmology would presumably be seen as misguided for the 
same reason:
L’homme est naturellement méchant, et la civilisation elle-même ne ferait 
qu’entretenir cette méchanceté naturelle. Car la civilisation [...] ne tend 
qu’à développer chez tous les humains le goût de la destruction. (114, 
p.133)
Perhaps surprisingly, Saint-Exupéry would not seem to be on the side of those who 
believe faith in human ingenuity and technology represents the way forward either, 
expressing his ‘angoisse devant la machine’ (110, p.l 12).
The second emphasis of most modern greens is on worksharing. If insufficient work 
is available for all, greens believe a reduction in working hours represents part of the 
solution. Such views ai-e also found in the 1930s, particularly because most of our 
sources saw work as a right, rather than a privilege or duty. ‘Chaque ouvrier avait 
un “droit au travail’” (15, p.384) for non-conformist movements like Jeune Droite or 
the Personalists. Some of these movements formulated theories based on what they 
termed ‘la propriété de métier’ (ibid., p.383). Even if an individual owned no land 
or property, it was argued that he owned his skills, and just as land-owners were 
entitled to sell their property, workers had the right to sell their learned skills. 
Attempts to make modern work more humane, even joyful, also led many to 
conclude that a shorter working day, through worksharing, was at least part of the
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answer: de Man (in his investigation of Ta joie au travail’), and Werther were two 
famous sources of such suggestions. Fourier’s preferred solution of giving workers 
a variety of tasks (a different type of ‘worksharing’) was also seen as a route to joy in 
work, though a long-term one (72, p.425).
An emphasis on challenging consumerism is another central element in modern 
green solutions. The consumer society is to be challenged because of its effects on 
the environment, and the unhappiness and inequality it creates in society. Giono too 
states clearly and repeatedly his opposition to material riches. ‘La richesse de 
l’homme est dans son coeur. [..,] Vivre n ’exige pas la possession de tant de choses’ 
(60, p. 193). He even argues that the consumer society and real happiness are 
mutually exclusive, since people are encouraged not to be satisfied by simple 
pleasures: ‘les hommes sont bien malheureux de vouloir, vouloir et toujours vouloir’ 
(51,p.459).
Nor is it only in fictional accounts that we find an emphasis on individual happiness 
and fulfilment, opposed to consumerism: youth movements made similar points.
The economy should not be based on encouraging wants; rather it should be 
focussed on needs, ‘au service de l ’homme’, and on emphasising alternative kinds of 
fulfilment, ‘la primauté du spirituel’ being one of their favourite motifs (15, 381).
There was a clear parallel between the Personalist approach and the later green focus 
on needs rather than wants. They even used similar terms: ‘we believe that a certain 
type of poverty is the ideal economic rule of personal life’; ‘contempt for the 
material attachments that enslave, a desire for simplicity’ (50, p. 192) (greens favour 
‘voluntary poverty’ and ‘simplicity’). Imposing a different type of economic 
organisation was certainly seen as one part of the answer to consumerism by the 
youth movements. They called for ‘la naissance d’une ‘économie organisée’, une 
économie respectueuse des exigences du bien commun et de ses finalités humaines’ 
(15, p. 392). Modem greens have also proposed similar sorts of ‘organisation’ of the
90-
economy as necessary to move away from consumerism. A further parallel is in the 
generally idealistic and imprecise approach of both the 1930s sources and the 
modern greens. One of the main criticisms made of modern green policy in this area 
has been of their failure to resolve the paradox between desiring small decentralised 
independent communities and simultaneously suggesting fairly authoritarian 
centralised economic controls (20, pp. 114-6). 1930s claims, such as ‘A Personalist 
economy will regulate production according to an estimate of the real needs of 
consumers as persons’ (50, p. 194), prove just as simplistic and frustrating as their 
green descendants (who is to determine what these ‘real needs’ are? How reliable or 
flexible will the ‘estimate’ be? How will the economy be ‘regulated’?)
However, if both green and 1930s solutions at the broader economic level leave 
much to be desired, their discussions of practical changes to work are more precise. 
For example, the fairly detailed discussion of favouring more labour-intensive work 
practices in modern green sources is also paralleled in the 1930s. Thus the artisan’s 
way of life is presented as more logical (if less efficient) than that of the modern 
industrial worker. Giono in particular returns frequently to this theme, usually 
offering his cobbler father as an example of a fulfilled, independent worker and 
valued member of the community. Whereas the Bata shoe factory employee might 
make more economic sense, the price to the individual worker of such efficient 
methods is high: ‘II est prisonnier et sa famille est prisonnière’ (68, p. 191). Labour- 
intensive, small-scale production is portrayed in glowing terms, and is seen as the 
solution here: ‘[Mon père] se servait de tous les outils dans leur diversité. Il était 
entièrement maître de sa vie’ (ibid., p. 190).
Just as in the 1990s, agriculture is once again the sector which attracts the most 
attention when labour-intensive solutions are discussed, however. There seem to be 
two reasons for this focus in the 1930s. First, to attempt to change traditional 
agricultural work, particularly that of the paysan, is seen as particularly misguided 
and damaging. Giono, again, presents an entire analysis of the ills of modern society 
based on such changes. The attempt to introduce technology (even the simple
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tractor) is criticised as unnatural; and the effects on the individual are also 
catastrophic. The dominant view is that such traditional labour-intensive work 
represents the best or most fulfilling type of employment (‘F idéal, c’est le travail 
dans le champs ou fait avec F outil’ (57, p. 134)), so to attempt to alter it is heresy.
The second reason for the focus on agriculture, and particularly the work of the 
paysan or artisan, is that such work is seen as the absolute opposite of modern 
industrialised work, with all its faults and dangers. It is therefore presented as one 
type of work which simply cannot be changed or ‘modernised’, ‘la négation même 7
du système Taylor’, an aspect the 1930s sources see as positive:
L’exploitant agricole est à la fois travailleur manuel, ingénieur, commerçant 
et chef d’entreprise. Cette confusion des rôles empêche toute organisation 
scientifique du travail. (115, p.366)
The paysan himself is indeed a role model, and the kind of work he does a favoured 
solution of our 1930s sources, in just the same way as modern greens stress his 
potential benefits. First of all, the kind of work he does is described in glowing 
terms, as fulfilling and rewarding, in a vivid contrast to the industrial work criticised 
earlier:
À
On ne peut pas savoir quel est le vrai travail du paysan; si c’est labourer, 
semer, faucher, ou bien si c’est en même temps manger et boire des 
aliments frais, faire des enfants et respirer librement; car tout est 
intimement mélangé, et quand il fait une chose, il complète l’autre. (68, 
p .152)
Ramuz agrees with Giono’s description of the paysan’s work as a state or his life, 
rather than a job, and implies, somewhat menacingly, that such work is inevitable in 
the future: the paysan is ‘ F homme tel qu’il a été et il est l ’homme tel qu’il sera forcé
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peut-être un jour de redevenir’ (111, p. 197). One difference, however, is the 
generally more positive emphasis which was still possible in the 1930s. Just as 
Touchard characterised the political atmosphere of the 1930s as simultaneously one 
of hope and fear, so most sources from the 1930s balanced:
simultaneous warnings of disaster, and an emphasis on a generalised 
religion of hope and joy, the satisfactions of complete involvement in 
independent work and love. (52, p.71)
While they made vociferous criticisms of their society, and of work in particular, the
1930s sources could be more positive about the possibility of finding alternatives in If
the (far more recent) past. Giono placed particular emphasis on such hope, whether 1I
in the practical example of the Contadour experiment (an attempt to recreate ‘the 
conditions of peace and joy’ portrayed in his 1935 novel Que ma joie demeure), or in 
fictional accounts. For example, Giono describes an anarchic paysan community 
who decide to rediscover an older approach, and to refuse modern society.
Interestingly, it is through work that they achieve this:
Nous étions malheureux de voir que le produit de notre travail était tenu en 
mésestime. Et c’est justement lui qui nous sauve et sauvera tout le monde. 
(60, p.143)
This is not to say that our 1930s sources see a return to an identical older paysan way 
of life as a sufficient answer. They, like our 1990s green sources, are also critical of 
some aspects of this way of life, particularly the social environment of rural 
communities. Giono repeatedly criticises the narrow-mindedness of certain 
communities. The harsh treatment of the former prostitute who becomes pregnant in 
Un de Baumugnes, and the shame of her parents, are roundly condemned, for 
example. The need to accept all members of the community, outsiders, foreigners, 
even mythical half-(wo)men, half-beasts is stressed. The individual paysan is rarely
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criticised, however. Instead, he is generally portrayed as a heroic figure: ‘notre 
dernier espoir’ (68, p. 149). Saint-Exupéry, in a typical attempt to represent flight as 
a noble occupation rooted in a long tradition, even claims that the heroic pilot is a 
‘paysan des escales’ (86, p. 150).
The character traits of the paysan are also seen as positive. ‘Dignité’ through his 
work, independence, prudence and a justified respect for natural forces are 
repeatedly underlined (68, p. 192). His determination in the face of adversity is 
particularly stressed: ‘Rlen n ’est têtu comme un paysan. Tout est détruit, il 
recommence, tout s’effondre, il reconstruit’ (60, p. 125). Together, paysans represent 
an impressive force for change, in Giono’s opinion, since ‘les Etats sont faits de plus 
de champs que de villes’ (ibid., p.96). The paysan’s desire to be part of an active 
community is also commended. This is particularly important as it is seen as a 
general solution to modern déracinement. This is seen as a crucial element in any 
attempt to redesign society, as the sense of powerlessness it inspires will pose 
problems for such attempts. Thus Ramuz sees the task of redesigning working 
practices as a daunting one, since modern man must achieve this ‘au milieu même 
du bouleversement que les progrès techniques ont introduit dans l’univers’ (57, 
p.83),
Saint-Exupéry also implies that enracinement is part of the solution. Ideal forms of 
work tend to take place in a rural setting, or small community, and in a society which 
is ‘organicist, rooted in rurality and natural hierarchies’, where the key values are 
‘creativity, nature, disinterestedness’ (87, p.91). Work and comradeship also 
represent a key element of any better society for Saint-Exupéry, but only certain 
forms of work. He refers repeatedly to the importance of a ‘métier’, rather than 
industrial work which he sees as dehumanising. Fraternity and comradeship are key 
elements in the fight against déracinement -  ‘la grandeur d’un métier est peut-être, 
avant tout, d’unir des hommes’ (86, p.35).
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Refinding a sense of place and the importance of the terre natale are repeatedly 
stressed as solution. Barrés, Giono, Ramuz are of course renowned for their sense of 
place (Lorraine, Provence, the Alps respectively). However, this emphasis is found 
not only in literature. Ordre Nouveau have been accused of Tme fervente et quelque 
peu sentimentale apologie du régionalisme... “Amour de la petite patrie; instinct 
indéracinable, centre de vie”’ (15, p.358). The Personalist Izard also criticised Ta 
camaraderie perdue entre les vivants et la terre’ (ibid., p.358) in Esprit in 1933, and 
implied that such a relationship would have to be rediscovered if current problems 
were to be addressed. This wasn’t mere nationalism, however. Indeed, some, 
including the Personalists saw local attachment or eni’acinement as a way of 
avoiding nationalism (Giono too stressed the absurdity of nationalism, borders and 
nation states by pointing out that paysans from all countries had more in common 
with each other than they did with aristocrats or even urban industrial workers from 
their own nation). For the Personalists,
L’amour du pays natal ne s’épanouit jamais en amour de la patrie. Au
contraire, [...] il en devient un furieux adversaire, (ibid., p.259)
The final aspect where 1930s and 1990s views of agriculture and the paysan as the 
way forward concur is in the need for diversity, whether this relates to crops grown 
or the kinds of communities in which people live. Here, Giono is particularly 
prescient. He talks of the dangers of single-crop plantations for profit at length (68, 
pp. 183-4), and argues that diversity is important for society as well as for 
agriculture. Fie repeatedly refuses to offer prescriptive answers, preferring to lead by 
example or tlmough depictions of the good life in his fiction. ‘On fait son bonlieur 
soi-même’ (116, p.9), and the freedom to do so is a key part of 1930s solutions.
Moving from agriculture to modern industrial work, we also find parallels between 
the emphases of modern greens and those of our 1930s sources. The main stress is 
on greater autonomy or self-management -  Esprit argued it was necessary to ‘faire 
participer étroitement les travailleurs aux activités et à la gestion de l ’entreprise’ (15,
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p.390). However, Personalist solutions were typically vague and idealistic: in their 
Manifesto, they demanded ‘the elevation [of workers] from the status of instruments 
to that of associates in the enterprise’, so that:
every worker be placed in a position where he can exercise to the maximum 
his personal prerogatives of responsibility, initiative, mastery, creation and 
liberty, in whatever role is assigned him by his capacities and by the 
collective organisation. (50, p.203)
Autonomy might be a long-term, vaguely-defined aim, but the right to joy or at the 
very least improved working conditions was seen as more readily attainable: ‘It is 
indispensable that the conditions which surround [labour] be human’ (ibid., p. 198). 
Nostalgia is present in some suggestions, with Saint-Exupéry apparently longing for 
some sort of ‘pre-industrial world, in which the skills and dedication of craftsmen 
themselves represent a morally satisfying way of life’ (87, p.45).
We have already seen that women represent a central focus for modern green 
discussions of work. We might expect that our 1930s sources would be less likely to 
offer such a focus: women’s suffrage was not granted until 1944 in France, and the 
atmosphere of the entre-deux-guerres could hardly be described as feminist, on the 
whole. However, there are some precocious suggestions in our 1930s sources in this 
area. The special difficulties faced by the paysanne are recognised, for instance -  
she is a ‘saint’, ‘usé[e] par la terre et par l’homme’ (70, p. 15). The Personalists’ 
attempt to question women’s traditional roles even led to an early attempt to revalue 
women’s traditional work. Their objections to modern industrial work meant that 
they did not see this as a potential solution:
We do not side with Engels’ view that her ‘emancipation’ demands ‘as a 
primary condition the entry of all women into public industry’. (50, p. 142)
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Instead, they were early proponents of an independent income for women who chose 
to remain at home to bring up children or look after the household: ‘We do not hold 
either that there is any special indignity attached to household tasks’ (ibid., p. 142). 
Such work should be recognised as proper employment. In this suggestion, the 
Personalist view resembles modern green calls for a guaranteed minimum income 
for all citizens, especially since they are similarly vague about how such a scheme 
would be administered or financed.
Of course, such analyses of women and work are generally vague and would be 
criticised as insufficient by modern greens. One aspect of 1930s solutions which is 
closer to those of the 1990s is their focus on women as the way forward, as more 
likely to resolve the present crisis. The Personalists do this in typically imprecise 
and undefined style:
One loves to dream of a society where [women] will collaborate with all the 
richness of a power that has never been used [... thus] assuring perhaps the 
recovery of man, who has failed, (ibid., pp. 133-4)
If the Personalists could only ‘dream’ of such a solution, Giono was more precise (if 
impractical as ever) as to how the changes he desired would be better achieved by 
women. First of all, his pictures of ideal, harmonious communities are invariably 
based around small family units, often older couples. A recurrent theme is the 
arrival of a woman in the life of a former bachelor paysan, and the positive changes 
this involves. For example, Giono attributes eventual positive changes to the kind of 
activity pursued to the arrival of a female character:
II m ’a pris l’envie [de] faire du blé.
C’est drôle que ça fa it  pris juste maintenant.
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C’est que je ne suis plus seul: j ’ai une femme. Un ménage, ça ne peut 
pas vivre de chasse. Depuis qu’elle est là, j ’ai besoin de pain, et elle aussi. 
Alors...
C’est naturel et c’est bon signe. (117, p. 123)
Giono’s emphasis is on women as the way forward; they will eventually be ‘heroic 
women leaders of the future, after our present revolution’ (118, p. 19) in the epic 
novels. His focus in such discussions of women as representing hope for the future 
is on work. Of course, Giono could certainly not be described as feminist, and in 
this, his views are different from those of most modern greens. He does not want to 
challenge the traditional division of labour in paysan communities, for example. In 
his ideal community, in Les vraies richesses, this is made clear: ‘Les hommes 
labourent. [...] Des femmes lavent au ruisseau. Des femmes font la soupe. Des 
hommes aiguisent les faux’ (60, p. 190).
Giono would seem to agree that women have an essential character which makes 
them closer to nature and better able to lead the way to a more joyful way of working 
than men. Thus Mme. Bertrand’s decision to use the ‘surplus’ wheat to make her 
own bread is the first step towards a better society in Les vraies richesses (ibid., 
p .l 12): freedom and joy follow. Women are seen as more practical than male 
characters, who merely talk about how change is needed; women act. They 
understand the importance of the individual gesture - ‘les bases du nouvel édifice’ 
(ibid., p.96) are invariably built from ‘un geste fait par un homme seul -  ou une 
femme’ (ibid., p.95). Women’s character means stability, too, which is important in 
any attempt to rebuild a paysan society:
[Women] are the hubs around which tumults revolve, and the safe point of 
return when frenzy droops. The number of Earth Mother figures in Giono’s 
work stems from this respect for women’s stability. (52, p.64)
Finally, many modern ecofeminists would argue that women are closer to the earth 
(16, p.21), and many of Giono’s female characters certainly share this tendency
Others did promote minimum income schemes similar to those of the 1990s greens. 
Youth movements in particular described such developments positively. Ordre 
Nouveau proposed such a scheme, which they felt should be organised at the 
European level in order to promote peace, freedom and security. They proposed 
creating;
un organisme supra-national ayant pour tâche de coordonner la production 
et la répartition des ‘produits nécessaires à la vie. (15, p.366)
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(Zulma and Mlle. Amandine are obvious examples, but even the ‘ordinary’ 
paysannes are represented as closer to nature than their male counterparts), and this 
is an aspect which makes them more likely to find better ways of living and working 
in his view. Marthe, watching the wild birds in Que ma ioie demeure exclaims: ‘Ah!
Comme il y a des choses qui parlent bien à la femme!’ (51, p.467), and similar direct 
links are frequently made. Female sexuality is also presented as an important link to «
nature. Women represent part of nature’s cycles in Giono’s view, and this makes 
them particularly at home in his ideal paysan communities, as in this way they are 
intimately connected to the elements (eg. the wind (117, pp.60-1)), and to the farm 
and wild animals too (119, pp.45-7).
Giono’s frank depictions of female sexuality are striking for the freedom and 
independence they attribute to women. Indeed, freedom is an important element in 
both green and 1930s solutions. One way of ensuring greater freedom is through a 
basic level of financial security for all citizens, just as greens argue for a minimum 
income scheme today. Of course, Giono would argue that security could never be 
based on money; but his proposals for self-sufficient, independent communities of 
paysans and artisans imply the same point: that a basic standard of living (food, 
shelter) is necessary for freedom.
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The Personalists also proposed a basic minimum income scheme, and in typically 
imprecise terms; the method of calculating such an income should be based not only 
on a ‘salaire vital’, ensuring basic subsistence, but also a ‘salaire culturel’ (ibid., 
p.386).
The final focus of our modern greens was on leisure. The idea that in a better 
society, work and leisure would be part of the same life is of course also present in 
the 1930s -  for Giono, the paysan way of life meets such aims (we are reminded here 
of his description, cited earlier, of the paysan’s work). Ramuz had earlier 
categorised the paysan as ‘pas un métier, un état’ (111, p.208), and this is a view 
which was frequently expressed in the 1930s. There was also a similar focus in the 
1930s on what constituted a suitable use of new-found or future leisure time. This 
was often presented as a potential ‘compensation à la dépersomialisation que le 
travail lui fait subir’ [à l’ouvrier] (90, p.426), and suitable activities were therefore 
widely discussed.
First, a lost sense of camaraderie at work should be solved by workers’ involvement 
in groups outside the workplace which would enable ‘leur repersonnalisation’ by
créant un milieu humain où se développent naturellement les qualités 
étouffées dans le travail automatisé: liberté d’esprit, initiative et 
responsabilité, (ibid.. p.426)
Some argued that smaller rural communities were the answer to ensure a solution to 
déracinement thi'ough time spent outside work:
Nous avons remarqué que le manoeuvre le plus déraciné, pour qui le travail 
n ’a pas d’autre sens que la perte de quelques heures quotidiennes en
too
échange d’une somme d’argent, ce même manoeuvre est un citoyen de son 
village. La compensation s’opère, (ibid., p.426)
A shared emphasis in the 1990s and 1930s discussions of leisure is on tourism, 
though their analyses are somewhat different. Most 1930s sources saw this as a 
positive way of enabling city-dwellers and industrial workers to rediscover a more 
natural way of life. The Auberges de la jeunesse were also seen as positive solutions 
(89, p. 154), for their pacifist emphasis and encouragement of young city-dwellers 
who wished to return to a more rural environment, albeit only temporarily. Giono 
lent one of the Ligues des AdJ his patronage for these very reasons. The young 
people who patronised the auberges seemed to agree that they solved the sorts of 
problems mentioned in the previous section. One young aubergiste lists a litany of 
complaints from her week as a member of ‘cette jeunesse laborieuse’, concluding:
‘Et puis, j ’ai connu les auberges qui répondirent à mon désir d’évasion, de vie au 
grand air’ (ibid.. p. 156).
Of course, the modem leisure industry did not yet exist in the 1930s; the differing 
emphasis on tourism can be attributed to the completely different scale and kind of 
activities of the period. Nevertheless, a few early criticisms can be found in French 
sources, particularly of the possibility of leisure time being abused: ‘l’homme se sent 
devenir petit à cause de la passivité’ engendered by ‘la TSF, le cinéma, les images, 
les bruits, les voix ...’ (57, p. 137).
Giono foresaw other potential dangers in the emphasis on organised leisure. In a 
discussion at the Contadour retreat, referring to his daughter Aline, he stated his 
view that such pursuits were to be avoided, since they might lead to military 
activities. Gymnastics was no more than a ‘prétexte à marche en rangs, demi-tours 
en principe, préparation militaire... ’ (120, p.35). Overall, the kinds of pastime 
favoured as leisure activities tended to highlight qualities of self-improvement and 
autonomy. Education and intellectual pursuits were favoured, particularly thr ough
mthe official attempts to popularise cultural activities (89, p. 161). Giono implies that 
such activities are a natural component of the artisan’s or paysan’s life. He describes 
his artisan father as ‘mille fois plus cultivé que toutes les maisons de la culture’ (68, 
p. 191). It is not, of course, surprising that intellectuals’ focus was on such issues. 
The Personalists too focussed on culture as inspiring and autonomous: ‘The aim of 
culture is active engagement and service, not suspension of judgement and isolation 
from action’ (50, p. 156). Other leisure activities which received widespread support 
in the 1930s similarly emphasised ‘active engagement’ and self-reliance. Gardening 
or growing food was officially supported by the Popular Front, particularly as this 
was seen as a healthy, outdoor activity (89, p .152).
Giono too describes his ideal paysans as devoting a significant part of their day to 
growing non-food crops. In Que ma ioie demeure, Jourdan plants an entire field of 
periwinkles and narcissus; Mme. Hélène exclaims, ‘Vous ne pouvez pas savoir la 
joie que vous me faites’ (51, p.476). Joy depends on beauty and distraction as well 
as satisfying work. The title phrase ‘que ma joie demeure’ is used only once in the 
novel, and it is when Bobi explains the importance to the community of the 
apparently useless deer: ‘C’est fait, mon vieux, pour que notre joie demeure’ (ibid., 
p.559).
Maulnier summed up the 1930s focus when he called for ‘un droit au loisir’; only 
this could achieve ‘les fondements d’un humanisme nouveau’ (15, p.348) in his 
view. The self-reliant and improving practices recommended by our 1930s sources 
as solutions to the depersonalisation of modern work were seen as a right. 
Furthermore, they were seen as inspiring hope and a feeling that change was possible 
in the face of the inliuman scale of modern institutions.
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2.5 Conclusion
111 the field of work, views prevalent in green politics today are certainly paralleled 
in 1930s sources. Themes which are stressed in both include the emphasis on 
inhuman scale; the speed of change; the effects of new kinds of work on the 
individual and a condemnation of monotonous deskilled work; the importance of 
leisure; the key role of the paysan, the small decentralised community and active 
participation in society at a local level.
While some clear differences do remain (for example, the ability of modern greens 
to discuss the environmental impact of work in precise, even scientific terms, or the 
reliance of some greens on information technology to provide at least a partial 
solution), these can generally be explained by the impossibility of 1930s sources 
having any awareness of such future developments; and, in any case, we do 
nonetheless find parallels in the 1930s views of their own technology. There is a 
parallel willingness by some to embrace such developments and see them as the way 
forward, while the majority remain sceptical o f ‘quick fix’ solutions which might in 
themselves involve new problems.
' These are systems terms, adopted by the Limits to Growth team. ‘Source; A point o f  origin of 
material or energy flows used by a system. Coal deposits under the ground are the sources o f coal in 
the short term; in the veiy long term forests are the sources o f coal, [and forests themselves, o f  course, 
have other sources]. Sink: The ultimate destination o f  material or energy flows used by a system.
The atmosphere is the sink for carbon dioxide generated by burning coal.’ (33, p.278).
 ^Preiidiville lists the names o f  many greens who attribute their politicisation to the May events; (35,
p.21).
 ^ The influence o f Illich has been particularly strong in this debate. See for example (43, pp. 124-30). 
".(44, p.135).
 ^This is the title o f (56) in its French translation.
 ^Now the Office National Interprofessionel des Céréales;(12, p. 1726).
’ For an account o f their impact, see ( I I , p.238).
® Giono’s desire to group the artisan with the paysan in his ideal money-free community means he 
describes a society apparently based on bartering where the artisan (and intellectuals like the doctor 
and teacher) seem not to be paid; instead, when bread is baked in Les vraies richesses, for instance, 
the doctor (who lends his mill to the paysans) is rewarded by sharing the bread.
 ^Fromm, To have or to be, 1976/1981. For details o f this text’s influence on green attitudes to 
spirituality, see (29, p.51).
m’° Writing in the Revue Française, 1932, quoted in (15, p.228).
' ’ Presumably the authors mean that the support o f women helped the Popular Front rally voters, 
because, o f course, French women still did not have the vote in 1936.
The low birth rate was seen as result o f prosperity and consumerism: see the explanation in the 
official report to the President in 1939, the ‘Code de la famille’, reproduced in E. Calnn, (72, pp.484- 
5).
Blum talking at the Procès de Riom in 1942, quoted in (11, pp. 157-8).
Quoted in (45, p.82).
J. Maritain, cited in (15, p.338).
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Chapter 3 
Ni droite, ni gauche
3.1 Introduction
Ni droite, ni gauche, mais devant! Waechter’s anti-alliance tendency dominated 
green politics in France until the early 1990s. Even though some degree of 
cooperation with the left has been accepted recently, criticisms of both the left and 
the right remain central to green political theory. Such criticisms can be explained 
as a reaction against older political parties and ideologies which are seen as having 
caused the current environmental crisis. To solve this, greens argue that new 
structures and ways of thinldng are needed.
Today, les Verts remain split on the grounds of cooperation with other parties. Both 
sides agree, however, that political ecology is a distinct movement, which does not 
fit into the traditional span of political ideologies from left to right. Both also 
vociferously criticise traditional left- and right-wing ideology and ideas. In the 
1930s too, a rejection of the traditional left and right flourished. Indeed, the 
omnipresent plirase ‘ni droite, ni gauche’ is one of the most evident resemblances 
between greens and the 1930s. Modern greens see traditional politics as having led 
to environmental disaster, while 1930s sources saw traditional politics as having led 
to the first World War, economic depression and the general ‘désordre établi’ of 
their society.
Once again, the approach in this chapter will be to outline modern green views on 
this issue; 1930s opinions will then be contrasted with these views. The first section
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of this chapter will therefore consider green arguments for refusing the traditional 
left-right divide, and their criticisms of the traditional left and right.
3.2 Green criticisms of the left-right divide
Traditional classifications are rejected because green parties do not feel they can be 
categorised in this way. They use vivid analogies to illustrate that they represent 
‘une troisième voie’. The image of the traditional left and right merely ‘rearranging 
the deckchairs on the Titanic’ is common (e.g. 20, p. 187; 19, p.43); and Porritt uses 
a surprisingly unenviromnental metaphor to make the same point: politics is
a three-lane motorway, with different vehicles in different lanes, but all 
heading in the same direction. [...] The motorway of industrialism 
inevitably leads to the abyss -  hence our decision to get off it, and seek an 
entirely different direction. (19, p.43)
Greens address themselves to disillusioned citizens who feel neglected by ‘la classe 
politique’. However, they emphasise the need to differentiate between the political 
strategies of cooperation within the system of the Fifth Republic, and ideals. So, 
even if les Verts cooperate with other parties on certain issues, or join a government, 
the ‘ni droite, ni gauche’ stance is still valid: it describes a general criticism of the 
ideologies or approaches of these other parties rather than a practical refusal to work 
with them at times. Waechter explains: ‘le ni droite-ni gauche n’est pas une attitude 
tactique, mais le constat de divergences conceptuelles sans doute irréductibles’ (96, 
p.l7).
Greens argue that the term ‘left-right divide’ is inexact, since the similarities 
between right and left are greater than their differences. First, both are inescapably
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corrupt. In France, ecologists reel off a litany of recent and past scandals: 
collaboration during the Second World War, Giscard and the Bokassa diamonds, the 
Socialists and the Urba scandal, the affaire du sang contaminé, or, of course, the 
Rainbow Warrior affair. Greens aim to offer an alternative to old movements, 
tainted with political scandal, being newcomers who want to keep their reputation 
clean. The policies of the left and right wing parties are also criticised as having led 
to the current crisis. Greens distance themselves from mistakes made by the ‘classe 
politique’, and claim to stand outside this class:
Les écologistes ne portent aucune responsabilité dans les politiques menées 
au cours des dernières années. Leur crédibilité est de ce fait intacte quand 
ils dénoncent la politique [des autres partis]. (122, p. 10)
Voynet highlights the need to ‘moraliser la vie publique’, and adopts a tactic many 
greens favour: instead of highlighting one political party, or the government of the 
time, she criticises all parties -  except, of course, les Verts. A whole political class 
is at fault: ‘Les affaires, les trafics d’influence, les délits d’initiés, les écoutes 
téléphoniques, la corruption: trop de dérapages pourrissent notre vie publique’ (123, 
point 10, p.3). Ail established parties are accused of attempting to steal the 
popularity of green politics, without actually addressing the issues the greens see as 
important. Statements such as that of Socialist Prime Minister Rocard in 1989 
(‘C’est dans tons les partis qu’il faut une pensée verte’) (124, p. 12) provoke a 
cynical reaction in the green camp. Attempts to ‘récupérer’ green politics are 
widespread, in their view. Even the Front National has made such attempts (125, 
P-5).
As well as their attempts to swallow political ecology, left and right have in common 
their responsibility for the current environmental crisis. Both are product!vist, pro­
growth, industrialist; both, particularly today, work within a capitalist economy. 
Economic growth is the issue which linlcs left and right particularly for the greens, 
who argue that ‘the global obsession with growth has led to a remarkable
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resemblance between capitalist and communist economies’ (29, p.78). Growth is an 
objective in each type of economy, one the greens see as disastrous: ‘Present-day 
economists, whether neoclassical, marxist, keynesian, or of the many post-keynesian 
schools generally lack an ecological perspective’ (ibid., p.76).
Left and right have also failed sufficiently to address the urgency of the 
environmental crisis. It is ‘a crisis which political organizations of left, right and 
centre seem unwilling to aclarowledge’ (37, p .l), even while they try to swallow the 
green parties. Worse, they continue to propose the same ‘remedies’ that caused the 
present crisis (126, p.2). Greens criticise ‘la suffisance du monde politique’ here 
(127, p. 10), rather than any single party. The dominance of one age-group and sex 
attracts more attention from the greens than their party allegiances: ‘ce Sénat 
consternant par sa sur-représentation d’hommes du troisième âge’ (ibid., p. 10).
The effects of both left and right-wing administrations on the individual or the 
person are seen as very similar by the greens. They often point out that ‘la personne 
se trouve opprimée dans les républiques populaires de l’Est tout autant que dans les 
sociétés capitalistes’ (73, p.41). Greens hold that both right and left-wing parties 
base their policies on ‘des idéologies nées sur les bancs d’une autre époque’ (35, 
p. 136) which must be rejected if the current crisis is to be solved. The fact that left 
and right have much in common and are rooted in an industrialist worldview means 
that neither is able to solve current problems: ‘they and their ideologies are part of 
the problem’ (128, p.x).
Some greens go further, arguing that it is ideology per se which must be rejected. 
This rejection is based on the argument that the ecological crisis is so grave as to 
‘transcend ideology’; ‘pollution, overpopulation and resource shortages [will] get us 
all, regardless of whether we [are] left or right’ (129, p.l 17). That neither left nor 
right wing worldviews have been different in practice is illustrated by a slogan used 
by greens in various countries: ‘the socialist atom is as radioactive as the capitalist
tos
atom’ (130, p. 165). There is also a desire to keep the diversity, the arc-en-ciel 
quality of the green movement. A clearly-defined ideology might discourage some 
members or supporters. Greens comment that ‘il est impossible de parler de 
Técologie au singulier’ (131, p.54); instead, they often refer to ‘écologismes’, or to 
the green ‘umbrella’, arguing that ‘les idéologies sont, par essence, à la fois 
réductrices et sources de division’ (35, p. 126).
Such greens believe their movement is more than the representative of a political 
ideology: ‘l’écologie est à la fois une science et une philosophie’ (132, p. 12). 
Waechter points out that, in theoretical terms, this means that the green approach 
resembles either left or right at times (96, pp.243-4). The stress on diversity also 
leads them to attack the bipolarisation of political life which they see as too 
simplistic, damaging - and dangerous, because, in their view, it has led to the 
appearance of the FN: ‘Le Front National -  l ’aboutissement de la politique bipolaire’ 
(38, p.289). Bipolarisation is also criticised because it hinders movements like the 
greens who wish to ‘faire la politique autrement’. Gaining power is not the only (or 
even the main) focus of the greens, and this affects their credibility in a bipolar 
system.
Perhaps surprisingly, green fears that bipolarisation affects their credibility might be 
unfounded. Indeed, the greens’ often independent stance in a climate where bargains 
and deals are the norm has been seen as an ‘atout’: ‘le vote vert bénéficie de la 
volonté des Français d’échapper aux clivages gauche-droite’ (133, p.3). A final 
reason for rejecting bipolarisation, then, might be simple self-interest.
As we have seen. Greens reject the left-right divide, but they also criticise the 
policies of traditional left and right-wing parties, and the ideologies on which these 
are based. Their principal criticisms of first the left, then the right will now be 
outlined.
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While there is common ground between the greens and both left and right, it is 
nonetheless undeniable that they have more sympathy with the left. Jaffré describes 
the ‘sympathie des électeurs verts pour les idées et les partis de gauche’ (134, p .12), 
and repeated analyses of les Verts’ membership find that a far higher proportion are 
prepared to vote for the left than for the right in second ballots (107, pp. 142-3). It 
would seem to be true that the strongest criticism is reserved for those closest to you. 
Whereas greens have low expectations of the right, they see the left as betraying 
their potential.
Que la droite cache et se cache [...] la fm d’un monde, cela peut se 
comprendre. Que la gauche [...] n ’imagine d’autre issue de la crise qu’une 
gestion étatique du capitalisme et continue d’aller chercher chez Keynes des 
remèdes qui, déjà inopérants sous Roosevelt, sont devenus inapplicables, 
dénote qu’elle est sur le point de mourir faute d’imagination. (94, p .15)
The first criticism greens make is, understandably, of the attempt to categorise green 
politics as a subset of left-wing politics. When asked why les Verts did not ‘admit’ 
to being left-wing, Lipietz replied: ‘Les Verts ne sont pas de gauche parce que la 
gauche n ’est plus de gauche’ (135, pp.64-5). Bennahmias and Roche argue that ‘les 
valeurs de justice, de solidarité et de partage qui sont celles de la gauche, d’un point 
de vue philosophique’ (107, p. 141) are now more evident in green policies than in 
those of the left. Voynef s rhetoric supports this analysis -  in 1995, she was arguing 
that ‘redistribuer les richesses’ (123, Point IX, p.3) was essential (a phrase now 
hardly used by the left). Greens criticise modern socialists for simply ‘managing 
capitalism’ (136, p.30). For Brière, les Verts are ‘plus rouges que rouges, c’est-à- 
dire, verts’ (137, n.p.). Certainly, in terms of social issues and values, ‘l’électorat 
écologiste est, depuis plus de dix ans, celui qui, presque constamment, affiche les 
positions les plus libertaires’ (138, p.64). Greens also argue that the left is to be 
criticised as it is overly optimistic about what can be achieved in time of ecological 
crisis: ‘il revendique le Meilleur des Mondes alors qu’il s’agit d’éviter le pire’ (102, 
p.96).
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With regard to particular policies, the left is particularly criticised in France for its 
pro-nuclear stance. The PS view that Tes dangers du nucléaire sont maîtrisables 
grâce au progrès scientifique’ (132, p. 134) is rejected, while the PCF is seen as 
worse still due to its combination of ‘jacobinisme, foi dans “le progrès scientifique”, 
glorification de la technologie, nationalisme et chauvinisme’ (ibid., p .136). The 
traditional centralism of the left is strongly criticised here. The left’s starting point 
of the economic sphere is also attacked. The stress on economic growth and 
ownership of the means of production on the left as an answer to unemployment and 
precariousness is one major difference between green and left approaches; ‘a filthy 
smokestack is still a filthy smokestack whether it is owned by the state or by a 
private corporation’ (19, p.48). The left-wing emphasis on the economic sphere as a 
way of increasing the general standard of living or ‘happiness’ is criticised by the 
greens: ‘une conception matérialiste du bonheur’ (96, p. 17) can only fail, and leave 
the majority resentful. As early as 1974, greens made the point that an emphasis on 
the economic sphere to increase happiness is absurd: ‘The French consume twice as 
much energy as in 1963. Are we twice as happy?
Alliances with the left were long rejected by greens, aware of the danger of being 
swallowed by the bigger partner. Duchêne, a green councillor explained their 
position in 1989: ‘Je me sens plus proche des gens de gauche. Mais si on fait 
alliance avec eux, on disparaîtra’ (139, p.3). Sainteny holds that such green fears are 
justified, if PS strategies are examined in relation to the level of the greens’ success, 
as ‘les stratégies de récupération et de réaction du Parti Socialiste envers 
l’écologisme’ vary according to the greens’ success rate (140, p.45).
The experience of the left in power in the 1980s is also frequently cited in green 
criticisms. The promised referendum on nuclear power never materialised. Nor was 
the Socialist policy of a reduction in the working week implemented. Of course, the 
Socialists were the party of the Rainbow Warrior, too -  ‘un véritable défi aux 
écologistes du monde entier’ (35, p.53). Finally, the experience of Chernobyl in
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April 1986, when ‘the French public, Greens included, were subject to one of the 
most successful state exercises in misinformation in Western Europe’ (141, p .181) 
confirmed green scepticism about the possibility of information in the nuclear field, 
no matter which party was in power.
Greens criticise the left’s specific policies; indeed, an exhaustive list of green 
criticisms of left-wing parties’ policies and conduct in government is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Flowever, to conclude, we can note that such green criticisms 
are based on the left’s unwillingness to accept sustainability as a guiding principle. 
Murray Bookchin explains:
The most unbridgeable difference between [political ecology] and the 
traditional left is that the traditional left assumes, consciously or 
unconsciously, that the ‘domination of nature’ is an objective, historical 
imperative. (25, p.56)
If the greens can be said to share certain views with the left, they also have policies 
and views in common with the right: the belief that the human being has a ‘proper 
place’ in the natural order is clearly ‘right-wing’ (20, pp.30-1). The left would also 
accuse the greens of adopting classic right-wing strategies on ‘natural’ limits to 
human achievement, on the denial that class divisions are fundamental, and on the 
Romantic view of nature (ibid., p.31). However, even in these areas, green policies 
leading from these views are different, as they are also influenced by their far more 
libertarian stance on social and cultural issues; and it is undeniable that green 
politics and the right have far fewer points of agreement than of disagreement. Even 
if positions occasionally coincide, ‘understanding the political and intellectual nature 
of Green politics means seeing that its political prescriptions are fundamentally left- 
liberal’ (ibid., p.84).
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If we compare the actual policies of the main right-wing parties^ in France and les 
Verts, it is certainly a lack of common ground which is most striking. There is basic 
disagreement on virtually all the issues they see as important, and particularly on 
social issues. With regard to public spending and taxation, their approaches are 
opposed. Les Verts want to increase both, whether by introducing new taxes (e.g. 
‘des “pollutaxes” pour F industrie’) (46, p.9) or by using public spending to increase 
the number of people working in environmentally ‘useful’ spheres. The parties of the 
right, however take the opposite approach: ‘les impôts et les charges étouffent 
l’économie, nous les baisserons’ (142, p.2).
Les Verts want to reinforce protective measures for workers (46, p.5), while the 
UDF’s emphasis is on employers rather than their employees (142, p.3). The greens 
are also interventionist in terms of consumer protection (46, p.4), unlike the classic 
parties of the right. Feminism is at the heart of the approach of les Verts, who focus 
particularly on encouraging female participation in political and public life (143, 
n.p.). They have also, unlike any other French political party, installed parité within 
their own party. The right, however, have been strongly criticised by les Verts for 
their attempts to block such measures over the last thiee years (142, p.2). Both les 
Verts and the right see ‘la politique familiale’ as a central issue, but offer completely 
opposite suggestions, with les Verts aiming to replace it by a ‘politique de l ’enfant’ 
(46, p. 10), while the UDF aim for a ‘politique familiale encore plus globale, concrete 
et ambitieuse’ (142, p.4).
The right-wing parties’ continuing faith in technology and growth to solve the 
problems of the enviromnent and unemployment is another key policy area where 
greens would argue the right’s aims are unsustainable. The right are to be criticised 
even more than the left on the nuclear issue, in particular, since they actually 
introduced the nuclear programme as it exists today in 1974. Worse still, they did so 
without consulting French citizens via a referendum. In terms of social or cultural 
policies, the difference is also marked. On issues such as education, immigration or
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drugs policy, the right and the greens are diametrically opposed (46, p.8 and 142,
p.2).
Overall, the institutions and emphasis of the gaullist 5^ ’’ Republic are criticised by 
the greens. They focus especially on centralised power, hierarchy (particularly the 
powers given to the President), the concentration of power in the hands of what they 
see as a political élite or class of professional politicians, and a general lack of 
openness and citizen participation. Les Verts want Te double refus du libéralisme et 
de Pétatisme’ (46, p.7). The right relies instead on ‘centralisation and large-scale 
bureaucratie control’ (20, p.29).
The most consistent focus for green criticisms, in terms of both policy and approach, 
is the Front National. This emphasis has been particularly apparent since the late 
1980s when the FN began to claim it was a ‘green’ party, an approach they still 
adopt today. In their 1997 legislative programme, for example, they devote one of 
their 16 sections to ‘ecology’, though it is not an ecology most greens would 
recognise; ‘Mieux vivre en France; [...] Défense du patrimoine naturel, architectural 
et culturel français’ (145, p.3) [my italics]. The greens state the distinctions between 
the two movements and their abhorrence of the far right unambiguously:
A la violence, la haine, la démagogie et le repliement égoïste des thèses 
lepénistes, les Verts répondent par le respect de la persomie, la solidarité 
supranationale et la non-violence. (146, n.p.)
Moving on now to the second kind of green criticism of the right (that is, of their 
general approach or worldviews), it is here that the Greens generally formulate their 
more direct criticisms. The main criticisms are of capitalism, and particularly 
capitalist industrialism. The right still see growth or increased production as the way 
forward: ‘la bataille pour la croissance et l’emploi’ (142, p .l) is mentioned 
positively in the very first sentence of the UDF programme in 1997, for example;
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and the RPR even argue that Chirac’s decision to dissolve the Assemblée Nationale 
in 1997 was based on a view that an increase in economic growth was desirable and 
possible (144, p.l).
Of course, for greens growth is a longstanding bête noire. In their view, the logic of 
capitalist economies compounds industrialism’s worst vices. They argue that 
‘capitalism permeates the whole globe’ (147, p.4) since, even in former communist 
states, increasing production rather than the satisfying of basic needs was the guiding 
principle (148, pp.37-8). Greens particularly criticise the encouragement of 
consumerism and the attitude that ‘après nous le déluge, et tant pis pour nos 
enfants’.^  Finally, the effects on the person of capitalism are attacked. The belief in 
trickle-down economics is attacked because the process cannot work in times of 
resource scarcity (19, p.45).
Given the lack of common ground between the greens and the right, it is hardly 
surprising that les Verts see the right’s attempts to ‘accaparer’ ecology as even more 
dangerous than those of the left. ‘Greening’ industry simply delays the problem and 
further depletes resources; it is not, despite its apparent enviromiiental 
improvements, compatible with a more green society (20, p. 178).
Having considered modern green views of the left-right divide, and criticisms of the 
left and right, we can now ask how far the analysis presented in our 1930s sources is 
similar.
3.3 1930s Criticisms
Seldom is the issue of hindsight more relevant than in a comparison of 1930s and 
1990s views on the possibility of a ‘Third Way’ in politics. In France, discussions of
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a ‘Third Way’ in the years following the Second World War were virtually 
inexistent, due to its association in people’s minds with fascism. The Poujadists first 
attempted to use the rhetoric of a new third way in politics in the mid-1950s, a short­
lived extremist attempt which further discredited any such stance. Not until the 
much later arrival of the greens, a new and clearly liberal movement, born in a 
period when the Third Way no longer sounded so dangerous, could such an approach 
realistically be discussed again (though the greens are still careful to acknowledge 
possible dangers).
In the 1930s, however, the ‘Third Way’ approach was widespread, and was certainly 
not limited to extreme-right groups. When we consider 1930s attitudes to the Third 
Way, we will therefore find striking parallels between these and later views of the 
greens, parallels which cannot easily be made between the 1930s and political 
movements in the interim period. Reynolds reckons that historians’ accounts of the 
1930s have failed to acknowledge the diversity of political opinion during the 
period. As she puts it, ‘The clash between left and right is the main plot of the 
opera’ (149, p.225) which means that groups, movements or ideas which situated 
themselves outside the traditional left or right (she mentions pacifists and groups 
dominated by women, but the statement holds true for many others) are less studied. 
This focus on left and right is increasingly seen as too narrow -  it takes into account 
‘the realities of the period only very partially, and it often fails to take them into 
account at all’ (150, p.x).
The second part of this chapter attempts to incorporate these two points -  that of 
similarities between modern greens’ and 1930s approaches to the left-right divide, 
and that of historians’ tendency to overlook the widespread nature of the ‘ni-ni’ 
stance in the 1930s. In doing so, one caveat must be mentioned from the outset. 
While at the start of the 1930s, ‘le régime parlementaire paraissait à bout de souffle’ 
(151, p .145), and the ni-ni stance was emphasised, by the time of the events of 6^ '^  
February 1934, the danger of fascism led many to accept political commitment on 
the left. This was the case for Giono, for example. Indeed, whether or not
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individuals supported the Popular Front, its immediate effect was to encourage a 
‘prise de position’: ‘Le renouvellement des pratiques militantes marqua 
profondément les années du Front populaire’ (152, p. 102). However, by the time of 
the failure of the Front populaire, disillusionment led many to return to their initial 
ni-ni stance. Discussions of the ni-ni approach in the 1930s must bear such 
changing positions in mind.
As for the greens, we will consider first 1930s criticisms of the left-right divide 
itself; then their main criticisms of each ‘side’ of this political spectrum.
3.4 1930s criticisms of the left-right divide
Hoffman offers a double explanation for the willingness to begin to question long- 
established political divisions in the climate of 1930s France, that is the collapse of 
the WWl Union Sacrée, and the growing internationalism of politics: ‘La rupture du 
consensus interne, dû à la guerre, portait au sein du pays le conflit idéologique 
externe’ (153, p. 15). To question the left-right divide was not a brand-new reaction 
of course. By the 1930s, such questioning had been apparent for over a century (65, 
p. 14). What was new was the ‘ampleur’ of this reaction. Its importance is found 
first in the number of groups who used ‘ni-ni’ rhetoric, as we shall see; and second 
in the particularly vehement stress they placed on this stance. Some used their 
group’s very name to underline their commitment -  Ordre Nouveau provided a 
reminder of their ‘Third Way’ ambitions through their choice (65, p.36). Others, 
Esprit notably, highlighted the absurdity of the arbitrary nature of the left-right 
division:
A interroger le contenu rationnel des mots, aucune opposition n ’est plus 
décevante, même sur le seul plan politique, que l’opposition gauche-droite."^
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Like modern greens, 1930s groups were keen to stress that their vision of a ‘Third 
Way’ did not simply mean a political centrism. Many thus used the vocabulaiy of 
revolution, or extremes, not always entirely convincingly. Interestingly, they even 
used similar metaphors as those chosen by modern environmentalists, emphasising 
the need for a total change of steam, of direction. For Esprit, for example what was 
needed was Tin renversement de vapeur, une révision profonde des valeurs’ (26, 
p .l 19). In terms which recall Porritf s earlier description of greens’ refusal of the 
traditional left-right divide, Aron and Dandieu were already explaining in the early 
1930s that;
S’il faut absolument nous situer en termes parlementaires, nous répétons 
que nous sommes à mi-chemin entre F extrême-droite et F extrême-gauche, 
par-derrière le président, tournant le dos à l’assemblée. (15, p.213)
Nor was the desire for a new ‘Third Way’ confined to groups who could not be 
linked to one or other side of the political spectrum. Just as the greens’ policies and 
ideas are often broadly associated with the left, so many of the groups using the ‘ni- 
ni’ rhetoric popular in the 1930s can clearly be associated with one or other tendency 
(154, p . l84). What is striking is that similar views were present, in similar terms 
across the political spectrum and outside it. The criticisms of the established left and 
right and the desire for a new Third Way meant that apparently opposite extremes 
actually agreed on basic issues. Borne and Dubief make this point clearly:
Un commun refus de l’ordre établi, la volonté que cela change conduisaient 
l’extrême gauche et l ’extrême droite à s’entendre, non dans le domaine de 
Faction, où les coups s’échangeaient, mais dans celui des idées’. (11, p .101)
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In the 1930s, as today, the rejection of traditional left and right meant that seeing 
those in power as an unchanging ‘classe politique’ rather than distinguishable parties 
based on very different ideas was common currency, perhaps even more so than in 
modern green circles. Parties were presented as cynical, stressing their differences 
or resemblances according to political convenience:
Dès que les circonstances, et notamment les nécessités électorales, semblent 
imposer un système d’alliances, les malheureux [= les partis] oublient 
instantanément les distinctions qu’ils n ’avaient d’ailleurs jamais faites qu’à 
grand-peine. (155, pp. 16-7)
Mayeur described the atmosphere of the early 1930s as one o f ‘exaspération 
générale’ with the ‘classe politique’ (149, p.205); the groups studied frequently used 
stronger terms - ‘l’intolérable tyrannie des partis’,^  for example. As evidence that 
democracy was but an ‘illusion’ and that the existence of the ‘classe politique’ was 
more significant than the left-right divide, some 1930s groups cited the ease with 
which voters transferred their allegiance from one supposed extreme to its opposite. 
Discussing the 1930s, Liithy quotes the example of whole groups of electors, 
particularly in the ‘word-intoxicated South’ who switched their allegiance from the 
Radicals to the Communists ‘apparently without noticing the difference’ (85, p.46).
Generalised criticisms of the ‘classe politique’ do not, however, imply an outright 
refusal to work with it. Just as the greens have had a somewhat confusing strategy 
here, many 1930s groups took a perhaps contradictory stance as regards cooperation 
with the ‘classe politique’ they so vehemently criticised. The Personalists expressed 
this stance in concrete terms at least. Beginning from the acceptance of political 
commitment (‘le Personnalisme ne doit jamais se laisser tenter par le luxe moral 
d’une pureté isolée’ )^, they defined their strategy in terms which might have served 
as a blueprint to modern greens:
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Du moins au départ, l’indépendance à l’égard des partis et des groupements 
constitués est nécessaire à une nouvelle mesure des perspectives. Elle 
n ’affirme pas un anarchisme ou un apolitisme de principe. (26, p.l 18)
Just as we noted with modem greens, we can observe a (perhaps wilful) confusion in 
the terms used - it is frequently unclear whether parties, movements or ideologies are 
being criticised. Milza argues that such ambiguity is understandable during the 
1930s, particularly when discussing fascism - ‘Le mot recouvre des réalités bien 
différentes’ (154, p. 172) from self-declared fascist leagues to those who would claim 
not to be fascist, but who shared virtually all the same goals. But this ambiguity is 
also partly because the extremes of both right and left in particular DID share some 
approaches or values, including
a common devotion to the ideas of a single-party, totalitarian 
dictatorship,-[and] a common hatred of liberal democracy which made such 
freakish events as the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 seem not umiatural. (156, 
p.l5)
Saint-Exupéry represents a good example of a writer who made just this point, and 
did so repeatedly in the latter half of the 1930s (157, p.74); he of course found 
himself in the position of a first-hand observer of both extremes, through his other 
role as an early pilot. In terms which recall the language of his Personalist 
contemporaries and the later greens, this experience led him
au nom de l’homme, (de prendre) parti contre toute civilisation totalitaire, 
qu’elle l’asservisse à un tyran ou à une masse anonyme, (ibid., p.74)
When discussing Saint-Exupéry, critics frequently highlight his assimilation of 
regimes, extremes, ideas, ideologies, political systems. All are suspect and lumped
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together: ‘Saint-Exupéry refuse le fascisme, il refuse le communisme, il renvoie dos 
à dos capitalisme et socialisme’ (110, p. 109). Giono’s favoured method of making 
this connection between such apparently diverse groups and ideas was simply to 
refer to them as one of a kind, frequently doing so implicitly - for example, by 
referring to the USSR as just another fascist state. In a typical passage, he sketches 
the similarities between not only fascism and communism, but between these two 
and parliamentary democracies as well:
Dans les Etats démocratiques comme la France, (...) l’organisation sociale 
prévoit la place de grosses fourmis au ventre blanc qui sont des reines qu’on 
nourrit et qu’on soigne. Dans les Etats autoritaires fascistes: Russie, 
Allemagne, Italie, l ’ordre social ne prévoit plus que la place d’un nombre 
très restreint de ces grosses reines et tend vers une reine unique au ventre 
énorme. Toute la différence entre les deux systèmes est là. (68, p. 194)
The second explanation for the (deliberate) confusion of supposedly opposed 
extremes was arguably the apparent ease with which prominent figures crossed from 
one to the other during the period studied. The willingness of intellectuals, in 
particular, to move from right to left and vice versa (‘Des intellectuels communistes 
sont passés au fascisme; des étudiants d’Action Française en 1930 étaient 
communistes en 1936’) (11, p .101) seemed to confirm that the ideas of both could 
not be entirely dissimilar. Sternhell (150, pp.l 11-2) has catalogued the attempts to 
capitalise on these crossovers, and underlines that, even if they were in fact relatively 
rare occurrences, their impact should not be underestimated. Thus such high-profile 
conversions as that of Doriot^ at the very least created a certain confusion.
Overall, our 1930s sources generally based their criticisms of the left-right divide on 
the premise that both right and left, whether extreme or mainstream, had more in 
common than they realised. The shared qualities of left and right are examined and
mcriticised at length, and fall into broadly the same categories as the criticisms made 
of both by greens today.
First, both left and right are corrupt. Such an emphasis is hardly surprising for two 
reasons. First, perhaps the most serious, and certainly one of the most divisive 
‘scandales politiques’ in France, the Dreyfus affair, was still in living memory and 
marked many, who feared that the apparent explosion of scandals would again lead 
to momentous divisions. The affair is mentioned frequently in the literature of the 
period, even (perhaps especially) in that of young writers, often as a kind of 
shorthand. To describe a character as ‘dreyfusard’ served to imply many other 
qualities or opinions. Thus Drieu could sum up a character by explaining that ‘M. 
Falkenberg avait fait catholiques ses enfants au temps de l’Affaire; ce qui ne l’avait 
pas empêché d’être dreyfusard’ (158, p. 169).
Second, particularly in the early years of the decade, scandals seemed to be 
accumulating as never before. Between 1928 and 1932, in particular, the impression 
was o f ‘scandales accumulés, particulièrement nombreux, à répétition pourrait-on 
dire’ (11, pp. 108-9). Political corruption was if anything more widespread and of a 
more serious nature in the 1930s than in the 1990s. Even the riots of February 1934 
were ostensibly a reaetion to ‘the corruption of the government’ (85, p.50). Often, a 
passing reference to ‘les affaires’ (65, p.212) was sufficient to explain a disgust with 
politics and politicians of all colours. The perceived corruption of French political 
life led to vituperative criticism, in terms that even modern greens might avoid as 
too extreme. Once again, parliamentary democracy per se was often targeted, 
standing as a general symbol of political life, in terms such as ‘pourriture 
parlementaire’ (11, p.l 10); but others were more specific or detailed in their 
criticisms of political corruption.
‘Les hommes politiques’ were particularly attacked, whether by literary or non­
conformist figures. Saint-Exupéry’s ‘répugnance à l’égard de l’homme politique’
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(110, p.l 10) was remarkable. Maulnier summed up the non-conformist view of 
French parliamentarians in 1934 - Tine coalition d’incapables, d ’escrocs et de 
policiers’ (15, p. 190). Politicians were seen as working in a general climate of 
dishonesty, usually in bianlcet terms -  ‘Gouverner c’est mentir’ (27, p.241). Once 
again, we note that all parties, all governments, whether of the left or the right are 
derided as one.
Non-conformist movements of the period were ‘volontiers “proudhoniens”’ (65, 
p.36). Admiration was also reserved, across the spectrum of non-conformist groups 
for the ideas of Comte, who had argued earlier that left and right wing politics were 
unlikely to provide answers to rampant ‘individualisme’.^  Given the scornful view 
of politics of both Proudhon (‘Faire de la politique, c’est se laver les mains dans la 
crotte’ )^, and Comte (politics being ‘un agent délétère minant la société’) (15, 
p. 127), it was hardly surprising that their self-declared disciples used them as 
inspiration in their criticisms of the left-right divide.
Sternhell has catalogued how the stress on human ‘materialism’ or ‘individualism’ 
(terms which are used incessantly in virtually all 1930s sources), coupled with a 
contemporary stress on French decadence and the corruption of her political parties 
and system represented a prevailing political ‘climate’, which would eventually lead, 
in his view, to an easy acceptance of fascism after the débâcle. For Sternhell, these 
factors are evidence that French people were ‘prepared’ by the end of the 1930s for 
fascism'^; he does, however, recognises that identical critiques could be found in the 
1930s across the political spectrum, on the extremes, and in the ideas of those who 
entirely refused polities.
Another way in which 1930s sources join modern greens is in explaining the shared 
corruption of left and right is by stressing that these ‘old’ movements or ideologies 
were equally responsible for the current crisis. Unlike the new movements, whose 
hands were clean, they had been in power when the crisis began. This old ‘classe
politique’ is condemned for its willingness to commit the young to war, seen as 
particularly damning. Given the youthful membership of many of these new groups, 
and recent memories of wartime, this would be unsuiprising merely in terms of self- 
interest. The extremist groups, the non-conformists and many writers and 
intellectuals used similar rhetoric to condemn ‘des ministres, le président qui signa 
les affiches, (...) tous ceux qui avaient un intérêt quelconque à se servir du sang des 
enfants de vingt ans’ (160, p. 15).
AU the groups were united in condemning, as greens repeatedly do, the lack of 
morality in public life, seen as present both on the traditional left and right (and 
indeed in western societies generally - ‘le déclin des valeurs occidentales’ (161, p.9) 
was an oft-repeated criticism in the 1930s). Such criticisms took two forms. Either 
the new movement would take a somewhat threatening stance, offering to rid France 
of such immorality, or it would simply stress its difference - its very basis being 
supposedly ‘moral’.
The first form was of course more frequent on the extreme right and left. Thus the 
Jeunesses Patriotes had a poster campaign in the 1930s linking politics and a lack of 
moral behaviour: ‘SFIO, démagogie, dictatures, sale finance, les Jeunesses Patriotes 
balaieront tout ça!’ (11, p. 106), and the Action Française’s stated aim during the 
riots of February 1934 was ‘s’opposer à une politique d’immoralité’ (154, p .161).
Of course the problem of defining what was meant by ‘morality’ in public life was 
more difficult (immorality was easily conjured up by references to ‘les affaires’, or 
hints at financial impropriety - the ‘sale finance’ of the JP poster); but this did not 
stop the new groups claiming that they would bring about such a moral atmosphere. 
There was, at least, some awareness of the need to start from a self-critical attitude, 
particularly among the extreme-right intellectuals of the period:
mA cause de mon idée de décadence, T introspection prenait une signification 
morale. Ayant à démasquer et à dénoncer, je pensais qu’il était juste que je 
commençasse par moi-même. (162, p. 12)
Others set up their movements with the express intention (or even the sole aim) of 
providing a new more moral alternative and just as the greens have more recently, 
spent years in the attempt to finetune an organisation which could guarantee moral 
conduct, usually basing their attempts, again as the greens do, on some appeal to 
‘spirituality’, religion or key, defined moral principles. Such a new approach was 
felt to be necessary in the face of the lack of morality in current movements and 
political life generally. So Mounier ‘aimed to create a movement, based on a 
doctrine of social and moral humanism, which would herald a new civilization’ 
(141,p.l92).
The idea of moral influence being exerted on public life was not a new one in France 
(Sangnier’s ‘Sillon’ movement had earlier attempted a fusion of religious and 
political principles, and was condemned by Rome for the attempt''), but the number 
of new groups claiming this as their prime motivation, and thus implicitly criticising 
the existing order, was. Often, as greens do today, youth, health and moral 
commitment would be linked, as in the Auberges movements. Indeed, a further 
criticism made in several 1930s sources was of the established political parties’ 
attempts to ‘récupérer’ new movements focussing on youth and moral commitment, 
like the Auberges, which had been set up with the express intention of being neither 
left nor right, of uniting young people from city and country in a non-party-political 
atmosphere. Giono saw the encouragement of the Auberges by the Front Populaire 
as little more than a Communist ploy to hamper the effectiveness and water down 
the high moral principles of a new movement, based on pacifist, non-party 
sentiments (27, p.248).
This was a danger stressed by most youth and non-conformist movements in the 
1930s - ‘On pose des questions morales et tout se termine en cuisine électorale’.'^
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Their fear was similar to that of the early green parties in France: that the established 
parliamentary parties, once aware of public pressure for change and the new 
movements’ radical plans to bring it about without them, would attempt to water 
down these movements’ ideas and policies by pretending to take them on board, in 
the Imowledge that through parliamentary procedure or the lack of familiarity of the 
new movements with the political system, their radical aims would go unmet. New 
ideas and approaches faced becoming ‘broyés, dénaturés par un impitoyable 
mécanisme’ - parliament and the existing political system, dominated by the old 
parties (15, p.201). There was no difference between left and right here: both were 
viewed as unscrupulous, accepting of damaging political traditions and concerned 
above all with their own survival within those traditions. Just as Greens today 
criticise the established parties’ attempts to ‘récupérer’ the success of their 
movement by watering down its ideas via parliamentary committees and long, 
drawn-out legislative processes, Ordre Nouveau warned (though in terms the greens 
would probably avoid) in October 1933 that:
Les députés et sénateurs stérilisent les idées et les sentiments par des 
méthodes aussi parfaitement taylorisées que le geste des Nègres, chargés à 
Chicago de saigner les cochons à leur entrée dans la chaîne, (ibid., p.201)
The rejection of capitalism could also be linked to the rejection of the left-right 
divide in the 1930s because the economic policy of both supposed opposites was 
rarely different:
II est très difficile, dans les années trente, de distinguer nettement une 
politique économique de droite et une politique économique de gauche. (65,
p.221)
Even apparently radical changes under the Popular Front led to little improvement in 
the day-to-day lives of the majority, as prices increased as fast, or faster, than their
t26
incomes did. Many of the non-conformist groups saw liberal economic policies as 
omnipresent, whether in democratic states run by centre-right elected governments, 
or in the supposed alternative of communist states. Reports of the fate of peasants in 
the USSR during the drive to collectivise farming were used as illustrations that 
human beings were being sacrificed at the altar of economic growth in communist 
states just as they were in capitalist ones (73, p.207).
Not until the arrival of modern greens were the apparently accepted ‘benefits’ of 
economic growth questioned to the same extent as in the 1930s. First, criticisms of 
‘le matérialisme grossier’*^ abounded. Materialism was seen to be the inevitable 
result of the emphasis on economic growth in capitalist societies, and was often seen 
as negative on spiritual grounds. Again, communist regimes were as dangerous as 
those traditionally perceived as capitalist here: ‘La politique personnaliste rejetait le 
matérialisme individualiste ou collectiviste’ (11, p.99). The idea was that capitalism 
(including state capitalism) was dangerous because the individual or ‘person’ was 
seen as a mere ‘ustensile de la société capitaliste’ (160, p. 19): ‘L’état capitaliste 
considère la vie humaine comme la matière véritablement première de la production 
du capital’ (ibid., p.21).
The policies in favour of economic growth of right and left were notably criticised 
by Giono, in terms familiar to modern greens. Like greens, Giono attempts to 
persuade that a different conception of the good life is necessary; that fulfilment is 
not related to wealth. Fie argues that ‘la conception moderne de la richesse’ (68, 
p. 157) is a relatively recent and misguided development, resulting in fact in a poorer 
society. Just as greens base many arguments on supposed loss of quality in the 
pursuit of quantity, Giono draws a similar conclusion: ‘On croit augmenter, on 
diminue’ (ibid., p. 186). Again, all parties are indistinguishable and equally 
responsible -  ‘ les partis politiques modernes ont donné [des sens nouveaux] à ces 
mots d’aisance et d’abondance’ (ibid., p. 154).
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In the criticisms of capitalism and of the drive for economic growth in particular, 
one aspect of 1930s criticisms does set them apart from modern greens, however. 
1930s sources, with some notable exceptions like Giono, frequently relied on 
blatantly anti-semitic attacks and caricatures. Such arguments, while clearly widely 
used on the extreme right, can also be found across the political spectrum.
References before and during the Popular Front to the ‘200 families’ often contained 
anti-semitic undertones, for example. Some extreme-right groups implicitly referred 
to Jews, through attacks on ‘la “ploutocratie” et la “finance cosmopolite’” (151, 
p. 143); others explicitly presented Jews as unfaithful citizens, more committed to ‘la 
finance internationale’ (154, p. 173) than to France. Nor were such views confined 
to those now notorious for their extreme-right views, such as the far-right youth 
movements and writers like Céline. Whole sections in Bernanos’ Les grands 
cimetières sous la lune, a work remembered as humanist, if perhaps conservative, to 
take but one example, are difficult even to read today owing to their anti-semitism: 
Jews are attacked for their supposed dedication to capitalism, are presented as a 
danger to France for this reason, and compared in now-shocking terms to a boil 
which should be lanced (155, p.40, for example).
Moving on to the political system, identical criticisms are found in 1930s and green 
sources of the ‘déséquilibre’ (68, p .168) which is again seen as resulting from a 
political system in which too much power is concentrated in the hands of only a few. 
In the 1930s as today, the state was represented as faceless, and discouraging of 
change or the direct participation of citizens:
Le but de l’Etat moderne n’est pas de donner la joie; la joie libère et il a
besoin de contrôler constamment l’existence des hommes, (ibid., p. 193)
While it would not be attempted until over a decade later, drastic reform of the Third 
Republic was widely seen as necessary by 1930 (65, p.222) and was a mobilising 
factor for many of the new movements, just as issues such as parité and participative
mdemocracy are today for the greens. If too much power was seen to be in the hands 
of the few, those few were therefore vulnerable to greater criticism when they were 
perceived to have failed, as the consequences of such failure were greater. Many of 
the youth groups of the 1930s pointed out that those still in power in the 1930s had 
been there before and during the first World War, for example. Indeed, Winock 
partly attributes the widespread engagement of young people in particular in new 
movements in the 1930s to the failure of leadership under the 3'^ Republic. ‘La 
génération des Brasillach’, he argues, felt let down by their leaders’ failure to take 
action, and often contrasted this failure in France with Flitler’s Germany by 1933.
Another point made frequently (with the possible exception of the Popular Front 
hiatus) in the 1930s sources is that, for the ordinary person, there is little if any 
practical difference between govermnents of left and right. In Giono's novels, for 
example, political leaders and governments remain a sinister, unnamed presence -  
male characters go to fight in futile wars, on the orders of faceless politicians, 
referred to vaguely if at all. Political allegiances were irrelevant, since the effects of 
right and left on individuals were the same.
While they were criticised on such practical grounds, the right and left (particularly 
the extremes of fascism and communism) were also targeted in many 1930s sources 
on a more theoretical basis, something which can be seen as linking them to modern 
greens. One relatively widespread reaction to politics in the 1930s was a wholesale 
rejection of ideologies. Just as many greens today argue that ideologies are 
dangerous because they exclude potential sympathisers, so many in the 1930s made 
the same point.
However 1930s critics often went further and talked of ideologies as inherently 
dangerous. Thus for Alain, ‘rien n’est plus dangereux qu’une idée, quand un homme 
n ’a qu’une seule idée’ (161, p. 13). Rigid beliefs were depicted as dangerous in vivid 
images -  Saint-Exupéry referred to ‘la folie sanguinaire des idées’, for example.
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Given the post-war context and the growth of mass movements based on ideology in 
neighbouring countries, it is hardly surprising that such dangers were stressed in the 
1930s, particularly by intellectuals. The lack of freedom of expression which Giono 
denounced in the USSR (27, p.250) found a frightening parallel in the ‘fascisme 
brûleur des livres’ of Hitler’s Germany.
The rigidity of doctrine and ideology was also criticised for its failure to allow for 
dissent or alternative solutions, whether or not they might work. Mounier thus 
attacked ‘impérialisme spirituel de l’homme collectif,’ (73, p.207) while Giono 
raged that the best solutions were inevitably rejected because they were neither of 
the left nor right, but ‘vécu en dehors de leur doctrine et comme malgré elle’ (68, 
p .155):
[Les communistes] préfèrent le triomphe de leur orthodoxie à la vie des
autres. Que tout le monde meure mais que mon parti gagne. (27, p.238)
Ideologies were also rejected on the same grounds as modern greens - due to a desire 
to be inclusive, rather than a fear of potential dangers. Just as today’s greens talk of 
‘écologismes’, so 1930s sources discussed ‘personnalismes’ (and of course, ‘la 
nébuleuse fasciste’ (154, p. 171)). Historians discussing the period agree that the 
movements were diverse and difficult to classify - ‘Les “non-conformistes” sont loin 
de constituer une famille homogène, aisément classable à l’extrême droite du champ 
politique’ (ibid., p. 184). Of course one problem of an arc en cieU inclusive 
approach, as French greens found out during the Brière affair,'^ is that accusations of 
sympathies with extreme right views in the movement are difficult to combat. 1930s 
movements faced similar difficulties and ambiguities -  Milza (154, p. 185) discusses 
resemblances (and underlines the far greater differences) between the non­
conformists and extreme-right groups in depth precisely because attempts were made 
by critics to linlc the two.
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The rejection by some of ideology in the 1930s meant that they claimed a different 
basis or justification for their beliefs or programmes, leading perhaps to a further 
resemblance between 1930s movements and the greens. That is, their movements or 
ideas are based on appeals to some greater authority, be it religion/spirituality or 
science. The Personalists are an obvious case in point, basing their analysis of the 
‘désordre établi’ on a combination of religious faith and philosophy and stressing ‘la 
primauté du spirituel’.'^ The desire to found a new more moral style of politics 
explains this attempt to mix spirituality and politics to some extent; the intellectual 
character of French political debate during the entre deux guerres might also go 
some way to explaining the early willingness to introduce appeals to science.'^
Another potential explanation for the search for less usual sources of inspiration for 
political movements might have been the desire to find a way to move away from 
the bipolarisation of French political life, seen as damaging by 1930s groups just as 
it is today by modern greens. The effects of the opposition of left and right were 
seen as detrimental, even if many considered it an opposition based on a false 
premise (the very existence of a left-right divide). Mounier denounced the effects of 
such a ‘dualisme pernicieux’ in politics (35, p. 133). Particularly towards the end of 
the 1930s, when war began to seem inevitable and unity was sought, such disunity 
was criticised. Perhaps in an attempt to move beyond the bipolar nature of political 
life, many of the 1930s sources rejected the idea of forming a permanent traditional 
political party, just as many greens do. Such views are found across the political 
spectrum and in the attitudes of intellectuals and writers of the period. ‘Mounier ne 
voulait pas être le chef ou l’adhérent d’un parti’ (11, p.99). ‘Pas de manifeste, pas 
de programme, pas de nouveau parti’ is the demand in Gilles (162, p.599).
No doubt the most fervent proponent of this view, however, was Giono, particularly 
by the end of the 1930s. Indeed the Contadour experiment was precisely an attempt 
to attain some sort of group commitment (or ‘communion’) while avoiding a party: 
Giono declared he felt comfortable in ‘un parti qui n’a pas encore de nom, et qui 
n ’en aura jamais, parce qu’il n ’est pas un parti’ (120, p.29). In his writing as well as
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in the example he gave in life, Giono argued, in didactic terms, that parties should be 
rejected ‘en bloc’: ‘Se libérer de tout’ (27, p.261).
Having detailed the shared criticisms between 1930s sources and the greens of the 
left-right divide, we shall now consider the more specific criticisms made in 1930s 
sources of first the left then the right.
‘Frères eimemis’ seems an appropriate description of the difficult relationship 
between the left-wing parties and many of the movements and individuals studied in 
this thesis. A similar analysis of specific themes (the working environment, for 
example) is shared at times, but for the new groups, the traditional left did not 
understand the extent of the crisis or act morally in its attempts to deal with it (and 
moreover, they did so in only a piecemeal fashion). The 1930s, especially after 
Februaiy 1934, were characterised by a desire for ‘engagement’ by intellectuals and 
youth. Thus historians have argued that the importance of Mounier’s Personalist 
philosophy and doctrine was not its originality or coherence but its ‘implication 
politique’, its ability to inspire ‘l’engagement à gauche de jeunes intellectuels 
chrétiens’ in France (89, p.275). However, once many had accepted the idea of 
engagement and looked to the left, the French left-wing parties of the 1930s were 
found wanting.
This is hardly surprising. Little was expected of the traditional right by most of the 
groups and individuals studied here, whereas the left seemed to be promising ‘des 
lendemains qui chantent’, at least in 1936. Before 1934, the left was seen as too 
divided to offer any hope to the new groups. Following the split at Tours in 1920, 
divisions were emphasised across the left. At the start of 1934, the CGT declared 
that: ‘Entre les communistes et nous, il ne peut y avoir rien de commun’ (88, p.86); 
in this at least they agreed with Thorez: ‘On ne marie pas I’eau et le feu’.'^ The 
Communists accused the SFIO of being a ‘parti bourgeois’ (72, p.220), or even 
‘social-fasciste’ in the 1930s (65, p. 15). Relations between the socialists and
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radicals seemed little better. ‘On ne peut pas oublier les batailles violentes entre 
radicaux et socialistes à partir de 1906’ (ibid., p. 15). In the early 1930s, the non­
conformists attacked the ‘impossibilité de servir l’intérêt général au milieu des 
querelles partisanes’ (15, p. 199).
Credibility was a problem for the traditional left when discussing revolution too. The 
PCF veered between contradictory positions, making a very public volte-face 
regarding its revolutionary stance between 1934 and 1939. The SFIO’s ‘uneasy 
balance between revolution and reformism’ in the 1920s and 1930s was equally 
conftising (72, p.254). By the 1930s, Jaurès’ strategy of waiting for ‘la croissance du 
prolétariat’, devised at the start of the century, was seen to be inappropriate, but 
there was no consensus on an alternative.
The very idea of a proletarian revolution was seen as fundamentally misguided by 
most 1930s groups and writers. The strategy of preparing (or waiting) for revolution 
was seen as a betrayal; indeed betrayal was an accusation frequently levelled at the 
left in the 1930s. Above all, the left was seen as having betrayed certain values.
Just as greens today argue that their liberal views on subjects such as feminism do 
not make them left-wing (since they are if anything more radical than the left), so 
many in the 1930s felt that their values actually differentiated them from a left which 
had abandoned them. There were two contradictory fears when discussing values on 
the left.
First, there was the fear that the left was too radical or extreme. This was a fear of 
the Communist party especially -  the fact it was not just a ‘parti comme les autres’ 
was stressed. What made it different in kind from the other parties was, of course, 
its ‘special relationship with Moscow and the Comintern’ (165, p. 147). The PCF’s 
acceptance of the 21 conditions of the 3"^  ^International, and more recently the purges 
in 1931 of members judged not to be adhering to these provoked the fear that France 
would be a European battleground for the two extremes of communism and fascism.
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For the Personalists, communism was to be feared as much as fascism because its 
main emphasis was economic -  this was not a ‘person-centred’ movement. After the 
failure of the Popular Front, this was extended to a fear of the traditional left in 
general. In 1938, Mounier published a short pamphlet. De la mvthique de gauche, 
‘un livre très dense et très critique à l’égard de l’idéologie de la gauche’ (65, p.215).
The second fear in the 1930s, which often existed in a clear contradiction within the 
same movement, was that the left was not radical enough, part of a ‘classe politique 
sans imagination’ (11, p.290). The fear that the left was not sufficiently radical was 
best seen in 1930s criticisms of the economic basis of left-wing politics. ‘Homo 
oeconomicus’ was at the centre of their argument -  instead of refusing monetary 
values point blank, the left argued on these grounds. There was particular criticism 
of the traditional left’s aim being simply to manage capitalism by the mid-1930s. 
Socialist economic policies were seen as far from left-wing, a point with which 
historians seem to agree:
La doctrine économique de L. Blum n’était pas socialiste dans son essence, 
elle tendait seulement à mieux faire fonctionner une économie où 
l’initiative privée conservait une importance primordiale. (152, p. 113)
This was viewed with particular disappointment by most of the non-conformists, 
who had been drawn to the planism of the Belgian De Man, whose ideas were 
debated at the 1934 SFIO congress and rejected, following Blum’s vehement 
opposition. Once in office, Blum was seen as betraying even basic socialist 
principles as well as such more daring economic alternatives:
Although planism was probably not the economic panacea that its 
advocates believed, it did at least offer, at the theoretical level, a more 
logical position than that of Blum, who was in 1936 to take on the task of
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applying what he believed to be palliatives to a system he believed to be 
doomed. (166, p. 165)
Even on the level of general values, the newer movements are critical of a traditional 
left which is seen to have abandoned or ignored the libertarian approach it might 
have been expected to take. Here again, we will note similarities between 1930s 
criticisms of the left and modern green criticisms of the Mitterrand years in 
particular. When considering such values, as opposed to policies, 1930s sources 
generally argue that the left has betrayed its original principles, which are now better 
defended or discussed in newer movements. Why did they argue this? First, the left 
is seen to have watered down its original beliefs (as in the confused stance over the 
possibility of a revolution, for example).
Second, some groups in the 1930s took as their starting-point an attempt to 
incorporate religion or spirituality into politics, and this led them to adopt values 
which they saw as logical and moral, but which established political parties were 
likely to dismiss as utopian or naïve, if not dangerous in a relatively newly-secular 
state. So Mounier could describe Esprit’s stance on social issues as ‘au nom du 
spirituel, en tête des Marxistes, plus loin qu’eux’ (15, p.239). Non-conformist 
groups were also wary of open identification with the radical left following the 
earlier reaction of the Catholic Church to Sangnier’s Sillon movement, and after 
Pope Pius XI’s statement on the Church and socialism in 1 9 31- ‘un fondement 
anticlu’étien caractérise le socialisme’.'^
Finally, certain key themes, which were deeply important to intellectuals and to new 
movements were the ones the left was seen to have abandoned. The most important 
ones will now be briefly considered. First, the traditional left is seen as having a 
limited analysis of key problems. Its attachment to the worker means the left has not 
been able to see the extent of the crisis facing all groups in French society.
However, even their analysis of the worker’s condition is seen as only partial by both
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intellectuals and new movements, whose sympathy for the industrial worker meant 
that the left was criticised for not going far enough, since it seemed to want only to 
guarantee higher incomes or improved working conditions until an eventual 
revolution, after which industrial work would not apparently be much different 
anyway. In contrast, ‘la pratique américaine des hauts salaires’ was not seen as 
positive by the non-conformists. They viewed it as based not on social justice nor an 
attempt to improve workers’ lives, but rather on a cynical
asservissement de l’homme aux exigences de l’économie[...]. Ainsi 
l’ouvrier sert deux fois la machine productrice à laquelle il est deux fois 
enchaîné: il la sert en tant que main-d’oeuvre et en tant que débouché/^
Giono’s sympathy for the ‘ouvrier communiste’ led him to a similar standpoint. 
Workers were ‘le grand peuple’, ‘comme toujours, trahis par leurs chefs’ (27, 
pp.254-5), i.e. the Communist party. Discussing the worker’s condition, he argued 
that the Popular Front had missed the point: ‘J’estime que c’est mettre un emplâtre 
sur une jambe de bois que de donner un congé payé’ (27, p.256). Writers and 
intellectuals were perhaps most open regarding their disappointment at the Popular 
Front’s perceived lack of radicalism. Despite his clear distance form the left by that 
point, Céline outlined in Bagatelles pour un massacre:
en une utopie non dépourvue de tendresse, ce que le Front populaire aurait 
dû faire: rendre au prolétariat ‘l’eau claire, le vent, les poumons, les fleurs’. 
(164,p.232)
On broad principles, particularly in the social field, the traditional left was found 
wanting. While radical ideas were surprisingly conspicuous by their absence in the 
Popular Front programme, the high initial hopes of some that ‘Tout est possible!’ in 
1936 and the atmosphere of the June/July strikes and demonstrations meant that 
many had believed radical changes would soon take place. A particular parallel
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between the Personalists and modern greens, now involved in a difficult 
collaboration with a less radical left, can be noted here.
The Personalists, under the influence of Mounier were unusually advanced on social 
issues in the 1930s, often on issues now important for the greens such as feminism. 
Over a decade before the publication of Beauvoir’s Le deuxième sexe, Mounier was 
already analysing Te vaste problème de la condition de la femme’ (26, p. 124) in 
some detail, and drawing radical conclusions with which the greens would agree 
over fifty years later: ‘Notre monde social est un monde fait par l’homme et pour 
l ’homme’ (ibid., p. 125). Mounier chose the key date of June 1936 to publish a 
numéro spécial of Esprit entitled ‘La femme aussi est une persoime’, with the clear 
aim of drawing attention to issues such as female suffrage and equal rights in 
employment right at the beginning of the Popular Front’s term of office. France’s 
colonial history and racism were similarly denounced and the Personalists went 
further than most in calling for retrospective ‘justice’ for countries colonised by 
France; for them, colonial peoples had been ‘parfois arrachés à un équilibre 
politique’ (ibid., p. 125) only to be corrupted by the morally banlcrupt French system. 
The left’s failure on social issues like women’s rights (the failure to introduce equal 
pay legislation, for example) attracted special condemnation from the Personalists.
Just as certain trades unions (notably the CFDT) have been quicker than political 
parties to react to the ideas of the modern greens, so their 1930s equivalents seemed 
to take on board the influence of the new movements like the Personalists sooner 
and to a greater extent than parties of the left did. The ‘Manifeste des douze’ 
contained an entire section entitled ‘Respect de la Personne humaine’, in which 
then-radical statements of principle were made.^' They too joined the criticisms of 
left-wing parties for being insufficiently radical.
The emphasis on the ‘lutte des classes’ by parties of the left was also criticised. This 
emphasis was old-fashioned in the view of newer groups and writers and led to a
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misplaced focus, in their opinion. First, groups whose inspiration was religious or 
moral simply did not agree that class antagonism was the problem. For Esprit and 
Jeune République, merely discussing class struggle was divisive and ignored the 
need for all groups affected by the crisis to work together. The emphasis on the 
worker by the left also attracted criticism from new groups on the grounds that it led 
to their neglect of the peasants, the most important group for many 1930s sources. 
Marx had earlier used the case of France to illustrate his argument that peasants were 
hopelessly disunited:
Their mode of production isolates them from one another. [...] The 
isolation is increased by France’s bad means of communication and by the 
poverty of the peasants. [.,.] They do not form a class. (168, p.414)
Many in the 1930s felt, like Giono, that Marx’s analysis was incorrect. The 
dismissal of this group by the established left-wing parties (‘The Socialist and 
Communist parties, whose doctrines related to urban societies, never effectively 
adapted themselves to the peasants’) (72, p.361) was therefore a serious stumbling 
block for many, precisely because they saw the peasantry (or some unified peasant- 
worker mass -  this was Giono’s suggestion) as the way forward.
Like modern greens, another problematic area for 1930s sources was often the 
centralism favoured by the left, particularly the communists. This was true of both 
the centralised French political system (attacked by the Personalists at some length) 
and of the centralised structure of the Communist party itself. The 21 Conditions of 
the Third International which the French Communist party had accepted in 1920 
were indeed a blueprint for a very centralised party structure, with their requirement 
for ‘acceptation obligatoire des décisions des organes supérieures du parti, sévère 
discipline’ (Statute 6Ÿ^ and so on. Political centralisation was particularly attacked 
by new youth movements on three basic grounds which resemble the arguments of 
modern greens. First, it was seen as leading to a lack of accountability and an
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inability to respond to important issues within parties. Mounier, for example, 
commented on the PCF’s party structure in scathing terms: ‘La compagnie de Jésus 
est un jardin d’enfants à côté de l’organisation du parti communiste’ (65, p.212). 
Second, centralised structures meant that parties were run by old men, and young 
people with new ideas thus took longer to make their mark. In contrast was the 
youthful leadership of newer non-conformist movements. Third, a lack of citizen 
participation in politics was perceived to be a negative result of centralised parties in 
a centralised system.
Probably the most sustained criticism of the left was its contention that the key to 
happiness was to be found in the economic sphere. This criticism can be found both 
in literary and political sources. Thus Giono argued that the left had a mistaken 
conception of the ‘good life’, one based on financial riches, and the non-conformists 
attacked the left specifically in their critique of ‘productivisme’. This term was 
widely used, by non-conformist groups as well as by Giono, to describe the focus on 
increasing and sharing financial wealth rather than on increasing happiness, 
something our sources saw as unrelated to wealth. The term would of course be 
adopted later by the green movement, and the definitions both sets of sources give of 
‘productivisme’ were strikingly similar (15, p.220).
An interesting parallel can be drawn here between 1930s movements which were 
attempting to blend Christianity and politics and the greens. Greens start from an 
awareness of scarcity which leads them to call for a ‘return to poverty’, voluntary 
simplicity and the more equitable sharing of resources. Some of the 1930s groups 
based their criticisms of society (and of the left in particular) on an analysis of 
poverty in Christian terms: ‘Le bourgeois ignore la Croix que le moindre misérieux, 
le moindre révolté expérimente chaque jour’ (ibid., p.241). The positive aspects of 
suffering and poverty in Christian terms led these groups to a glorification of simple 
life which, though based on a different starting point, reached many of the same 
conclusions as modern greens Both sets of sources thus criticise the left for wanting 
to increase production and wealth to lead to a better life. It was in such terms that
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movements such as Jeune République criticised the left’s ‘acceptance’ of capitalism 
from a Christian standpoint (72, p.295).
Another reason for fearing and criticising the left which is agreed upon by modern 
greens and the 1930s youth groups was that the left was seen as the most likely to be 
able to capitalise on the success of these newer groups. 1930s groups were wary of 
the Popular Front, and in particular of the youthful Sous-secrétaire à la Santé 
publique in charge o f ‘organisation des loisirs et des s p o r t s Lagrange, who was 
relatively open regarding his attempts to win over or ‘récupérer’ those attracted by 
the non-conformists and youth movements:
‘Joy’, ‘youth’, ‘health’, ‘happiness’ are recurrent themes in Lagrange’s 
speeches. The emphasis on the young was to demonstrate that democracy 
also was capable of harnessing the revolt of youth. (169, p.229)
The actual experience of the left in power during the Popular Front was to disappoint 
those in the 1930s who had been influenced by the rhetoric of ‘rassemblement’, 
much as the greens were disappointed by the experience of a left-wing president and 
government in the early 1980s. The Popular Front experience also led to 
disappointment as its eventual effect was seen to be divisive -  and after the initial 
imity it had seemed to offer, this disappointment was greater than it might otherwise 
have been, much as the eventual failure of the first Mauroy government (with its 
inclusion of a wider left) was doubly disappointing for future greens. Many 
previously non-political (or even anti-politics) sources had accepted political 
commitment in the early days of the Rassemblement populaire (this was true of 
youth groups -  Esprit in November 1935, Sangnier’s Jeune République in July 1935; 
and of artists and intellectuals -  Giono being one example), and its failure left many 
even more disillusioned with traditional left-wing politics than before. The failure 
of the left in office has been presented as the turning point for Céline, for example. 
‘L’image péjorative donnée de 1936, quantitativement très mince dans le texte, mais 
d’une extrême aggressivité’ (164, p.226), in Mort à crédit, and ‘tous les stéréotypes
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du “mauvais ouvrier”, [...] une image violemment hostile du “peuple” de 1936’
(ibid., p.227) marked the first real gulf between this writer who had been welcomed 
by the left and his previous supporters. ‘Plutôt Hitler que le Front populaire’ was to 
be Céline’s attitude by the end of the Popular Front experience, according to Roche 
and Leroy (164, p.231).
Most subsequent commentators have agreed with hindsight that the experience of 
the Popular Front represents a mixed picture overall, with achievements in the 
cultural field but failure economically, for example; but what we should note here is 
that the key policy areas focussed on by many newer groups and intellectuals were to 
be the focal point for major disappointments. As we have observed, progressive 
social ideas were mixed in these groups with an emphasis on new economic theories 
like planism and an attempt to moralize politics. Yet Te bilan financier du Front 
populaire est assurément décevant. [...] Il l’est aussi sur le plan de la justice sociale’ 
(152, pp. 107-8). The failure of the Popular Front to live up to expectations in areas 
such as equal political and employment rights for women or unemployment was seen 
as just as immoral as the conduct of previous governments.
Overall, however, the main criticism leveled at the left in the 1930s was that it 
failed, like all the others in the ‘classe politique’ to realise the extent of the ‘désordre 
établi’. As modern greens criticise the left for not taking the extent of the 
environmental crisis as their starting point, so the 1930s sources felt the left’s 
approach to a grave crisis of society was piecemeal at best. At worst, it was seen as 
too busy with internal squabbles to notice the crisis at all, morally corrupt and 
dominated by the old, who were closed to exciting new ideas like planism which 
might have gone some way to providing solutions, in the views of newer groups.
This meant that by the end of the decade, a more strict return to a ‘ni-ni’ approach 
was seen as a appropriate response. ‘Un esprit de révolte’ was to mark both Giono 
and the non-conformists by the end of the decade, much as it had at the start (11, 
p.279).
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If the 1930s sources considered here shared certain qualities with the left, they also 
resembled the right in some ways. This was the case for both individuals and 
movements during the 1930s. Indeed, Coston has argued that this was true of early 
‘environmentalists’ in the 1930s, like Geffroy, who can be seen as sharing 
characteristics with the right:
Geffroy était ‘de droite’, comme on l’était dans la première moitié du XXe
siècle, c’est-à-dire fermement attaché à notre sol et à nos traditions. (170,
p.6)
Greens are also frequently reminded that one of the best-known early 
environmentalists in France, Jacques-Yves Cousteau was the brother of the 
notorious journalist of the right and editor in the 1930s of Je suis partout, Pierre- 
Antoine Cousteau (ibid., p.24). Many have commented on the ‘right-wing’ themes 
and approaches shared by some 1930s sources as well as on the perceived right-wing 
qualities of early environmentalists. Sternhell points out, for example, that what sets 
Mounier and the Personalists apart from the extreme right is not their analysis of 
what was wrong with French society (which was similar on most key points), but the 
solutions they proposed (150, p.274). There was also a shared emphasis on 
Christianity (at least in the rhetoric of both). There was sympathy, for example, for 
T’importance attachée [par la droite] à la religion chrétienne, à la primauté du 
spirituel et aux valeurs morales’ (154, p. 168) (though the right’s ‘valeurs morales’ 
tended to be more traditional than those of new groups or iconoclastic individuals 
like Giono). A romantic view of (and political concern for) the paysan was arguably 
common to both too.
Others make the point that there was common ground between many of those 
proclaiming their ‘ni-nisme’ and the right by referring to how the groups would later 
react to the Occupation and the Vichy regime, and imply shared views by 
underlining their willingness to work with the regime in 1940. The ‘termes et 
thèmes qui constituent les fondements du régime de Vichy’ according to Ferro (‘la
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culpabilité de la Troisième République’, Ta faiblesse du régime’. Ta nécessité de 
régénérer la nation’) (171, p.35) were clearly shared by 1930s groups, and Mounier 
did indeed work with the Ecole d’Uriage on the basis of shared criticisms of the 
previous regime.
What is clear, however is that a ni-ni stance was frequently seen as playing into the 
hands of the right. This accusation was made particularly by the left and the 
Radicals, and in terms which are similar to Lalonde’s present-day criticisms of 
Waechter’s preference for a ni-ni approach. Thus Alain famously commented in 
1930 that
Lorsque quelqu’un me dit que l’opposition droite-gauche est dépassée, je 
sais qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un homme de gauche. (65, p. 14)
Indeed, many of the groups who took a ni-ni stance were careful to acknowledge 
such dangers, and it was arguably in order publicly to distance themselves from the 
right that they were so detailed in the criticisms they made. Mounier actually 
denounced Ordre Nouveau, a group for which he had previously shown some 
sympathy, for this reason in April 1934:
We [Esprit] have also written ‘Neither Left nor Right’. But not in the usual 
sense, not to conceal, under a seeming serenity, secret inclinations and 
alliances. (81, p.270)
Overall, although areas of broad agreement can be found, there were far fewer points 
on which our 1930s sources and the right were in agreement than there were points 
on which they were diametrically opposed to one another. The right were globally 
criticised for having refused to keep up with a changing world by newer groups in 
the 1930s. The lack of common ground between the newer groups and the right was
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perhaps particularly evident because criticisms of the ‘ruling class’ in the period 
generally meant, in effect, the parties of the right and centre. While the left spent 
most of the period in opposition, in the twenty years between the Treaty of Versailles 
and the German invasion of Poland, the right-wing parties participated in 
govermnent for fourteen of those years (172, p.507).
The first and most obvious area of difference was in the right’s acceptance of 
capitalism. Generalised criticisms of capitalism are so widespread in the 1930s 
sources that they seem simplistic to the modern reader. Virtually every page of Les 
vraies richesses, for example, contains a despairing comment on ‘ 1’argent’: ‘Dans 
notre société, l ’argent est la seule valeur, l’argent est la seule richesse’ (ibid., p. 103); 
‘La civilisation de l’argent est en train de tout engloutir sous son déluge’, (ibid., 
p .M l).
More specific criticisms, of the effects of capitalism in particular, also abound. The 
absurdity and cruelty of the capitalist ‘logic’ is denounced first of all. Giono sees the 
destruction of wheat crops in France when ‘les sept dixièmes des hommes de la 
Terre ne mangent pas à leur faim’ as an indictment of capitalism’s logic (ibid., 
p. 108). Economic liberalism was principally attacked. Loubet del Bay le quotes La 
Tour du Pin to sum up the sentiments of the non-conformist groups on the subject; 
‘Le libéralisme, c’est le renard libre dans le poulailler libre’ (15, p.220). In contrast, 
the traditional right-wing parties in 1930s France have been described as classic 
liberalists, a stance which Larkin attributes to their reliance on the political support 
of the paysan, renowned for his hatred of direct taxation. The ‘big business 
connections’ of the right would also have influenced their liberalism in economic 
matters, an influence the new groups deplored (85, p.40)
Again, there was often a religious basis for such differences between new groups and 
the traditional right. Jeune Droite represents one example of a new group which 
stressed its rejection of traditional right economic policies on the grounds that these
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were anti-christian and thus immoral. Mounier publicly supported the group, at least 
in its early days, for precisely this reason. Such criticisms of the right tended to 
focus on inequality, Christian views on poverty, and of course T’usure’, a word 
which Loubet del Bayle even credits the non-conformists with ‘resurrecting’ in the 
1930s; and along with references to ‘le prêt à intérêt’ and the works of Thomas 
Aquinus, such criticisms are very evident in Esprit in particular in the early 1930s:
Quelques-uns se sont fatigués à définir le système capitaliste actuel, il
n ’était pas besoin de tant chercher, c’est l’usure érigée en loi générale.
The emphasis of the traditional right on its supporters among the peasants and the 
bourgeoisie also contradicted the emphasis of the newer groups on other sections of 
society, and notably their concern for the industrial worker, whose life they found 
intolerable. Some, with Jeune Droite, attributed the very existence of any ‘lutte des 
classes’ to the capitalist system which they saw the traditional right maintaining (15,
p.226).
The second main area of disagreement between the right and our sources was the 
state and its political institutions. This clash was unsurprising given that the right 
was self-avowedly conservative and resistant to change, whereas the one thing all the 
new groups and newly-committed intellectuals had in common was their desire 
radically to change virtually every aspect of the ‘established disorder’, especially in 
the political domain. The right of the 1930s has been described as based on 
‘défense’ -  whether of the ‘patrie’, ‘armée’, ‘religion’, ‘l’ordre social’, ‘la propriété’, 
or a basic ‘défense fiscale’ (172, p.408), the right had a group to promote the defence 
of tradition. Such defence of the old order automatically distanced them from the 
newer groups more than the left, who at least claimed to want change. The right was 
seen as hampering the introduction of a better society to a greater extent than the left 
for this reason.
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The institutions of the Third Republic were also inherently conservative - ‘The Third 
Republic sought to stabilize rather than to transform society’ (85, p.39) -  and the 
fact that it was dominated by the right tlu ough most of the period studied tended to 
mean that the regime’s conservatism and that of its politicians, particularly those on 
the right, were assimilated in the criticisms of the newer groups. The traditional 
right in the 1930s wanted a combination of a powerful, centrally-controlled state and 
a rather extreme version of economic liberalism. The views on the state of the new 
right caused even more alarm among the sources studied here: an example might be 
the Croix-de-Feu which aimed for a state based more firmly on ‘un modèle 
traditionnel et paternaliste’ (154, p. 169).
Such State paternalism was a key criticism of the right for newer, youth-led 
movements. Their desire for citizen participation, a move away from capitalism and 
the introduction of economic planning meant that they were campaigning for the 
precise opposite of the right-wing prescription on the two key areas of organisation 
of the state and the economy. The paternalism of the civil service was criticised too, 
particularly as it was seen as dominated by the same sort of conservative bourgeois 
as found in parliament.'^^ The nationalism of the right was a final contentious area 
for many of the newer groups in the 1930s. Memories of the first World War and 
fears of a second, coupled with the stress on the need for internationalism among 
youth movements (influenced in their methods if not their policies by communism 
and fascism) meant another gulf between them and the right.
If we take merely one example of a 1930s non-conformist group, the Personalists, 
we will note a clearly-stated contrast on all the key areas so far identified as 
important for the right -  i.e., economic liberalism, conservatism, the role of the state 
and nationalism. Personalists’ criticisms of capitalism have been described briefly 
above; they worried at length about the possibility of a radically new participative 
democracy too:
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Le problème crucial pour le persomialisme est celui de la légitimité du 
pouvoir exercé par l’homme sur l’homme, qui semble contradictoire avec le 
rapport interpersonnel. (26, p. 126)
Finally, they stated clearly and repeatedly their opposition to nationalism and its 
inherent dangers -  ‘L’Etat, répétons-le, n ’est pas la nation. [...] Seuls les fascistes 
proclament leur identité au profit de l’Etat’ (ibid., p. 126). This is not to say that they 
resorted to a ‘stateless a n a r c h y a l o n g  the same lines as Giono, however: instead, 
they outlined their preferred alternatives in direct contradiction to the ideas of the 
traditional right.
The overall reason for the gulf between the traditional right and most of the sources 
studied here, then, would be the effects on the individual or person of the right’s 
policies, whether in political or economic terms. In political terms, the refusal of a 
more participative and inclusive regime by the right was seen to result in a 
dangerous level of political disaffection at a critical time. On economic grounds, the 
right was seen as the standard-bearer for a dehumanising (or to use the more 
common 1930s term, ‘immoral’) approach. This was seen as particularly 
disappointing and hypocritical by those groups who based their proposals for 
society, as indeed the right claimed to, on Christian beliefs:
For Mounier, the flagrant collusion of Catholics with the reactionary 
politics and economic oppression of the ‘established disorder’ was morally 
intolerable and confessionally suicidal. (81, p.267)
The fourth main area of criticism we should consider is that of the extreme right.
The extreme right represented a special focus for many of our 1930s sources in their 
criticisms of the right, just as the Front National represents the same special case for 
the greens today. Of course, just as the FN and the green parties in France appeared 
at the same time, so many of the movements discussed here grew up in the same
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period as the extreme right in France. The need to differentiate themselves from the 
extremes and from fascism explains to some extent the clearly-stated criticisms of 
the extreme right of most of the sources used here. This need was acute because 
many of the new groups had collaborated with the new right groups in their early 
days, usually because, as we saw earlier, they made virtually identical criticisms of 
the ‘désordre établi’. They felt the need, therefore, to stress their different solutions 
to the problems facing French society, and their unambiguous criticisms of the 
extremes. Such criticisms took three basic forms: attacks on the presence of fascist 
groups in France; on the content of their political programmes; and on their methods.
The presence of fascism was widely feared in France, especially after 1934. There 
was an ‘exaggerated but understandable’ (85, p.48) fear of the revolutionary right 
following the events of 6"’ February. The very raison d’etre of the Rassemblement 
populaire, which marked the entry into official politics of so many of our sources, 
was the reaction to this evident fascist presence (153, p.29). The fear of a French 
fascism was what prompted the political commitment of many intellectuals, who 
reacted faster than traditional political parties did, according to Touchard, when they 
formed their anti-fascist Vigilance Committees (65, pp.217-8).
Fascist ideas and the content of their political programmes were the second main 
focus for criticisms. Their key themes (‘I’Etat tout-puissant, le corporatisme, le culte 
du chef charismatique’) (154, p. 176) were anathema to the non-conformists and to 
intellectuals and artists. Giono’s plaintive defence of the individual forgotten in 
mass regimes and attack on the damaging scale of fascist states (68, p. 195) were 
agreed upon by the non-conformists too, and represent a clear parallel to modern 
green criticisms of the extreme right’s programme.
Finally, the methods of the extreme right provoked a notably fearful response. They 
were seen as powerful due to their wealthy supporters, such as Coty. Doriot’s PPF 
received ‘10 million francs from big business in 1937’ (85, p.50). Many assumed
t48
they were prepared to use their support directly, with ‘the streets rather than 
parliament as their road to power’ (this perception was perhaps why so many reacted 
firmly to the throat of the French far right in the 1930s, even though most historians 
now agree that direct action was the last thing the leaders of the extreme right 
wanted at the time) (ibid., p.48). However, their declared aims (the revolutionary 
right wanted to ‘harness modern technology and methods of state control to new 
expressions of national sentiment’ (ibid., p.49)), combined with apparently extreme 
tactics nonetheless provoked a strong reaction by the mid-1930s.
It has often been argued, of course, that this reaction was not, however, strong 
enough. The eventual defeat of France in 1940 and subsequent implementation of 
some of the ideas prevalent in the 1930s under Vichy are offered as evidence that the 
reaction of 1930s groups was insufficient, and that they played into the hands of the 
right. What is clear is that the eventual adoption by Pétain of some widely-shared 
ideas from the 1930s confirmed the earlier fears of many of our sources, who had 
frequently stressed the dangers of fascist or right-wing ‘récupération’ of key themes. 
An emphasis on the need for ‘travail dans la nature, éducation physique, éducation 
morale’ (171, p.272) might have been shared by 1930s groups across the political 
spectrum and implemented by Vichy in the Chantiers de Jeunesse programme, but 
they would certainly not have agreed on what the content or purpose of that 
‘education morale’ was. In summary, then, the more critical attitude to the right than 
to the left, despite the avowed ni-ni stance of many groups, was to be confirmed as 
appropriate by the end of the decade, if not, perhaps, sufficiently radical or 
widespread.
3.5 G reen solutions
The first line of the party statutes of Les Verts indicates their main suggestion for 
achieving change: ‘L’engagement politique est une étape capitale dans la lutte
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écologique’. Les Verts daim  to have been the first greens to accept the need for 
political commitment, rather than a social movement or lobbying organisation, a 
strategy which has been variously attributed to the lack of an effective civil society 
in F r a n c e , t o  the politicisation of young people during May 1968, and to the 
disillusionment of environmentalists following the election of Mitterrand and the 
left-wing government of 1981, after which green parties accepted party structures 
and a permanent commitment to the political sphere.
However, if the idea of engagement was accepted very early as a necessary solution 
to the perceived crisis, the tactics this would involve were not so easily decided 
upon, and still provoke disagreement in green circles. Various strategies have been 
chosen -  the refusal of a traditional pai'ty; the refusal of a permanent structured 
party, but participation in specific elections (Dumont’s 1974 campaign being one 
example of this strategy); the choice of local activism rather than national politics; 
and, of course, the acceptance of a permanent party, but one which attempts to be a 
new kind of party. The question of alliances provokes further splits -  some, such as 
Génération Ecologie have always adopted Tine politique de la main tendue’ towards 
other parties, allowing ‘double appartenance’ (simultaneous membership of more 
than one political party), for example. Les Verts, as we have seen, have adopted 
various strategies, usually in reaction to events -  no alliance with left seemed 
possible during the 1980s, following their reaction to Chernobyl, and involvement in 
the Rainbow Warrior affair.
If the greens accept engagement as the starting point of any solution, yet insist they 
are neither of the left nor the right, what kind of politics do they aim to commit to? 
Their absolute rejection of traditional political approaches have led some to accuse 
them of being too idealistic and utopian in their strategy; ‘Neither left nor right, but 
somewhere over the rainbow’, a s  Bariy puts it. This is a somewhat simplistic 
picture, however. In effect, there is a wide range of possible green solutions, which 
tend to fall into two broad camps.
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First, there are ‘reformist’ strategies, commonly found in the manifestos of the green 
parties, which commonly propose specific, detailed changes to the political system 
and the economic sphere. Second, there are more general, less defined attempts to 
‘urge’ change in society or human beings rather than taking the political system as 
the point of departure. The second type of solution often highlights spirituality and 
the need to ‘reclaim utopia’ (29, p. 14).
Greens can claim to be neither of the left nor the right in their unique assortment of 
criticisms of traditional right and left, but in the solutions they propose, they have to 
‘borrow from pre-exisiting traditions’ (20, p. 182): ‘ecological limits may limit 
political choices, but they do not determine them’(136, p.7). This means that in 
some solutions, it seems more accurate to talk of an 'et de droite et de gauche’ 
stance. Sainteny (3, pp.62-3) points out that one such contradiction can be seen in 
their preference for massive decentralisation of power, coupled with their desire for 
a strong state-level (or even international) authority to implement environmental 
protection measures.
Bearing in mind this range of approaches, both broad sets of suggestions (reformist 
and revolutionary) will now be considered.
3.5.1 Green reformism
While the society they would eventually like to see is radically different than the 
current one, most greens aim not for imminent revolution, but for the no less 
idealistic ‘painless birth of a new civilisation which respects the human person and 
the biosphere’ (141, p. 192). In practice, this means accepting a political party of 
some sort, with a programme of policies. The key changes in the political domain 
proposed in such programmes will now be summarised.
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The organisation of the state and the political system is the first area in which greens 
propose radical solutions to their perceived ‘crisis of representation’. Their solutions 
mainly address the redistribution of power within the political system and increasing 
the participation of the citizen. Their proposals are summed up in their calls to 
‘réinventer la démocratie et la citoyenneté’ by moving to a Sixth R e p u b l i c t h e  
institutions of the Fifth are seen as beyond repair. Specific changes they want to see 
would be based first on decentralisation of power. Greens want to see most 
decisions being taken at local or regional level (46, p. 10). Their Sixth Republic 
would also involve moving away from bipolarisation ‘qui enferme la réflexion dans 
un clivage gauche-droite’ (35, p.257), to a more plural multi-party system, for which 
a change to an electoral system based on proportional representation is seen as a 
prerequisite (46, p. 12). The executive’s power would be strictly limited, and 
Parliament’s increased (ibid., p. 12). In sum, many of their proposals would recall 
the institutions of the Third Republic, were it not for their insistence on their second 
solution -  citizen participation.
They propose to involve the citizen more in day-to-day decision making. ‘Accentuer 
la participation aux décisions’ (126, p.2) is a recurrent theme, one which they intend 
to achieve by such measures as the introduction of a ‘référendum d’initiative 
citoyenne à tous les niveaux de la vie publique’ (46, p. 12), as well as extending 
voting rights to all who live in France for more than five years, allowing citizens to 
address the Conseil Constitutionnel and reforming the Senate so it would be 
composed of regional representatives (46, pp. 11-12).
In one of the clearest contradictions to their desire to decentralise decision-making, 
however, the greens are virtually unanimous that in the economic sphere, the 
opposite approach should be adopted. The focus on natural limits leads them to call 
for the resurrection of interventionist economic strategies, now virtually ignored by 
most political parties, but common, of course, in the 1930s. Attempts simply to 
modify capitalism (the greening of industry, catalytic convertors) are attacked as 
insufficient: instead, the whole economic system must be abandoned. Production
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should be directed, presumably at state level, for need rather than profit (20, p. 176). 
Such radical, top-down strategies are surprisingly widespread, even in basic 
reformist documents such as manifestos -  les Verts stated in 1997, for example, that 
their economic strategy would be based on Te double refus du libéralisme et de 
f  étatisme, l’affirmation d’une logique non-marchande’, which seemed to involve the 
state taking over where private enterprise was seen to have failed, by the ‘massive’ 
creation of socially- and environmentally-useful jobs -  ‘une politique de type 
“grands travaux’” , but in the field of employment (46, pp.6-7).
Another key area where the greens present clear reformist solutions is in the desire to 
introduce a more ‘moral’ public life. These include a more independent judicial 
system; ‘la transparence entre finances publiques et privées’ (123, Point x, p.3); and 
measures to avoid the corruption of politicians such as ensuring accountability, ‘une 
rémunération correcte’, ‘le droit à une réinsertion professionnelle’, more 
‘transparence’, and ‘l’évaluation des politiques publiques’ (46, pp. 11-12).
Political parties’ structures are also the focus for reforms, with les Verts in particular 
keen to lead by example. Decentralisation of power within the party is strictly 
adhered to tlmough ‘structures démocratiques’, and the ‘primauté des régions’, with a 
locally-elected body (the Conseil National Inter-Régional) to ensure this (91, p.201). 
The atmosphere of party meetings is supposed to be one o f ‘convivialité’, in an 
attempt to encourage all to participate, particularly women and the young who are 
seen as disadvantaged in traditional party structures. Leaders are rejected by les 
Verts (if not by GE), who prefer to have four ‘porte-paroles’, two of each sex, to 
avoid the ‘culf of the leader they criticise in other political movements (‘des partis 
de présidentiables’).^^
Finally, they stress policies aimed at increasing the participation of women and the 
young in public life, whether through obvious changes like parité (46, p. 10) or, in an 
approach reminiscent of the Popular Front, through ‘une politique d’incitations
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fiscales et législatives’ for youth groups, particularly to ‘encourager les loisirs et les 
pratiques sportives’ (ibid.. p.9).
3.5.2 Green revolution
Many of the reforms listed above are of course found in the programmes of other 
parties (though no doubt none would accept all of the greens’ reforms together). 
Where the green solutions are undoubtedly more original is in the second group, that 
of less practical, often revolutionary proposals. We should note here, however, that 
to divide the kinds of solution proposed by greens in this way does not mean that 
they do not frequently combine some reformist solutions with an emphasis on the 
second sort too.
The second sort of attempt to urge change, usually in human nature rather than in the 
voting system, is understandably less specific or clear, particularly when greens 
attempt to define how such change will be arrived at. Tellingly, the most detailed 
account of this sort of revolutionary change was described in a work of fiction, 
Callenbach’s infamous Ecotopia.
The first area in which green solutions tend to be at the very least idealistic is in their 
refusal of ‘les solutions duales’. Their economic aim is to involve all in their project 
for a new society, and to address the problems caused by capitalist productivism at 
the root, not by treating the symptoms (unemployment, precariousness) (38, p.96). 
How they actually plan to achieve this complete rejection of capitalism is less well 
documented, and the occasional reference which can be found tends to involve some 
appeal to principle, or, more often, a vague implication that mass spiritual 
enlightenment will do the trick.
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This emphasis on The holistic sense of spirituality’ and its ability to achieve political 
change is where the greens are at their most utopian:
The general point about the religious approach is that the changes that need 
to take place are too profound to be dealt with in the political arena, and 
that the proper territory for action is the psyche rather than the 
parliamentary chamber. (22, p.l 1)
This represents a convenient answer (if not a particularly convincing one) when 
greens are asked how they propose to get from the political institutions they criticise 
so strongly to their future decentralised, non-dualist, environmentally-friendly 
society. Of course, it is an approach based on a long-established tradition. Quite 
apart from the Personalists’ attempts to mix politics and faith, the early greens of the 
1970s were on the whole avowedly Christian, if non-practising,^' and works stressing 
spirituality such as Fromm’s To have or to be (published in France and Germany in 
1976) were highly influential in the European movement’s formative period.
This approach is perhaps surprisingly widespread within the green movement today. 
‘The “re-enchantment” of the world is the defining feature of contemporary deep 
ecology’ (22, p.45) for Barry; and even mainstream environmentalists like Porritt 
agree: ‘To the enduring challenge of social justice we must now add the challenge of 
spiritual enlightenment’ (19, p.233). Indeed, some see the emphasis on spirituality 
as explaining the greens’ appeal to a great extent: ‘Green politics is a filling of the 
spiritual vacuum at the centre of late industrial society’ (20, p. 121).
Greens frequently appeal to ‘holism’ or ‘embeddedness’, the idea that human beings 
are part of nature and that a ‘new cosmology, a re-spiritualization and/or 
“rediscovery” of the mythic importance of nature’ (22, p.45) will lead us naturally to 
change on a deep level. Women are often portrayed as more open to such 
‘enlightenment’, especially in the works of ecofeminists (174, p.x). Some argue
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that, in fact, women have always had a ‘spiritual sense of nature’ (‘Women have 
always thought like mountains’ [sic]) (175, p.41), and that it is their absence from 
the exercise of power which has led to the current environmental crisis. Many critics 
have stressed dangers and disadvantages in this approach. First, it leaves greens 
open to aecusations of utopianism, as we have seen. Second, it leads to a degree of 
exclusivity, with those who dislike the emphasis on spirituality (or simply men in 
general, in the eyes of many ecofeminists) portrayed as less than fully green:
With the holistic sense of spirituality, one’s personal life is truly political 
and one’s political life is truly personal. Anyone who does not comprehend 
within him- or herself this essential unity cannot achieve political change on 
a deep level and cannot strive for the true ideals of the Greens. (29, p.52)
A final revolutionary or extreme solution in the political domain should be 
mentioned. Some sources, sceptical about both the likelihood of change in the 
established party system and about the possibility of changing human nature through 
vague appeals to spiritual enlightenment have concluded that the environmental 
crisis is likely to be solved only by imposing severe change from above. 
O’Riordan’s^  ^classic definition of the four broad types of political response to the 
environmental crisis accepts that an ‘authoritarian’ response is possible (though 
many greens refute this, arguing that authoritarianism of any sort is not truly 
‘green’). What is clear is that, whether truly green or not, an awareness of the 
environmental crisis ‘has the potential for the creation of a profoundly anti­
democratic politics’ (22, p.47). Such approaches seem to have been more common 
in the early years of the green movement, with issues such as population leading 
individuals like Elniiclf ^  to call for imposed change.
Faced with a choice between working slowly in the established party system 
(without much chance of success, in France) and hoping Ga'ia will intervene, the 
frustration of such greens is perhaps understandable. We might now consider
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whether a similar combination of reformist and radical change, and resulting 
frustration are to be found in the 1930s sources.
3.6 1930s solutions
The first clear parallel between the new environmental movement at the end of the 
century and the sources studied from the 1930s is in their (at first reluctant, then full) 
acceptance of engagement. So Personalism was described by its founding figures as 
Tme philosophie engagée dans les grandes luttes du siècle’ (75, p.62), which 
recognised that an ‘effort collectif (26, p. 103) was the only possible solution to the 
political crisis they analysed. One essential factor in this acceptance of engagement 
was of course the reaction to the events of 1934: ‘Les événements de février 1934 
provoquèrent un reclassement qui mit fin progressivement aux ambiguïtés. Chacun 
doit choisir son camp’ (11, p .102). ‘La solidarité du péril’ (15, p .171) was the 
dominant reaction by the mid-193Os.
Some unexpected figures joined in this general reaction. Giono, renowned for his 
individualism, was prepared by 1935 to make the only party political commitment of 
his life.
Entre le Giono qui en février 1934 adhère à l’AEAR' (‘Pour cesser d’être 
inutile. Pour avoir des camarades. Pour pouvoir concerter l’action. Pour 
sentir cette action dirigée par un parti’. Commune 1934) et celui qui, au 
moment de Munich, stigmatise les communistes fauteurs de guerre, le 
contraste est net. (164, p. 174)
1 Association des Ecrivains et Artistes Révolutioimaires.
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Giono was quickly disillusioned, then, by the Rassemblement populaire, but 
maintained his public commitment to non-party groups such as the Auberges and the 
Contadour experiment until the occupation. In intellectual circles generally, 
engagement was seen as the most appropriate reaction. Notably, the Comité de 
Vigilance des Intellectuels Anti-Fascistes (with Giono joining Langevin and Alain as 
founders) aimed to place intellectuals ‘à la disposition des organisations ouvrières’ 
(177, p.57). The Amsterdam-Pleyel movement had been founded with similar aims 
in 1932 (its key members being Barbusse and Rolland).
Nor was this seen as an inappropriate reaction by political movements of the period. 
Indeed, the young non-conformists called publicly on writers to move away from the 
‘brillante mais superficielle’ literature of 1920s and respond to ‘le besoin profond 
d’une littérature plus engagée dans la condition humaine’.'^ '' The PCF made similar 
calls -  in July 1931, Thorez recognised that ‘one vital way of reforming links with 
the mass of working-class people was tln*ough cultural activities of various kinds’, 
and fellow-travellers (who would eventually be ‘rejected as bourgeois’) were 
welcomed (178, p.98). In a widespread contradiction of Benda’s previous warning 
in La trahison des clercs that intellectuals should go back to ‘idées pures’ and leave 
‘l ’événement’ to politicians, intellectuals and artists accepted political commitment 
on such a scale in the 1930s that this is one of the most discussed aspects of the 
contemporary political climate.
‘La solidarité de l’intellectuel, de l’écrivain avec les masses souffrantes’ (179, p.20), 
and general political commitment by leading figures was the first element of 
solutions proposed in the 1930s, then. Such intellectual involvement did bring 
problems, however. One Comintern official in Paris saw the PCF as a lost cause in 
the 1930s, precisely because it was ‘too obsessed with its own “philosophical crises” 
to be able to respond to the political realities of the day’ (180, p.262).
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On the right, too, a public engagement was seen as a necessary step, as Céline (to his 
later regret) demonstrated, at least in his work. Indeed, it has been argued that 
intellectuals and writers who opted for the extreme right were often attracted 
precisely by the idea of engagement rather than the extreme right’s actual policies: 
‘ces intellectuels attirés par le fascisme étaient plus sensibles à son activisme qu’à 
son idéologie’ (11, p.98).
Once the idea of engagement was accepted, the question of what that commitment 
should mean was raised in the 1930s, and in the same terms in which the greens 
would raise it half a century later. The answers they arrived at were also similar. 
There was an initial rejection of political parties: the non-conformists favoured a 
‘refus du parti en tant que tel’ (15, p.203) at the start of the decade. The ‘règles de 
stratégie persomialiste’ stated clearly that: ‘Du moins au départ, l’indépendance à 
l’égard des partis et des groupements constitués est nécessaire’ (26, p.l 18).
This stance was to change for some by the time of the Rassemblement, later the 
Front Populaire, when ‘the impossible became realisable’ (166, p. 133) -  although 
such high hopes were always going to be disappointed. The different atmosphere of 
politics under the Popular Front offers one explanation for its ability to win over 
previously non-party-political figures: ‘Politics became a pageant’ (ibid.. p.l 14), 
‘both celebration and political protest’ (169, p.227). Its encouragement of family 
outings at political demonstrations, and of women’s politicisation (181, pp. 185-90) 
are reminiscent of modern green tactics. The Popular Front’s emphasis on the 
cultural might also have helped -  it was not ‘une simple coalition électorale’, but the 
union of over a hundred organisations ‘parmi lesquelles plusieurs [avaient] des 
objectifs principalement culturels, [ce qui] multipliait les occasions d’engagement’
(182, p. 100).
The willingness of previously ni-ni groups like the Personalists to give some support 
to the Popular Front was not a permanent commitment, needless to say. Mounier’s
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engagement is best described as ‘a revocable “engagement à gauche”’ (81, p.287), 
and his varying position tlii'ough the 1930s (no specific commitment to left or right 
until 1935, then some degree of support for the left until 1938, Avhen he penned an 
obituary for the Popular Front in Esprit, and returned to a general ni-ni stance, 
combined with some sympathy for the left) is representative of the political 
evolution of many of our sources. By 1938, the ni-ni approach was very much in 
evidence again -  Tour beaucoup il devenait difficile de choisir entre “les crimes de 
Staline” et “les crimes de Hitler’” (183, p. 152).
Once again, contradictions ai'e quickly apparent, since the 1930s sources mixed 
policies traditionally associated with both left and right in much the same way as 
modern greens do. One example would be the Personalists, who strove to find a 
balance between their belief in a ‘revolution nécessaire’ (with its left-wing 
connotations) and traditionally conservative Catholicism. Again like the greens, such 
conservatism and revolutionary change were frequently present within the same 
movement or individual. To divide 1930s solutions into two broad categories is not 
to say that groups did not favour aspects from both at once, then.
3.6.1 1930s reformism
If the 1930s sources were virtually unanimous in their hatred of capitalism, many 
were less than clear about what should replace it. This was understandably true of 
writers in particular. For Céline, criticism of the existing order was sufficient; for 
Giono, it was enough to ‘destroy’ capitalism (and he did give -  somewhat romantic 
-  indications as to how this destruction might be achieved by the paysan) (60, pp.95- 
6), and allow some organic development of a better alternative -  ‘Cette société bâtie 
sur l’argent, il te [==le paysan] faut la détruire avant d’être heureux’ (ibid., p.207).
■s
t60
Many looked to marxist economic theoiy, at least as a starting point. However, for 
most of our ni-ni groups, this too had inherent dangers. For the Personalists, the 
marxist analysis of capitalism had many positive elements but these had to be 
combined with a new emphasis on the person and clearer indications of how a new 
economic system would place the person at its centre. To this end, one of Mounier’s 
study groups debated the issue at some length, eventually publishing a special issue 
of Esprit in April 1934, entitled De la propriété capitaliste à la propriété humaine.
This carefully explained the Personalist position and described key aspects of a 
better economy, if remaining somewhat elusive as to how French society might 
actually get there (‘par fragments ou en bloc, vite ou lentement, directement ou par 
détours, c’est le secret de l’avenir’) (26, p. 122). The Personalists’ solutions 
resembled those of other non-conformist groups in their stress on finding a ‘third | |
way’ between capitalism and ‘state capitalism’ (‘ni capitalisme sauvage, ni 
étatisme’) (64, p. 143), but were generally more explicit regarding the detail of their 
eventual aims. These included, among many others, ‘la substitution à l’économie 
anarchique, fondée sur le profit, d ’une économie organisée sur les perspectives 
totales de la personne’, which resembled green solutions in its desire to replace 
production for ‘want’ with production based on ‘need’; and the ‘abolition des classes 
formées sur la division du travail ou de la fortune’. Industries which led to 
‘l’aliénation économique’ were to be nationalised, but this was to be done 
(somehow) ‘sans étatisation’ (26, p. 120).
The Personalists were careful to link their economic aims to their political ones. The 
main reason for economic reform was that it was necessary in political terms -  
democracy could not work under capitalism: ‘La démocratie capitaliste est une 
démocratie qui donne à l’homme des libertés dont le capitalisme lui retire l’usage’.
A ‘démocratie économique effective, adaptée aux structures modernes de la 
production’ (26, p. 128) (i.e., able to control them for the person’s benefit) was to 
take its place.
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What these ideas meant in practice was an emphasis on economic planning as a 
solution between communism and capitalism, particularly the ‘Planisme’ of De Man. 
Another contradictory attempt to balance central or state-level control with 
decentralisation of power can therefore be observed here, since most of the new 
groups did want political decentralisation except in the economic sphere. This 
contradictory emphasis was shared by the non-conformists, but also by some on the 
left (the neo-socialists). The new right were more consistent, if more threatening, 
since unlike the Personalists, they married the rejection of capitalism and acceptance 
of planning to an outright rejection of democracy -  ‘le capitalisme n ’est pas autre 
chose que la forme sociale de la démocratie’ (184, p. 128).
For most of our 1930s sources, though, the rejection of capitalism meant looking for 
new, third-way structures in politics and economics - ‘Ils semblaient rechercher [...] 
dans le domaine des institutions une voie médiane entre mollesse supposée des 
démocraties et rouages totalitaires des dictatures naissantes’ (182, p.90). This led 
them to make relatively concrete proposals for reform of the state.
The need to reform the state and its institutions was one practical change agreed on 
by all. Even the traditional parties of right and left were discussing what reforms 
should be made in the 1930s. By 1933, ‘to talk of a reform of the state had become 
respectable; the executive had more or less ceased to function’ (166, p.22). Esprit 
called for a new ‘démocratie organique’ (15, p.212) to be allowed to grow. The non­
conformists generally wanted an ‘état minimum’, except in the economic realm.
The state ‘by degrees limits itself to a role of exceptional mediation and defense’ in 
Mounier’s ideal Personalist community (81, p.274). This was based on their attempt 
to place the person at the heart of any alternative state, since ‘tout pouvoir non- 
contrôlé tend à l ’abus’ (26, p. 126). The Personalists’ proposed practical reforms 
were therefore based on:
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une limitation constitutionnelle des pouvoirs de l’Etat: équilibre du pouvoir 
central par les pouvoirs locaux, organisation du recours des citoyens contre 
l’Etat, habeas corpus, limitation des pouvoirs de police, indépendance du 
pouvoir judiciaire, (ibid., p. 126)
We might note here that all these points are still stressed in the current manifesto of 
Les Verts. A particular parallel can be drawn between the emphasis in the 1930s on 
the ‘problème de la représentation’ (the title of an issue of Esprit in March 1939) and 
green support for decentralisation and citizen participation. The non-conformists all 
wanted to encourage more citizen participation in decision-making. ‘Une 
représentation aussi sincère, intégrale et efficace que possible des volontés des 
citoyens’ (ibid.. p. 127) should be introduced, but this, it was felt, did not to go far 
enough, since representation per se was not absolutely democratic -  the citizen still 
suffered from ‘l’inévitable aliénation que lui impose la condition du gouverné’
(ibid.. p. 127) in the most ideal democracy.
Locally-based power was seen, by the Personalists as by the greens, as the best 
solution to this problem. An ‘Etat pluraliste’ was called for in 1935, with ‘pouvoirs 
divisés et affrontés pour se garantir mutuellement de l’abus’ (ibid.. p. 128), and 
federalism and decentralisation were to be the ‘utopie directrice’ (ibid.. p. 125).
There was also a widespread emphasis on mass or ‘bottom-up’ change -  ‘On ne 
refera pas la France par les élites, on la refera par la base’ (155, p.56). Proportional 
representation was also emphasised in the attempt to guarantee accurate 
representation, with support for this measure coming even from the far-right:
[Le chef des Croix-de-Feu, le ‘Colonel’ de la Rocque] se prononce même 
pour un mode de scrutin “sincère”, incluant la proportionnelle et le vote des 
femmes. (154, p. 167)
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By the 1930s, virtually all movements identifying their engagement as a political one 
were clear that French women should be afforded political rights (50, p.251). The 
emphasis on the role of women and young people in changing society and in a more 
participative political system is of course shared by modern greens. Both groups 
were seen as significant in the 1930s for their generally favourable views on 
pacifism in particular (as we shall see in Chapter 4). young men because they would 
be called upon to enlist, and women, especially war widows, who were organising 
campaigns with slogans such as Tls ne nous prendront pas nos fils!’^^
Of course, the youthful membership and leaders of many of the new movements may 
have played a role in their emphasis on youth as a potential solution to many of the 
problems they identified in French society. The co-directors of Combat, to take but 
one of many examples, were thirty and twenty-seven years old respectively in 1936 
(184, p. 123). Intellectuals and wi'iters also looked to youth to reconstruct society, 
often in very optimistic terms. Giono could write as late as 1938, for example, that 
he was
bouleversé de joie devant tout le travail lucide et courageux qu’ont fait les 
jeunes gens des Auberges de la Jeunesse. Bouleversé parce qu’ils sont 
l’espoir, qu’avec eux tout est possible; que sans eux rien n ’est possible. (27, 
p.247)
3.6.2 1930s revolution
This idea that ‘tout est possible’ was a recurrent one in 1930s France and perhaps 
contributed to the prevalence of demands for impractical or utopian change, 
especially during the middle of the decade. There were grandiose calls to ‘refaire la 
renaissance’ (112, p.84) for example. Such solutions tended to be dramatic but not 
clearly defined, again especially those of intellectuals and writers. Giono could
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wiite in his non-fiction that T1 n ’y a qii’un seul remède; notre force. Il n’y a qu’un 
seul moyen de l’utiliser: la révolte’ (160, p.25), but then describe his version of the 
better society only in a work of fiction, where his imagination could be exercised 
freely and details of how change might be achieved could be attributed to mystical 
natural forces or superhuman newcomers, like Bobi in Que ma joie demeure. Saint- 
Exupéry also stated vaguely that what was needed was to emphasise qualities such 
as ‘Humanisme, Homme, Fraternité’ against individualism, doctrine and ideology, 
though how this might achieve change was left unstated (185, p.60). Of course, 
artists need not define change in concrete terms political movements are expected to 
adopt: ‘Giono never seriously concocts an organized utopia, a more perfect future 
state’ (52, p.98).
For political movements, though, such definitions were expected. However, groups 
who offered definite critiques of the existing order generally favoured ‘le rêve moins 
précis d’un ordre nouveau’ (11, p.98) when it came to offering solutions:
Mounier fait remarquer que si le cri “A bas les voleurs!” est en 
transversalité de la droite à la gauche, aucune “formule positive” n ’a 
émergé d’un côté ou d’un autre. (164, p. 144)
- nor indeed from newer groups on the whole, whether non-conformist or of the 
extremes:
Lorsqu’il s’agit de définir le régime politique de son choix, le chef des 
Croix-de-feu se montre peu enclin à la précision. (154, p. 167)
In some cases, this is an unfair accusation, however. We might certainly accuse the 
Personalists of utopianism, but they were at least relatively precise in their 
descriptions of this utopia, since Mounier believed his movement should avoid the
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failings of other groups. Personalism was even described by one of its founders, 
Domenach as ‘a method for thinking and living’ (112, p.4). As we have seen in the 
previous section, Mounier did try to define elements of practical change. This is not 
to say that he was not also tempted by relatively utopian idealistic pronouncements. 
In the October 1933 Esprit.
Mounier envisaged his ideal future society as one vast monasteiy in which
the rule of money and the material would come to an end. (ibid.. p.80)
Mounier’s strategy appears to have been to combine his global utopian vision with 
practical reforms in the short-term which were to make the ideal state attainable in 
the longer term. He set about trying to form a network of ‘communes à la taille de 
l’homme’, inspired by Proudhon, (81, p.271) which he described as ‘collective 
persons inspired by a living poverty or generous simplicity’ (112, p.82). These were 
to be the basis of an eventual ‘spiritual revolution in Europe’ (ibid.. p.87) but this 
would only be possible under a combination of this network with ‘time, a pluralistic 
state, and a decentralized economy’ (ibid.. p.87).
For the non-conformists, famously, revolution was ‘nécessaire’ even though they 
recognised that any revolution is ‘une crise morbide [qui] n ’apporte point de solution 
automatique’ (26, p.l 19). They frequently argued that calls for a revolution were 
neither impractical nor utopian, however, basing their defence on their faith in 
human revolutionary potential was closely linked to their religious faith and 
emphasis on spirituality as a way to achieve radical change. ‘La révolution sera 
spirituelle ou elle ne sera pas’.^  ^ Personalists argued that philosophy and spirituality 
had to be combined with political commitment in order to harness ‘the revolutionary 
power of clnistianity’ (112, p.80). Mounier’s dogmatic statements on the necessity 
of a spiritual element in political change recall those of Capra and Spretnak 
discussing the greens:
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Aucune action [politique] n ’est saine et viable qui néglige tout à fait, à plus 
forte raison qui repousse, ou le souci de l’efficacité, ou l’apport de la vie 
spirituelle. (26, p. 110)
This was Mounier’s explanation for the failure of the Popular Front -  the ‘obituary’ 
he wi'ote for the coalition in March 1938 noted that it had lacked ‘a strong 
spirituality which could have improved men, articulated doctrines, and formed 
characters’ (112, p. 131). Terre Nouvelle used the same argument, describing 
themselves as ‘communistes spiritualistes’ and making their point strikingly tlnougli 
their use of a white hammer and sickle imposed on a red cross (81, p.279).
A final parallel can be drawn in this section between modern ecofeminists and the 
emphasis on women’s special role in achieving a sort of spiritual or ‘felf change in 
some 1930s sources, notably the Personalist stress on women as the way forward or 
the female characters in the novels of Giono. Female characters are rarely the main 
protagonists in his fiction, but where they almost invariably play a central role is in 
bringing about radical change through the ‘petit geste’. Such change is depicted as 
radical and effective, but arising from an artless ‘felf reaction, usually to the 
women’s natural surroundings. ‘Les bases du nouvel édifice’ (60, p.95) which leads 
to the community finding itself on a ‘nouvelle arche de Noé’ (ibid., p. 141) arise not 
from a rational reaction to political crisis, rather from a natural quasi-spiritual 
reaction to an absurd ‘civilisation’.
To those desperate for urgent and radical change in the 1930s, however, such 
utopian visions or the widespread combination of reform and revolution led to a 
frustration even more understandable than that of modern environmentalists. Those 
who felt change then had to be imposed were, with hindsight, to prove more 
dangerous by the end of the decade -  working with Vichy tempted even figures 
diametrically opposed to most of its views like Mounier because, despite their 
disagreements, even Vichy seemed more likely to allow change than the previous
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regime. The early acceptance of the Vichy regime also meant, of course, that France 
would no longer be at war, the focus of the next chapter.
' Dumont, in an interview in 1974, reproduced in (130, p. 152).
 ^The gaullist RPR will be included in the right for the purposes o f this chapter, as, despite a long- 
running debate on whether gaullism can easily be classed as ‘right-wing’, this is where most political 
scientists situate them; and, more importantly, where the greens believe them to belong. When greens 
refer to ‘la droite’ today, they certainly include the RPR in their criticisms,
 ^ Green slogan, used on a poster in Amis de la Terre, Recueil de documents, held in the Bibliothèque 
nationale, Paris.
Mounier, ‘Court traité de la mythique de gauche’, reproduced in (65, p .211).
 ^L’Union Nationale des Combattants (UNC) in 1933, quoted in (154, p .161).
 ^Meunier, quoted in (73, p.208).
 ^For au account o f  how Doriot switched front being a Communist Party leader to his position o f ‘chef 
de parti de masse’ in the PPF, see (154, pp. 178-82).
® See (151) for a discussion o f  Comte’s influence.
 ^Speaking in March 1852, quoted in (65, p.35).
See (150, ‘Preface’) for details.
" See (151, p.43) for details.
Aron, Ordre Nouveau. No. 4, October 1933, quoted in (15, p.203).
An oft-used term, here employed by Bucard’s ‘Francistes’, quoted in (154, p .175).
In Citadelle, quoted in (163, p.87).
Jean Brière, one o f the founding members o f Les Verts and a ‘porte-parole’ during the 1980s made 
a speech reported as anti-semitic in the French press during the Gulf War. Lalonde accused les Verts 
o f  reacting too slowly in their eventual condemnation o f Brière, though the party countered that their 
internal democracy meant that exclusion, even on racist grounds, was a long process in order to allow 
the accused member to mount a proper defence.
Mounier’s term, repeated widely in the 1930s. See, for example (164, p .143).
Larkin, for example, offers the intellectual nature o f French politicians, drawn from the professions
and dominated by intellectuals as an explanation for the different style o f debate in France and Anglo-
saxon countries; see £85, p.40).
Thorez in 1931; quoted in (88, p.87).
Reproduced in (72, p.643).
Aron & Dandieu, Le cancer américain, quoted in (15, p.229).
‘Le syndicalisme fiançais ne peut admettre, entre les personnes, des distinctions fondées sur la race, 
la religion, la naissance, les opinions ou l’argent’ for example. The ‘Manifeste’, published in 1940 is 
reproduced in (72, p.489).
The 21 Conditions o f the Third International are reproduced in (ibid.. p.233).
See (152, p.45). Lagrange was thirty-five when appointed.
Viance, Esprit, no.13, November 1933, p.29, quoted in (15, p.223).
See (85, p.42) for an account o f why this was so in the 1930s.
Redfern repeatedly uses this phrase to describe Giono’s political views.
By Hofftuan, for example; cited in (91, p. 163).
Title o f paper published in IRNES Perspectives on the environment, pp.43-57.
See http://www.les verts.imaginet.fr for details.
See http://www.les verts.imaginet.fi-.
One study o f European green movements found that ‘most’ o f the activists in the early groups were 
Christian -  see (29, p.50).
^^(176), published in 1981.
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An American academic best known for The population bomb, who later renounced his 1960s views 
as dangerous and unworkable.
‘Dieu vivant’, no.15, quoted In (15, p.237).
Mounier in a letter to Archambault, reproduced in (15, p .211).
Bonnaud-Lamotte in the discussion following Winock’s paper, reproduced in (183, p. 158).37 Mounier, quoted in (141, p.206).
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C hapter 4 
W ar
4.1 Introduction
There are three broad parallels accounting for shared attitudes to war by modern 
greens and 1930s sources. First, both have recent memories or ongoing experience 
of actual conflict (WWl,  war in Ethiopia, civil war in Spain for 1930s sources; the 
Vietnam War at the formative period of the green movement, and more recently, war 
in the Gulf and in former Yugoslavia). They therefore have a shared experience of 
living through war, albeit on quite a different scale. This shared experience also 
came during the formative period of both sets of sources. Those who joined the 
youth movements of the 1930s were born before or during WWl,  and many of them 
would have lost close relatives in the conflict; many, including Giono and Céline 
had actual experience of combat at a young age. The greens, too, were marked by 
war during the formative period of their movement. The Vietnam war was one of 
the most-debated issues during May 1968, the My Lai massacre having taken place 
in March of the same year; and as we noted in Chapter L the green movement had 
its direct origins in both the May events and the anti-military and anti-nuclear 
protests of the Cold War. Campaigns at Fessenheim and against the extension of the 
military base at the Larzac plateau in 1973 were the first experience of political 
commitment for many greens, including high-profile figures like Solange Fernex 
(186, p.205).
Second, they shai'e a fear of likely future conflict involving France, a fear confirmed 
by WW2 for the 1930s sources, and the wars already mentioned in the 1990s. Such 
fears vary in intensity during the periods studied. Third, the two sets of sources
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share the belief that these likely future wars are to be feared more than any previous 
conflict. In the 1930s, this was because new weapons technology (including 
chemical weapons) and the prospect of the first effective use of air strikes, combined 
with the unheard-of military might of Germany and the USSR, meant that the next 
war’s effects were impossible to predict and clearly far more devastating than those 
of any previous war. For modern greens, this is because of a comparable fear of the 
potential use of new technology in future conflicts, notably nuclear weapons and 
modern germ warfare.
These three shared experiences and fears lead, unsurprisingly, to broadly similar 
criticisms, ones which set both greens and 1930s sources apart from dominant 
attitudes in the interim period. After WW2, the memory of the Occupation and the 
Holocaust meant extreme pacifism was discredited in France. Not until 1970s anti­
military campaigns (campaigns which were led by nascent greens) did organised 
pacifism make an impact again. Indeed, critics of modern greens already make the 
connection between them and the 1930s in this context: ‘Au cours de la guerre du 
Golfe, les écologistes furent [...] à de nombreuses reprises étiquetés comme 
“munichois”’ (31, p. 18).
In the 1930s, absolute (or ‘integral’) pacifism was a common reaction to the horrors 
of WWl,  especially since there was not yet the awareness of the Holocaust and 
consequences of refusing war against Nazi Germany. The extent of pacifist attitudes 
in 1930s French society was to be played down in the aftermath of WW2. As late as 
1991, Ingram demonstrated that ‘the dearth of historical writing on the French peace 
movement of this centuiy is almost complete’ (187, p.l). '  Ingram attributes this in 
part to the number and diversity of 1930s pacifist groups, which makes their study 
complicated. Reynolds (149, p.201) further argues that, because pacifism had an 
‘awkward tendency to ignore left/right distinctions or to switch between them’, it has 
been ignored by historians interested in ‘the main plot of the opera’ (ibid., p.225). A 
final plausible explanation is given by Walter. If pacifist movements are forgotten, 
it is because they represent a painful memory:
mC’est l’histoire d’un désastre. Nous nous étions réunis pour combattre le 
fascisme et la guerre, et nous avons eu les deux, avec la défaite en prime. 
(188, 69)
No matter how the failure to remember 1930s pacifism is explained, what is of 
interest for this study is that virulent criticisms of the effects of war are to be found 
across the entire range of green movements and 1930s sources; and, as we shall see 
in the final two sections of this chapter, that an extreme form of pacifism is widely 
seen as an appropriate response.
4.2 Green criticism s
Both the effects of an actual war or the potential effects of a future conflict are 
criticised by greens. These can be considered in two broad categories: the effects of 
war on society in general, and on the individual or person.
4.2.1 War and society
Any green analysis takes as its starting point that there is no such thing as a 
‘glorious’ war (19, p. 162), no matter how justified it might be. Whether a ‘ju s f war 
or not (and many greens still argue this is a contradiction in terms), the effects of any 
combat on the enviromnent are the same. Criticisms are made of the direct effects of 
war on human lives, the abuse of limited natural resources and damage to the 
environment caused by war. War is ‘the ultimate pollutant’ (37, p.l 14), and the 
military in wartime represents ‘la plus grande source de gaspillage’, wasting all the 
resources most important to the green analysis: ‘du travail, de l’espace, de l ’énergie, 
des minéraux rares,’ and polluting ‘les airs et les eaux’ (189, p.88). War is also
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attacked for its effects on society in the long-term. Greens have studied the effects 
of toxic chemicals and radiation released into the environment, and campaign in 
favour of communities still affected by mines, birth defects, and other long-term 
effects. The funding of conflicts around the world also ‘precludes any possibility of 
a peaceful transition to a sustainable society’ (19, p. 161), the greens’ ultimate goal.
When greens criticise the cost of war, they especially invoke the nuclear industry. 
The anti-nuclear campaign was of course the ‘fer de lance des écologistes en France’ 
(35, p.26), and for greens, civil and military uses of the atom are interrelated, 
because of the common effects they have on society. First, both involve a strong 
state: protection against terrorism is needed for both nuclear installations and the 
force de frappe, regardless of their different uses. Next, two key demands of the 
greens are citizen participation and freedom of information. Both are impossible in 
an ‘état nucléaire’, in the greens’ view. The dominance of the nuclear debate by the 
‘teclmocracy’ (19, p.59) or ‘savants’ means citizens feel unqualified to pai'ticipate; 
and secrecy rather than freedom of information is the hallmark of a nuclear power 
for the greens. They see this as true of both nuclear energy (eg. the French 
government’s attempt to cover up the extent of fallout from Chernobyl) and weapons 
(secrecy regarding the extent and effects of French nuclear testing, for example).
Greens further criticise the complicity of the media and the use of propaganda during 
wartime, which mean those who oppose a war are marginalised, if not demonised. 
Secrecy and the managing of information are attacked for their long-term effects on 
democracy, rather than their use during actual wars alone. Indeed, the greens 
frequently make the point that the effects of actual conflicts are only a small part of 
the problem. Instead, the possibility of war and the effects of a militarized society 
are argued to have the most damaging effects, and it is these effects we will now 
consider.
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First of all, greens argue a ‘war culture’ exists, even outside wartime, and that this 
adversely affects democracy. The decision-making process of foreign and defence 
policy is ‘wholly unaccountable’ (37, p. 114), especially in France, where both 
domains are the special reserve of the President. Chirac’s decision to resume 
nuclear testing in 1995 is cited as an example of the lack of democracy: no mention 
was made of this decision in his pre-election programme, and public opposition did 
not prevent the tests being carried out. The war ‘culture’ is seen as particularly 
dangerous because particularly difficult to define and to challenge. Some greens 
have attacked the use of violent images, ‘jouets guerriers’ and so on (eg. 190, p.5) as 
an important part of this ‘culture’.
Second, greens criticise the costs to society of remaining prepared for possible 
conflict. These costs are both economic and environmental. Greens typically 
compare military spending with what they see as more deserving or pressing 
concerns. ‘Dix heures de dépenses militaires, c’est des moyens contraceptifs pour 
toutes les femmes’ (189, p.82); or they contrast the expenditure of the Ministère de 
l’environnement and that of the Ministère de la défense nationale ‘300 fois plus 
faibles!’.^  The military also consumes limited resources; the example of the US 
military is frequently cited (10% of the country’s oil consumption is used by the 
military (37, p.l 14)). Finally, military requirements are prioritised to the detriment 
of more environmentally sound ones. In France, the development of the Larzac 
plateau for military training, and the eviction of hundreds of paysans whose families 
had worked the land for centuries was one of the first campaigns to mobilise French 
environmentalists.
Greens oppose the costs of being prepared for possible future wars as immoral, when 
the ‘real danger’ is elsewhere, in their view:
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Greens attribute colonialist attitudes to what they see as the French attachment to the 
nation state (they particularly dislike the term ‘patrie’) and heroic leaders. In France,
■ *The threats we face today are less likely to arise from a breakdown between 
nations than from the breakdown between humanity and the Earth (19, 
p.l60).
Most immoral of all, though, in the greens’ view are the arms industries which profit 
from war. Not only are these exactly the type of industrial productivist concerns the 7
greens reject, but in liberal capitalist economies, ‘logic’ dictates they should j
encourage further wars in the drive for profit. As Porritt puts it, ‘industrialism 
begets belligerency’ (ibid., p. 161). Greens offer several specific examples of wars 
which they see as having been encouraged or continued for economic reasons rather 
than any ‘raison d’é ta f , notably the superpowers’ involvement in the Iran-Iraq n
conflict (191, p.43). Greens in France argued the Gulf War, too was being fought 
principally for economic reasons; les Verts’ slogan at the time was ‘Pas de guerre 
pour le pétrole’ (107, p. 160). Especially cynical is the arms industry’s exploitation 
of patriotic sentiment for profit in the view of the French greens, who quote Anatole 
France to illustrate the point: ‘On croit mourir pour la patrie, on meurt pour les 
industriels’ (189, p.84).
An aspect by which greens are particularly concerned here is how developing 
countries are affected by war. The ‘culture’ of war means French attitudes are ‘plus 
conquérants que solidaires’ (96, p. 198). This in turn means that the effects of the 
enviromnental crisis will be worse than they need be: as more and more people I
compete for fewer resources, ‘we can anticipate a period of disputes and armed
\ 1%
la conscience collective est marquée par le mythe du chef glorieux [et par] 
des ambitions impériales. [...] La réalité ne correspond plus à ces rêves. (96, 
p.183)
This attacliment is criticised as dangerous, since it prevents new ways of addressing 
the environmental crisis, encourages war, and even leads to anti-democratic or 
extreme politics outwith wartime: the Front National is ‘l’héritier extrême de cette 
logique qui pousse à la confrontation plus qu’au partage’ (ibid., p. 189).
The final broad criticism greens make of the effects the ‘war culture’ has on society 
relates to power and hierarchy. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the greens want 
devolved power and an ‘état minimum’. Neither can be achieved while the 
attaclnnent to the nation-state and dominance of the army continue. Moscovici 
explains the green view:
Etat et militarisation vont de pair, non seulement sur le plan économique, 
mais également sur le plan de la pensée (192, p.48).
The military is presented as the antithesis of the green movement: ‘Défenseur de la 
vie, il se veut d’emblée à l’antipode de l’organisation de la m orf (ibid., p.48). Its 
ideas and principles (key themes being self sacrifice, membership of a mass 
organisation, obeying orders, top-down decisions) all contradict green hopes for 
society. In France, such ideas are seen as particularly damaging, since military 
service means young citizens may be influenced, making them less likely to become 
the sort of active citizemy the greens would like. Dumont, for example, argues that 
the effect of military service is to prevent questioning attitudes: ‘L’armée m ’a fait 
savoir qu’il fallait obéir d’abord, quitte à protester ensuite’ (189, p.83).
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The effects of actual or potential war are thus dangerous for participative democracy. 
The effects for the individual or person are seen as just as damaging as those for 
democracy, however, and it is to these effects we will now turn.
4.2.2 War and the person
In their criticisms of the effects of war on the person, greens generally refer to the 
effects of actual conflicts rather than potential effects of future war. One exception 
is their emphasis of the potential effects of new teclmology, which will be 
considered at the end of this section.
Greens are first critical of war as it affects two groups disproportionately -  the young 
and the poor. These are two groups which already have the special sympathy and 
attention of the greens. Both groups are seen to be affected disproportionately 
during actual times of war and because of the potential for future conflict.
The young, firstly, attract special sympathy from the greens for three main reasons. |
They, like the green movement, were not yet born when the environmental crisis was |
■ fcaused. They have no real political power (politicians are ‘ces hommes du troisième 
âge’) (123, p.3), nor do they run the industries which greens attack: their hands are 
cleaner. Second, as they will live longer, they are more likely to suffer the extreme 
effects of an environmental crisis than their elders, who caused it. Finally, the young 
are the group most likely to support the greens, and hence, the best hope for the 
future: almost 50% of those who vote for les Verts are under 35 years of age (107,
p .168).
Why do greens argue that the young are disproportionately affected? In time of war, 
they are of com'se most likely to be called on to fight. Even outwith war time, young 
French men are required to complete military service of one year or civil
I l l
‘coopération’ of two years."  ^ The experience of military service (and the virtual 
impossibility of conscientious objection in France) marked many greens -  it led 
Dumont to adopt Tine véritable guerre individuelle contre l ’armée’ (189, p.83), for 
example. That they are more likely to be called on to fight in wars is seen as 
particularly unjust because of the loss of potential involved in the mass deaths of the 
young; and, more importantly, because the young have no influence when the 
decision is made to go to war. Politicians who will not themselves have to fight 
have unfair power over them. Some greens even argue that one danger of military 
impact on the young is that a general culture of violence ensues. Levene sees little 
difference between football hooligans, conscripts and officers who choose to serve 
(an ‘upper-class gang’) (191, p.48).
The second group identified by the greens as disproportionately affected is that of 
the disadvantaged or the poor, particularly those in developing countries. Why do 
greens feel this group deserves special attention? Again, they are not implicated in 
the environmental crisis to the same extent, but will suffer unduly as a result of it. 
Second, such people are more likely to have a sustainable way of life, particularly in 
developing countries, than those who send them to war. Finally, greens argue that 
those who have not benefited from modern industrial use of scarce resources must be 
given special consideration, as the planet’s limited resources mean they will never 
enjoy the standard of living current in industrialised countries.
Why do greens argue that such groups are disproportionately affected by war?
Again the ‘economically deprived, socially confined and politically coerced’ are the 
most likely to have to do military service or sign up for the military (ibid., p.49) -  
those from more influential groups can frequently avoid service. Second, they too 
have little political power, so will be forced to fight in wars begun by others. Their 
lack of political weight also means that they suffer unduly even outwith times of 
war. The cause of inhabitants of French Polynesia, where nuclear testing was carried 
out for several decades, was one the greens were quick to adopt, for example. Those 
who join the military tlnough economic necessity are generally viewed
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sympathetically by the greens, too. One of the effects of possible nuclear war which 
the greens frequently highlight is the ‘extraordinarily high incidence’ of 
psychological disorders, drug abuse and alcoholism at missile bases such as Strategic 
Air Force Command - ‘the stress of carrying out mass murder’ (19, p. 149).
The main argument against actual war is of course its potential effect on the 
individual who has to fight. Futile loss of life and the absurdity of many wars are 
stressed by greens, who frequently provide chilling statistics to explain their position 
-  ‘Since I960 at least 10,700,000 people have died in 65 wars’ (ibid., pp.62-3). 
Greens see this as a particular tragedy because such wars typically involve the 
aimihilation of a more sustainable way of life, especially in developing countries.
The agronomist Dumont defined himself as a ‘pacifiste intégral’ for precisely this 
reason:
ceux qui vont mourir un fusil à la main sont ceux qui ne pounont plus 
manier la faux ou pousser la charrue. (189, p.81)
Nor are such effects limited to those who actually fight or to times of war. In many 
countries under military occupation or during war, a relatively sustainable way of 
life is abandoned, with, for example ‘self-sufficiency [giving] way to prostitution as 
the only relevant way to make a living’ (191, p.41). The effects of war on 
populations and on the land on which they are dependent are a key focus for 
criticisms: in Vietnam, for example, people still die from the effects of dioxin 
poisoning, suffer cancers, go blind, and give birth to seriously ill or malformed 
children (ibid., p.42). The disproportionate after-effects of war on women are 
another focus of green criticisms. ‘Fatiiai chal culture is founded on sacrifice, crime, 
war’;^  women typically have less power and are less implicated in the decision to go 
to war, yet their health and livelihoods will be disproportionately affected.
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The prioritising of military needs has negative effects for individuals as well as for 
society in general. First, military spending (along with debt) means even basic 
necessities such as safe drinking water are unavailable in many developing countries. 
Second, inspirational groups for the greens such as the remaining native American 
Indians have been dispossessed of their lands and traditional way of life in order to 
allow for military exercises (see 193, pp. 136-40).
The final broad criticism made by greens of the effects of war on the person are of 
the potential effects of new weapons. The potential ‘human consequences of 
modern technology’ (19, p.51), particularly nuclear weapons, have been spelt out in 
frightening detail in accounts such as Schell’s The fate of the earth. French greens in 
particular have been
intarissables sur le descriptif de l’hiver nucléaire, ne ratant pas une occasion 
d’aller se coucher sin la chaussée pour simuler les conséquences d’une 
attaque nucléaire (189, p.82),
and have been accused of scaremongering as a result. The greens may contribute to 
the atmosphere of fear which the possibility of war and potential effects of new 
weapons create, but they would argue this is necessary if the ‘culture’ of war is to be 
destroyed, as we shall see later. We will look first, however, at 1930s criticisms of 
war.
4.3 1930s criticisms of war
In the 1930s too, criticisms of war focussed on both the effects of actual conflict and 
the possibility of future wars. Again, these can be considered in terms of society in 
general, and the person.
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4.3.1 War and society
Like modem greens, those living in post-WW 1 France were aware that war was 
never ‘glorious’. Horrific accounts of the reality of trench warfare had been widely 
published during the 1920s, and the efforts of influential anciens combattants like 
Emile-Auguste Chai'tier (‘Alain’, professeur de khâgne at the Lycée Hemi-IV 
tlnoughout the 1930s) meant that the ‘scandale de la guerre’ was communicated to 
the younger generation (65, p. 123). There was a corresponding belief that Ta guerre 
juste, qu’on appelle aussi la dernière des guerres’^  was an illusion, since no matter 
what the cause, its effects were the same.
Accounts of direct effects of war on the land where it was fought were widespread in 
the 1930s and emphasised the same aspects which greens stress today. Criticisms of 
‘gaspillage’ recur in both sources, though in the 1930s, the word ‘matériel’ rather 
than ‘enviroimemental’ is used. War always involves ‘gaspillage des hommes, des 
matériaux’,^  ‘ruines matérielles’ (194, p. 101). The absurdly wasteful effects of 
actual conflicts on the environment were present in fictional accounts as well as in 
the ‘témoignages’ of former soldiers - ‘Les forêts, on a tiré dessus aussi, au canon’ 
(53,p .44).
Criticisms of the effects of actual conflicts were not limited merely to the ‘matériel’, 
though. The significance of equal citizens for French republicanism meant that the 
hierarchy of command necessary in wartime was particularly resented -  it was ‘un 
pouvoir absolu et humiliant, indigne d’hommes libres’ (194, p.92). Decisions are 
taken by an officer ‘qui connaît et décide par trois bureaux, [qui] n’a pas vu la 
guerre’, who is ‘hors de la boue, de la faim, de la soif, du froid et des éclatements 
volcaniques’ (195, p.44) in what was presented as a direct contradiction of the 
republican principles of fraternity and equality.
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The third criticism based on actual conflicts related to the use of wartime 
propaganda. ‘Pai' la musique, par les discours, l ’excès de la violence est relevé 
jusqu’au niveau de la beauté’ (ibid., p. 174). Those who had fought in WWl found 
this particularly deplorable and cynical: wartime broadcasts were ‘mensonges 
destinés à tuer [...jqu’on vous donnait à la TSF’ (27, p.243) and were attacked for 
their effects during the war.
However, as with modern greens, very few critics in the 1930s restricted their 
attacks to the past effects on society of actual wars. Instead, they felt a duty to 
describe and explain the effects of war on society generally, even outwith wartime. 
With regard to propaganda, for example, most critics focussed on its growing use 
and effects during the 1930s rather than simply explaining how it had been used 
during W W l. This is less than surprising given the ‘remarquable essor des 
nouvelles méthodes de propagande’ (152, p. 103), such as radio and cinema® during 
the decade. Ownership of radios in France rose from 2,625,000 in 1935, to more 
than 5,500,000 in 1939,^ and by the middle of the decade they played ‘un rôle 
politique capital’ (ibid., p.98). Criticisms of the effects of what was seen as pro-war 
propaganda were therefore continued long after WWl had ended. The press, which 
had been complicit with the military during WWl in the view of former soldiers, 
was seen as encouraging a war ‘culture’ generally. Thus Mounier attacked 
L’Humanité during the 1930s as a ‘chronique militaire’ (65, p.212).
Nor were such preoccupations evident only in the latter part of the decade, when we 
might have expected to find them. The entire decade was characterised by fear of 
war, in a way that the 1920s had not been. If the 1920s were ‘l’après-gueiTe’, 
marked by optimism and the conviction that WWl had been ‘la der des ders’, then 
by the early 1930s, there was a clear sense that France was again living through an 
‘avant-guerre’ (196, p.6). Weber catalogues a plethora of intellectuals and 
individuals predicting war ‘pour demain’ even in 1930 and 1931 (ibid., pp.242-3), 
and Mounier described 1930s society as suffused by a ‘culture’ of war - ‘une guerilla
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permanente’ (26, p.35). Giono was by no means unusual in his cynical view in 
February 1934 that war was Tin moyen de la politique’ (197, p.6) in 1930s France.
Like greens today, 1930s sources saw the extent of this ‘culture’ as difficult to define 
and dangerous for society. First, everyday life was ‘impregnated’ by a general fear 
of the ‘next last war’ (196, p.243), which meant that attempts to change society for 
the better were likely to be met with a less enthusiastic response. Touehard, for 
example, describes the negative effects of ‘le poids fondamental de la guerre dans les 
années trente [...] non seulement sur la société, mais sur les mentalités’ (65, p.98). 
Such fears were just as present on the right of the political spectrum, though often 
for different reasons. Maulnier argued in 1938 that the right’s fear of a possible war 
was based on the perception that France was not sufficiently prepared for conflict, 
and that, if Nazi Germany were defeated, ‘la bolchévisation immédiate de l’Europe’ 
would probably follow (183, p. 150).
For Giono, the danger of the war ‘culture’ was that it permeated all aspects of French 
society and meant the young, in particular, would be more likely to accept the 
eventuality of war.^^ In his view, the greatest threat facing France was not invasion, 
nor communism or fascism, but a general lack of hope and resulting perception that 
change was impossible -the country was ‘affamé de paix’ (159, p. 170).
Many argued that the emphasis on war meant that the true crisis facing French 
society was not being addressed. As well as a general ‘culture’ of war, they argued 
France had an ‘économie de guerre’ even outwith wartime (198, p.565).
Expenditure on the military was viewed as a particular misuse of valuable resources. 
Larkin describes ‘taxpayers’ objections that a third of the government’s revenue was 
now earmarked for armaments’, in 1938 (85, pp.67-8). With hindsight, these 
criticisms may seem misguided - historians generally attribute the débâcle at least in 
part to the comparatively low level of military expenditure in France during the 
inter-war period, seeing the Popular Front’s decision to increase spending as Too
mlittle, too late’/^ Nevertheless, criticisms of spending on the military were abundant, 
even as late as July 1939, when Vigilance was attacking spending on the 
‘militarisation du pays’ as unnecessary (183, p. 154). Also in 1939, Mounier drew 
the classic comparison between spending on education and spending on arms, one 
now employed by greens: had a French leader during the 1930s invested in education 
rather than the ‘sinldiole of armaments’, he would have ‘saved’ France (112, p. 149).
The arms industry itself was a marked focus for criticism, combining as it did tlii'ee 
key 1930s hates -  industrialism, capitalism and frequently, acceptance of taylorist 
practices. 1930s sources agreed with modern greens that the industry actually 
caused wars. Along with their ‘political agents’, ‘capitalist arms-dealers callously, 
almost nonchalantly, sent [young idealists] to their deaths’ (165, p. 150). A second 
focus for criticism was that the industry (indeed, all industries) made a profit from 
war: ‘L’industrie n ’est jamais aussi prospère que dans la guerre’ (68, p .131). Even 
outwith wartime, the arms industry swallowed valuable resources which should have 
been spent on more deserving causes, in the view of many 1930s sources. In 1938, 
for example, the Radicals summarised the 1930s as ‘la belle époque des marchands 
de canons’ (65, p. 129). A final resemblance between 1930s and green criticisms of 
the arms industry was the view that those fighting in wars were doing so not for a 
noble principle or ‘la patrie’, but for ‘les intérêts de l’industrie’.'^
Moving on to the effects of the possibility of war on developing countries, we can 
demonstrate a surprising parallel between the attitudes of the Personalists and those 
of the greens today. Of course, it is undeniable that the most common attitudes in 
the 1930s were far from ‘green’ (though this is presumably true of common attitudes 
today as well). ‘Une France gallocentrique’ (65, 220) is no doubt an accurate 
summary of prevailing views and attitudes to the colonies and dependencies, in 
particular. As evidence, we might cite the six million visitors to the 1931 Exposition 
Coloniale de Vincennes, or the publicly-stated view of even the Popular Front 
Minister of Colonies, Moutet, that the reason for addressing the agricultural crisis in 
Indo-China was a military one -  ‘France’s vulnerable international position dictated
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that she exploit the colonies more fully’ (166, p. 155). Even the supposedly anti­
colonialist communists adopted a pragmatic position, with Thorez famously 
explaining to the 1937 party congress that Te droit au divorce ne signifie pas 
l’obligation de divorcer’.
The candidly exploitative attitudes of the majority in the 1930s make the position of 
the Personalists seem particularly radical, especially if we consider the close iinlcs 
between the catholic church (the Personalists were virtually all catholics) and French 
colonialism. The Personalists devoted a section in their Manifesto to ‘The 
interracial community’ (50, pp.263-266), in which they called for the church to 
distance itself from eolonialism, and for the staged independence of all French 
overseas territories and dependencies, criticising misconceived notions of ‘la dualité 
civilisation-barbarie’ (11, p.62). They also highlighted the military exploitation of 
‘more ancient and more spiritual’ civilisations, attacking the ‘“blessings” of forced 
labour and military service’ France had introduced (50, p.264).
Again like modern greens, the Personalists also linlced their eritieisms of French 
attitudes to dependent territories and war to nationalism and the nation-state 
(‘ruineux et régressif (26, 124)). The linking of the nation state and pro-war 
sentiment was in fact commonplace in the 1930s, in both political and literaiy 
sources. Saint-Exupéry even used a metaphor which would be enthusiastically 
adopted by greens four decades later in his impassioned plea to move beyond 
nationalism and the ‘haine et divisions’ he believed it caused: ‘Pourquoi nous haïr? 
Nous sommes solidaires, emportés par la même planète, équipage d’un même 
navire’ (86, pp.242-3).'^
Along with nationalism the emphasis on the nation state was frequently rejected in 
1930s sources, particularly since the emphasis on the nation and on the state was 
believed by many sources to lead to fascism (15, pp.305-6). Ordre Nouveau even 
wrote a spectacularly naïve open letter to Hitler in November 1933, warning him:
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Vous voilà condamné à descendre la pente qui mène du nationalisme à 
l’étatisme, de Tétatisme à rautarchie, de Tautarchic à la guerre’ (15, p.310).
The ‘myths’ of patrie and leader were equally attacked by many sources. ‘Une 
certaine exaltation cocardière’ (65, p.217) was still common in the 1930s, on the left 
as well as on the right, and anciens combattants sometimes reacted negatively to 
such glorification of the patrie, with Prost pointing out that, to present the 
‘cérémonies de onze novembre’ as ‘une fête à la gloire de la patrie’ would be 
entirely wrong (194, pp.61-2). Esprit attacked the inappropriate glorification of the 
nation: ‘Nous avons condamné la Nation, la Patrie faite Dieu’ (15, p .191). In 
literature, too, the patrie was presented as a dangerous myth. Giono emphasised 
‘Quand je vois un arbre, je dis arbre, je ne dis jamais ‘France’. Ça n ’existe pas’ (199, 
p.302).
While ‘la vénération à l’égard des grands chefs militaires (Joffre, Foch, Pétain, 
Gallieni, Gouraud)’ (65, p.98) was still common in 1930s France, many of our 
sources also identified this as a dangerous trend. Mounier warned of the effect of 
such ‘myths’ as ‘I’hoimeur’, ‘le chef in 1934 (164, p. 144). In literature, Giono, 
Céline and Saint-Exupéry all portrayed military leaders in a less than flattering light, 
typically emphasising their distance from actual combat and lack of sympathy for the 
‘poilus’ they commanded; and both Giono and Saint-Exupéry also stressed that the 
glorification of such figures had damaging effects in the long term, since they were 
‘des idoles carnivores’ (86, p.241).
Finally, a long-term effect of the militaiy emphasis in society was felt to be a 
concentration of power, with 1930s France being described as ‘une société très 
hiérarchisée’ (65, p. 137). This seemed to many sources a contradiction of 
republican principles, and its causes were discussed critically. As in modern green 
critiques, the key concepts on which the military is based are presented as the
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antithesis of many of the new movements of the 1930s. The army in particular was 
T’école de Tabnégation, du sacrifice et de l’honneur’ (194, p. 100) whereas 
movements like the Personalists saw the individual and personal responsibility as the 
keystone of their proposals for change. Even outwith wartime, the military influence 
was seen as damaging to society through military service. Alain described how 
military service prevents questioning attitudes, and how military hierarchical 
structures were incompatible with the republican ‘regard’ for equal citizens - ‘On n ’a 
pas assez souligné à quel point le pouvoir militaire est absolu et humiliant’ (195, 
p. 135). Many of the individuals studied here were profoundly mai'ked by their 
experiences of military service. As one ex-serviceman put it, ‘rien ne rend plus 
antimilitaire que la fréquentation des militaires’ (194, 92).
These effects of actual or potential war were therefore seen as damaging for society 
in 1930s sources, just as they are today in green accounts. Further resemblances can 
be demonstrated in 1930s criticisms of the effects of war on the person.
4.3.2 War and the person
As well as accounts of the effects of actual war on the person, including vivid 
descriptions of the reality of life in the trenches, 1930s sources also concentrate on 
potential effects of new technology, which will be considered at the end of this 
section.
The first resemblance with the greens can be observed in their mutual identification 
of the young and the poor as two groups who suffer unduly from the effects of actual 
or potential wars. Again, these are two groups which already have the special 
sympathy and attention of 1930s sources.
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The young, firstly, attract particular sympathy as Tes fils de la génération du 
charnier’ (182, p.90). Ingram has demonstrated how war widows played an 
important role in French pacifist groups in the entre-deux-guerres (187, pp.249-285), 
and Boimaud-Lamotte recalls the ‘leitmotiv’ of the contemporary women’s press as 
‘Ils ne nous prendront pas nos fils!’ (200, p .158). There was a special emphasis on 
the young, then, as they were seen to have suffered the consequences of WWl 
without in any way having responsibility for causing or prolonging the war, and 
because they were felt to be at particular risk in the event of any future conflict - 
‘C’est parce que les jeunes seraient appelés à faire la guerre future qu’ils reçoivent 
une attention particulière’ in the 1930s (194, p. 103). They were also a particular 
focus for many 1930s sources as the best hope of avoiding future wars, as young 
Freneh people were apparently more pacifist than their elders. This perception has 
subsequently been corroborated to some extent in studies such as Ingram’s, in which 
the ‘equation of youth and pacifist radicalism’ during the 1930s is seen as ‘perhaps a 
valid one’ (187, p.276). Pacifist youth movements like the Auberges are cited in 
illustration of this linlc.
The young would be unfairly affected by future conflict in the eyes of many in the 
1930s for reasons similar to those identified by greens today. 1930s sources first 
criticised the ‘vieille dégoûtante baliverne’ that the loss of a ‘generation’ to war was 
ever justified (160, p .11). Giono in particular denounced the idea that ‘la génération 
présente doit se sacrifier pour la génération future’ (ibid., p.l 1). The young are also 
presented as specially vulnerable to myths, propaganda and the encouragement of 
leaders. This point is made frequently, both in political or philosophical discussions 
of war and in literary accounts, on the right as on the left. After the Anschluss, for 
example. Combat stressed the potential effects on the young in pai'ticular, in 
typically vitriolic terms:
On n ’a rien vu d’aussi perfide que cette propagande d’honneur nationale
faite par des étrangers suspects dans les bureaux du Quai d’Orsay pour
488
précipiter les jeunes Français, au nom de Moscou ou au nom d’Israël, dans 
un conflit immédiat.'"'
Politicians and military leaders were also widely criticised, first because ‘ces 
vieillards grisâtres et gras’ (201, p.304) did not actually have to fight in wars, yet 
decided the fate of the young -  ‘ [ils] nous ont envoyés à la guerre, restant eux- 
mêmes au c h a u d Secondly, they were attacked for their experience and cynical 
manipulation of the more gullible young: they were old ‘politiciens,’'^
connaissant la vie et les roublardises et sachant parfaitement ce qu’il faut
dire aux jeunes hommes de vingt ans pour leur faire accepter la saignée
(160,p.l5).
Literary accounts of young men at war, such as Giono’s Batailles dans la montagne 
or the war chapters in Voyage often portray their gradual realisation that they have 
been ‘duped’ by old politicians or military leaders, Bardamu, for example, initially 
impressed by ‘le colonel et sa musique’, ‘encouragements’, ‘fleurs’, the parade of 
soldiers on horseback and ‘patriotes’ soon notices that ‘la musique s’est arrêtée. [...] 
On était faits comme des rats’ (53, pp. 18-19). Céline implies the young soldiers’ 
innocence and gullibility in a telling plnase: ‘On est puceau de l’horreur comme on 
l’est de la volupté’ (ibid.. p.24).
Outwith wartime, the young were also disproportionately affected. In the 1930s, 
military service attracted particular attention and criticism on several grounds. First, 
conscientious objection was all but impossible, and for an apparently more pro­
pacifist youth, this created a difficult moral dilemma. Second, given the fear that 
war was imminent tlnoughout the thirties, there was the real fear among young 
conscripts that service might mean actual combat relatively quickly. Third, military 
service was a particular focus since by 1935, because of the demographic ‘gap’ 
caused by WWl and the low birthrate, it was extended to two full years. For the
489
Personalists, this was the last straw. They immediately devoted a full issue of Esprit 
to the contradictions between personal moral principles, religion and militaiism in 
April 1935, in which Mounier denounced various aspects of military service in ‘one 
of the most significant polemical documents of the thirties’ (81, p.275). Les 
catholiques et la défense nationale.
One group which attracted great sympathy in the 1930s was the paysan youth. 
Whether they were called away from the land to fight in a war or to perform military 
service, they suffered more than perhaps any other group. First, their absence 
frequently meant the collapse of small farms and loss of livelihood, since especially 
after WWl,  they were difficult to replace (85, p.73). Second, they were perceived as 
particularly unsuited to the regimented atmosphere of the military. An anecdote 
Besset recounts about René Dumont’s military service between1924 and 1926'^ 
illustrates this second point. When asked by Lieutenant de Luppel what his reaction 
would be if he saw an enemy sniper on the hill opposite,
Dumont le paysan n ’hésite pas: ‘Je mets les chevaux à l’abri.’ Fureur du 
lieutenant, qui voulait une réponse style chai'ge de la brigade légère, et 
quinze jours de salle de police pour impertinence. (189, p.83)
The second group identified as disproportionately affected by war in the 1930s were 
the poor, particularly those living in rural commnities. This is unsurprising, given 
the large numbers still living on the land in 1930s France, and the special affection 
for the stereotypical paysan.'® There was sympathy for the paysan particularly 
because of the history of his sacrifice in war. For example, during WWl,  estimates 
of the number killed who were from rural or paysan backgrounds have been as high 
as 80% of the total (13, p. 142). For authors like Giono who saw the paysan as an 
ideal, this was an especially shocking waste. He constantly emphasised that paysans 
were ‘les soldats de toutes les guerres’: ‘on n ’a jamais tué que des paysans dans les 
batailles’ (68, p. 134).
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As with the special focus on the young, the rural poor also attracted the attention of 
1930s sources because they were believed to be more pacifist than other groups, and 
thus potentially more likely to resist war. This belief was closely linlced to 
republicanism. As the rural poor and the paysans were the group most likely to 
support the pro-republic Radical Party, they appeared to many to be Te rempart le 
plus solide de la République et de la paix’ (65, p. 131), against the perceived tln'eat of 
a communist revolution or fascism.
What were the reasons for these groups being disproportionately affected by war? 
First, many 1930s sources argued, often with some bitterness, that politicians and 
military leaders saw them as more dispensable than other groups. For ‘des 
gouvernements guerriers’ (201, p.306), war was ‘un instrument politique’; industrial 
workers were useful for the arms industry, therfore ‘la guerre, ça n ’est des morts que 
pour nous [les paysans]’ (197, p.6). For Céline, the poor generally suffer in wartime: 
‘On ne les intéresse que saignants, les salauds!’ (53, p. 109). Indeed, politicians in 
the 1930s were quite open about their intention to use paysans rather than other 
groups in the event of war. Thus the ‘revigoration’ of the peasantry in the colonies 
was desirable purely because ‘our army will not be able to find reliable troops from a 
sickly peasantry’ (166, p. 155).
The result was that war meant the poor from different countries, and paysans more 
than any other group, fighting one another when they had no quarrel with their 
counterparts, but were acting on the orders of politicians and military leaders who 
caused the conflict. Giono stressed the absurdity of paysans of different countries 
hurling shells at one another when ‘si vous étiez là les mains vides [... vous seriez 
tentés de] vous serrer la main’ (68, p.226). Céline too argued that the poor of one 
nation fighting the poor of another was absurd, even if they were more than prepared 
to do so :
mIl existe pour le pauvre en ce monde deux grandes manières de crever, soit 
par l’indifférence absolu de vos semblables en temps de paix, ou par la 
passion homicide des mêmes en la guerre venue. (53, p. 109)
The absurdity of war for the individual called on to fight is repeatedly stressed. No 
matter what the aim of the war, nor its eventual outcome, its effects for individuals 
are just as cruelly absurd. Such attacks on war were generally based on personal 
experience of WWl -  Giono, for example, stressed the ridiculous waste of ‘des 
morts qui n ’ont jamais vu un Allemand’ (59, p.67). The experience of the huge loss 
of life during ‘les absurdes attaques et contre-attaques pour quelques mètres de 
terrain’ (194, p.92) meant many saw actual war as pointless, whatever the outcome, 
and this pointlessness became the focus of their criticisms. Giono summed up the 
reactions of many anciens combattants when he wrote ‘ce qui me dégoûte dans la 
guerre, c’est son imbécillité’ (160, p. 15), while for Céline experience of actual war 
was invariably ‘une immense universelle moquerie’ (53, p.22). By the 1930s, there 
was a widespread impression that wars which were originally presented as just or 
necessary soon proved to be pointless or absurd; many thus reacted with frustration 
at the prospect of another war at the decade’s end by the question ‘Mourir pour 
Dantzig?’ (85, p.73).
The loss of life during any war, no matter how just, was also a recurrent theme in the 
works of Saint-Exupéry. Already in 1931, in Vol de nuit he had demonstrated an 
instinctive pacifism, with individuals’ lives as the most important consideration, 
‘Nous agissons [...] comme si quelque chose dépassait en valeur la vie humaine... 
Mais quoi?’ (202, p.66). Following his visit to Spain in the middle of the decade, he 
was even more marked by ‘les affres et les absurdités d’une guerre civile’ according 
to D ’Astier de la Vigerie (110, p .109). By the late 1930s, he ‘almost seemed to 
believe’ that ‘il n ’existe pas de cause qui vaille qu’on lui sacrifie une seule existence 
humaine’ (203, p.48).
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Unsurprisingly, the Personalists were also to take the effects of war on the person as 
their main focus as the decade progressed. They were particularly disappointed by 
the Popular Front decision to increase military spending, since they saw this as a 
contradiction of the purely defensive role for the military the Rassemblement had 
earlier seemed to suggest, a role the Personalists favoured. They argued that the 
increase in military spending was an overreaction to the German réintroduction of 
military service in 1935 and occupation of the Rliineland in March 1936. There 
were numerous, unusually polemical attacks in Esprit during 1936 and subsequent 
years, notoriously Mounier’s questioning of Général de Castelnau on what he argued 
were Personalist moral grounds: ‘Général, trois fils, n’est-ce pas assez?
Indeed, low morale in the military during the 1930s has since been attributed to the 
widespread nature of such antimilitarist focus on the effects of war on the person. 
While there was sympathy for those who had fought in WWl,  particularly the ranlc 
and file troops, and an undeniable admiration for certain military leaders, by the 
1930s, low public opinion of the military, bitter inter-service competition for funds 
and a longstanding failure to modernise^^ meant that ‘senior officers were depressed; 
other rallies depressing’ (196, p.247).
The criticisms made by our 1930s sources of the effects war had on the person were 
not limited to those who actually fought in wars. As greens do today, the fate of 
women left behind was discussed at length, arguably for two reasons. First, women 
were often seen as more sympathetic figures, and were to offer a poignant 
illustration of the devastating long-term effects of war on the person in the aftermath 
of W W l . Their suffering was to remain highly visible long after the war had ended, 
with France ‘a country of elderly and often single women, [...] submerged by the 
dark weeds of mourning’ for a generation (ibid., p. 14). An understandable cynicism 
or bitterness pervaded 1930s female accounts of their own perceived role in relation 
to war, ‘sacrificing sons and lovers without complaint, [...] bearing and nurturing 
camion fodder for future wars’ (204, p. 106).
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Of course, the focus on women was by no means limited to the long-term effects of 
loss of life during war. In literary accounts such as Giono’s Le Grand Troupeau, the 
direct effects of war on paysan communities were described, with moving depictions 
of women, the old and children left to struggle against the elements to survive. An 
account of brutal requisitioning, added to the hardship of war is given, with the 
female characters responding in despair ‘Vous nous laissez les yeux pour pleurer?’ 
(119, p. 120).
The second reason for the focus on women in the 1930s was arguably in an attempt 
to dissuade young men from accepting service in the military during wartime. Giono 
in particular favoured this approach. One effect of war described by many 1930s 
sources is the sexual availability of women left behind. Giono gives an account of a 
paysanne, in love with a young man who has been called up to fight, having sex with 
a deserter (ibid.. p. 178). Céline too describes the sexual availability of women in 
Paris, in a galling contrast to life on the front; and he makes clear that the ordinary 
soldier has little chance of enjoying a hero’s welcome after war is over:
Vous serez vite oubliés, petits soldats... Soyez gentils, crevez bien vite...
Et que la guerre finisse et qu’on puisse se marier avec un de vos aimables
officiers. (53, p.l 17)
Women are also used as literary symbols of life continuing through the obvious 
metaphor of pregnancy. Giono contrasts the pointless sacrifice and death of war 
with the hope of new life among those left behind, when, for example sixteen-year- 
old Madeleine finds out she is carrying the child of Olivier, dead in battle (119, 
p.209). The futility of lost life is also demonstrated and criticised by comparing the 
reality of war with the more natural way of life soldiers have left behind. The 
consequences of their absence are also highlighted, both by literary and non-literary 
sources. Thus, instead of a small paysan community working in harmony with 
nature, Personalists argued ‘war, barbarism and disease, [...] alcohol, drugs, syphilis 
and depopulation’ would take hold (50, p.263).
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The final resemblance between 1930s and green criticisms of the effects of war on 
the person is found in their focus on the potential effects of any future war. Here, 
French women are again argued to have played a particular role. It was female 
pacifist organisations such as the LICP which really brought home ‘the message that 
the next war would be the last. An apocalypse’ (196, p.239). Vivid depictions in the 
1930s of previous conflicts were associated with the implication that the effects of 
any future war would be far worse.
In part, this was a reaction to developments during WWl,  whenYpres had seen the 
first-ever use of chemical warfare, with German troops releasing liquid chlorine 
downwind on 22 April 1915. Fifteen thousand French and Algerian soldiers were 
killed or injured on that day alone, with an estimated total of 90,000 dead and 
1,300,000 injured during the rest of the conflict (205, p.207), yet the chemist who 
had masterminded the use of the gas, Fritz Haber was awarded the 1919 Nobel Prize 
for Chemistry. And by 1937, the Germans had moved on, discovering a more deadly 
chemical weapon, the first nerve gas, ‘Tabun’.^ '
This greater danger of future conflicts was the focus of many works of art and 
literature in the 1930s, particularly in the cinema. The visual impact of films 
depicting the future fate of humanity after another war was particularly effective. 
Again, such accounts were clearly scai'emongering in intent at times. For Weber, 
widespread fear that war was imminent as early as 1930 was due to ‘the impact of 
events [being] bolstered by a rash of pacifist war films and alarmist publications’.^ ^
Saint-Exupéry was one author who emphasised the potential effects of new 
technology, after seeing war in Spain at close hand: ‘Une guerre, depuis qu’elle se 
traite avec l’avion et l’ypérite, n ’est plus qu’une chirurgie sanglante’ (86, p.242). 
Bernanos repeated his warning that such future conflict was imminent in the
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conclusions of both La grande peur des bien-pensants and Les grands cimetières 
sous la lune: ‘Vous ne vivrez pas vieux, jeunes gens français!’ (155, p.275)
Even if they contributed to a climate of fear, such warnings were felt to be necessary 
in works of art during the 1930s in order to ensure that WWl was truly ‘la der des 
ders’. One ancien combattant explained the role of warnings in art: ‘Cela [‘montrer 
à la masse la réalité tragique de la guerre’] impressionnera les foules, les 
déconcertera? Tant mieux’ (194, p. 104). Artistic depictions of the reality of war 
were by no means seen as sufficient in the attempt to prevent future war, however. 
The wide-ranging proposals of greens and 1930s sources will now be examined.
4.4 Green solutions
War represents an exceptional theme in the green critique, since their proposed 
solutions are perhaps more widely debated and more detailed than their account of 
the problem and its causes. If reminders of the horrors of war or nuclear winter are 
seen as essential, there is nonetheless a stronger emphasis on how best to avoid war 
in future or move away from the ‘culture’ of war.
The first essential element of all proposed green solutions is the acceptance of a 
personal engagement or commitment, something which is viewed as more necessary 
in this field than in any other. A primary element of this commitment is the 
acceptance of the responsibility to educate others as to the dangers of war and the 
steps greens feel are needed to avoid all future conflicts. While some have argued 
that this emphasis is mistaken and doomed to failure,^^ most greens seem to agree 
with Waechter that ‘les idées sont plus redoutables qu’une armée!’ (96, p. 188).
Such commitment can take many forms. Some greens have emphasised the 
educational role of art in portraying the effects of future conflicts and spurring
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viewers or readers to action (16, p.20). Films such as Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove 
have been cited by certain greens as useful in the attempt to raise awareness (20, 
p. 127). Others have preferred the more traditional commitment of personal 
involvement in direct action campaigns, or demonstrations to raise awareness and 
express the strength of public opposition to militarism. Indeed, the first political 
commitment of any sort for many French greens was in anti-military public 
campaigns such as that at Larzac (31, p. 105). The special responsibility of 
intellectuals, particularly scientists, in the attempt to raise awareness is frequently 
emphasised, partly because they have helped cause the current situation^"' and partly 
because they can speak out with authority against technocrats who tiy to stifle 
debate. Anti-nuclear and anti-military groups such as Survivre et Vivre, led by 
scientists like Pierre Samuel are felt to give credibility to the green stanee (192, 
p.lOO).
The strategy of leading by example is frequently raised as the most appropriate form 
of personal commitment. Greens prefer to convince than to coerce: ‘the force of 
example has produced more lasting change in the world than the force of tlireaf (37, 
p. 118). Both on a personal and on a national level, this is seen as an appropriate 
form of commitment. Dumont has explained his motivation in such terms -he has 
argued that it was the horrors of war which gave him ‘le virus de la responsabilité’ 
(189, p.79). Waechter too mentions his own conscientious objection as evidence of 
his commitment (31, p .l05).
The need for engagement and this attempt to lead by example are combined in a 
commitment to pacifism as the generally preferred green solution. However, green 
pacifism takes many forms; and, confusingly, many greens reject even the term 
‘pacifist’. They dislike the connotations pacifism still has, especially in France.
Thus some greens claim to be ‘not pacifist (though we admire their stance)’ (31, 
p .l 16). Few use the term at all, preferring ‘nonviolent’ (141, p.201).
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Nevertheless, if we consider the meaning of the term, it seems at the very least 
disingenuous for greens to claim not to be pacifist. Pacifism has been basically 
defined as the ‘(support of) policy of avoiding or abolishing war by use of arbitration 
in settling international disputes’ (206, p.603). Perhaps the best laiown definition, 
though, arises from A.J.P. Taylor’s distinction between ‘pacificism’ (‘the 
assumption that war, though sometimes necessary, is always an irrational and 
inhumane way to solve disputes, and that its prevention should always be an over­
riding political priority’) and wholesale pacifism (‘the belief that all war is always 
wrong and should never be resorted to’).^  ^ In the case of France, however, Ingram 
argues this to be an ‘artificial’ definition (187, p.7), since there, both positions would 
be described as ‘pacifiste’, with the term ‘intégral’ occasionally employed to 
distinguish between the pacifists and the potentially less inflexible pacificists.
Ingram concludes that pacifism should be used to describe those ‘for whom peace 
was a primary, consistent, and overriding concern and goal’ (ibid., p.8).
What is evident is that under any of these definitions, the stance of most greens can 
comfortably be defined as pacifist even if they themselves prefer the terms 
‘nonviolent’ or ‘non-aggressive’. To take but one example, les Verts have never 
since the foundation of their party supported French involvement in an armed 
conflict, and their 1997 Programme closely reflects the key elements of the pacifist 
approach, demanding
une nouvelle politique de sécurité axée sur la prévention des conflits armés, 
l ’éradication des causes profondes de la guerre et la promotion des modes 
de résolution pacifiques des conflits. (46, p. 15, point 6)
Their stance could perhaps best be summed up, then, as pacificist in the short-term, 
but pacifist in its ultimate ambition to eradicate war, and in its firm commitment to 
work towards this goal. It is cleai’ too that, while this would be an aecurate summary 
of the majority green view, exceptions do exist, and as with most issues, a range of 
green positions can be observed. First, some French greens do readily embrace the
mterm ‘pacifiste’ or ‘pacifiste intégral’ to describe their stance, one example being 
Dumont (207, p.53). Second, a minority of French greens, notably the leader of 
Génération Ecologie, Lalonde, would clearly best be described as ‘pacificist’.
Indeed, it was Lalonde’s different view of defence policy which led to the original 
split between him and the new party of les Verts in 1984, when he described their 
‘extremist’ attitude on the subject as ‘naïve et dangereuse’ (208, p. 101). Once again, 
then, we can observe various shades of green on this question, the lightest green 
stance being pacificist and the darkest fully pacifist, with the clear majority of 
French greens tending towards pacifism, even if they are willing to accept the idea of 
a ‘transition period’ (19, p. 156) during which a less absolute approach is allowed.
This majority approach has led to accusations of a potentially ‘contradictory 
pacifism’, given the clear green commitment to human rights. Such greens are 
sometimes asked under what conditions they would accept intervention in an armed 
conflict. The answer seems to be none. Even during any transition period, only 
‘defensive weapons’ are to be allowed (though, typically, greens fail to explain what 
they mean by this apparent contradiction in terms), with society quickly moving to ‘a 
weapons-free zone protected by social defence’ (29, p.58).
Another (admittedly less troubling) contradiction is also to be observed in the terms 
favoured by greens to discuss their pacifist stance. Greens invariably talk of 
‘struggles’, ‘battles’, even ‘wars’ against war (‘La lutte contre le nucléaire, leurs 
positions antimilitaristes, autant de batailles qui portent leurs fruits’ -  (31, p.293)), 
apparently without irony.
Once a commitment to a pacifist or pacificist stance is accepted, the second 
emphasis of green solutions is on forming movements or broad-based coalitions in 
order more effectively to achieve peace. Indeed, Simonnet has argued that without 
the anti-militaiy and anti-nuclear campaigns of the 1970s, the greens might never 
have come into existence, since it was commitment in these areas which brought
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about Ta première fusion entre ces différents courants sociaux jusque-là éparpillés’ 
(192, p. 106), which were eventually to become the basis of the modern green 
movement. The acceptance of commitment in organised movements or campaigns 
was to lead to wide-ranging discussions within the nascent green movement as to 
which reforms would best achieve their goal of peace, and it is these specific 
approaches or policies which will now be summarised.
The first recurrent factor in green proposals is their habit of making impractical, 
idealistic or reckless declarations on the subject of avoiding war. Already in the 
1970s, left-wing anti-nuclear campaigners were describing their green counterparts 
as ‘ces doux rêveurs écolo-baba’ (31, p.53), unsurprisingly given such 
uncompromising green views as that of Porritt at the height of the Cold War:
to combat [the spread of communism and the Soviet ‘thi’eaf ] we’d be better 
off investing in bread and Bibles than nuclear weapons. (19, p.57)
At times, the inflammatory nature of modern green pronouncements resembles now- 
notorious statements from the 1930s. ‘A well-managed defence is often much more 
productive than a costly v i c t o r y r e c a l l s  the sort of desperate statements made by 
1930s pacifists (‘rather a foreign occupation than war’^ ^)at the end of the decade. 
Such views are typically expressed in the debate about the possibility of aggression. 
Once a pacifist stance is adopted, opponents will generally ask what reaction is 
proposed in the case of invasion or occupation by a hostile power.
Greens sometimes reject the question as an invalid or unimportant one. Pacifism 
itself is presented as sufficient to avoid aggressive tactics from others: ‘We are 
tlneatened because we threaten others’ (209, p.31), as Bahro would have it, therefore 
by openly adopting a non-aggressive stance, others will react in kind. This 
optimistic assumption belies the serious green focus on specific tactics to adopt in
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the event of attack, an issue to which most green movements have devoted a great 
deal of thought.
Greens begin from the clearly pacifist view that violence is never appropriate, even 
as a form of resistance. For Waechter, ‘nonviolence active’ is only way to resolve 
conflicts ‘avec le respect de la personne humaine’ (96, p. 189). Kelly identifies what 
she sees as a contradiction in the tactics of the left, accepting violent means (the 
possibility of war, use of weapons) to achieve a nonviolent end, a strategy she sees 
as doomed to failure. In contrast, for greens, ‘both our methods and our goals must 
be nonviolent’ (29, p.67). This translates firstly as the adoption of nonviolent direct 
action outside wartime to achieve the ultimate goal of eradicating war completely. 
Such tactics have long been adopted by the greens in France. Solange Fernex 
describes typical green tactics at an early anti-nuclear demonstration in Alsace:
Should the militaiy intervene, a plan was devised whereby a group of small
girls would run towards the soldiers crying ‘papa, papa’. (210, p.378)
Greens also praise the Kanaks’ use of ‘Faction de désobéissance civile’ (3, p.73) as a 
model for a successful strategy in any attempt to change society. Such tactics are the 
long-term proposal for moving towards peace. Similar tactics are advocated in the 
event of an actual invasion by a hostile power. During such an invasion, greens 
favour a strategy known as the ‘hedgehog’ defence, the idea being that if occupation 
is made as ‘prickly’ or uncomfortable as possible for an occupying power, they will 
eventually abandon the attempt.
Les Verts’ official defence policy is based on such tactics. In 1991, they called for 
the immediate preparation o f ‘une défense civile non violente: non-armée, 
économiquement et politiquement dissuasive’ (211, p.6) across France, with the 
traditional military being phased out as citizens accepted responsibility for their own 
defence. Reaction to an invader would be based on ‘active, nonviolent resistance
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and noncooperation’, including ‘large-scale symbolic actions, economic boycotts, 
social and political boycotts, strikes, overloading of facilities and administrative 
systems, deliberate inefficiency’ (29, p.58). Greens recognise that such tactics 
would not be an easy option, however:
The need for people to die for their country would not disappear merely
because we had done away with our weapons. (19, p .158)
Greens therefore insist that, in fact, preparation for the event of invasion is only a 
very minor part of the solution to the problem of war. The main focus has to be on 
how to create the conditions for peace, rather than on reactions in the event of future 
war. Instead of the dominant ‘war culture’ which exists at present, ‘violent cultural 
values’ need to be abandoned and ‘a permanent worldwide peace’ established (37, 
p.l 13). In creating such peace, greens focus on the need for change in various areas 
(economic, political, social), and suggest key groups which might show the way 
forward. Both these aspects of the green solution to the problem of war will now be 
considered.
As for the other themes considered in this study, the first consistent focus for the 
greens in their attempt to find solutions is the capitalist economy. At the most basic 
level, reformist greens argue that ‘to avoid war,’ ‘different economic structures in 
which enterprises were nonmonopolistic, appropriately-scaled and se lf  organised,’ 
‘the minimal use of resources’ and ‘production for need not profit’ would need to be 
introduced as a first step away from the ‘culture’ of war (29, p.76). Most greens go 
further and agree with Petra Kelly that capitalism (‘state capitalism as well as private 
capitalism’) ‘needs to go’^  ^ if war is to be avoided in future.
The first argument the greens use to explain the need to abandon capitalism is based 
on self-sufficiency, which is seen as unlikely if not impossible in a capitalist world 
economy. Greens hold that, if populations are to resist involvement in war, they
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must first be self-sufficient. This point is made firstly in relatively utopian green 
texts. In Gorz’s ‘utopie possible,’ for instance, the population of a break-away green 
society recognises that ‘la souveraineté nationale dépend d’abord de notre capacité à 
savoir nous nourrir nous-mêmes’ (32, p.60). Callenbach conveniently situates his 
Ecotopia, too, in California, a state where self-sufficiency provides a more 
interesting diet than that of, say, a self-sufficient Scotland.
The argument that self-sufficiency is necessary to avoid war is found not only in 
utopian green visions of future states, though. In 1988, les Verts’ electoral 
programme was claiming in similar terms that:
le meilleur moyen pour l ’Europe d’accroître sa sécurité résiderait dans le 
développement de son autonomie économique et sa capacité à produire sur 
place ce dont elle a besoin. (3, pp.74-5).
The next main explanation for the need to abandon capitalism if war is to be avoided 
is based on the existence of private arms industries in the capitalist economy. There 
are two reasons for abolishing such industries. First, in the drive for profit, they 
produce the ultimate unnecessary goods; and it is logical for these industries to 
encourage war. Greens thus call for the nationalisation of these industries as an 
immediate step. While capitalism still exists, individual governments should ensure 
that they do not operate for profit. The second step would be to stop arms sales 
altogether and convert the arms industries to production in more ‘socially useful’ 
sectors: ‘pour un monde solidaire et pacifique,’ ‘la reconversion programmée de 
l’industrie d’armement et la renonciation au commerce des a r m e s a r e  essential. 
This strategy is agreed on by both reformist greens and fully pacifist darker greens -  
the above policies were stressed in the ‘Entente’ between the reformist Génération 
Ecologie and the darker green Verts, for instance. The second reason for abandoning 
capitalist arms production is that it attracts investment that might otherwise be 
devoted to more green priorities:
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Il ne sera pas possible d’accroître T’aide’ aux pays démunis, de financer la 
protection de l’enviroimement national et mondial sans une très 
substantielle réduction des dépenses militaires. (207, p.53)
The abolition of capitalism is believed by greens to go hand in hand with reform of 
the state, their next focus in finding a solution to the problem of war. Greens start 
from the observation that the ‘politics of peace’ (29, p. 54) cannot be developed in 
the type of state which has never existed without the possibility of war, and in which 
political parties have always been, in Lalonde’s view, ‘machines de guerre, 
appendices de l’Etat’ ‘Réinveter le rôle de l ’état’ is thus the first step in moving 
away from war (38, p.271).
For the greens, the current state structure is at the same time ‘trop grande et trop 
petite’ to enable societies to move away from the constant possibility of war (3, 
p. 56). Indeed, there are only two areas in which greens accept that their ideal model 
of highly-devolved power is not sufficient, those being environmental protection and 
avoidance of war, or ‘peace and the ecological balance of the planet’ as Spretnak and 
Capra put it (29, p.59). Greens thus accept the existence of international authorities 
in these two areas. Current states aie first ‘trop petits’ because in the event of any 
region or nation attempting invasion of another sovereign area, only a supranational 
body (greens suggest the UN could adopt this role) would be able to impose 
effective sanctions. Current states are simultaneously ‘trop grands’ because in the 
event of war, large nations are ‘inherently dangerous,’ (ibid., p.57) given their 
greater resources.
The nation state is the next focus of the greens in the attempt to move away from 
war. The reason for the scale of most modern wars, in the greens’ view is ‘the sheer 
size of nation-states’ (37, p. 117). Greens frequently cite the example of Germany 
here. Whereas in the past, conflicts ‘used to plague the German principalities or the
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Balkans’, these were more easily settled, since ‘their small size was a virtue, not a 
vice’ (ibid., p.l 17). Regions rather than nations are thus seen as a potential answer 
to large-scale conflict. For this reason, die Griinen and les Verts were against 
German reunification (39, p.57).
Nation states are not simply rejected because of their scale, however. Their typical 
characteristics (they are ‘egotistic, chauvinistic, and competitive’^^ ) are seen as 
leading to an inevitable emphasis on war, and greens believe that it is only by 
moving to smaller structures, in which individual citizens have more involvement, 
that such characteristics will be left behind. The final reason for rejecting the nation 
state is that smaller structures would be less able to afford nuclear weapons, an 
important concern for the greens. ‘The national state,’ therefore ‘should not be 
defended because its defence can only lead to the destruction of us all’.^ ^
The rejection of the nation state means greens look for potential solutions to both 
smaller structures (particularly regions, in which citizens have more direct 
participation tlnough measures such as the ‘référendum d’initiative citoyemie’), and 
international cooperation in the effort to abolish war. The Austrian ecologist 
Jungle’s call for ‘une nouvelle Internationale, dont les buts seraient différents de ceux 
poursuivis par l ’Internationale socialiste’ (31, p.321) bas been welcomed by green 
parties across the world, for example.
One aspect of this approach is based on avoiding future conflict between developed 
countries and those countries which are ‘en voie de développement’. Greens argue 
that ‘solidarity with the peoples of the Third World’ is an essential element of any 
strategy designed to avoid future conflict (209, p.31). Joint campaigns with pacifists 
in developing countries and a more equal distribution of resources are emphasised.
If war or conflict is to be avoided in future, economic ‘solidarité nationale et 
internationale’ with disadvantaged groups will be essential, in the greens’ view (46, 
p.7, point 3d).
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The next focus of green solutions is reform of the military. Most greens accept the 
idea of some sort of ‘transition period’ in the move towards a fully green defence 
policy, as we have already observed. Les Verts summarise the green position as 
follows: ‘Maintenir une défense armée restera un impératif tant que la défense civile 
ne sera pas opérationnelle’ (211, p.6). This ‘défense armée’ will immediately 
undergo a process of démocratisation, however, even in such a transition period.
One strategy greens favour is the initial retention of some form of military or civil 
service, in order to ensure an army which is ‘démocratisée’ until it can be abolished 
completely. Thus ‘les jeunes auront à choisir entre le service national classique et un 
service civil de même durée’ until civil defence strategies are fully in place (ibid.. 
p.6), even though greens are in principle opposed to military service.
■I1Ultimately, unilateral disarmament will follow (37, p. 118), ‘creating peace without 
weapons, swords to ploughshares in East and West. Beginning at home’ (209, p.31).
The greens’ emphasis on the special dangers of modern weapons technology leads
them to call for international regulation, and is a cornerstone of their campaign
against civil use of nuclear power. For greens, civil and military uses of atomic
energy are closely linked: they are both ‘war technologies’: ‘Chernobyl made clear U
there is no “peaceful” use of atomic energy’ (213, p.95). Disarmament should
therefore be linked to a ban on civil uses of atomic energy and the regulation, and
eventual banning, of modern weapons. I
Another aspect of the ‘war culture’ widely identified by greens as dangerous is the 
role of the media in encouraging or supporting war. Green solutions here are 
determined by their commitment to freedom of information and liberal values.
Instead of an attempt to ban what they see as propaganda or disinformation in the 
mainstream media, greens have traditionally reacted by attempting to offer different |
points of view. One of the earliest forms of green commitment can be observed in |
their rapid founding of alternative sources of information. Two important examples
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are Le Sauvage, formed in 1973 with the declared aim of ‘expulser le débat nucléaire 
de son ghetto’ (192, p. 108) and La Gueule ouverte.
Green solutions, finally, focus on support for two groups they see as most likely to 
move society away from war, that is the young and women. The focus on the 
younger generation and ‘les générations futures’ means greens emphasise the role of 
education in any solution to the problem of war. A ban on producing and selling war 
toys (209, p.32) would be one example of a green policy adopted in the attempt to 
help future generations move away from war. The ‘demystification’ of war, the 
‘patrie’ and the ‘myth’ of the strong leader is also identified as an essential 
component of the move towards a ‘postpatriarchal generation of men who were no 
longer willing to “prove their manhood” in “patriotic” foreign wars’ (29, p.76).
The need to move away from what greens see as a patriarchal society brings us to the 
final ingredient of the green recipe for avoiding war, that is, the stress on women as 
the way forward. Even reformist greens tend to argue, along with their more 
extremist counterparts the ecofeminists, that there is some linlc (whether natural or 
socially-induced) between women and peace. Lalonde, for example, agrees with his 
darker green colleagues that, in the green anti-military stance, ‘nous avons suivi les 
femmes dans leur désobéissance’ in a ‘société de plus en plus mortifère’ (214, p.63). 
At the least, women are seen as less accepting of war, with the example of greater 
female participation in anti-nuclear campaigns cited as evidence of this view. 
Ecofeminists go further, arguing that:
men seem to be experts for technology, women for life, men make war, 
women are supposed to restore life after the wars. (213, p.93)
The two sorts of greens reach slightly different conclusions. As a minimum, most 
greens would stress the need for women to have a more active role in society and 
more power (through measures such as ‘parité’), since they argue that this would
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mean a more widespread anti-war focus in society. Ecofeminists tend to believe this 
would not be sufficient, and argue instead that ‘modern machine-men’ (ibid.. p.95) 
must adopt traditionally ‘female’ characteristics if war is to be eradicated (though 
they are characteristically vague as to how this might be achieved).
4.5 1930s solutions
As we observed with modern greens, the emphasis during the 1930s was clearly on 
how to prevent future conflicts and move towards a permanent peace, rather than on 
remembering or criticising previous wars. The horrors of WWl were of course 
stressed, but, as we shall see, this was almost always in an attempt to prevent such 
horrors ever taking place again.
As for greens today, the first step for our 1930s sources was the recognition that, if 
‘empêcher une guerre n o u v e l l e was their aim, a personal acceptance of 
engagement or commitment was essential. The extraordinary number of 
intellectuals accepting a public political commitment of some sort in the 1930s has 
indeed been attributed above all to their desire to prevent another war. Ory and 
Sirinelli, for example, argue that many intellectuals and public figures were ‘pushed’ 
to action by the thieat of war, particularly by 1935-6 with wars in Ethiopia and in 
Spain. Massis’ Pour la defense de l ’Occident. Pour la paix en Europe was signed by 
intellectuals not previously (nor indeed, later) known for their political commitment, 
among them Marcel Aymé and Pierre Mac Orlan, who signed ‘par pacifisme’ (183, 
p.l 11). In France, by the middle of the 1930s, Ory and Sirnelli conclude that ‘il n’y 
eut pas de “non-intervention” intellectuelle’ (ibid.. p. 112).
Again, such commitment was to take many forms in the 1930s. The responsibility to 
educate others, particularly the younger generations, was perhaps the form of 
commitment which was most widely accepted. Such attempts tended to underline
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the horrors of war, as we have seen, and to focus on how future wars might be 
prevented. Those who had experienced WWl were particularly committed to this 
approach, arguing that the strength of public opinion was the best way to prevent 
future conflicts, in much the same way as modern greens argue that educating the 
majority about the extent of the environmental crisis will be sufficient to provoke a 
change in behaviour. Thus anciens combattants’ groups argued in 1930 that what 
was needed was for them to
prendre une part toujours plus active à l’éducation de l’opinion publique 
afin que celle-ci puisse toujours exiger la solution des conflits 
internationaux par la voie pacifique. (194, p. 107)
The emphasis on education was also highly visible in the names chosen for many of 
the anti-war movements of the 1930s. Groups like the Ligue des Mères et 
Educatrices pour la Paix, founded in 1928, increased their activities as the 1930s 
wore on, with 65,000 members in 1932, increasing to over 100,000 by 1938. 
Reynolds points out that in their work, too, they Taid special emphasis on the 
education of children’ (149, p. 192). Of course, a commitment to educate and debate 
solutions could also be observed in the inevitable foundation of a publication to 
disseminate the views of new groups, particularly the reviews founded by the youth 
and non-conformist movements.
The potential for education tln ough works of art, literature and films seemed to be 
recognised during the 1930s too. As well as the literary depictions of the effects of 
war which we have already considered, Weber argues that a ‘rash’ of pacifist war 
films appeared in the early years of the decade, A 1’Quest, rien de nouveau in 1930 
being only one of the best-remembered (196, p.242). The particular effectiveness of 
artistic representations of the effects of war was widely recognised, with anciens 
combattants’ groups calling for ‘l ’éducation par 1’image, dans toutes les nations’ 
(194, p. 104). The Sangnier-influenced Jeune République even took a ‘mobile
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museum’ across France in 1931, with works devoted to educating audiences on Ta 
guerre et la paix’ (187, p.82).
A more widespread form of commitment was participation in anti-war movements, 
demonstrations and campaigns. Reynolds has argued that such commitment was a 
paiticular hallmark of the 1930s, rather than the earlier years of the entre-deux- 
guerres, since until the end of the 1920s, Tegalistic’ measures and bodies such as the 
League of Nations were seen as the best hope of ending wai' (149, p. 189). The 
Briand-Kellogg pact’s claim to ‘outlaw war’ in 1928 could be seen as the logical 
conclusion of such legalistic attempts to avoid war (ibid., p.270). By the 1930s, 
hope in such attempts had waned, and France witnesses a burgeoning of anti-war 
groups. By 1936, more than 200 such groups could be catalogued (ibid.. p. 183).
The acceptance of engagement led first to mass support for anti-war demonstrations 
such as the Rassemblement pour la Paix at St. Cloud in August 1936. Jackson 
describes this as a typical Popular Front ‘pageant’, its characteristics being not the 
traditional confrontation of political demonstrations, but rather a friendly 
atmosphere, participation by women and families and an emphasis on enjoyment as 
much as on protest (166, p. 189). Such ‘rassemblements’ placed an emphasis on new 
tactics as well as new aims, just as anti-nuclear demonstrations would decades later.
The emphasis on acceptance of engagement in anti-war campaigns led to some 
surprising collaborations in the 1930s. Beyond their shared commitment to avoiding 
war, it is difficult to find much to link groups such as Jeune République and the 
mothers’ or feminist pacifist groups who worked together in the middle of the 
decade (187, p.262). Individuals too accepted engagement in groups they had 
previously attacked (as indeed they would again later). Perhaps the most surprising 
example was that of Giono, whose convinced anti-party rhetoric was abandoned for 
a brief period in the middle of the decade when he worked with the communists. 
Citron explains that the threat of war alone could lead Giono to accept working with
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the PCF by 1933, for the simple reason that they were Ta plus importante des masses 
pacifistes à être organisée’ (215, p.xv). Even after the attempt to work with the 
communists foundered, Giono directed his efforts to avoiding war, abandoning 
works of fiction because T1 va vouer jusqu’à la guerre l’essentiel de son énergie à 
prêcher la paix à tout prix’ (182, p. 117), notably through the Auberges de Jeunesse 
network, for which he travelled across the South of France giving anti-war lectures.
The ‘ampleur’ of anti-war propaganda was remarkable in the 1930s (194, p.l 13), 
and commitment was unusually visible. Propaganda, demonstrations, signed 
declai'ations, and public calls on leaders to avoid war such as those signed by 
Dumont and Giono at the end of the 1930s (189, p.85), along with publicity 
following the first prison sentences for French conscientious objectors in the late 
1920s (187, p. 131) all meant that a wide-ranging debate about the best course of 
action and the level of personal responsibility continued tliroiighout the period.
A pacifist stance was undoubtedly a common conclusion reached by those involved 
in this debate. Just as we observed for modern greens today, however, the term 
pacifist had ‘several shades of meaning in the inter-war years’ (ibid., p.7). If we 
recall the distinction between the terms pacificist and pacifist we noted earlier, it is 
clear that during the 1930s, many groups combined the two approaches, much as 
greens do today. Many took a pacifist view in the long term (or at the start of the 
decade, when the thieat of fascism was not so pronounced), but were prepared to 
move towards a more pacificist view as a short-term step towards full pacifism, or as 
the decade wore on and events led them to moderate their initially optimistic 
positions. The extent of the pacifism of various groups and individuals has been 
closely examined in recent years, as has the motivation of certain groups for 
adopting a pacifist stance. The most important will now be outlined.
The first, and possibly most visible group frequently taking at least a pacificist 
stance during the 1930s was that of the anciens combattants who had fought in
■ 1
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W W l . One in two of those who survived the war joined an association for anciens 
combattants, such as the Union fédérale or the Union nationale des combattants 
(194, p.l), most of which were active in educating civilians and the younger 
generation as to the realities of war. Prost has described their stance as ‘pacifisme 
patriotique (ibid., p.l 14), though his definition implies rather a pacificist stance for 
most groups. That is, anciens combattants were virtually all prepared to accept the 
responsibility to fight again if need be; their emphasis, however, was on ensuring 
that war would never take place.
The position of most Personalists is also best described as pacificist rather than fully 
pacifist, particularly towards the end of the decade. Mounier was careful to 
distinguish between an ‘utopie directrice’ of pacifism (26, p. 125), towards which 
Personalists must work, and the short-term acceptance of participation in wars which 
might take place while this better society was being worked for. Even so, the 
Personalists certainly displayed a repeated reluctance to commit to support for armed 
struggle. Lewis describes Esprit’s reaction to the Ethiopian crisis as ‘oddly muted,
[... counselling] moderation until Catholics were better informed about the war’s 
causes,’ though the journal did eventually condemn Mussolini’s ‘coup vilain’ (81, 
p.277). Later, their views on intervention in Spain was similarly muted and divided 
(112, p. 118). Even Mounier’s eventual strong lead in attacking the Munich 
agreement certainly did not mean that a range of positions was not always present 
within the Personalist movement. Many Personalists eould clearly be described as 
fully pacifist in the 1930s and the review’s tone was one which had, in Loubet del 
Bayle’s view, ‘de claires résonances pacifistes’ (15, p. 196). Mounier himself 
continued to call for European disarmament, even after the Munich agreement (ibid., 
p.123).
Indeed, the characteristic of French anti-war groups most frequently discussed in 
recent studies has been the remarkable presence of extreme pacifism during the 
decade. If the anciens combattants’ official movements were eager to stress their 
patriotism and willingness to fight if necessary, it was often to distinguish their
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pacifist sympathies from the more hard-line views of the Tiew-style’ pacifists of the 
1930s, as Ingram terms them (187, p. 121). Such ‘new-style’ or integral pacifists 
‘rejected and condemned all foreign wars’ (ibid., p. 121), with notorious slogans such 
as ‘Plutôt la servitude que la guerre’ (194, p. 107) meaning their views were highly 
visible tliroughout the decade.
These pacifists often based their stance on religious conviction (149, p.201) or on 
their experience of WWl.  Of this second group, Giono is one of the best-known 
examples. Whereas, as we shall see, most pacifists were to water down their stance 
as the tln eat of fascism grew, Giono’s views seemed to evolve in the opposite 
direction, with extreme statements of his position more and more common as war 
approached. In 1938, he wrote ‘Je n ’ai honte d’aucune paix’ (27, p.275), arguing 
that, no matter what the circumstances, ‘11 vaut mieux être vivant que m orf (ibid., 
p.253).
A final group of apparently integral pacifists are those identified by Ingram as 
‘opportunistic in inspiration’ (187, p.9), that is those whose political convictions led 
them to support an extreme pacifist stance out of expediency at various points during 
the decade. This led to some strange companions being found in French pacifist 
movements. Until the mid-193 Os, the PCF adopted an apparently committed pacifist 
stance, based on the best interests of the USSR, while the extreme right too adopted 
a conveniently contradictory pacificism as soon as the possibility of ‘la guerre impie 
contre nos compagnons d’armes italiens’ or Hitler’s Germany loomed (65, p.234).
As we might have expected, such unusual bedfellows helped ensure bitter 
disagreements within inter-war pacifism. Far from unity against a common enemy, 
the widespread nature of pacifist commitment in France meant divisions 
characterised the hundreds of movements. Those who accepted reluctantly the 
possibility of involvement in war, even if their ultimate aim was to end all wars, 
were attacked almost as virulently as those who made no commitment at all to
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preventing future conflicts. In November 1931, Cliallaye bitterly denounced as 
‘belli-pacifistes’ those who took what we would term a pacificist stance (187, p.71). 
Pichot described the divisions between the two types of French pacifist in 1935;
L’un défend la paix dans la prophétie passionnée de la guerre fatale et 
réclame la force, tandis que F autre chante la paix comme il ferait d’une 
idylle et maudit la guerre, si bien que F un paraît aux yeux de l’autre vouloir 
la guerre, et l’autre aux yeux du premier offrir son pays sans défense aux 
coups de l’adversaire.^"^
Such disagreements were if anything exacerbated by the evolving views of many 
one-time pacifists as the decade wore on. Examples abound of those who followed 
Barbusse’s earlier development from an extreme pacifism to the ‘reluctant 
acceptance of war as a necessary evil’ (178, p.32). From the Rassemblement 
populaire’s initial emphasis on peace, many in the Front populaire majority and 
government changed their demand to that of ‘des canons pour F Espagne’. Similarly, 
the ‘considerable’ pacifism of Alain’s young rue d’Ulm ‘disciples’ at the start of the 
decade was ‘peu à peu fondu,’ especially by 1936 (198, p.603). After the 
comparative unity of 1935, peace campaigners thus turned on each other. Many 
joined Maublanc from 1936 in his ‘inlassable’ attacks on ‘ F aveuglement des 
pacifistes intégraux,’ whose committed stance was seen as unwittingly encouraging 
‘les desseins d’agression [des pays fascistes]’ (177, p.62).
Of course, any discussion of 1930s pacifism must be placed in the context of the 
mounting tlmeat of fascism. Most historians point out the growing contradictions 
between the committed pacifism and equally committed anti-fascism of 1930s 
groups, for whom ‘l’impérialisme nazi prend de court leur “Plus jamais ça!”’ (183, 
p. 153). The Personalists were but one example among many who were eventually 
obliged to choose ‘entre deux impératifs qui semblaient contradictoires: défendre la
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paix et se défendre contre le fascisme extérieur’ (ibid., p. 155), concluding that Ta 
paix n ’est aujourd’hui possible que par un coup d’arrêt aux fascismes’.
Such ‘contradictory pacifism’ (149, p. 194) was probably the most widespread 
attitude on the left. The communists moved from the pacifist stance of the early 
1930s to accepting war as ‘a potential necessity in an ideological crusade to protect 
the revolution and its home in the Soviet Motherland’ (187, p.9). On the non- 
communist left too, statements such as T’antifascisme ne saurait être le prétexte 
d’aucune guerre’ in 1934 (177, p.61) gave way to what Reynolds has described as 
‘politicized’ pacifism for many groups (149, p. 194), with the Popular Front doing 
more than any other government of the entre - deux- guerres to rearm France and 
modernise the military -
Malgré le pacifisme de certains de ses membres, la gravité de la situation 
extérieure obligea le Front populaire à mettre en oeuvre un très coûteux 
programme de réarmement. (152, pp. 121-2)
As we observed in the case of the greens, another apparent contradiction (though 
again, a far less serious one) is seen in the choice of terms used to discuss pacifism. 
In titles such as Rolland’s Le Combat pour la paix in 1932, and Méric’s Pour tuer la 
guerre in 1933, or in the stated aim of the pacifist LICP (‘la guerre contre toutes les 
guerres’) (187, p. 155), pacifists of the 1930s were willing to seem very warlike.
A further similarity between greens and 1930s groups is that, once some degree of 
pacifism or pacificism was accepted, the emphasis was clearly on forming broad- 
based coalitions or movements to prevent war or achieve peace. The number of 
French pacifist groups in the 1930s was bewildering, as we have noted. Brunet also 
points out that it is frequently forgotten that the Rassemblement, later the Front 
populaire actually began as an attempt to build a broad-based movement against war, 
and included many non-political or non-party peace groups (152, p.33). Unusually,
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after the split of the left at Tours, the communists too began working in groups more 
open to fellow-travellers in order to avoid war. Thus after 1932 the Amsterdam- f
Pleyel movement, of communist sympathy, was nonetheless ‘an attempt to win over 
a broad spectrum of support around the theme of opposition to war and fascism’
(166, p.26). I
Outside party politics, broad-based groups were also accepted as the most effective 
form of commitment. The Auberges de Jeunesse groups founded by Giono (ibid., 
pp. 134-5) took peace as their main goal and saw the international atmosphere of 
hostelling as one way to avoid war between the youth of different nations, explaining 
in 1938 ‘nous ne voulons pas tuer demain nos camarades de route des vacances 
d’hier’ (27, p.249). Giono also advised paysans of different countries to unite, 
arguing in his Lettre aux paysans that such unity was a potential solution to the 
problem of war (68, p. 142).
An exception to the general emphasis on public commitment, unity and forming 
movements in the 1930s we should mention here is Céline. The only course of 
action when faced with the prospect of war which is even vaguely recommended is a 
kind of anarchistic self-preservation. Bardamu feigns madness (or truly is made 
insane by his experience of war) to escape combat, arguing ‘La meilleure des choses 
à faire, n ’est-ce pas, quand on est dans ce monde, c’est d’en sortir?’ (53, p.81).
However, to a certain extent, we might argue that even Céline does accept some 
commitment and the responsibility to educate others. His very decision to write and 
publish Voyage, with its effective depiction of the horrors of war for the individual, 
and the evident conclusion of Bardamu that any alternative is better than war surely 
represents a public commitment against war of some basic sort.
Even if Céline did not accept commitment in quite the same way as many other 
authors and intellectuals of the period, sufficient numbers did to result in an 
extraordinary level of debate during the 1930s as to how the goal of peace might best
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be achieved. As modem greens have, 1930s groups and individuals proposed a huge 
range of specific reforms and varying approaches in their attempts to find solutions 
to the problem of war. These reforms and approaches will now be considered.
The first similarity we will note between 1930s sources and modern greens is in their 
tendency towards relatively idealistic and at times reckless approaches or 
pronouncements. We have already seen that statements such as ‘rather foreign 
occupation than war’ were widespread in the 1930s as they are in some green 
solutions. A further similarity can be observed in the frequently utopian visions of 
many 1930s sources. Chickering has detailed the rejection of all aspects of modem 
society which was involved in the relatively widespread ‘utopian pacifism’ of 1930s 
France, with its calls for the outright destruction of ‘a social and political order that 
is utterly corrupt and beyond rehabilitation’.^ ^
Literaiy sources too tended towards utopian solutions, as do writers of ‘green 
fiction’ today. Giono’s calls for paysans to abandon money and end war in the late 
1930s seem hopelessly idealistic to the modem reader, as do Saint-Exupéry’s 
generally naïve appeals to peace and love: after the outbreak of war in Spain, he was 
still stressing ‘[des] solutions généreuses et convaincantes (l’amour des hommes, la 
paix), sans appprécier les données du problème’, as D’Astler de la Vigerie put it 
(110,p.l09).
More practical reforms were also proposed, however. As today, there was a 
relatively widespread focus on the problem of aggression, for example. If a pacifist 
stance was accepted, what reactions did our 1930s sources suggest in the event of 
invasion by an aggressive power? Here, 1930s solutions are remarkably similar both 
in focus and detail to those proposed by modern greens. Even in the face of the 
growing threat of fascism, the Personalists argued that violence was generally 
inappropriate (though as we have seen, Mounier and a majority of the Personalists 
were to modify their views as the decade wore on). Thus they argued that ‘fascism
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should be confronted by an effort to encourage its evolution towards more human 
forms, not with violence’ (113, p .140). Other pacifist groups agreed with the LICP 
that if ‘some lunatic’ invaded France or called on the French to fight,
it would be up to the peoples to resist the fact of war by all possible means: 
general strikes, individual or collective revolt, passive or violent. (187, 
p.146).
Such civil disobedience tactics bear a striking resemblance to the ‘hedgehog’ 
defence advocated by modern greens, even if 1930s sources were more willing to 
accept the use of violent tactics in achieving their ultimate aim of nonviolence and 
an end to war (ibid., p. 14). Some 1930s sources did go further towards the green 
position, notably Giono, who argued (though in somewhat of a contradiction)^^ that 
both pacifist tactics and aims had to be nonviolent:
La violence ne donne pas de victoires éternelles. [...] Le jour où vous [les 
paysans] serez les maîtres, serez-vous toujours dignes d’être les maîtres? 
(68, p .146)
Giono also resembled the greens in his view that such tactics did not represent a 
‘paix facile’, concluding that ‘il faut beaucoup de courage pour être pacifiste déclaré, 
plus que pour être guerrier timide’ (27, p.264). Others also pointed out the 
contradiction of those who wanted peace being willing to risk war to achieve it, 
notably Ordre Nouveau, who warned that the French government ‘serait bien 
capable, au nom de la paix, de faire la guerre’ (15, p. 190).
However, in the 1930s as today, the question asked most frequently was not how to 
cope in the event of aggression or invasion, but rather how to ‘organiser une paix 
durable’ (15, p .185) in the first place. As Méric explained, when the next war 
arrived it would all be too late, thus ‘for the pacifists of the thirties especially, all
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energies were directed at avoiding a recurrence of war’ (187, p. 16), and at putting in 
place ‘the conditions for peace and joy’. A s  modern greens do, suggestions as to 
how to ensure peace focussed on various key areas (the economy, the state and so 
on) and the role of certain groups. The most important will now be outlined.
Unsurprisingly, the first emphasis in 1930s solutions was on abandoning capitalism. 
The non-conformist and youth movements generally based their rejection of 
capitalism on political grounds as we have seen in Chapter 3, but they also rejected 
capitalism on the grounds that it led to war. The first element of their solution here 
was a commitment to analysing and making public the links between capitalism and 
war. The ‘big capitalists who would profit from the carnage would never have the 
silence of Esprit’ in the face of ‘their enterprise of public deception’ The 
Personalists aimed to educate their compatriots as to the extent of capitalist 
involvement in encouraging war (‘Dans ce régime capitaliste, nous savons pourquoi 
la guerre’ [sic])^^ and offered suggestions as to how to move away from the capitalist 
system as an urgent step to avoid future wars (they particularly favoured the 
immediate nationalisation of arms industries within a planned economy).
A more persistent focus on the responsibility of capitalism in causing and prolonging 
war, though, is to be found in the 1930s works of Giono. Since T’état capitaliste 
considère la vie humaine comme la matière véritablement première de la production 
du capital,’ (160, p.21), ‘on ne peut pas tuer la guerre sans tuer l ’état capitaliste’ 
(ibid., p.23). The main reason for getting rid of capitalism is that self-sufficiency, 
which is essential if war is to be avoided, is not possible for the majority under 
capitalism. While workers cannot produce enough food for themselves and their 
families, they remain ‘les ustensiles de la société capitaliste’ (ibid., p. 18), and have 
no choice but to accept war.
For Giono, the solution must come from the paysans, the only group in society 
which still has the ability to ‘kill’ capitalism. He gives an unusually detailed and
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typically impassioned account of how the paysan must abandon ‘paper money’, 
refuse to cultivate single crops for financial profit and remain entirely self-sufficient, 
while only growing enough to feed his family, and no more. If paysans across the 
world accepted this (admittedly idealistic) strategy, there could be no war, since 
there would not be enough food to supply the city-based workers in the armaments 
industry, nor the military itself (68, pp. 172-3).
For the 1930s non-conformist groups, self-sufficiency was also a possible solution to 
prevent war, though like the greens today, they felt this should be organised at a 
Europe-wide level. Ordre Nouveau, for example, called for a ‘zone d ’échanges 
planés,’ [sic] to be managed by an ‘organisme supra-national’ in Europe, its aim 
being to provide ‘à chaque Européen une sorte de minimum vital,’ something which 
would represent ‘un gage de paix pour le continent’ (15, p.366).
Capitalism is not, of course, targeted in the search for solutions simply because self- 
sufficiency is seen as impossible in such an economic system. Other proposed 
solutions to the problem of war which would necessitate a move away from liberal 
capitalism included the view that arms industries should not be privately-owned and 
operated for profit, and the view that spending on the military and on arms ought to 
be redirected to creating a more equal society, since ‘without social justice, war is 
perpetual’."^ ' Tempête, a ‘pacifiste intégral’ whose ideas are discussed at some 
length by Ingram, made similar points and concluded that pacifists had ‘a Bastille to 
storm and destroy: it is Capitalism which creates wars’ (187, p. 153). Nor were such 
views restricted to minority groups in 1930s France. At the World Disarmament 
Conference of 1932, the official French delegation’s proposals included 
international-level controls on arms production and sales, particularly those of the 
newer more dangerous chemical weapons, which should ultimately be baimed (196, 
p.238).
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The view that capitalism created wars was not based simply on the idea that arms 
industries encouraged them for profit, however, and this meant that 1930s solutions 
went further than simple control or abolition of the arms industries. Ordre Nouveau 
argued that Tes raisons de la guerre qui vient’ (in 1932) lay in a capitalist regime 
which accepted Trente millions de chômeurs,’ and once again suggested a plamied 
economy with wide-ranging reforms of private property was needed as a solution 
(15, p.310). The Personalists too argued that only by abolishing Te capitalisme 
matérialiste’ entirely could the ‘antagonismes artificiels et destructeurs’ which it 
created be left behind (ibid.. p.447).
For our 1930s sourees, the abolition of the capitalist economic system also went 
hand in hand with reform of the state. (Indeed, for many the two were indivisible: 
Giono was far from alone in direeting his critieisms at ‘l’état capitaliste’) Here 
again, we can distinguish between practical, reformist proposals and more utopian 
visions in discussing 1930s solutions.
In terms of reformist proposals, 1930s sources arrived at many of the short-term 
solutions favoured by greens today. Political parties and governments under the 
system of the 3'^ Republic were seen as too influential and likely to lead to war, and 
there were calls from various groups for pacifism to be ‘placed above the political 
parties and governments’ Practical reform of the state to achieve this aim was a 
common focus for 1930s anti-war groups. Prost’s study of anciens combattants in 
the entre-deux-guerres devotes an entire chapter to ‘les idées des combattants sur la 
réforme de l’e ta f, which included many ‘mesures qui moraliseraient le scrutin’ now 
identified with the French greens, such as such as PR for all elections, strict controls 
on corruption, and political equality for women (194, p. 197). Ultimately, virtually 
all pro-peace groups had ‘une conception élevée du rôle du citoyen’ (ibid.. p. 101) as 
a key aspect of any solution.
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In their more ‘utopian’ suggestions (or often, mere hints) as to how the state might 
be changed to avoid war in future, many 1930s sources were accused of anarchism. 
Céline, for example has been described as having pacifist sympathies, with 
‘d’indéniables résonances anarchistes’ (164, p.230); and Redfern argues that the 
logical conclusion of Giono’s pacifism would be a similar sort of ‘stateless anarchy’ 
(52, p.21). Particularly after his split with the Communist-dominated AEAR, Giono 
stated repeatedly his rejection of all governments and all political parties, 
particularly at the end of the decade, and he made clear that the basis for this 
rejection was his pacifism: ‘Dès qu’on entre en lutte contre la guerre, on entre en 
lutte contre le gouvernement’ (160, p.20). Giono’s preferred solution, insofar as it 
can be defined, seemed to be small, self-sufficient paysan communities, no political 
parties, and a complete rejection of the ‘patrie’ or nation state.
Overall, the nation-state was rejected in favour of an emphasis on internationalism 
and cooperation, a key element of many 1930s solutions to the problem of war. 
Whereas by the 1930s, many ‘legalistic’ attempts to ensure peace on an international 
stage were already seen to have failed (Esprit analysed in some detail ‘l’échec dans 
la Société des Nations du parlementarisme international’ by 1932),"^  ^many continued 
to place their faith in pacifist coalitions and mass movements of ordinary citizens.
‘A coalition of people across borders, across the nations’ (187, p. 150) was called for 
in 1932 to prevent war, and many argued that the only way to achieve peace was ‘par 
le rapprochement international’ of ordinary people (198, p.563).
Of course, some pacifists did still stress the importance of the patrie, notably the 
anciens combattants’ groups; but most saw a potential solution in international 
strength in numbers (27, p.249), particularly for those who would be eailed upon to 
fight in any future war. Thus Giono based his appeals for the union of ‘les paysans 
de toutes les nations’ on the idea that, if paysans refused to fight one another, war 
would not be possible (since war is inevitably fought only by ‘les paysans de tous les 
pays’) (68, p. 142). Interestingly, the Personalists came very close to the preferred 
green solution of some combination of internationalism and regional devolution as a
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solution to war. In the first issue of Esprit, they called for Tine organisation 
supranationale de l’humanité’ to move away from T’égoïsme national et l’isolement 
qui provoquent les inimitiés et les guerres’ (15, p. 178), but argued that this must be 
combined with decentralisation, just as greens propose(any civilised society would 
have to be ‘anti-étatiste et décentralisée’) (ibid.. p.448).
Nor were attempts at international union or rassemblement restricted to European 
neighbours. If this solution was to be effective, most 1930s groups argued it had to 
be introdueed on a world-wide scale. French pacifist groups aimed to build 
coalitions, particularly in Algeria, where the ‘indigenous population’ was seen as a 
particular target for education campaigns against war and links to metropolitan 
pacifist groups (187, p. 140), since Algerian people too would be called upon to fight |
for France in a future conflict. A speaking tour by French pacifists in 1932 took as 
its aim ‘building the pacifist movement’ and spreading the ‘education message’
(ibid.. p .141).
Such an international emphasis was also considered by the Personalists to be a |
potential solution to future conflict since it would be linked to ‘ a redistribution of the 
world’s wealth and particularly of raw basic materials’ (50, p.265). War would not 
be ended until there was a greater level of equality, with colonialism in particular 
attacked as ‘un jeu à fins capitalistes et belliqueuses’."^"^ The international emphasis 
was essential for most non-conformists if war was to be avoided in future, since 
there was no point in avoiding a ‘guerre nationale’ if it were simply replaced by a 
‘guerre coloniale’ (216, p.442). Giono made much the same point, though more 
lyrically: ‘Ma joie ne demeurera que si elle est la joie de tous’."^^
The next focus of 1930s solutions was reform of the military. Again, some solutions 
were more revolutionaiy than others, with Giono ealling on his readers to ‘se libérer 
de l’armée nationale’ (27, p.261) -  though, as usual, giving no practical indication as 
to how they might actually do this. The principal focus of most 1930s sources was
71
323
1
1actually relatively similar to that of Giono, however. Most seemed to see the 
abolition or at least the dramatic scaling-down of the armed forces as an eventual !!
aim, even if they were somewhat more realistic than Giono in accepting a ‘transition
period’ during which the military would take a purely defensive role (187, p.67). 1y.That such ideas were influential in the 1930s is symbolised, in Weber’s view, by the 
French decision to rename the Ministry of War the Ministry of Defence in 1932. 1i
Another aspect of solutions proposed in relation to the military in the 1930s was 
disarmament. The relatively simplistic formulae favoured by many (Te 
désarmement, ce sera la paix’/^  are perhaps misleading, since many groups debated 
the issue at length, usually concluding that a transition period with the acceptance of 
‘national defence’ was appropriate in the short term, but only if allied with a 
‘commitment to working towards total, rapid and, if need be, unilateral
disarmament’ (187, p. 146). Others argued that a parallel ‘désarmement des esprits’ i
(194, p. 106) would be an essential component of this strategy. Even so, it is difficult 
to look back at 1930s calls for disarmament without judging them in the context of 
German military spending. The Berlin correspondent of Esprit who argued in 1935 
that the ‘only efficacious weapon’ against Flitler was ‘integral disarmament’ (112, 
p.96) appears dangerously naïve, no matter that his view was shared by many in 
France.
The final aspect of the 1930s approach to the problem of war was to emphasise 
certain key groups as the most likely to offer solutions. As we have seen, Giono 
based his solutions in part on an appeal to the paysan. While this solution was a 
fairly unusual one, the second group on whom he focussed, the young, was felt to 
provide a potential answer by many 1930s sources.
Giono’s stress on the young as particularly likely to end war was based mainly on his 
experience of working with his pacifist Auberges de Jeunesse. His ‘jeunes 
camarades’, who had accepted membership of non-partisan hostelling organisations
324
were seen as particularly likely to accept a pacifist commitment. Inaugurating a new 
hostelling centre in 1937, Giono stressed this potential: ‘Unissez-vous pour un seul 
but: LA PAIX’ Young people were also seen as less tainted by the past errors of 
French society (they were ‘purs, pacifiques et libres’, ‘de l’humain tout frais et tout 
neuf) and therefore able to build a better world; by the end of the decade, Giono 
was claiming they were the only hope: ‘C’est en [votre jeunesse] seule que j ’ai 
confiance au milieu de l’effondrement’.'^ ^
Another reason for seeing the young as particularly likely to work to avoid war was 
that they would be called on to fight. Giono stresses this aspect in all his addresses 
to the Auberges at the end of the 1930s. The non-conformist youth movements were 
particularly aware of the ‘responsibility’ they had, since ‘ils représentaient la 
génération sur laquelle aurait pesé en premier le poids d’une guerre éventuelle’ (15,
p. 186).
If the young represented a special source of hope, their education was clearly an 
important part of 1930s solutions. This focus is seen first in the work of individuals 
who had a certain ‘influence morale’ with the young (177, p.65) such as Giono and 
Alain. Alain explained his Mars ou la guerre jugée was ‘une tentative de 
démystification des vertus guerrières,’ for example (ibid., p.65). The second focus is 
on the next generation, with many 1930s groups working to educate them 
differently, in order to encourage their pacifist development. Thus the Ligue 
Internationale des Mères et des Educatrices pour la Paix ‘issued tracts against wai’ 
toys and directed anti-war propaganda at children’ throughout the 1930s (149, 
p. 192). Indeed, this quite common emphasis on women educating the next 
generation, and what has been termed ‘maternal pacifism’ brings us to the final hope 
of avoiding war for many in the 1930s, that is a focus on women.
As we find today in the ecofeminist arguments of some greens, certain 1930s sources 
held that women were ‘natural’ pacifists, or that there was a ‘natural’ link between
32-5
women, particularly mothers, and peace (ibid., p. 190). Others (the ‘feminist 
pacifists’, as Ingram terms them (187, p.249)) saw the two movements based on 
women’s rights and pacifism as having similar goals for society, which would 
explain the clear connection between female campaigners and peace more than any 
‘essential’ female trait. Whatever the explanation, however, what was important for 
many 1930s sources was that women, like the young, seemed to offer particular hope 
of moving away from war.
Again, the very visible participation of otherwise uncommitted women in groups 
such as the Ligue Internationale des Femmes pour la Paix et la Liberté or in 
demonstrations such as the ‘mothers’ procession’ at the 1936 Rassemblement pour 
la paix meant that for many, encouraging women might offer a non-party alternative 
strategy to ending war (166, p. 189). And, since women had had no political voice 
(and would not do so until 1944), they, like the young, were sometimes seen as less 
implicated in the current crisis, and thus a source of fresh ideas as to how better to 
organise society. The reformist element of such solutions was therefore to demand 
equal political rights for French women, the argument being that due to ‘the 
supposedly natural linlcs between women and peace’ (149, p. 190), a society in which 
women had more power would be less likely to accept participation in a future war 
and would work more energetically to avoid war in the first place.
We might end this chapter, however, on a typically utopian note, since such an 
emphasis certainly characterises many of the solutions to the problem of war 
suggested both by green and 1930s sources. If we return to Giono’s views on ending 
war, we also find a particular emphasis on women. For Giono, the principal group 
in 1930s France with the ability to end wai", as we have seen was that of the paysans. 
Within this group, however, the paysanne had a key role, in that she could best put a 
stop to war. The paysan could refuse to fight in the first place, of course; but Giono 
argued that this would be more difficult and more dangerous than if his female 
counterpai't were to react to his absence by destroying all stocks not necessary to 
feed the family left behind, hiding what was kept, then refusing to be his
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‘remplaçante’ in the fields (68, p.227). The ouvrier would not be able to replace the 
paysan in sufficient numbers, since his presence was needed in the arms factories, 
and there would not in any case be enough food to feed the military. War could thus 
be ended, since as Giono told the paysannes, ‘Vous avez la famine à votre 
disposition’ (ibid., p.228).
' Ingram himself identifies the 1930s as the decade when French pacifism was at its most radical and 
most widespread: ‘There had been “integral” pacifists before 1930, but what is new at the end o f  the 
twenties is that these isolated instances o f  absolute “integral” pacifism began to coalesce into a proper 
movement [...which] became a force in French politics’ (187, p. 14).
 ^This example is o f  the respective budgets under Mauroy in 1981, seen as particularly disappointing 
by the greens, since Mitterrand had pledged to increase spending on the enviromuent (96, p. 185).
 ^ Myers, quoted in (19, p. 160).
Military service is due to be phased out in France, but the process has been delayed since the 
election o f the left-wing majority in 1997 and young men are still currently required to enrol.
 ^ Irigaray, quoted in (193, p. 134).
 ^Alain, writing in Vigilance in April 1938, quoted in (183, p. 154).
’ Tézenas du Montcel, ‘Dans les tranchées’, 1930, reproduced in (194, p.91).
® An oft-cited example is the 1936 Popular Front electoral propaganda film. La vie est à nous. See 
(152, p. 103) for a discussion.
 ^Brunet also points out that these figures are certainly underestimates, since many did not declare 
their ownership o f  radios to avoid the licence fee (ibid.. p.98),
He repeatedly explained his decision not to allow his daughter to participate in physical education 
drills at school on these grounds, for example.
" See (85, pp.66-69) for a more detailed discussion o f this point.
This was the view o f the Comité national du centre syndical d’action contre la guerre, cited in (183 
p. 154).
The greens refer to the ‘équipage du même vaisseau spatial’ (7, p. 17).
Quoted in (183, p. 150).
The quote is from one o f the ‘poilu’ publications cited in Prost (194, p .135).
Prost gives a detailed account o f  the pejorative terms used by anciens combattants to describe ‘les 
hommes politiques’ -  ‘politicards’, ‘pillards’, ‘politicaille’, ‘les loques de la politique’, ‘les vieux 
routiers parlementaires’ among them. ‘Politicien’ was invariably used in its pejorative sense, in 
Prost’s view, and was far more frequent than ‘homme politique’. See (ibid.. pp. 133-135).
Dumont is an interesting figure for this study since he lived through both the 1930s and foundation 
o f  the French green movement. After his military service, he became a ‘pacifiste intégral’ for life, 
even signing joint anti-war declarations with 1930s figures like Giono (189, pp.79-88). He later 
attributed his ‘dévouement sacré à la cause écologique’ specifically to its pacifism (ibid.. Préface).
O f course, the paysan cannot automatically be considered ‘poor’ (Giono, for example, refused the 
association o f poverty with a simple lack o f money in his ‘Lettre aux paysans sur la pauvreté et la 
paix’). Modem greens also dislike the term ‘poor’ when discussing groups commonly associated with 
the term (the unemployed o f  modern cités, for example), since they point out that even the poorest 
citizen o f  a developed country has a greater income and greater access to material goods than the vast 
majority o f  those in developing countries. The term is perhaps blunt, but is used here because it can 
cover a wide range o f sub-groups without unnecessary repetition o f such distinctions as independent 
smallholders, their families, the rural unemployed, unemployed workers in new towns and cities, and 
even the native populations o f 1930s French colonies and dependencies.
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See Heilman (112, p.96) for a discussion o f  Mounier’s motives in writing this article, and o f  the 
outraged reaction and wideranging debate which followed its publication.
Larkin points out that in 1934-5, the French army was spending four times as much on horse fodder 
as on petrol, for example (85, p.68).
For details o f the development o f chemical weapons during the 1930s, and the impact they had, see 
(205, pp.206-208).
Weber lists several films which had such an effect in the early 1930s. See (196, pp.242-3).
Notably Pepper (14, p.3) -  see Introduction for his explanation o f this position.
Irvine and Ponton make a point many greens stress, that almost half o f all research physicists and 
engineers work ‘on weapons and war’ (37, p.l 14).
Cited in (187, p.7),
Boulding (cited as ‘inspirational’ to the greens) in (37, p. 118).
Cited in (149, p. 189), for example.
Kelly is quoted in (29, p.62).
The ‘defence’ section o f the programme agreed on by GE and les Verts is reproduced in (212, 
p. 149).
From his Court traité imagé sur les écologies, cited in (3, p.56).
Kelly’s view, quoted in (29, p.57).
Boulding’s conclusion in (37, p .l 16).
Raymond Aron’s description o f the aim o f  the majority in the 1930s, in (198, p.591).
Reproduced in (194, p. 107).
Mounier in the first edition o f  Le Voltigeur, quoted in (183, p. 155).
Cited in (187, p. 13).
Giono swerved between relatively tlu'eatening pronouncements such as ‘11 n’y a qu’un remède; 
notre force’ and the nonviolent position, often within the space o f a single text (eg. 68)
The expression is Giono’s, from Que ma joie demeure: the Contadour ‘experiment’ o f  the 1930s 
was a practical attempt to create such conditions on a small scale. See (120, p.4) for further details. 
Mounier in March 1935, quoted in (112, p.96).
Esprit. 1932, quoted in (15, p.278).
Romain Rolland, quoted in (187, p .156).
The LICP demanded this in 1932. See (ibid.. p. 146).
See discussion in (15, p.451) for details.
Dalbon writing in Esprit in 1933, quoted in (ibid.. p.368).
In the Préface to Les vraies richesses.
Sirinelli quotes Chateau using this slogan in 1935 (198, p.605).
Giono’s address is reproduced in (27, p.269).
Giono’s Message at the first Congrès des Auberges de Jeunesse in 1938, reproduced in (ibid.. pp. 
270-272).
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C hapter 5 
The city
5.1 Introduction
An apparent paradox for modern green politics is that, while reserving some of their 
most extreme criticisms for modern urban environments, most green activists and 
voters nonetheless choose to live there. Greens do at least show a preference in 
France for smaller towns rather than cities, with nearly 70% of green militants living 
in towns of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants in 1990 (35, pp. 168-9). However, the 
corresponding figure for the Parti Socialiste, with its history of urban support and 
organisation, is almost as high, at 64% (no doubt reflecting the relatively small 
number, even today, of French cities and towns of over 50,000 inliabitants).^ Of PS 
and Verts activists, similar proportions also choose to live in larger cities (of more 
than 100,000 inhabitants) - 25% and 22% respectively in 1990 (218, p.49). Voters 
for French green parties or candidates are even more likely to live in large towns and 
cities than party members and activists. Since their first organised political and 
electoral campaigns, the green vote has been strongest in the same few towns and 
cities, that is, in Paris and the surrounding region, in Brittany (Quimper, St-Brieuc) 
and in the east of France (Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Colmar).^ There is a corresponding 
lack of support for the greens among rural dwellers. Agriculteurs in particular 
demonstrate Te moins de sympathie pour le parti vert: 6% pour une moyenne de 
12%’ (219,p.l62).
The high proportion of green activists and sympathisers who are urban-dwellers 
made French cities a natural foeus for green political protest in the early days of the 
movement. Given the green strategy of thinking globally and acting locally, it was
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unsurprising that some of the first public signs of green feeling in France were 
events such as the Parisian Amis de la Terre-organised ‘manifs à vélo’ or protests 
against the building of the expressway beside the Seine, Mamère points out that 
many environmental and related problems are seen at their worst in modern cities, 
and that city-dwellers are thus more likely to be spurred into action. He concludes 
that the problems seen in modern cities are a natural focus for environmentalists:
Parce que l’écologisme est un humanisme, il doit prendre la défense de tous 
les ‘sans-voix’, qu’ils se nomment arbres, mer, montagne, chômeurs, 
défavorisés, exclus. [C’est dans] la ville [que] se trouvent concentrés le 
plus de chômeurs, le plus de pauvres, le plus de ‘laissés-pour-compte. (220,
p.60)
Indeed, some green theorists have argued that environmentalists did not emphasise 
publicly the important role played by the city in green theory clearly enough in the 
early days of the movement, with damaging results. They claim that the early 
concentration of ‘not inconsiderable resources upon protecting hedgerows, 
butterflies and bunny rabbits’ (221, p. 12) was unwise, if not immoral when many 
people were living in threatening and unsustainable environments. In contrast to 
early environmentalism, most green political activists would now agree with 
Weston’s conclusion that the environment of the inner cities is ‘of as much concern 
as the protection of trees - and the one is not possible without the other’ (ibid.. p. 12).
5.2 G reen criticism s o f the city
Green criticisms of the city can be divided into two main fields of concern: effects 
on the environment, and effects on the person. These will now be outlined.
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5.2.1 Effects on the environment
The first focus for green criticisms is a retrospective one. Greens, particularly in 
France, criticise the manner in which the process of urbanisation took place. 
Bookchin explains that the ‘real urban crisis’ has resulted,
not from the emergence of the city as such; rather it results from the 
emergence of a relatively new and cancerous phenomenon that poses a 
deadly threat to the city and the countryside alike: urbanization. (222, p.x)
The term urbanisation usually refers to the period following the Industrial 
Revolution. Before this period, people did of course move to the towns (223, p.88). 
The important difference between this ‘émigration rurale’ and post-industrial 
urbanisation for greens is the much greater size and permanence of the later 
movement, and the resulting change of balance between the numbers living in rural 
communities and those in towns.
The urbanisation process gathered momentum much later in France. As Duhamel 
explains, ‘la France s'est urbanisée trop lentement au départ, trop rapidement à 
l'arrivée’ (224, p. 132). This is explained by various interruptions to the mtanisation 
process, including the two World Wars and the economic crisis of the 1930s.^ These 
interruptions meant that following the Liberation, the rural exodus was to involve 
vast numbers over a comparatively short period, on a scale far greater than that 
experienced in Britain for example. The speed and scale of urbanisation were 
exacerbated because the French population, which had been unusually stable for 
over 50 years, now grew rapidly. Between the end of the 19^ ’’ century and WW2, the 
population of France increased by only 0.5 million, partly due to the large loss of life 
in both wars (226, p. 102). Increases in the birth rate and in immigration in post-war 
France meant that the population then grew by more than 40% over a similar period 
(1945-1990). Within this increased overall population, the balance between urban
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and rural populations changed dramatically. In 1851, only 6.5% of the population 
lived in urban areas with more than 20,000 inhabitants. By 1975, 41.6% of the much 
larger French population lived in such areas (12, p.818).
With hindsight, the understandable desire of much of the French rural population to 
move to the towns in this way is criticised as having caused various problems. If 
urbanisation has proved to be Te phénomène sociologique majeur de la société 
française durant la seconde moitié du XXe siècle , it was ‘mal conçue, mal conduite, 
et donc mal vécue’ (224, p.77). The resulting unplanned or badly planned change in 
balance between French urban and rural populations has been criticised by 
environmentalists in terms of its effects on the environment since urban populations 
are less self-sufficient, less sustainable and produce more waste and pollution than 
those in rural environments.
The scale of the rural exodus over such a short period placed unanticipated strain on 
housing stock, already affected by the destruction of WW2 and inadequate in terms 
of hygiene and amenities. Attempts at improving the situation in towns were 
initially uncoordinated, leading to the ‘tache d’huile’ outward spread of the city, and 
often only making matters worse. The idea, expressed by the French Ministre de 
l’Equipement Albin Chaiandon, that it was the ‘vocation’ of all land to be built upon 
(225, p.27) encapsulated the official approach to plamiing the urban enviromnent for 
much of the post-war period. The more recent development of ‘rurbanisation’ (the 
spread of populations out of the city itself) has also been strongly criticised by 
greens:
L’urbanisation s’étend comme les cellules cancéreuses, par métastases, 
s’insinuant dans les champs et les forêts avant de les absorber 
complètement, dans un tissu bâti en permanente expansion. (96, p.36)
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Greens conclude that the initial failure to plan means that future attempts to manage 
the cities are likely to fail (‘On peut se demander si une telle concentration est 
gérable, dans l’absolu’).'^  In France, the failure to encourage people to move to 
smaller cities and towns, rather than automatically heading for Paris, meant that the 
capital suffered disproportionately during the mass move to the towns. Of course, 
this is not simply a 20*^ ’’ centuiy development in France, where the tradition of 
centralisation was ‘strengthened with each major shift of regime’ until the 3'^ 
Republic (227, p.217).
This legacy of political and administrative centralisation meant that when French 
society began to become industrialised during the 3'^ ' Republic, the only obvious 
location for any industry or business which needed access to decision-makers was to 
be Paris. This in turn meant that those leaving rural areas to find work would be 
attracted to Paris, where opportunities were concentrated. As well as the broad 
reasons already noted for the centralisation of French society, other more specific 
decisions influenced the concentration of the population in Paris. It is probable that 
many such decisions were taken with the deliberate aim of reinforcing the 
centralisation of French society. Lepetit and Pinol see two key forms of regional 
development (roads and administration) as jointly affecting the centralisation of the 
population before and during urbanisation in this deliberate fashion. They conclude 
that the centralisation of France influenced the course of urbanisation, as both a 
cause and an effect, resulting in a sort o f ‘vicious circle’, under which centralisation 
leads to further centralisation (228, p. 127).
Although the figures for the population of Paris itself have been in decline since 
their highest point in the 1920s and 1930s (because housing space has been taken 
over by business and office premises), the He de France region has continued to 
expand.
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Table 1: Population of Paris and Region^
Date City of Paris Paris Region
1921 2 906 472 5 683 000
1936 2 829 753 6 785 000
1968 2 590 771 9 250 400
1990 2 152423 10 660 554
Such urbanisation and the centralisation of politics, administration and population 
are jointly criticised for the direct effects they have on the environment. The first 
broad focus for such green criticisms is the unsustainable nature of the Freneh city, 
and particularly Paris. The idea of sustainability is one of the cornerstones of green 
political theory, and what makes their analysis of this issue distinct from that of the 
left, for example. Modern cities are ‘the most unsustainable feature of an 
unsustainable system’, posing a particular challenge to green politics (19, p. 172).
What are the effects of the city on the environment that make it unsustainable in the 
view of green political theory? First, the effects of cities on the planet’s natural 
resources are unsustainable. The concentration of huge, non-self-sufficient 
populations in urban centres creates ‘supply streams’ - that is, clean water, food and 
virtually all other goods must be transported there, wasting natural resources, 
especially fuel. Current urban environments are criticised in particular by 
environmentalists because their concentration of such populations leads to 
unsustainable pressure on both renewable and non-renewable resources (33, p.46). 
Care in present use of these resources is necessary according to green theory because 
of the need to take into account ‘les besoins des générations futures’ (3, p.79).
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The greater use of natural resources by urbanised populations occurs both directly, as 
a consequence of large populations in one spot (eg. in the effort needed to provide 
urban populations with water (229, p.21)) and indirectly, as a consequence of a 
combination of various factors, including population size. For example, the outward 
spread of cities, increased population size and the French policy of ‘urban zoning’^  
mean that it is now unlikely that urban workers will live within walking distance of 
their workplace, leading to greater pressure on resources.
Second, the concentration of population also leads to unsustainable levels of 
pollution. The OECD has termed cities a threat to sustainable global development 
because
they produce huge amounts of non-recyclable waste and pollution which 
must be absorbed back into the ecosystem, causing problems which range 
from local to global in scale. (229, p.21)
Some degree of human pollution of the environment is unavoidable - even the most 
primitive society would cause pollution thiough burning wood, for example. Greens 
argue, however, that levels of pollution are compounded by urban environments, ie. 
that the concentration of population, the increased size of cities and official policy 
have combined to make their effects more extreme and unsustainable. They also 
focus on certain types or causes of pollution which are seen as particularly harmful 
for the environment.
The cause of pollution which attracts the most criticism from environmentalists is 
the private car. The acceptance by successive French governments of the need for 
cities to accommodate the private car (notoriously, Pompidou’s statement that ‘Paris 
doit s ’adapter à l’automobile’), and consequent failure sufficiently to encourage the 
use of public transport in cities has been one of the key points of green criticism 
since the birth of the movement. An early Amis de la Terre poster campaign
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(‘Bagnoles ras-le-bol’) clearly linked the negative effects of cai*s and city life, 
asking:
HEUREUX? embouteillages - bruits - deux heures de trajet - pas d’espaces 
verts - air vicié... HEUREUX? on s’asphyxie dans les villes, des tours 
Montparnasse, des voies express... HEUREUX? on en a marre de la vie où 
on est esclave, de la ville où le profit de quelques-uns étouffe la vie de tous 
(profit des pétroliers, des constructeurs d’automobile).^
Third, the scale of modern cities is seen as unsustainable. The effects of 
urbanisation, as we have seen, have been compounded by increases in population 
size. Not only are more of the world’s population choosing to live in urban centres, 
but the world’s population itself is far bigger than at any other time in history, and 
still growing exponentially. The size of modern cities exacerbates further the 
problems relating to resources and pollution, and ‘le gigantisme des choses’ means 
that achieving radical change is very complex, if not impossible.
The next consequence of the modern city which is criticised by modern greens is the 
rural decline which has accompanied the urbanisation of the population. While 
Marx and Engels saw the urbanisation which followed industrial capitalism in a 
positive light (the move to the towns ‘rescued a considerable part of the population 
from the idiocy of rural life’) (231, p.60), greens argue that negative aspects have 
outweighed such positive effects. The rural environment has also suffered: ‘The eity 
and the country are under siege today; both are being subverted by urbanisation’
(222, p.3). Decisions on rural life are taken by those with power who tend not to 
live in the rural environments they will be affecting, and who are seen to have little 
awareness of local conditions and problems. The European Union has also attracted 
much attention from greens in this field, as its role is viewed as a missed 
opportunity. Whereas certain decisions could usefully be made at European level in 
greens’ views (through ‘Politiques communes de protection du patrimoine naturel et
336
de la bio-diversité’, for example) (46, p. 15), the EU’s uniform policies, particularly 
on agriculture, are seen as inappropriate.
Uniformity of policy resulting from centralised decisions is also criticised by greens 
for failing to take account of regional diversity. Finally, the decisions which have 
been taken by the centre are seen as misguided, since they have led to further 
depopulation of rural areas:
Over the last thirty-five years, governments have paid out billions in 
subsidies and grants to promote a way of farming that has caused millions 
to move away from the countryside. (19, p. 172)
These criticisms of the effects of the city on the environment are ones we would 
have expected from the green movement. As we have seen in previous chapters, 
however, they also focus their criticisms on the effects on the person, and it is to 
such criticisms we will now turn.
5.2.2 Effects on the person
Here, many of the points important for environmentalists could be identified just as 
easily with the left. They share a common emphasis on poverty, unemployment, 
powerlessness, isolation, marginalisation, inadequate housing, illness and 
depression, and would both identify similar factors as some of the most important 
causes of these negative aspects of cities. However, for environmentalists, these 
factors make the city an important focus for different reasons than for those of the 
left. Whereas left-wing groups might see these problems as able to be solved 
individually (by reducing the unemployment rate or building better public housing, 
for example), or by socialist reform or revolution (abandoning capitalism), for green
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politics, they are evidence of an illogical and unsustainable industrial society, whose 
effects would be no or little different under communism or socialism. For the
greens, these problems will not be solved except by rethinking very basic S
-■iassumptions about the way we live, taking into acount the effects we have on the
environment. For the greens, these two aspects (effects on the enviroimient and (
ieffects on the person) are thus closely linked.
J 'f
■J'
T
made on slightly different grounds. Since 1982, unemployment has never fallen 
below two million in France, and levels are at their highest in cities.^ Greens agree
Some green ideas on the effects of the city on the person are not, however, typically 
associated with the left. One such idea would be the view that life away from rural 
or more ‘natural’ environments leads to a lack of what some greens call 
‘embeddedness’ (‘enracinement’). Deep greens have always argued that physical 
distance from a more ‘natural’ environment leads to a negative change in mentality. 
Indeed, such criticisms are found even in relatively shallow green views of the 
modern city, based on a general emphasis on quality of life, ‘une préoccupation qui 
apparaît dès les premières manifestations du mouvement’ (232, p.63). A
«I
The next main focus for green criticism is the social exclusion seen in the modern 
city. The economic expansion of the ‘trente glorieuses’ is now seen to have been 
accompanied by a neglect of the social sphere. Debray has described France during 
this period as a ‘société à deux vitesses’ (233, p.8), with economic aspects cruising 
in high gear while social aspects were stuck in a low gear. While this uneven 
development was criticised in the 1970s, environmentalists have pointed out that it 
now seems ‘un panorama enviable pour notre regard actuel’, because of ‘la 
progression régulière et soutenue du pouvoir d’achat dans un contexte de chômage 
quasi-nul’ (103, p.23).
Undoubtedly the most important aspect of social exclusion for enviroimientalists and 
other politicians alike is unemployment, though some of the greens’ criticism are
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with other politicians on the negative effects of unemployment - ‘social, personal, 
economic’, leading to ‘a high correlation between unemployment and rates of early 
mortality, disease, alcoholism, mental illness and crime’ (19, p.64). However, 
greens also criticise unemployment because of the context of the environmental 
crisis:
At a time when other resources are becoming scarce, [unemployment] 
represents a serious and totally irrational waste of our most valuable 
productive resource, (ibid., pp.64-5)
Greens criticise the ‘social marginalisation’^  of the unemployed in ‘unsatisfactoiy 
living environments’ (234, p.31), with few facilities, high unemployment, and the 
‘ghetto-isation’ of poor and immigrants. Such segregation means that the city is 
disproportionately affected. Health problems, social exclusion and unemployment 
are all at their worst in the British inner city or French banlieue and have more 
pronounced effects because of their interaction (19, p.86). Seabrook adds ‘crime, 
violence, psychiatric and emotional illness, loneliness, more people on drugs, more 
people bereft of marketable skills’ (235, p. 105) to this list, and makes an important 
point for green criticisms in his conclusion. Far from being a ‘vestigial problem’, 
poverty in cities is ‘structural, a necessary, precise concomitant of the patterns of 
growth and development of the economy’ (ibid., p.111).
The marginalisation and segregation of vulnerable groups - the poor, old, immigrants 
as well as the unemployed - is one of the most important obstacles to individual 
‘development and autonomy’ (ibid., p. 109) in cities and this is therefore one of the 
strongest criticisms made by greens. Waechter takes the car as an example of such 
marginalisation, pointing out that in 1989, one quarter of French families had no 
access to a car, ‘tout en étant condamnées à vivre dans un espace organisé pour la 
voiture’ (96, p.50). Green criticisms of racism and the ‘ghettoisattion’ of immigrant 
communities usually stress the city too:
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Les cités d’urgence des années 60 sont un peu les bidonvilles des villes 
riches du Nord; occupées par les immigrés, elles ont parfois pris l’aspect de 
ghéttos, où une triple marginalité, économique, géographique et 
linguistique, favorise la xénophobie, voire le racisme, (ibid., p.85)
A final aspect of social exclusion severely criticised by environmentalists is its 
effects on health. Illich and Gorz in particular have stressed that ‘Les facteurs de 
santé et de maladie sont avant tout sociaux’ (32, p.213). Those who live in cities, 
particularly centralised urban environments like Paris, suffer negative effects on 
health disproportionately. While Paris is the home of less than 4% of the French 
population, it has 16% of deaths from bronchitis and 8% of deaths from lung cancer 
(86, p.79). Such negative effects of city life on the health of the individual are 
criticised by greens as they are impossible to avoid. This example of individual 
powerlessness brings us to the next criticism made by greens, that is of the effects of 
the scale of the modern city.
The scale of modern cities is criticised not only for its compounded effects on the 
environment, but also for its extreme negative effects on the person, and particularly 
its effects on the ability of individuals to control or change their environment.
Greens have argued that this ability, or even ‘droit’ (34, p. 124) should be the 
determining factor in deciding the appropriate size of cities:
A partir de quel seuil démographique la ville cesse-t-elle d’être désirable? 
Sans doute à partir du moment où le désir de ses habitants ne détermine 
plus son évolution. (86, p.82)
The scale of modem cities, and particularly Paris has led to the exacerbation of 
already existing problems relating to social exclusion, just as it magnified 
environmental degradation and pollution. Kofman has described how urban zoning
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policies, still encouraged in France after they had been abandoned in other European 
countries, resulted in tension in the banlieue and its eventual development into a 
‘simplified shorthand for a cluster of social ills and problematic inhabitants, [...] a 
place of exclusions’ (236, p.382).
The scale of modern urban environments is particularly criticised for its effects on 
the autonomy and way of life of individuals. Its compounded environmental 
problems affect their health disproportionately. Other negative effects of the scale of 
the city on the person criticised in green accounts include the lengthening of the 
working day (through increased journey times to and from work, for example), the 
inaccessibility of cultural facilities (cost and distance from home are again 
criticised), the increased cost of accommodation, and the lack (or destruction) of 
community (‘esprit de quartier’). The scale of the city is also criticised for its 
encouragement of defeatist attitudes. Environmentalists believe that all citizens 
should be involved in decisions about their environment, and their main criticism of 
scale is thus that ‘le gigantisme urbain étouffe la démocratie’ (86, p,8I).
Currently, then, centralised, urbanised societies are criticised for replacing the 
desired ‘civic autonomy and active citizenry’ with a ‘passive constituency’ of urban- 
dwellers and the ‘civic supremacy’ of centralised cities over rural societies (222, 
p. 146). This development, combined with the poor quality of life, social exclusion 
and problems of scale we have already described, is summed up by greens in the 
idea of alienation. As we have noted in previous chapters, greens use the term 
alienation in a different way than marxists do, focussing particularly on health and 
the environment.
In terms of health and alienation, Gorz, Illich and Dumont have all focussed on the 
negative effects of the ‘professionalisation’ of medicine on individuals,’^  effects 
which have compounded the physical and mental consequences of large-scale urban 
living environments. High rates of alcoholism, depression, even prostitution’ ’ have
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been volunteered as the results of city life and the impression that urban dwellers 
have no power to manage their own health. As well as criticisms of the effects on 
physical health, mental health is seen to be affected by isolation and loneliness, 
among other factors.
Dans la ville, la solitude est devenue un phénomène de masse, mal vécu et 
mal soigné. [...] Plus de 10% des Français souffrent de dépression 
nerveuse. [...] La peur de la ville n ’y est pas pour rien. (224, p. 140)
The urban environment is important with regard to avoiding a sense of alienation 
(something greens often term ‘convivialité’) ’^  in two ways - first, city environments 
themselves are not sufficiently natural, and this leads to further alienation of their 
inhabitants: ‘Pas d’emacinement dans le béton’, as a green slogan has it (86, p. 132). 
The green emphasis on the need for espaces verts has been present since the earliest 
days of the movement. The alienation of the population is often linked to aesthetic 
objections to the modern city. For Waechter, ‘la nature expulsée, la ville [devient] 
un univers anonyme et parfois hostile’ (ibid.. p.37).
Second, the scale of the modern city means its citizens live too far* from more natural 
riual environments. Deep ecologists in particular have stressed the human ‘need’ for 
wilderness, but non-deep greens also see more natural (though less extreme) 
environments as necessary. For greens, the distance from nature inherent in large 
urban environments involves a loss of freedom:
[Lorsqu’il] ne subsiste plus ni champ ni forêt à portée de bicyclette, la 
respiration n ’est plus possible et la liberté n’est qu’une illusion, (ibid.. 
pp.35-6)
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If environmentalists criticise the alienation produced by separation from natural 
enviromnents, it is usually because, like the scale of modern cities, it can affect our 
ability or desire to change society. Bookchin warns us to be wary of ‘the changes 
urbanization has produced in our sensibility toward society and toward the natural 
world’ (222, p.ix). Indeed, this final criticism, that urbanisation has had negative 
effects for democracy and citizen participation is perhaps the most consistent made 
by greens. We might now consider how far 1930s sources share such critical views 
of the effects of the city.
5.3 1930s criticism s o f  the city
The green criticisms detailed above take as their main focus post-war urbanisation 
and conditions in late-20‘’’ century urban environments. Before WW2, however, a 
much greater proportion of the French population still lived in rural communities 
than is the case today, and the urban environments of 1930s France were clearly very 
different to their contemporary equivalents. It might seem unlikely, therefore, that 
we would find many comparable criticisms in 1930s sources.
However, the essential elements of the urbanisation process which greens criticise 
today were already becoming apparent in 1930s France. For example, as noted in 
Table I , the population of Paris itself (as opposed to the Paris region) reached its 
highest level between the wars. The economic crisis France experienced at the 
beginning of the 1930s was the first to affect a population based mainly in the towns, 
even if the proportion living there was not as high as it is today. The effects of town 
and city on their new inhabitants were therefore highly visible and attracted attention 
and comment, notably in the relatively novel cinematic focus on the city, in films 
such as Game’s Hôtel du Nord. For Borne and Dubief, one difference between 
1920s and 1930s France is that by the time of the economic crisis, ‘la ville est au
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bout d’un cycle’ (11, p.230), with uncertainty about its effects and its future a key 
feature of the period.
The apparent paradox we noted in the case of modern greens (that while reserving 
their strongest criticisms for cities and towns, they nonetheless ehoose to live there) 
is also paralleled in the 1930s. Citron points out that Giono always lived in the 
(albeit small) Provence town Manosque, and never adopted the kind of paysan life 
he lauded (he was only an infrequent visitor to the Contadour ‘experiment’) (215, 
p.xiii), and the youth groups of the 1930s were invariably ‘des Français très 
“urbanisés,”’ even if some, like the Personalists had ‘une qualité de prise de 
conscience qu’on ne s’attendrait guère à voir survivre dans nos cités désolées’ (73, 
p.209).
These broad resemblances mean we can consider 1930s criticisms of the city’s 
effects on the person and the environment as we did for green criticisms, since 1930s 
sources did indeed focus on both sorts of effects, even if they would not have used 
the term ‘environmental impact’.
5.3.1 Effects on the environment
As with modern greens, 1930s sources base their criticisms not on the existence of 
the town or city per se, but on recent urbanisation and the speed and extent of 
unplamied change. The post-WW 1 years had witnessed urban building on a massive 
scale, ‘une rage de mortier, de ciment et d’acier’ (159, p. 169). Given that French 
towns and cities had only been growing for a relatively short time (and hardly at all 
during the war), such sudden changes were striking. In 1938, Giono noted that in 
only fifty years ‘le jeu industriel’ had taken over towns, ‘transforming’ their size and 
functions beyond recognition (68, p. 135).
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The speed and extent of unplanned change, on which greens would later focus, were 
already attracting criticism in the 1930s. The new demands of capitalist industry 
were blamed to a great extent for such change: most had moved to towns and cities 
because large concentrations of workers were now required, and when the economic 
crisis arrived, the impact on ‘cette nouvelle classe ouvrière,’ ‘le prolétariat déraciné 
de la banlieue autour de Paris’ (11, p. 17) was feared. The demands of industry 
meant that the move to the towns had happened quickly, and that foreign workers 
had also been widely employed. This led to widespread criticisms of ‘déracinement’ 
and badly-plamied, segregated living environments too, with examples such as 
Vénissieux (80% of its inhabitants were from outwith the Lyon area in 1930, with 
almost half of them coming from outside France)’^  meaning that examples of the 
urban developments greens would later criticise were already visible in France.
Perhaps the most vocal critic of the unplanned nature of urbanisation cited here was 
Céline. He repeatedly commented on the incredibly rapid spread of Paris, focussing 
on the effects of urbanisation on both the city itself and the countiyside. 
Unsurprisingly, given his medical training, he also denounced the effects of 
unplamied urbanisation on health, as we shall see in the next section. In terms of 
enviromnental damage, he focusses on very similar areas as do modern greens: 
pollution (‘la Seine, ce gros égout’) (53, p.305), the use of natural resources (‘tout le 
monde en veut, tout le monde en réclame’)’'’ and the effects of concentrated 
populations on both.
The unplanned and swift nature of post-WWl urbanisation was also seen as having 
led to an unfortunate imbalance between urban and rural populations. Between 1921 
and 1931, 600 000 people had left the countryside in the move to French towns and 
cities (11, p.217) leading many to fear ‘le dépeuplement absolu’ of rural areas by the 
1930s (238, p.77). An important factor in fears of this rapid urbanisation was that it 
was ‘selective’:
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Dll point de vue démographique, le plus grave est que l’émigration étant 
sélective -  ce sont les jeunes et les jeunes adultes qui partent [...] -  il 
s’ensuit un dangereux vieillissement de la population în situ et une baisse 
parfois catastrophique de la natalité, (ibid.. pp.79-80)
The imbalance between urban and rural populations was not criticised in terms of 
population size alone, then , but also because it was widely feared that the departure 
of young people would lead to a vicious circle, with those left behind unable to 
replaee them. Of course, T’équilibre global des générations’ had already been 
destroyed by WWl (172, p.516), meaning fears of such imbalance were particularly 
acute in the entre-deux-guerres. If there was criticism in the 1930s of the 
urbanisation process, however, there was an even greater focus on the environmental 
effects of urban populations once they were established in the towns and cities, in 
terms similar to those employed by modern greens. These criticisms will now be 
outlined.
The first such criticism, that urban populations are unable to be self-sufficient, 
creating problems of supply and waste is identified particularly by Giono in Les 
vraies richesses. Giono describes at length the effects on both urban dwellers and 
the environment of concentrated populations. During a visit to Paris, his narrator 
concludes that those who live there are numb to the absurdity of
les trains incessants alimentent les foyers, [...déchargeant] les étoffes, les 
viandes, les poissons, les légumes, les épices, pour la consommation [,.,] du 
travail, du désir et de la bataille, (60, p.64)
whereas his visitor is shocked by the waste involved in such incessant efforts to 
supply Tes esclaves de l’artificiel’ (ibid.. p.68). The feriying of provisions to Paris 
is summed up as ‘une chaîne sans fin d’esclavage où ce qui se produit se détruit sans 
créer ni joie ni liberté’ (ibid.. p.65). The idea of urban waste being unnatural and
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difficult for the rural visitor to comprehend or accept is also a focus in the text. In 
the city:
Rien n’est vierge. Rien n’arrive neuf jusqu’à vous. Tout a été fatigué, 
utilisé, tripoté, par des millions de bras, de mains, de jambes, de cuisses, de 
fesses, de poumons... (ibid., p.45)
‘Cette absence totale de la pureté’ in the city and the absurdity of transporting 
provisions are vividly contrasted with the self-sufficient independence of Giono’s 
idealised version of the paysan community, producing everything necessary 
themselves. Members of the community such as the mayor, musicians or artisans, 
who do not produce their own food are portrayed as offering valuable services to the 
community in order to be supplied, while the representative of bureaucratic 
administration, the Préfet is dismissed: ‘Celui-là, s’il veut manger, qu’il travaille’ 
(ibid., p. 150).
The second focus for criticism is one of the effects of unplanned or badly planned 
urbanisation, that is, the rapid and uncontrolled spread of the city. Such effects on 
the environment were particularly visible by the early 1930s, after the Loi Loucheur 
of 1928 had allowed massive, public-financed building ‘aux portes de Paris’, with 
40,000 ‘logements HBM’ following between 1928 and 1939 in the Seine region (11, 
p.231). Other precursors of later problems included the modern housing 
development at Drancy,’  ^ in 1934 ‘qui [annonçait] -  tours et barres, ciment armé -  
les ‘grands ensembles’ des années 1950’, (ibid., p.231). Housing spread in the 
1930s has since been described as ‘anarchique’, with ‘ les lotissements sauvages non 
viabilisés’ multiplying, ‘au hasard au milieu des usines et des voies ferrées’ (ibid., 
p.229).
The extent of such spread was presented as terrifying in the works of both Céline 
and Giono. Céline described the inevitability of the disappearance of Vigny-sur-
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Seine (‘Paris va le prendre. Il perd un jardin par mois’) (53, p.531) and the equally 
inevitable effects on both society and the environment the process would have. ‘La 
Seine a tué ses poissons’, ‘la dernière boule de jardin a disparu’, and those behind 
the developments are less than inspiring (‘trois lotisseurs viennent d’entrer en 
prison’) (ibid., p.531).
For Giono, the growth of the cities was absurd, and the desire to live in such 
conditions (‘s’entasser les uns et les autres sur les fondations même de l’industrie’)
(68, p. 138) incomprehensible. The upward and outward spread of the city was |
frequently denounced as particularly unnatural in his works; in his view, cities and !
their inhabitants represented
[L’agglomération] dans des proportions considérables sur de petits espaces 
de terre, tout restreints, et qu’ils envisageaient même dans leurs moments 
de plus grand délire d’augmenter en hauteur, en épaisseur, (ibid., p. 137)
The concentration of population in Paris was matched, even more so than is the case 
today, by the concentration of power and decision-making in the capital. Just as 
greens today criticise the effects of decisions being taken in Paris by govermiients or 
ministers with little awareness of the diversity of approaches needed for different 
regions and rural areas, so 1930s sources were highly critical of centralised decision­
making. Under the centralised system of the Third Republic, local politicians could 
wield great influence at national level, and since many issues which would be dealt 
with by county and municipal authorities in England were in France ‘the direct 
responsibility of the central government’ (85, p.37), decisions which might have 
been appropriate in a minority of regions were frequently applied to the entire 
countiy, regardless of their suitability to the local climate, farming, economy and so 
on.
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Le Populaire made this point in 1936, arguing that Mes milliards de francs’ had been 
wasted, which might have been used to ‘contribuer au bien-être rural’ (89, p.57) 
under a less centralised system. Literary sources agreed. Giono in particular 
criticised what he saw as the tendency of govermnents and politicians to ignore those 
who were not city-dwellers. ‘On a trop l ’habitude de croire qu’il n ’y a du peuple 
qu’à Belleville’, whereas ‘le peuple ne s’arrête pas aux barrières de Paris’ (239, 
p.24). Denouncing politicians as ‘ces hommes faux,’ he bemoans their power over 
the paysan especially:
The intensified environmental impact of this centralised population also reached a 
level in 1930s Paris that would arguably not be seen until much later in other French 
towns and cities. The earlier ‘haussmannisation’ of Paris meant that its streets had 
been able to ‘accueillir la circulation automobile’ very quickly (ibid.. p.230), and 
along with the new factory developments in the Paris region, this meant that the 
effects of pollution were very apparent, attracting criticism from both Céline and 
Giono. ‘Les volutes de mille usines, de cent mille voitures en trafic’ meant that 
Paris had become ‘un pot d’échappement sans échappement’ (67, p.237). Céline 
also describes the physical effects of pollution -  at Place Clichy, ‘la chaleur des
Partout ils font les lois, les lois qui régissent votre vie, [...] Ils font comme 
si vous n’existiez pas, vous, les paysans. (68, pp. 141-2)
However, the concentration of population and power in Paris was not seen as 
beneficial to the capital, either. Indeed, the unplanned and rapid nature of post- 
WWl urbanisation meant that Paris of the 1930s was witnessing problems that 
would not be found in other French towns and cities until at least the 1950s, in the 
view of Borne and Dubief (inhabitants of ‘les vieux centres’ being forced out by 
offices, the traditional social mix of the city being lost, with factories and their 
workers leaving for the suburbs, ‘l’entassement dans un parc immobilier vétuste et 
sans confort’, the higher proportion of unemployment in the Paris region and so on) 
(ll,p .231).
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autos, juin venu, celle qui vous brûle la gorge et le fond du nez’ reminds him of the 
Ford factory (53, p.303). Visiting Paris, the narrator of Les vraies richesses is also 
struck by the heightened effects of pollution in the capital: ‘Ce ciel ne fait pas 
respirer. Il noie d’un seul coup les poumons’ (60, p.36).
Again, it is the scale of the modern city, and particularly Paris which is presented as 
exacerbating environmental impact, not least because of the ‘aesthetic pollution’ it 
entails. Criticisms of scale abound in French literature of the period, whether of the 
sheer numbers grouped together in cities or of architectural developments. At a time 
when most were bemoaning the ‘hollow years’ of the post-WWl period and French 
‘Malthusianism’ (196, p.78), authors like Céline and Giono were instead attacking 
the ‘extrême multiplication des générations que la teclmique industrielle a entassées 
dans les villes’ (68, p. 141). The ternis generally chosen to describe cities were 
‘termitières’ (110, p. 109); ‘cette fourmilière’ (53, p.261); Paris was ‘cette ville où les 
hommes sont entassés comme si on avait râtelé une fourmilière’ (60, p.36). The 
visual impact of cities on such a scale was presented as terrifying: ‘New York, c ’est 
une ville debout [...] raide à faire peur’ (53, p.237, with some attacking the 
‘décadence du génie urbain français’ for replacing the ancient fortification of Paris 
with ‘des casernes de brique’ (11, p.230).
Nor were criticisms of the effects of urbanisation limited to changes in cities and 
towns. Both rural decline and the loss of regional diversity were criticised for their 
effects on the environment in the 1930s as they are now by greens. The official 
support for farming on a larger scale, with paysans encouraged to acquire land by a 
1918 law on credit (11, p.220), together with the ‘selective’ urbanisation mentioned 
earlier had led by the 1930s to criticisms of rural ‘dépeuplement’. The very recent 
adoption o f ‘monoculture’ farming in certain regions of France was also feared, 
particularly since ‘1’esprit commercial’’  ^was felt to be behind the specialisation in 
wine and fruit production.
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There were violent criticisms of the potential effects on the environment of such 
developments in journals such as Raquef s Progrès Agricole between 1919 and 
1939, which attacked ‘ces “vampires de la finance” (les fabricants de “fertilisants”)’ 
and ‘les teclmocrates’ whose emphasis on large-scale production was already argued 
to be leading French farming ‘à la ruine et à la mort’ (170, p.3). Giono also 
denounced the effects on the environment of such developments in surprisingly 
‘green’ terms in the 1930s, arguing that polyculture was essential, and that regional %
diversity in crops must be maintained if the land and quality of produce were not to 
suffer. Whereas appropriate crops would flourish, ‘industrial’ farming was doomed
Ce qui se faisait naturellement est devenu une vraie bataille et il faut des 
centaines de litres de jus de nicotine pour lutter contre le mal. (68, p. 184)
A common focus in the 1930s was on the perceived official encouragement of 
uniformity, and criticisms of the loss of regional or local traditions were frequent. 
This was true not only of agricultural production, but also of the rural way of life. 
The influence of radio and travelling cinemas had brought ‘Fair de la ville’, with 
rural dress codes and eating habits soon similar to those in towns (11, p.221). For 
Daniel-Rops, ‘le péril est le gigantisme’, which was closely linlced to the 
centralisation of French society, denied fundamental, natural differences and led to 
the loss of regional diversity and long-established traditions. Thus
le Breton et le Provençal mêlés dans l’anonymat faubourien, fondus peu à 
peu dans le creuset d’où sort le misérable métal du citoyen prolétaire (15,
p.206)
were the inevitable and regrettable result of state centralisation. Indeed, as with 
other themes, it was effects on the person that attracted the majority of 1930s 
criticisms. These will now be outlined.
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5.3.2 Effects on the person
The criticisms made of the effects on the person of urbanisation and the city in 1930s 
sources are again similar to those made by their left-wing contemporaries. The 
socialists, communists and radicals also denounced living conditions of the urban 
poor and the effects of urban unemployment, for example. However, many in the 
1930s argued, as modern greens do, that neither a socialist revolution nor specific 
piecemeal reforms would be sufficient to address such problems. Instead, they saw 
the effects of urban environments on the person as one part of ‘une crise totale de 
civilisation’, ‘une crise du monde moderne, ‘une crise globale’ (15, pp.248-9). This 
‘faux monde’ would have to be rejected entirely, since human ‘misère physique et 
spirituelle’ was its inevitable outcome (159, p. 172): ‘Nous n ’avons pas été créés 
pour le bureau, pour l’usine, pour le métro, pour l ’autobus’ (ibid., p. 173).
The idea of a lack of ‘enracinement’ is again at the centre of such criticisms of the 
effects on the person of urban environments. 1930s sources even used the same 
terms as greens - the Personalists criticised ‘le déracinement, conséquence de la 
concentration industrielle et urbaine’ (15, p.228). Quality of life was central to such 
critiques. The distance from a more ‘natural’ environment and way of life was seen 
to lead to physical and psychological health problems. The city was believed to 
exacerbate problems relating to new kinds of work, for example. The 
‘ dépersonnalisation’ of industrial work could be overcome by the worker returning 
to a small village community:
le manoeuvre le plus déraciné, pour qui le travail n ’a pas d’autre sens que la 
perte de quelques heures quotidiennes en échange d ’une somme d’argent est 
un citoyen de son village. La compensation s’opère, l’enracinement a lieu 
dans le milieu rural. (90, p.426)
of Paris was particularly shocking when contrasted with the burning of ‘surplus’ 
wheat to maintain price levels (both Giono and the Personalists made this 
comparison) (68, p. 181 and ibid.. p.217). The effects of unemployment on the 
person were criticised as immoral and absurd,
absurde, car tous les perfectionnements techniques aboutissent aujourd’hui 
au chômage, l’abondance à la misère [...] Nous refusons une civilisation qui 
affame trente millions d’hommes, (ibid.. p.219)
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In contrast, the urban industrial worker is ‘perdu dans la grande ville’, the 
‘mutilation’ he undergoes at work is not recompensed, and his ‘liberté d’esprit, 
initiative et responsabilité’ remain ‘étouffées dans le travail automatisé’ (ibid.. 
p.426).
:?
The next main fbcus of 1930s criticisms is on social exclusion, seen as exacerbated 
by the concentration of populations in the towns and cities. Once again, the primary 
criticism here is of the effects on the person of unemployment. In the 1930s, 
awareness of such effects was acute, as the economic crisis of the beginning of the 
decade had struck urban workers in a manner new to France. As Borne and Dubief 
point out, ‘les racines rurales permettent de survivre en cas de perte d’emploi ou de 
sous-emploi’ (11, p.37). The rural French population had thus been protected at a 
very basic level in times of economic crisis, but in the 1930s, a new group of urban- 
based workers, most of whom had no unemployment insurance, faced an extreme 
struggle to survive (85, p.35).
The non-conformist groups took the effects of urban unemployment on the person as 
a central focus in the 1930s. For the non-conformists, unemployment was closely 
linlced to capitalist industrialism, and was the logical outcome of a system which 
represented for Esprit ‘une sorte de péché social’ (15, p.219), since it destroyed 
human dignity. The sudden presence of unemployed workers begging on the streets
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Such criticisms of unemployment were linked to fears of Tes haines, les guerres, les 
désordres’ (ibid.. p.218), seen as the inevitable result of such absurdity and injustice, 
particularly in a society in which the gap between rich and poor was as wide as that 
of France in the 1930s. Ordre Nouveau attacked the divisive effects of a society in 
which ‘une minorité de “pourvus”’ existed alongside ‘d’innombrables démunis’ 
(ibid.. p.225). The disparity in income between the two groups was more apparent 
by the 1930s, in the view of Cahm, since industry had expanded, and because 
workers in the cities could observe the conspicuous wealth of some urban-dwellers 
in a way that would not previously have been possible in smaller rural communities:
The factory-owner, because of the large size of his concern was 
proportionately much wealthier and more powerful in relation to his 
workers than the owner of the small artisanal concern, whose way of life 
and social status were not so different from those of his employees. (72, 
p.410)
The gulf between ‘pourvus’ and ‘démunis’ was widened by the segregation of urban 
workers. The term ‘ghetto’ was employed in the 1930s as today to describe the 
grouping of urban workers in the banlieue, which was ‘vétuste et sans confort’ (11, 
p.230), The ugliness and isolation of such new living environments in comparison 
to the rural backgrounds from which their inlrabitants had been ‘arrachés’ (86, 
p.240) was frequently remarked upon -  it was former paysans who had been
enfermés dans ces ghettos énormes qui ressemblent à des gares de triage 
encombrées de wagons noirs, (ibid.. p.240)
Again, the feared result was conflict -  and indeed, ‘les années 1930 voient se 
multiplier les affrontements dont la ville est l’enjeu’ (11, pp.229-30). Racial conflict 
was already feared in the 1930s too - ‘la xénophobie se déchaîn[ait], alors même que 
diminuait] le nombre des étrangers’ (ibid.. p.231).
254
The effects on health of such living environments were also feared. 1930s critics 
attacked the same aspects of urban life as greens do today. First, the crowding in 
modern cities was viewed as particularly damaging, particularly in literaiy accounts. 
Giono lists examples of crowding at length (‘chambres où ils sont trois, quatre, cinq, 
la famille’) before his narrator turns his back on Paris in disgust (60, pp.66-9).
Céline describes Bardamu’s horror of commuters ‘comprimés comme des ordures 
dans la caisse en fer’ of the tramway (53, p.305). The incessant noise of the city is 
seen as detrimental: ‘dans ma chambre toujours les mêmes tonnerres’ (ibid.. p.267).
Indeed, Céline returns throughout Vovage to the effects on physical health of the 
urban environment, commenting repeatedly on aspects highlighted today by greens. 
As well as Bardamu’s hatred of noise and crowding, the episode where he practices 
as a doctor stresses the connections between the urban poor and ill health, 
particularly through the pathetic Bébert. Pollution is directly blamed for illness: 
‘tout le monde toussait dans ma rue’, hardly surprising when to see the sun it was 
necessary to climb ‘an moins jusqu’au Sacré-Coeur’ (ibid.. p.308). Giono also 
reaches the conclusion that modern life causes illness: ‘Je crois que, si nous savions 
vivre, nous ne serions peut-être pas malades’ (51, p.62).
Such effects of the urban environment are seen by all our sources as compounded by 
the scale of the modern city, just as greens argue today. Already in 1932, there was 
widespread nostalgia for the ‘Paris des artisans, de la sociabilité des quartiers’(l 1, 
p.230). De Rougemont offered the new urban environment as evidence for his view 
that ‘I’homme moderne a perdu la mesure de l’humain’.’  ^ By the mid-193Os, when 
he wrote Bagatelles pour un massacre. Céline had reached the conclusion that the 
scale of the modern city meant change was impossible:
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[Paris] est une ville qu’on ne peut plus reconstruire, même plus aménager, 
d’une façon d’une autre. [...] C’est une ville qu’est devenue maintenant
toute nuisible, mortelle pour ceux qui l’habitent. (67, pp.236-7)
This idea that change is not possible is a key element of the final broad criticism 
made of the city’s effects on the person, that is that it leads to widespread alienation 
for its inhabitants. Some 1930s sources even arrived at a very similar (non-Marxist) 
definition of alienation as modern greens do. Mounier argued that Marxists did not 
go far enough in their definition, and that communism would not end alienation, as sgreens do now:
" ' fI
Le marxisme a raison de penser que la fin de la misère matérielle est la fin 
d’une aliénation, et une étape nécessaire au développement de l’humanité.
Mais elle n’est pas la fin de toute aliénation. (26, p.21)
Instead, life in modem urban environments and industrial work would cause 
alienation even under a non-capitalist system. A key aspect of such alienation was 
the effect on psychological health of life in the city. Just as pollution, poverty or 
crowding affected the physical health of ‘citadins’, so depression and loneliness 
were portrayed as the inevitable result for many in the city. For the Personalists, 
loneliness was not ‘une donnée de la condition humaine’, but rather the result of the 
modern way of life: ‘on se fait seul’, by the rejection o f ‘les petites communautés’ in 
favour of ‘le gigantisme social’ (ibid., pp.43-4). Few accounts of the loneliness of 
the city-dweller are as vivid as that of Bardamu when he finally reaches the United 
States. The speed and inliuman scale of New York are clearly linlced to Bardamu’s 
isolation:
En Afrique, j ’avais certes comiu un genre de solitude assez brutale, mais 
l’isolement dans cette fourmilière américaine prenait une tournure plus 
accablante encore. (53, p.261)
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After only a few days in New York, Bar damn explodes: ‘ J ’en avais assez d’être seul! 
[...] De la sympathie! Du contact!’ (ibid., p.267). Elsewhere, it is not simply the 
scale of the modern city which leads to such problems, but also its inhabitants’ 
umiatural surroundings. Cities lack Tes fleurs, les espaces, les jardins’ (67, p.239), a 
point emphasised in Vovage when Bardamu suggests pathetically that the ill child 
Bébert be taken to the cemetery, the only uncrowded green space in the area. ‘La 
cruelle matière de leur habitat’ (60, p.37) leads to illness for city-dwellers in Giono’s 
view, too.
Unlike Céline, however, Giono argues that a key aspect of such alienation is the 
distance of city-dwellers from the more natural rural environment. (While Céline 
criticises the lack o f ‘espaces verts’ in the city, the countryside is hardly presented as 
a superior alternative) For Giono, the heart of the problem is that there are people 
who have no first-hand laiowledge of ‘ce qu’est un arbre, une feuille, une herbe, le 
vent de printemps, le galop d’un cheval, le pas des boeufs’ (60, p. 18).
The eventual result of all of the above problems, and of general alienation is seen as 
an overwhelming defeatism, and this represents the final broad criticism made in 
1930s sources of the effects of the city on the person. Both literary sources and the 
non-conformists argued despondency was the eventual effect of modern urban life. 
The scale of the urban environment is implicated, as always: ‘Plus la ville est grande 
et plus elle est haute et plus ils s’en foutent’ (53, p.268). The city-dweller is not 
even conscious of the effects his surroundings are having:
Quand on habite à Raney on se rend même plus compte qu’on est devenu
triste. On a plus envie de faire grand-chose, voilà tout, (ibid., p.308)
357
Giono agrees with Céline that such effects take hold without the city-dweller being 
aware that he has developed ‘un autre sens de la liberté, un autre sens de la grandeur, 
un autre sens de la vie’ (68, p. 139). Such alienation was seen by Giono as 
particularly dangerous, because it would lead to ‘l’éternité de la prison’ (ibid., 
p. 139). If the city dweller was not conscious of how restricted his vision was, there 
was no potential to change society for the better. Such despondency was also 
viewed as dangerous, somewhat paradoxically, in the 1930s because ‘l’homme 
déraciné, prolétarisé, coupé de toutes ses attaches familiales, régionales’ by the 
industrial urban environment was seen as particularly likely to be attracted to 
extreme alternatives -  this was the view of Ordre Nouveau and the Personalists, for 
example (15, p.234). If his work or his community did not provide a sense of 
belonging, the urban dweller was believed to transfer ‘son besoin d’em'acinement 
dans un homme, un parti, un mythe’ (90, p.437).
Many concluded with Giono that ‘nul ne peut vivre séparé de son milieu’ (60, p.73). 
Having reached this conclusion, as indeed greens would decades later, what 
alternatives to the city did they propose as potential solutions to the problems they 
identified as critical?
5.4 G reen solutions
As in previous chapters, greens propose solutions to the problems they identify in 
modern cities which vary in practicality from reformist proposals, such as those 
found in the manifesto of les Verts for instance, to outright utopian visions of new 
kinds of society. The reformist proposals will be outlined first.
Such solutions stress that it is not necessarily the city which must be abandoned, but 
rather our ‘old industrial heartlands’ (37, p.76) in their current form. They hold that
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this is not an utopian solution, pointing out that ‘history is littered with cities that 
rose to power and then fell into decline’, usually because ‘they abused the 
environment on which they depended’ (ibid., p.75). ‘Reconstruire la ville,’ or 
finding new kinds of city is therefore essential if the city is to survive at all, and is 
the basis for their proposals. Perhaps surprisingly, given their virulent criticisms of 
the city, the survival of urban environments is something most greens want to see. 
There may be a ‘crise de la condition urbaine’, but this should not lead to a desire for 
‘une nouvelle ruralisation de la population,’ in Waechter’s view, as ‘la ville remplit 
une fonction d’échange et de service que nulle autre structure ne saurait remplir’ (96, 
pp.85-6). The aim is rather to find a balance between city life and ‘convivialité’.
While this aim does lead reformist greens to stress the need for new controls or 
curbs on certain activities, their solutions are based particularly on a new citizenship, 
with community involvement an apparent panacea for most of the city’s ills (‘carrots 
rather than sticks’, in Dobson’s words) (20, p. 155). In terms of controls, first, they 
emphasise the need for tax changes and stronger laws on pollution (‘le principe 
pollueur-payeur’) (46, p.4), transport (ibid., p.3) and waste (ibid., p.4). This is a 
relatively minor element of their proposals, however. Their focus is primarily on 
addressing the effects on the person of the city. Problems such as loneliness, 
alienation and racism which are associated in their view with urban environments 
are to be addressed by a new kind of community, with ‘urban villages’ suggested as 
the ideal (19, p .171). The abolition of urban planning permission, or at least of ‘le 
zonage’ (46, p.3), to allow a ‘hotchpotch’ of services, housing, ‘espaces verts’ and 
leisure facilities to grow ‘organically’ and according to the needs of each community 
is proposed (ibid., p. 171). The aim is to ‘revivifier les communautés (quartier, 
commune, famille, association)’ (3, pp.55-6). A key element for greens here is 
‘participation à la vie locale’, with ‘conseils d’insertion, de dialogue interculturel 
dans les villes de plus de 10.000 habitants’ proposed (211, p. 10). Such measures 
would, they argue, address problems of racism at a local level and allow each 
community to determine its character and priorities.
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Decentralisation of power to citizens is again an important ingredient in reformist 
solutions. ‘Une régionalisation, voire une municipalisation du pouvoir politique’ 
(34, p. 66) is a starting point, but greens argue that further devolution of power and 
decision-making is essential in cities, with power transferred ‘vers les bassins de vie 
et de travail’ as much as possible (46, p. 13). Greens repeatedly highlight the need 
for autonomy, not simply because humans are seen as having the right to influence 
and determine their own lifestyles, but because it is felt that this will actually lead to 
greater environmental awareness on the part of the individual, who will be able to 
see the effects of his/her chosen way of life: autonomy ‘dans 1’atelier, la campagne 
ou le bureau pour chaque individu, dans son territoire pour chaque communauté’ 
means ‘la possibilité de “voir le bout de ses propres actes”, de maîtriser les 
conséquences’ (34, p. 18). A key element of green reforms is encouraging 
individuals to accept responsibility for their community, and indeed for their own 
health. While state-level controls on pollution are one step which might address 
health problems in cities, the emphasis for the citizen is on ‘neighbourhood 
healthcare schemes’: ‘we must keep ourselves healthy’ (19, p. 169), in the greens’ 
view.
Even if the green movement has very urban roots, as we saw at the beginning of this 
chapter, this does not mean that reformist proposals focus only on the city when 
looking for potential solutions. ‘La notion d’espace rural de qualité’ (240, p.95) is 
also important for green political theory, particularly in terms of agriculture, ‘the 
problem of how we feed ourselves’ being ‘arguably the most vital component of a 
Green ecological strategy’ (241, p.60). The reformist green emphasis here is 
therefore usually on more sustainable agricultural methods, with les Verts aiming to 
‘encourager l ’agriculture paysanne et biologique et convertir les activités 
productivistes et polluantes’ (46, p.3). Protection of forests and other natural 
environments are also stressed in the reformist green approach (ibid., p.5). Even 
greens who see the city as potentially positive do also stress the need for a higher 
proportion of the total population living in rural environments. This brings us to the 
second main focus for reform, that is, an emphasis on the scale of the modern city.
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A different balance between urban and rural populations would also lead to 
remaining cities existing on a smaller scale. Les Verts indeed argue the need to 
‘déconcentrer la région parisienne et les grandes métropoles régionales au profit des 
villes moyennes et des zones rurales’ (46, p.3). Instead of growth, greens call for 
development of the city, just as they want to replace economic growth with 
sustainable development:
La croissance est la caractéristique de l’état jeune. A l’âge adulte, on n ’a 
plus besoin de croître (quand on continue à le faire, cela s’appelle cancer), 
mais on se développe. (240, pp.98-9)
Smaller cities would mean their inhabitants would more easily be able to reach the 
countryside, with straightforward access to ‘un patrimoine naturel suffisant pour la 
santé et le bien-être’ to become a constitutional right (46, p.5). Smaller cities would 
also mean the self-reliance of their inhabitants could be increased, and the volume of 
waste reduced, alleviating the pressure on land elsewhere. Greens have seriously
For Buchmann, ‘un modèle de société urbain’ dominates in France (240, p.95) and 
must be challenged. The scale of the modern city is damaging for all citizens, 
whether they live there or not. Greens emphasise the need to address the size of 
cities tlirough a ‘rééquilibrage du territoire’ -  ‘l’exigence de parité’ (217, p. 132) 
between town and country with ‘l ’accès aux services publics sur tout le tenitoire’
(46, p.3) is seen as an important element of achieving such reforms, since few will 
want to move to a rural environment where long journeys to work, poor leisure 
facilities, schools, hospitals and so on are the norm. The balance of the urban and t
rural populations is a central focus for reformist greens. Waechter, despite his 
acceptance of the city as necessary, albeit in a smaller form, concurs that, ‘la 
commune et notamment la petite commune rurale est le lieu privilégié de la société 
que nous souliaitons’.’^
364
proposed ‘allotments and rooftop gardens’ as a key element of change to the modern 
city, pointing out that in the Far East, ‘cities produce much of their own food within 
their boundaries’ through such measures (37, p.47).
A further example of the green emphasis on ‘acting locally’ is their support for 
regional diversity, which should again be safeguarded in the constitution, in their 
view (46, p. 10). Greens have long supported the Breton and Occitan campaigns for 
greater independence, as such diversity and the sense of place they believe is 
associated with regional attachment might represent the possibility of greater 
‘enracinement’, with the environmental benefits greens believe this would imply 
(242, p. 182).
The idea of ‘emacinemenf is, however, more frequently stressed in the second, 
revolutionary or utopian type of green solution, to which we shall now turn. This 
second type of solution has two guiding principles -  sustainability and what greens 
see as a human ‘need’ for enracinement. It is because of their stress on both that 
deep greens in particular are more likely to question the existence of the city, or to 
call for a mass return to the land: we must ‘live as close to the land as possible. [...] 
We must make its rhythms our patterns, its laws our g u i d e . T h e  idea of basing 
human societies on patterns apparently observable in the natural world is one many 
deep ecologists favour, emphasising qualities they see as prevalent in nature 
(diversity, symbiosis and so on) to argue that human beings should adopt small, 
highly decentralised rural communities (22, p.49).
In their calls to return to the land, such greens are inserted in a long tradition which 
believes that ‘whereas the town corrupts, country life preserves and encourages 
virtue’ (243, p .183). Greens would interpret this ‘virtue’ as a greater awareness and 
acceptance of sustainable practices. Secondly, and relatedly, rural life ‘brings 
happiness, whereas the town brings misery and destroys tranquillity of spirit’ (ibid., 
p.183).
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If cities are to be abandoned, these more utopian greens do at least address how the 
alternative might be made more attractive to those who might not immediately 
accept its advantages. Thus they have stressed the benefits (to health, for example) 
of rural enviroimients. Green theory has also concentrated on how to avoid negative 
effects for individuals of a more sustainable way of life, asking, for example, how 
such communities can be sufficiently diverse for all individuals to accept them, and 
how personal freedoms might be protected.
A ‘rééquilibrage du territoire’ (46, p.3), with the redistribution of services and 
amenities from towns and cities to the countryside, so these environments become 
more viable and attractive environments is again seen as a first step. An emphasis 
on self-development and education is particularly common, with Gorz stressing that 
his ‘utopie possible’ would ensure access to ‘centres pluridisciplinaires d’auto­
enseignement et d’auto-apprentissage, ouverts à tous jour et nuit, à la portée de ceux 
des villages reculés’ (32, pp.59-60), for example. Such proposals are also aimed at 
avoiding isolation in future rural communities.
This more idealistic solution to the problems of the city places special emphasis on 
the paysan as a role model for the future -  whereas the 20^ Century has witnessed 
the development of ‘peasants into Frenchmen’,^’ such greens imply a return to the 
paysan way of life would be a step forward, both in terms of sustainability and 
‘enracinement’. The paysan has a special role in green thought. As a self-reliant, 
and commonly even self-sufficient producer, he was a model of sustainable living. 
He is also seen as having a greater awareness of the earth, because of the need to 
work in harmony with natural cycles. The desire to pass on the farmed land to the 
next generation also led to care for the environment. ‘L’économie des ressources et 
le respect du pain quotidien, de la nature et de la vie’ are cited by greens today as 
elements of the ‘culture paysanne’ which should be re-embraced (189, p.45).
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As well as the paysan’s superior awareness of his environmental impact, green 
critiques often imply a quasi-spiritual relationship between the paysan and the earth, 
something they see as providing a potential way forward to a more sustainable 
balance between human beings and the planet. Lovelock has argued that paysans 
make more ‘natural’ greens in their willingness to accept ideas such as his Gaïa 
theory (that ‘la Terre est un être vivant’), which are dismissed by most scientists 
(apparently because ‘les scientifiques sont en général condamnés à mener une vie de 
citadins’) (244, p.30). Those who live and work on the land are ‘souvent stupéfaits 
d’apprendre que quelqu’un doive établir une proposition formelle pour une idée 
aussi évidente que l’hypothèse Gaïa’, since ‘pour ces gens de la campagne, cette 
hypothèse est vraie et l’a été de tout temps, (ibid., p.31).
The next reason for proposing some form of return to the land is based on the 
advantages for the person of more ‘natural’ surroundings. ‘The difference is 
aesthetic’, as ‘the country surrounds us with pure air and quietness and all the 
healing beauties of the natural scene’ (243, p. 183), A key emphasis for deep green 
political theory here is the idea of wilderness, generally taken to mean nature 
unaffected by human interference. Interestingly, for a political theory which aims to 
be non-anthi'opocentric, Deep Ecology nonetheless seems to see wilderness in terms 
of its value for human beings and the effects it can have on the person. ‘Wilderness 
experiences’ are described in countless Deep Green accounts,^^ and their authors 
often state that such experiences as ‘contemplating a mountain’ initially inspired 
them to become Deep Ecologists. Exposure to a rural, and ideally a wild 
environment is therefore recommended as a natural, or spiritual way to convert 
others to the green cause. Such greens argue that access to wild rural environments 
should be a ‘right for all’, leading Barry to accuse them of recommending a sort of 
‘deep green consumerism’ which could be just as damaging and elitist as the light 
green kind they deplore (22, p.50).
Again, such greens argue that women have a key role to play in moving towards 
their sustainable society. If men’s ‘Mastery of n a t u r e h a s  led to the current
364
unsustainable liuman-nature relationship, they argue that one way to stop current 
patterns of exploitation, particularly in the rural environments to which they hope we 
will return, might be to look to women. For Davion, ‘there is an important linlc 
between the domination of nature and the domination of women’ and an 
understanding of one is aided by an understanding of the other (346, p. 8). This 
understanding would enable us to ‘go beyond colonisation’ of the countryside, 
‘liberate nature’, and establish ‘a more balanced human-nature relationship’ (245, 
p .158).
Qualities traditionally associated with women such as ‘desire, caring, love, 
conservation, nurturing’ (ibid., p.5) are highlighted by ecofeminists as the way 
forward (leading critics to accuse them of being anything but feminist) (246, p. 10). 
They argue that such qualities should be adopted more widely, with women already 
living in the countryside as some kind of role model. Of course, such solutions are 
open to the criticism that they merely want to revert to the past, to backward rural 
communities. Indeed, some ecofeminists accept this point, and argue that prehistoric 
societies which ‘worshipped the Goddess of nature and spirituality, our great 
Mother, the giver of life and creator of us all’ were in fact sustainable as modern 
urban societies are not; they were even ‘structured very much like the peaceful and 
more just society we are now trying to construct’
In fact, this emphasis on goddess figures is startlingly widespread in the more 
extreme green solutions which emphasise a return to the land. Lovelock of course 
chose Gaïa (the Greek goddess of nature) as the illustration of his view that the earth 
is neither a ‘force primitive à dominer et à conquérir’ nor ‘un vaisseau spatial fou, 
voyageant à jamais privé de commandant de bord et d’objectif (244, p.32), but 
rather a living organism, capable of revolt and of rejecting its despoilers. This final 
point is repeatedly stressed in deep green solutions: if we fail to accept their 
suggestions, they imply somewhat menacingly, nature will force us to change our 
ways. Lovelock, for example, points out that the most deadly poisons are to be 
foimd in nature, and argues that if we carry on in our current urbanised.
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industrialised societies, Gaïa will use these against us. ‘Des surprises déplaisantes 
risquent de surgir’ (ibid., p. 143): ‘la Nature n’hésite pas à recourir à la guerre 
chimique si des armes moins conventionnelles s’avèrent insuffisantes’ (ibid., p. 129).
We can now conclude by asking how far 1930s sources identified such extreme 
solutions, and the less radical reforms proposed by greens today as an answer to the 
urban problems they criticised.
5.5 1930s solutions
Although there was evidence of a desire to reform aspects of the city, particularly 
under the Popular Front, the emphasis in the 1930s sources consulted here was 
clearly on more radical, if not utopian solutions. This is true of virtually all the I
sources, with the immediately conspicuous exception of Céline, who ‘criticises 
urban life but never goes so far as to glorify its alternative’ (109, p.833). Drieu’s 
description of the approach taken in Vovage (‘Cracher, seulement cracher, mais 
mettre au moins tout le Niagara dans cette salivation’) (162, p. 18) certainly seems 
apt when we consider Céline’s equally negative portraits of the rural environment 
(‘triste avec ses bourbiers qui n ’en finissent pas’) (53, p.23).
In this section, as for green solutions, the reformist suggestions which were made in 
the 1930s will be outlined before concluding with an account of the more radical 
suggestions made.
There was a similar focus on the potential of the city in the 1930s as today.
Criticisms were of the city in its current form, but many argued that it could be 
improved thi'ough reforms, usually addressing its size. The Personalists were keen,
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for example, to point out that there was no ‘modèle uniforme aux sociétés humaines’ 
(26, p.44) and that a different type of city could just as well serve the person as the 
rural enviromnent would. Their belief in the potential of the person meant that when 
they called for ‘communes “à la mesure de rhomnie,’” Mounier stressed that by this 
they meant not only ‘des jardins de banlieue et des voisinages de quartier’, though 
these were essential elements of their reformist proposals, but also ‘l’univers’ (ibid., 
p.43) “  as well as their need for a sense of community, human beings were capable 
o f greatness.
Reforms of the city were proposed to increase the ‘convivialité’ of the urban 
environment, particularly under the Popular Front. ‘Un phénomène essentiellement 
urbain’ (89, p. 147), the Popular Front made concerted attempts to improve the urban 
environment, notably under the influence of the mayor of Suresnes, Henri Sellier, 
who had earlier been a French ‘pionnier des cités-jardins’ (11, p.231). An emphasis 
on the ‘greening’ of the city, aesthetic improvements and easy access for all to green 
spaces was widespread -  in 1937, Giraudoux ‘rêvait d’une ceinture verte autour de 
la grande ville, d’un Marais restauré’ (11, p.230).
The stress on ‘loisirs’ as one way to address the negative effects of the city in its 
current form (particularly the effects on health) was a key aspect of reformist 
solutions. The Popular Front, again, with Lagrange saw temporally escape from 
urban conditions as one reformist step, supporting the development of the Auberges 
de jeunesse and arranging ‘accommodation for holidaying workers in peasant 
households’ (169, p.232), for example. Mounier wanted to address urban alienation 
by ‘guarantee[ing] to the individual sport, leisure, cultural amusements,’ something 
which would best be achieved through ‘administrative and economic 
decentralization’ (81, p.273).
Indeed, decentralisation was a pillar of such reformist solutions. The non-conformist 
groups all proposed this as a virtual panacea to the ‘crise de civilisation’ they
Overall, as greens do today, 1930s reformists based their solutions above all on a 
reaction to the scale of the modern city. The first aim was to find a better balance 
between urban and rural populations, and between Paris and regional towns and 
cities. The Personalists, for example, stressed the need to ‘garder la notion d’échelle 
ou d’optimum en matière de groupement humain’ (26, p.44), with their preferred 
solution seemingly the small town, while Ordre Nouveau based their solution on the 
highly-decentralised commune, seen as being ‘à la taille de l’homme’ (81, p.271). 
Even Giono claimed not to be recommending ‘des édens campagnards’ as the only 
solution (though, as we shall see later, his proposals could be contradictory to say the
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observed in their society. Ordre Nouveau called in their Manifesto for ‘une
■Idécentralisation assez parfaite’ (15, p.443), ‘la petite patrie décentralisée’ being seen 
as the answer to problems associated with both ‘déracinement’ and nationalism 
(ibid., p.444), as it would lead to an attachment less to the nation than to the region. %
For Esprit, extreme decentralisation was essential -  ‘toute communauté doit être 
décentralisée jusqu’à la personne’ (ibid., p.452), even if it was not exactly clear how ?
this might best be achieved. |
As today, reformist proposals focussed on changes to the countryside as well as to 
the city. Even the ‘urban phenomenon’ of the Popular Front demonstrated a 
continued ‘sollicitude à l’égard des agriculteurs’ (89, p. 147), with measures such as 
the introduction of the Office National du Blé attempting to guarantee better living 
conditions for agriculteurs. While their intentions might have been admirable, 
however, the potential consequences of this move were widely feared among 
agriculteurs, with a rearguard action against the officially-recommended crop 
specialisation gaining momentum by the 1930s. The widely-read 1930s journal 
Progrès Agricole has subsequently been praised by modern ecologists for its early 
attempt to ‘défendre l ’agriculture traditionnelle, exempte de produits chimiques’
(170, p.3) during the 1930s. Giono too attacked the modernisation of farming with 
particular vehemence (68, p. 148), though the solutions he proposed could hardly be 
considered reformist.
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least) (79, p.254). Again, there was a stress on providing amenities for rural 
populations if villages and towns were to become popular living environments. For 
Giono, ‘il s’agit surtout de laisser entrer la vie dans ce qui est devenu machinal et 
mécanique’ (60, p .121), generally by facilities (he uses the example of Grasset, his 
publishers) being relocated to smaller rural towns and villages -  inban concerns 
should have ‘le courage de tout entasser dans des charrettes et de s’en aller à la 
campagne’(ibid., p. 120).
A new balance between cities, towns and countryside would mean that those cities 
and towns which remained would exist on a smaller scale, the chief advantage of 
this development being that rural environments would be close-at-hand. 1930s 
reformists clearly stressed the benefits for the person (in terms of avoiding alienation 
and ill health) of access to rural environments. Access to the French ‘patrimoine’ 
was beginning to be seen as a right for all by the 1930s, with Le cri des auberges, the 
hostelling journal calling on young people in particular to ‘leave the city and give 
yourself up to the joy of breathing fresh air’ (169, p.231). The only town Giono 
presents in a vaguely positive light in his 1930s fiction, Villevieille in Le chant du 
monde, is such a small, rural concern, not ‘une ville véritable’ (215, p.xxiii), but part 
of the countryside which surrounds it; ‘au-dessus des toits le ciel gardait le vert 
mouvant des forêts’, while ‘de chaque côté de la rue les ruisseaux roulaient’ and the 
gardens were ‘pleins de foins sauvages’ (79, pp. 118-121).
Smaller towns are also emphasised by modern greens for their greater self-reliance. 
Indeed, even the green suggestion that urban populations take to gardening in the 
drive towards sustainability had a 1930s predecessor. Lagrange was author of a 
report, published in the Journal officiel in July 1936, which called on workers to 
‘consacrer à la culture des jardins floraux et maraîchers une partie de leurs heures de 
loisirs’, the aim being improvements to health, greater self-sufficiency in times of 
economic crisis, and even arguably aesthetic improvements to the urban 
environment (89, p. 156).
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Smaller, decentralised towns and cities were also emphasised in an attempt to find a 
solution to the perceived loss of regional diversity affecting 1930s France. The 
proposed emphasis on sense of place and regional attaclnnent sometimes took a 
more sinister form during the 1930s, however, with some groups, such as Ordre 
Nouveau praising aspects of regional identity (‘régionalisme terrien, racial et 
culturel’ which greens would reject outright. For the Personalists, however, as for 
the greens today, ‘la fidélité naturelle qui attache l’homme à son pays’ (‘pays’ 
meaning local area or region rather than nation here) is rather a way to avoid the 
‘exaltation raciste, passion nationale’ (15, p.451), since the attacliment to the patrie 
is forsaken in favour of the commune. Giono’s fictional rural communities are the 
perfect literaiy illustration of this theory, with foreigners repeatedly chosen as central 
characters and portrayed as integrated completely, and even strange, mythological 
half-human, half-animals welcomed as emiching community life.
It was in fiction too that the more radical kind of solution, to which we shall now 
turn, was usually suggested in the 1930s. As Citron points out when discussing 
Giono’s works, this was ‘son droit comme romancier’ (84, p.xxxiii). Whereas the 
non-conformists recognised the need to outline specific reforms which might move 
society towards a different way of life, the novelists could call on their compatriots, 
as Giono did, simply to ‘vous débarrasser de votre ville!’ (60, pp.46-7). It was also 
the artist’s prerogative to change or even contradict earlier views. From Giono’s 
calls for the end of the city, to praising ‘les paysans des petites villes’ (ibid.. p. 137) 
and implying rural towns were a possible alternative, to his later adamant insistence 
that he had not in fact recommended any solution (‘Je n’ai pas utilisé le mot “Retour 
à la terre” ou qu’on me coupe les oreilles’) (120, p.99), any account of Giono’s 
alternatives to the problems of the city must aclaiowledge a range of positions, 
though his emphasis was at least consistently on highly-decentralised rural paysan 
communities, both in his fiction and non-fiction.
By the mid-193 Os, Céline too was calling for extreme (and extremely negative) 
solutions, insofar as he did propose any at all: ‘la banlieue faut pas l ’arranger, faut la
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crever, la dissoudre’ in order to ‘guérir l’humanité de son vice infect: la ville’ (67, 
p.238). What should be put in its place is typically vague and bleak, because 
obviously impossible (‘Tout le monde, toute la ville à la mer!... [...] pour se refaire 
du sang généreux’) (ibid., p.238).
There was also a radical bias in the solutions proposed by the non-conformists.
While they did outline possible reforms to the city, their long-term ‘utopie directrice’ 
seemed to imply it should be drastically scaled-down, if not abandoned altogether. 
Daniel-Rops, for example, called for ‘un enracinement plus grand de I’homme dans 
la région’ (15, p.454), while closeness to the earth was repeatedly stressed as the way 
forward. The first issue of Réaction propounded a solution based on a more natural 
way of life: ‘Retournons aux sources de la vie pour nous g u é r i r O r d r e  Nouveau 
too argued that a new emphasis on ‘le rapport indispensable et fécond de I’homme à 
la terre’ (ibid.. p.443) might represent a solution to the problems associated with 
urban life.
Giono argued more explicitly that nature offered patterns on which human society 
should be based -  ‘le social ne doit être que le naturel’ (60, p. 106). The small, rural 
communities he saw as most ‘natural’ are depicted as close to the earth, both 
physically and in their reliance on natural cycles and the seasons. Giono frequently 
depicts harvest celebrations or festivals marking natural cycles, such as the ‘Mère du 
blé’ ceremony in Le chant du monde. Such communities are seen to be aware of the 
effect humans can have on nature, and indeed, of their debt to nature. Borne and 
Dubief point out that in much of the French countryside during the 1930s, such 
ceremonies were still common and reminded agriculteurs, in particular, of their 
dependence on nature for survival (11, p.225).
If country life was believed to remind rural dwellers of their reliance on nature and 
of the effects they had on the environment, it was also widely seen as bringing 
happiness and joy; the countryside was ‘le terrain de ta joie’ (60, p.71). The view
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that humankind would be more content if based in rural communities led many to 
ask how the population, and particularly the young, could be persuaded of the 
advantages of country life. A popular American song during the entre-deux-guerres 
asked ‘How can you keep them down on the farm after they’ve seen Par-ee!’ (233, 
p.229), and many felt that convincing urban-dwellers of the advantages of country 
life would be an uphill struggle, given the prevalence of negative images of ‘country 
bumpkins and village idiots’ in the literature, cinema and jokes of the period (ibid.. 
pp.229-230).
For Giono, vividly depicting the joys of his idealised paysan communities (‘la belle 
vie!’) (70, p. 171), and directly contrasting these with the ‘malheurs’ of the modern 
city seemed to be the answer (68, p. 154). Indeed, many in the 1930s seemed to 
agree that ‘it was sufficient to educate man in order to transform the world’ (81, 
p.279), as Lewis describes the Personalist approach. Thus, after a long account of 
the horrors of the city in Les vraies richesses. Giono simply implies that rural life is 
the answer by describing immediately afterwards the contentment of waking up on 
the first morning in the countryside -  ‘Voilà que tu te sens déjà mélangé au ciel qui 
s’éclaire, à l’oiseau qui vole’; ‘Tu vas apprendre peu à peu à être un homme’ (60, 
p.72).
The most frequently-suggested solution is a return to a way of life based on the role 
model of the paysan. First, this would solve problems o f ‘déracinement’: ‘Le paysan 
incarne pour les citadins la stabilité, l’enracinement’ (223, p.9). The paysan is doser 
to the earth than any other figure - ‘il connaît sa terre comme sa poche’ (117, p.88), a 
characteristic which is sometimes depicted in a quasi-spiritual fashion. For Giono, 
for example, the paysan’s mysterious ‘liaison directe terre-corps’ (68, p. 157) would 
be destroyed and the paysan would become no more than an agriculteur by the 
introduction of machines of any sort, even a simple tractor (79, pp.215-7). Second, a 
higher proportion of paysans would mean more fulfilling work in natural 
surroundings, instead of the dehumanising industry of the modern city -  the non­
conformists believed an emphasis on the paysan way of life would ‘rendre à la
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personnalité sa valeur créatrice’ (15, 454). The kind of creative work done by the 
paysan was described in glowing terms: Tusage de la terre’, often described using 
De Rougemont’s phrase, ‘penser avec ses mains’ was for Mounier ‘a cultural act’ 
(26, p. 130).
Third, a return to the paysan lifestyle was depicted as ensuring care for future 
generations, just as greens today imply it could. In a moving passage at the end of 
Terre des hommes. Saint-Exupéry explicitly states that such care for future 
generations is also the best guarantee of happiness. Contrasting his search (and that 
of his ‘camarades’) for excitement and fulfilment with the deathbed scene of an old 
paysan, he is clear which man has had the most successful life:
[la mort] est si douce quand le vieux paysan de Provence, au terme de son 
règne, remet en dépôt à ses fils son lot de chèvres et d ’oliviers, afin qu’ils le 
transmettent, à leur tour, aux fïls de leurs fils. [...] Ce qui se transmettait 
ainsi de génération en génération, avec le lent progrès d’une croissance 
d’arbre, c’était la vie, mais c’était aussi la conscience. (86, pp.244-7)
Finally, the emphasis is on the paysan because his traditional qualities are felt to 
represent the best hope for changing modern society. While, as we have seen in the 
first two sections of this chapter, urban life was believed to affect city-dwellers’ 
ability to react and desire to change their society, the paysan is depicted as stubborn 
and committed: ‘Rien n’est têtu comme un paysan. Tout est détruit, il recommence’ 
(60, p.25). Given the extent of the ‘crise de civilisation’ identified by many in the 
1930s, there was a not-infrequent implication that ‘le soulèvement paysan’ was the 
best hope (215, p.xxix).
The next reason for proposing a rural-based society was founded on the aesthetic 
advantages this was felt to confer. Again, Giono frequently juxtaposes sordid 
depictions of urban surroundings with the wild beauty of the countryside. His
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emphasis on the need for beauty (a ‘passion pour hinutile' representing salvation)
(51, p.90) is closely linked to the need not only for a rural environment, but for a 
wild one, an emphasis which recalls the modern deep green stress on the role of ;f
wilderness in raising awareness. In Que ma ioie demeure, the paysan life alone is 7
not sufficient for joy. Bobi’s first suggestions are based on the need for wild I
Î
creatures and flowers for human happiness: ‘Tu n ’as jamais semé des... des... des |
■îpâquerettes?’ (ibid., p.35). The community of the Plateau Grémone first attains such |
happiness with the arrival of the wild deer. Here, the artist has a special role (‘la ?
mission du poète’) in reminding those who have lost joy in life, probably without 
realising it, that happiness is not only possible, but a right: ‘Je chante le balancement 
des arbres...’ (159, p .173).
.1Another group with a key role to play in finding solutions are women. First, perhaps ^
due to their ability to give birth, they are depicted as being more in touch with 
natural cycles than even the paysans (51, p.80), sometimes even ‘becoming’ part of 
the earth -  ‘Je suis printemps, je suis envieuse comme tout ça autour, comme le 
monde’, as Clara exclaims in Le chant du monde (55, p.266). Second, traditionally 
‘feminine’ qualities are presented as a potential way to improve society. This was 
argued by both the Personalists, whose emphasis on women has already been noted |
(26, pp. 122-4), and in Giono’s fictional accounts of more joyful societies. He 
repeatedly depicted female characters transforming society and bringing joy through 
‘le petit geste’ (117, p .123), almost invariably that of baking bread. From such small 
beginnings, whole communities are regenerated, with women the catalyst for change 
every time. The bread-making which revigorâtes the village community of Les 
vraies richesses, for example, is ‘bien un travail de femme, un travail pour lequel il 
faut de la maternité, [...] de la séduction’ (60, p. 104).
Just as greens today face accusations they wish to return to more backwards societies 
on the basis of the solutions they propose, so similar criticisms of Giono’s vision of 
paysan societies were frequent:
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Exalter la vie des bergers, des cultivateurs,des artisans aux dépens de celle 
des ouvriers, c’était, même sans le vouloir, inciter ceux-ci à revenir à 
l ’existence de leurs ancêtres. (215, p.xxviii)
Giono himself acknowledged such criticisms -  ‘Les politiques vont encore 
m ’accuser de vouloir revenir au moyen âge’ (68, p. 154). Again like some greens, he 
did not attempt to refute them, arguing instead that ‘l’aisance et l’abondance de ces 
temps passés’ meant they should indeed be reembraced (ibid., p. 155).
The final resemblance we should note between the solutions suggested by greens and 
in 1930s sources is an emphasis on nature as conscious and potentially vengeful, 
frequently involving images of a goddess figure. The paysans depicted in works by 
Giono and Ramuz frequently worship or give thanks to nature in some way, as in the 
Mère du blé ceremony or Ramuz’ short story Salutation pavsanne, which describes a 
solitary paysan’s journey tlii’ough a forest, hailing all the natural phenomena 
surrounding him, from insects to trees (247, p.71). Hills, rivers and the earth are all 
frequently personified, often in order to provide warnings to human characters 
regarding their arrogance (‘la montagne se charge de parler aux hommes’) (248, 
p.39). In fiction, of course, authors can give free rein to their wildest visions of 
natural apocalyptic retribution for human folly. Giono had a project between 1936 
and 1938, Fêtes de la mort, never completed, in which he planned to depict ‘la fin du 
monde moderne’ following a natural revolt (215, p.xix). One such vision he did 
depict in fiction was his wishful account of nature reclaiming the streets of Paris, 
‘[une ville] parcourue d’industriels froids’ in Les vraies richesses (60, p. 184).
Soudain, toute la ville éclate d’arbres. [...] Tes Louvres éclatent, tes 
cathédrales s’effondrent, [...] un bouillonnement de sève soulève tes murs 
et les écarte. [...] Puis, c’est le silence et la paix gorgée de richesses. (Ibid., 
pp. 184-192)
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‘ IN SEE terms any ‘agglomération’ o f 2,000 inhabitants or more an urban environment (217, p.22).
 ^For further detailed analysis o f the green vote, see (218, pp,47-66).
^For an examination o f urbanisation in the period between 1945 and 1980, see (225, pp. 13-41).
Buchmann, quoted in (96, p.96).
 ^ Statistics from (12, pp.844-5).
 ^For details o f  why this was official policy in France, and how such zoning was achieved through the 
use o f ‘Plans d‘Occupation des Sols’ and the ‘permis de construire’, see (230, pp.42-3).
’ Poster in a collection o f Amis de la Terre publications held at the Bibliothèque nationale, Paris.
® See (12, p .l497) for details o f the percentage o f the active population unemployed in each region of 
France, and a comparison o f urban and rural unemployment figures.
 ^Gorz, quoted in (20, p. 165).
Illich and Gorz both attack the reservation o f education and medicine to specialised groups, in La 
Convivialité or Ecologie et politique for example (chapters on health in each). Dumont has also 
talked o f the need to ‘deprofessionalise’ healthcare, pointing out that the vast majority o f illnesses 
could be prevented or diagnosed by trained lay-people. He calls for a network o f  Chinese-style 
‘barefoot doctors’ to this end, in L’Utopie ou la mort! for example.
One study showed that urbanisation led to higher levels o f prostitution in France, and that the 
recruitment o f prostitutes focussed as a matter o f course on ‘newly-arrived country girls in Paris 
railroad stations’ (237, p.22).
This is the title o f  a key green work, Illich’s La convivialité, for example.
Figures from (11, pp. 16-7).
Flere he is criticising the abuse o f rivers ( ‘Elies souffrent qu’on dirait, elles sont toujours en train 
de sécher’, because o f  the demands made on them), but he makes similar criticisms in other areas (53, 
p.502).
La Muette would be used during WW2 as an internment camp for refugees, then to hold French 
Jews prior to deportation. It is still in use as low-cost public housing today.
Such specialisation happened particularly in the Bas-Languedoc, Val de Loire, and the Bas-Rhône 
regions between 1930 and 1940 (11, p.221).
His analysis, from 1933, is explained in (15, p.266).
This is the title o f a chapter in Waechter’s Dessine-moi une planète.
Speaking in 1986, quoted in (35, p. 169).
Deep Ecologist Kirkpatrick Sale, quoted in (22, p.45).
This is the title o f Weber’s authoritative study of the French move from a peasant-based socity to a 
modern industrial power.
See (22, p.49) for a list o f  such accounts.
One o f  the first ecofeminist texts argued that the choice facing humankind was between Feminism 
and the Mastery o f nature (245, n.p.).
K. Eisler, quoted hi (246, p.23).
Manifeste de l ’Ordre Nouveau, reproduced in (15, p.442).
The text o f  the first issue is reproduced in (ibid.. pp.440-1).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Both sets of sources examined in this thesis were reacting to the extent of the crisis 
they felt their society must urgently address, the environmental crisis for modern 
greens and the ‘crise du désordre établi’ for 1930s sources. For ail four themes 
considered here, we can also observe a common emphasis on radical or utopian 
solutions, whether because extreme solutions were seen as necessary to the extreme 
crisis they had identified, or because wide-ranging criticisms led them to ask what a 
better world might look like. What might such parallels between 1930s sources and 
greens today lead us to conclude?
First, we can agree with French greens that the origins of their movement are diverse 
and certainly not as recent as the first attempts to develop political parties or social 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Even if the first pictures of the Earth from 
space or the events of May 1968 determined the development of green politics, 
‘many of the environmental concerns expressed today are hardly new’ (9, p .l), as 
Coates has argued. A concern for what we would now label the environment is 
evident in both politics (for example, the Popular Front emphasis on a popular 
‘right’ to experience natural surroundings) and, strikingly, in the literature of the 
1930s (for example, Giono’s attacks on the potential effects of monoculture in 
agricultural production).
Second, we might agree with Reynolds’ conclusion that important aspects of 1930s 
life have been underemphasised, if not entirely ignored, by the major historical 
accounts of the entre-deux-guerres. The relatively widespread focus on potential 
environmental problems such as pollution, clearly present before WW2, is generally
377
ignored in the traditional foeus on the ‘main plot of the opera’, the left-right divide, 
and, of course, on the ‘inexorable march to war’ of France (196, p.6).
Î
■K
Third, Coates’ view that the diversity of forms of environmental concern in the 
1930s is paralleled by the diverse forms of modern green polities apparently holds
:!true in the case of France, As Jaffre points out, there is still no ‘écologie politique
d’appellation contrôlée’ in France (249, p.l 1). The debates on approach and
whether to accept ‘engagement’, which continue to dominate the French green
movement, reproduce many of the discussions on tactics which could already be 
.observed during the 1930s, in movements such as the non-conformists, for example.
Fourth, we might agree with Pepper that modern green movements are failing to 
learn from earlier lessons and debates, a key example here being that, already in the 
1930s, as we have seen, many were arguing that simply demonstrating the extent of 
a crisis would not be sufficient to achieve change. The green movement’s emphasis 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s on educating people about the extent of the 
environmental crisis, in the belief that this would automatically inspire positive 
change, could be seen as a damaging waste of time and energy (14, pp. 1-3), given 
that this strategy was already demonstrably insufficient.
Finally, it is tempting to speculate that awareness of the environmental crisis might 
have prompted our 1930s sources to react as modern greens have, although it is, of 
course, impossible to predict how such diverse figures as Giono, Céline and the 
Personalists would have reacted. One interesting example does imply that some, at 
least, might have been sympathetie to the aims of the greens, however. René 
Dumont, the first green presidential candidate was born at the start of the century 
and first became known in France during the 1930s as a committed pacifist, even 
signing public anti-war declarations alongside Giono at the end of the decade. He 
attributes his later sympathy for the green movement in part to formative experiences 
such as military service during the entre-deux-guerres, and anger at injustice during
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trips to French colonies (189, p.97). Perhaps some of our sources would have 
followed a similar evolution.
What is clear is that, while the French greens might represent a new political 
movement, they are firmly attached to much deeper roots in French culture and 
society. The themes they identify as essential elements of the green approach, their 
acceptance of political commitment, the criticisms they make of society and the type 
of solutions they propose all link them to more distant predecessors than we 
typically imagine.
379
A ppendix 1 
L ist o f w orks consulted
I. B. Lalonde, ‘Les origines du mouvement écologiste’ in Marc Abélès (éd.). Le 
défi écologiste.
3. R. Dumont, L’utopie ou la mort!
3. G. Saintenv, Les Verts.
4. La grande encyclopédie Larousse.
5. A. Waechter, ‘De l’écologie à l’autonomie’ in Marc Abélès (éd.), Le défi 
écologiste.
6. B. Lalonde & D. Simomiet, Quand vous voudrez.
7. P. Alphandéry, L’équivoque écologique.
8. A. Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th century: A history.
9. I. Coates, Enviromnental coneern in Britain 1919-1949: Diversity and continuity.
10. J.-L. Mathieu, La défense de l’environnement en France.
II . D. Borne & H. Diibief, La crise des années 30. 1929-1938.
12. Quid, 1995 edition.
13. F.-G. Dreyfus, ‘Le pacifisme en France’ in Maurice Vaïsse, Le pacifisme en 
Europe des amiées 1920 aux années 1950.
14. D. Pepper, The roots of modem environmentalism.
15. J.-L. Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années 30.
16. K. Taplin, Tongues in trees: Studies in literature and ecology.
17. S. Antoine et al, Ecrits francophones et environnement 1548-1900.
18. M. Winock, ‘22, v’ià les années 30’ in L’événement du jeudi.
380
19. J. Porritt, Seeing green.
20. A. Dobson, Green political thought.
21. A. Naess, ‘The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement’ in Inquiry, 
N o.16.
22. J. Barry, ‘Deep ecology and the undermining of green politics’ in IRNES, 
Perspectives on the environment.
23. R. Goodin, Green political theory.
24. J. Seed et al, Thinking like a mountain: Towards a council of all beings.
25. D. Foreman, ‘Second thoughts of an eco-warrior’ in S. Chase (ed.). Defending 
the Earth: a dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman.
26. E. Mounier, Le personnalisme.
27. J. Giono, ‘Precisions’, in Ecrits pacifistes.
28. L.-F. Céline, ‘Préface’ to 1972 edition of Voyage au bout de la nuit.
29. C. Spretnak & F. Capra, Green politics, the global promise.
30. D. H. Meadows et al, The limits to growth.
31. R. Pronier & V.J. Le Seigneur, Génération verte: Les écologistes en politique.
32. A. Gorz, Ecologie et politique.
33. Meadows et al. Beyond the limits: Global collapse or a sustainable future.
34. A. Lipietz, Vert espérance.
35. B. Prendiville, L’écologie, la politique autrement?
36. J. O’Connor, ‘Un développement soutenable du capitalisme, est-il possible?’. 
Ecologie politique, vol. 1.
37. S. Irvine & A. Ponton, A green manifesto - policies for a sustainable future.
38. C. Brodhag, Objectif terre: Les Verts, de l’écologie à la politique.
39. G. Pillement, France, ta beauté fout le camp!
40. D. Voynet, ‘Rejoignons les Vert(e)s’, in Vert-Contact, no. 198, 27/4/91.
381
41. J. Rousselet, L’allergie au travail.
43. D. Robertson, A dictionarv of politics.
4 3 .1. Illich, ‘Nemesis médicale’ in La convivialité.
44. A. Gorz, Adieux au prolétariat.
45. A. Gorz, Capitalisme, socialisme, écologie.
46. Programme des Verts pour les élections législatives de 1997: Ensemble, donnons 
du sens à l’avenir!.
47. W. Morris, ‘Useful work versus useless toil’, 1884, reproduced in A. Clayre 
(ed.). Nature and industrialization.
48. T. Roszak, Person/planet.
49. M. Bookchin, Toward an ecological society.
50. E. Mounier, A Personalist manifesto (English version; French version is out of 
print).
51. J. Giono, Que ma ioie demeure.
53. W. Redfern, The private world of .lean Giono.
53. L.-F. Céline, Voyage au bout de la nuit.
54. J. Giono, Colline.
55. J. Giono, Le chant du monde.
56. J. Lovelock, The Gai'a hypothesis.
57. C.-F. Ramuz, Taille de l’homme.
58. J. Giono, Le serpent d’étoiles.
59. M. Chapsal, interview with J. Giono, originally published in L’Express, and 
republished in Quinze écrivains.
60. J. Giono, Les vraies richesses.
61. L.-F. Céline, ‘La vie et l’oeuvre de Philippe Ignace Semmelweis (1818-1865) et 
autres écrits médicaux’, published in Cahiers Céline, Vol. 3.
382
63. E. Mounier, ‘Editorial’, Esprit, No 1, October 1933.
63. J. Steel, ‘Céline, ses contemporains et le concept du travail’, published in the 
proceedings of the Collogue international de Londres: Louis-Ferdinand Céline. 
1988.
64. J. Giono, Ecrits pacifistes.
65. J. Touchard, La gauche en France depuis 1900.
66. C. Laubier, The condition of women in France from 1945 to the present.
67. L.-F. Céline, Bagatelles pour un massacre.
68. J. Giono, ‘Lettre aux paysans sur la pauvreté et la paix’, in Ecrits pacifistes.
69. D. Halévy, Visite aux paysans du centre.
70. J. Giono, Un de Baumugnes.
71. Interview with Céline in ‘Louisiane’, Cahiers Céline, 3.
73. E. Cahm, Politics and society in contemporary France, 1789-1971.
73. T. Roszak, L’homme/planète (French version of Person/planet, with additional 
material).
74. M.H. Kelly, ‘The fate of Emmanuel Mounier’, Journal of European studies, 3.
75. E. Borne, Emmanuel Mounier ou le combat pour l’homme.
76. A. Gorz, ‘Qu’est-ce que le travail?’, Echos, 81.
77. J. Steel, Paul Nizan, un révolutiomiaire conformiste?
78. M. Barrés, Les déracinés.
79. J. Giono, Le poids du ciel.
80. L.-F. Céline, ‘Contributions de médecine sociale’, in Cahiers Céline, 3.
81. David L. Lewis, ‘Emmanuel Mounier and the politics of moral revolution’, in 
Catholic review, no.56.
83. J.-P. Brunet, Histoire du socialisme en France.
83. J. Giono, L’homme qui plantait des arbres.
383
84. P. Citron, ‘Notes’ to the Oeuvres romanesques complètes of Jean Giono, Vol.5.
85. M. Larkin, France since the Popular Front.
86. A. de Saint-Exupéry, Terre des hommes.
87. ‘Man, plane and planet’ in S. Beynon-John, Saint-Exupérv.
88. J. Defrasne, La gauche en France de 1789 à nos jours.
89. L. Bodin & J. Touchard, Front Populaire 1936.
90. M. Collinet, Essai sur la condition ouvrière 1900-1950, reproduced in E. Cahm, 
Politics and society in contemnorarv France.
91. B. Prendiville, Environmental politics in France.
92. A. Gorz, ‘Changer d’utopie’, in Partage.
93. R. Chenavier, ‘André Gorz, une philosophie de l’orientation (et de la 
désorientation)’, in Modem & contemporary France, NS2(4).
94. A. Gorz, Les chemins du paradis: L’agonie du capital.
95. A. Gorz, Farewell to the working class (updated English translation of Adieux au 
prolétariat).
96. A. Waechter, Dessine-moi une planète.
97. J. de Rosnay, Le macroscope.
98. A. Toffler, The third wave.
99. D. Caniou, Marginalisme et retour à la terre.
100. P. Alphandéry, ‘Romantisme et écologie’, in Ecologie politique, 3.
101. Secrétariat d’Etat auprès du Premier Ministre chargé de l’environnement, 
Ecologie et pouvoir.
102. B. Charbonneau, Le feu vert: autocritique du mouvement écologiste.
103. Les Amis de la Terre, L’écologie contre le chômage.
104. D. Voynet, Editorial, Vert-Contact, March 1997.
105. A. Gorz, Métamorphoses du travail.
384
106. D. Voynet, ‘Editorial’, Vert-Infos, February 1998.
107. J.-L. Bennahmias & A. Roche, Des Verts de toutes les couleurs.
108. A. Levi, Guide to French literature. 1799-present. Vol. 3.
109. K. Anderson, ‘ “Familistère rénové” or “Révolution moyenneuse”: A utopian 
Céline?’, The French review. Vol. 68, No. 5.
110. E. d’Astier de la Vigerie, ‘Ecrivain engagé ou combattant solitaire?’, in Les 
critiques de notre temps et Saint-Exupéry.
111. C.-F. Ramuz, Questions.
112. J. Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the new catholic left, 1930-1950.
113. R. Trintzius, ‘Louis-Ferdinand Céline: Voyage au bout de la nuit’, Europe, 15 
December 1932.
114. E. Herbert, ‘Céline et Zola’, in J.-P. Dauphin (éd.). Les critiques de notre 
temps et Céline.
115. H. Mendras, ‘Sociologie de la campagne française’, reproduced in E. Cahm, 
Politics and society in contemporary France.
116. Interview with J. Giono, ‘Jean Giono ou le pluriel singulier’, Vie culturelle 
littéraire. No. 72, August 1971.
117. J. Giono, Regain.
118. N. Goodrich, Jean Giono, master of fictional modes.
119. J. Giono, Le grand troupeau.
120. J.-M. Carité, Jean Giono, homme du Contadour.
121. D. Voynet’s address to the 1997 Assemblée Générale des Verts, available 
online at http://www.verts.imaginet.fr/.
122. J.-L. S aux, ‘Un entretien avec Dominique Voynef, Le Monde, 26/6/93.
123. D. Voynet, Voter Dominique Vovnet, ça change tout!. Manifesto for the 
Presidential election, 1995.
124. Interview with M. Rocard, Express, 8/8/89.
385
125. J. Bompard, (No title), National Hebdo, 15/2/90.
126. B. Lalonde, En vert et contre tous. Manifesto for the Presidential election,
1981.
127. D. Carton, ‘Quand M. Balladur dîne avec Mme. Voynef, Le Monde, 28/1/93.
128. P. Kelly, ‘Introduction’ to J. Porritt, Seeing green.
129. D. Pepper, ‘Environmentalism and labour’ in J. Weston (ed.), Red and green.
130. D. Gurin, ‘France: making ecology political and politics ecological’, 
Contemporary crises (3).
131. L. Feriy, ‘Ecologie, le bien et le mal’. Express, 26/3/92.
132. H. Chevallier, Eléments pour une écologie politique.
133. J. Jaffré, (no title) in Le Figaro, 14/3/89.
134. J. Jaffré, (no title) in Le Monde, 28/5/92.
135. A. Lipietz, ‘Les Verts: bleus, blancs, rouges... ou bruns?’ in Libération, 
(supplément, les Ecologistes).
136. M. Ryle, ‘Socialism in an ecological perspective’, in J. Weston, Red and green.
137. J. Brière, Motion to the Assemblée régionale des Verts in Dijon, June 1984.
138. G. Sainteny, ‘L’écologisme est-il un centrisme?’. Libération, 30/3/89.
139. J.-Y. Lhomeau, ‘L’âge d’or écologiste’, in Libération (supplément, Les 
Ecologistes).
140. G. Sainteny, ‘Le Parti socialiste face à l’écologisme’. Revue française de 
science politique. Vol. 44, No.3.
141. B. Prendiville & T. Chafer, ‘Activists and ideas in the green movement in 
France’, Green politics (1).
142. UDF, Programme pour les élections législatives de 1997.
143. ‘Proposition de loi constitutionnelle’, published online at http://www.verts. 
imaginet.fi7vertcontact/vc97/451.
386
144. J.-F. Maiicel, Le choix de F intérêt national: Programme du RPR pour 
l’élection législative de 1997.
145. Le Front National: un Programme pour gouverner. 1997.
146. ‘Déclaration commune du 17 novembre 1990’, [signed by the 4 porte-paroles 
and all seven députés européens], available online at
http ://www. verts .imaginet.fr/.
147. J. Weston, ‘Introduction’. Red and green.
148. C. Castoriadis, D. Cohn-Bendit et al, De l’écologie à l’autonomie.
149. S. Reynolds, France between the wars: gender and polities.
150. Z. Sternlrelh Neither right nor left: Fascist ideology in France.
151. M. Winock, ‘Action Française’, in Flistoire de l’extrême droite en France.
152. J.P. Brunet, Histoire du Front Populaire (1934-1938).
153. J. Mossuz-Lavau & H. Rey, Les Fronts Populaires.
154. P. Milza, ‘L’Ultra-Droite des années 30’, in Histoire de l ’extrême droite en 
France.
155. G. Bernanos, Les grands cimetières sous la lune.
156. D. Thomson, Political ideas.
157. B. d’Astorg, ‘Citadelle dans le désert’, in Les critiques de notre temps et Saint- 
Exupérv.
158. P. Drieu la Rochelle, Gilles.
159. J. Giono, ‘Aux sources mêmes de l’espérance’ in Rondeur des jours.
160. J. Giono, ‘Refus d’obéissance’ in Ecrits pacifistes.
161. S. Berstein (éd.). L’encyclopédie du XXe siècle, les années trente.
162. P. Drieu la Rochelle, ‘Introduction’ in Gilles (essay on critical reception of his 
novel).
163. E. W. Knight, ‘Saint-Exupéry et la pensée existentialiste’, in Les critiques de 
notre temps et Saint-Exupérv.
387
164. A. Roche & G. Leroy, Les écrivains et le Front Populaire.
165. A. Forrest, ‘The French Popular Front and the politics of Jacques Doriof in 
M.S. Alexander & H. Graham, The French & Spanish Popular Fronts: 
Comparative perspectives.
166. J. Jackson, The Popular Front in France, defending democracy.
167. A. Siegfried. Tableau des partis en France.
168. K. Marx, Selected works. Vol. II.
169. J. Jackson, ‘Popular tourism and leisure in the vision of the Front Populaire’ in 
M. S. Alexander & H.Graham, The French & Spanish Popular Fronts: 
Comparative perspectives.
170. H. Coston, Non! L’écologie n ’est pas de gauche. Elle n’est d’aucun parti.
171. M. Ferro, Pétain.
173. J.-F. Sirinelli. Les droites françaises.
173. G. Le Puill, ‘Dominique Voynet: toute aventure collective suppose le débat’, 
L’Humanité. 13 January 1998.
174. P. Kelly, ‘Preface’, in J. Plant, Healing the wounds: the promise of 
ecofeminism.
175. S. Doubiago, ‘Mama Coyote talks to the boys’, in J. Plant, Healing the 
wounds: the promise of ecofeminism.
176. T. O’Riordan. Environmentalism.
177. N. Racine-Furland, ‘Antifascistes et pacifistes: Le Comité de vigilance des 
intellectuels antifascistes’, in A. Roche & G. Leroy, Les écrivains et le Front 
Populaire.
178. J.E. Flower. Literature and the left in France.
179. A. Blum, 'Europe: Perspectives littéraires et tensions idéologiques’ in A. 
Roche & C. Tai'ting Des années trente, groupes et ruptures.
288
180. M. Stanton, ‘French intellectual groups and the Popular Front’, in M.S. 
Alexander & FI. Graham, The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative 
perspectives.
181. S. Reynolds, ‘Women, men and the 1936 strikes’, in M.S. Alexander & FI. 
Graham, The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative perspectives.
182. P. Cry & J.-F. Sirinelli, Les intellectuels en France.
183. M. Winock, ‘Les intellectuels français et l’esprit de Munich’, in A. Roche & C. 
Tarting, Des années trente, groupes et ruptures.
184. G. Leroy, ‘La revue Combat, 1936-1939’, in A. Roche & C. Tarting, Des 
années trente, groupes et ruptures.
185. J.-L. Major, ‘Entre deux générations littéraires’ in Les critiques de notre temps 
et Saint-Exupérv.
186. P. Inch, ‘Larzac occupied’ in The Ecologist, vol.3, no.6.
187. N. Ingram, The politics of dissent.
188. Conference discussion on the theme of ‘Antifascistes et pacifistes’ reproduced 
in A. Roche & G. Leroy, Les écrivains et le Front Populaire.
189. J.-P. Besset, René Dumont, une vie saisie par l’écologie.
190. Verts Europe. No.38. Oct. 1991.
191. M. Levene, ‘Peace is more than banning bombs’ in J. Weston, Red and green.
192. D. Simomiet. L’écologisme.
193. V. Andermatt-Conley, Ecopolitics: the environment in poststructuralist 
thought.
194. A, Prost, Les anciens combattants et la société française. Vol. 3: Idéologies.
195. Alain. Mars ou la guerre jugée.
196. E. Weber, The hollow vears. France in the 1930s.
197. J. Giono, ‘Giono avec l’AEAR’ in Commune, no.6, February 1934.
389
198. J.-F. Sirinelli. Génération intellectuelle. Khâgneux et Normaliens dans Tentre- 
deux-guerres.
199. J. Giono. Jean le Bleu.
200. Summary of conference discussion following M. Winock, ‘Les intellectuels 
français et F esprit de Munich’, reproduced in A. Roche & C. Tarting, Des années 
trente, groupes et ruptures.
201. J. Giono, ‘Recherche de la pureté’ in Ecrits pacifistes.
202. L.-P. Quint, ‘Vol de nuit’ in Les critiques de notre temps et Saint-Exupérv.
203. R. Caillois, ‘Un instrument de civilisation’ in Les critiques de notre temps et 
Saint-Exupérv.
204. J. Vellacott, ‘Women, peace and internationalism, 1914-1920’, in C. Chatfield 
& P. van den Dungen (eds.), Peace movements and political cultures.
205. D. Dav. The eco wars.
206. The concise Oxford English dictionarv. 1984 edition.
207. R. Dumont, ‘Ecologisme et pacifisme’ in P. Alphandéry et al (eds.). La 
sensibilité écologique.
208. S. Parkin, Green parties, an international guide.
209. R. Bahro, Building the green movement.
210. S. Fernex, ‘Nonviolence triumphant’, in The Ecologist, vol 5, no 10.
211. [n.a.], ‘Le choix de la vie’. Vert-Contact, no. 198, 27/4/91.
212. J.K. Proud, ‘Ecology parties in Franee’, in N.A. Addinall, Freneh political
213. M. Mies & V. Shiva, Ecofeminism.
214. B. Lalonde, Sur la vague verte.
215. P. Citron, ‘Préface’ to the Récits et essais volume of the Oeuvres romanesques 
complètes of Giono.
390
216. [n.a.], ‘Manifeste de l’Ordre Nouveau’, in J.-L Loubet del Bayle, Les non- 
conformistes des années trente.
217. A. Frémont, France:géographie d’une soeiété.
218. D. Boy, ‘Le vote écologiste 1974-1992’, in M. Abélès (éd.). Le défi écologiste.
219. D. Boy, ‘Les agriculteurs et l’écologie’, in B. Hervieu (éd.). Les agriculteurs 
français aux urnes.
220. N. Mamère, ‘L’écologie au-delà des arbres’, in P. Alphandéry et al, La 
sensibilité écologique.
221. J. Weston, ‘The Greens, “Nature” and the Social Environment’, in Red and 
Green.
222. M. Bookchin, Urbanization without cities.
223. A. Moulin, Les pavsans dans la société française de la Révolution à nos jours.
224. A. Duhamel, Les peurs françaises.
225. Y. Mény, ‘Urban planning in France: Dirigisme and pragmatism’, in D.
McKay (éd.). Planning and politics in Western Europe.
226. F. Bloch-Lainé et al, La France en mai 1981 : Forces et faiblesses - 
Commission du bilan.
227. D. Looseley, "Paris versus the provinces: Cultural decentralization since 1945’, 
in M. Cook, French culture since 1945.
228. B. Lepetit & J.-L. Pinol, ‘France’, in R. Rodger (ed.), European urban history.
229. OECD, Environmental policies for cities in the 1990s.
230. P.M.B. Chapuy, ‘France’, in R.H. Williams (ed.), Plamiing in Europe.
231. K. Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party.
232. M. Abélès, ‘L’écologisme n ’est pas un poujadisme’ in Libération, ‘Les 
Ecologistes’ (supplément).
233. J. Forbes & N. Flewlett, Contemporary France.
234. J.M. Rubenstein, The French new towns.
391
235. J. Seabrook, ‘The inner-city environment: Making the connections’ in J. 
Weston, Red and green.
236. E. Kofman, ‘Cities: a decade of “la politique de la ville’” in Modern and 
contemporarv France, Vol.4.
237. L.P.Moch, Paths to the citv.
238. J.-B. Charrier, Citadins et ruraux.
239. J. Giono, letter to Le Monde in 1931, reproduced in the proceedings of the 
Colloque Giono aui ourd’ hui.
240. A. Buclimann, ‘Les écologistes et l’aménagement’ in M. Abélès(ed.), Le défi 
écologiste.
241. B. Tokar, The green alternative.
242. P. Le Guirriec, ‘Dix ans d’écologie politique en Bretagne’ in M. Abélès(ed.), 
Le défi écologiste.
243. D.G. Charlton, New images of the natural in France.
244. J. Lovelock, La terre est un être vivant.
245. V. Plumwood, Feminism or the Masterv of nature.
246. V. Davion, ‘Is ecofeminism feminist?’ in K. Warren (éd.), Ecological 
feminism.
247. C.-F. Ramuz, ‘Salutation paysanne’ in Pastorale. Nouvelles et morceaux, 1905 
-  1946.
248. C.-F. Ramuz, ‘Joie dans le ciel’ in Pastorale. Nouvelles et morceaux. 1905 -  
1946.
249. J. Jaffré, ‘Préface’ to J.-L. Bennahmias & A. Roche, Des Verts de toutes les 
couleurs.
392
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Céline, L.-F.
Giono, J.
Ramuz, C.-F.
Saint-
Exupéry, A. 
de
Esprit. Paris, various dates.
Bagatelles pour un massacre. Paris: Denoël, 1937.
Mort à crédit. Paris: Gallimard, 1936.
Vovage au bout de la nuit. Paris: Gallimard, 1932. 
(Edition consulted: 1952)
With the exception of the texts listed below, references in 
the thesis are to the Oeuvres romanesques complètes (7 
vols.). Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade,
1980.
Ecrits pacifistes. Paris: Gallimard, 1978 (this collection).
Les vraies richesses. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1937.
Que ma ioie demeure. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1935.
Le chant du monde. Paris: Gallimard, 1934.
With the exception of the texts listed below, references in 
the thesis are to the Oeuvres complètes (16 vols.). Paris: 
Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1935.
Pastorale. Nouvelles et morceaux, 1905 -  1946. Paris: 
Sang de la Terre, 1986
Joie dans le ciel. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1925
Oeuvres (4 vols.). Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade, 1953.
Secondary Sources
39-3
Abélès, M. (dir.)
‘Céline: Au début était l’émotion’, entretien inédit first 
published in Magazine littéraire, September 1990, pp.94- 
103.
Encarta 97, CD-Rom, various articles
Ensemble, donnons du sens à l ’avenir! Programme des 
Verts pour les élections législatives de 1997. Paris, 1997.
L’Etat de la France 1993-4. 1995-6 & 1998-9. Paris: La 
Découverte, various dates.
La Grande Encvclopédie Larousse. (21 vols.) Paris: 
Larousse, 1975.
Le Front National: un Programme pour gouverner. Paris, 
1997.
UDF, Programme pour les élections législatives de 1997. 
Paris, 1997.
Vert-Contact, les Verts’ fortnightly newsletter, available 
online at http://www.les verts.iniaginet.fr
Verts-infos, newsletter and updates, available online as 
above
Les Verts. [Statutes of party; no author, publisher or place 
of publication given] 1984.
‘Tout Céline’ in Magazine littéraire, no. 116, September 
1976, pp.8-38.
Le Défi écologiste. Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, coll. 
Environnement, 1993.
‘L’Ecologisme n ’est pas un poujadisme’ in Libération: Les 
écologistes (supplément), p.63. Paris, 1993.
394
Acot, P.
Alain
Aidons, T.
Alexander, M.S. & 
Graham, H. (Eds.)
Allen, R. 
Almeyras, P. 
Alphandéry, P.
Histoire de l’écologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1988.
Mars ou la guerre jugée. Paris: Gallimard, 1931.
Battle for the environment. Glasgow: Collins, 1972.
The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative 
perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989.
‘Down with environmentalism’, in The Ecologist, vol. 2,
110.12, p.3.
‘Les Pamphlets [de Céline]’ in Magazine littéraire,
110.116, September 1976, pp.22-24.
‘Romantisme et écologie’, in Ecologie Politique, vol. 3, 
Autumn 1992, pp.79-86.
L’Equivoque écologique (éd.). Paris; La Découverte, 
1991.
La Sensibilité écologique en France. Paris: La 
Documentation française, 1991.
L’Ecologie contre le chômage. Paris: La Découverte, 
1984.
Recueil de documents. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, 
1970-1991.
Andermatt-Conley, V. Ecopolitics: the environment in post-structuralist thought.
London/New York: Routledge, 1997.
“ ‘Familistère rénové” or “Révolution moyenneuse”: A 
Utopian Céline?’, The French Review. Vol. 68, No.5, 
April 1995,pp.830-837.
Free-market environmentalism. Boulder: Westview Press,
1991.
Politics and Environment. A reader in environmental 
crisis. Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear, 1970.
Ecrits francophones et environnement, 1548-1900. Paris: 
Editions Entente, 1991.
Alphandéry, P., Bitoun, 
P. & Dupont, Y.
Amis de la Terre
Anderson, K.
Anderson, T. & Leal, 
D.R.
Anderson, W. (ed.)
Antoine, S. et al
395
Arnould, M.
Arvon, H.
Astier de la Vigerie, E. 
d’
Attfield, R.
Azéma, J.-P. & Winock, 
M.
Bagarolo, T.
Bahi'o, R.
Barbier, J.-B.
Bari, J.
Baiioy, J.-J.
Barrés, M. 
Barrier-Lynn, C.
Barry, J.
‘The Death of the Loire?: Report on France’ in The 
Ecologist, vol. 19, no.3, p .118, 1989.
L ’Autogestion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1980.
‘Ecrivain engagé ou combattant solitaire?’, in Les 
Critiques de notre temps et Saint-Exupérv, pp.105-114.
Rehabilitating nature and making nature habitable. Paper 
given at the Philosophv and the natural environment 
conference, Cardiff University, 20-22 July 1993.
La Ille République, naissance et mort. Paris: Calmann- 
Lévy, 1970
‘Histoire de l’écologie’ in CNS, vol.3, no.4, December 
1992, pp.135-141.
Building the green movement. London: Heretic Books,
1986.
From Red to Green: Interviews with New Left Review. 
London: Verso Editions, 1984.
‘Unite or destroy the earth’, in New Statesman. 18 January 
1980, pp.87-8.
Le Pacifisme dans l’histoire de France de l’an mille à nos 
jours. Paris: La Librairie française, 1966.
‘The feminization of Earth First!’ in Ms, vol.l 1, no.6, 
May-June 1992, pp.83-85.
Les Dossiers verts et noirs de l’écologie (3 vols.).
Geneva: Famot, 1979.
Les Déracinés. Paris: Nelson, 1897.
‘Ecologie: Vers un despotisme super-éclairé?’ in Esprit, 
110.449, September 1975, pp.184-196.
‘Neither Left nor Right but somewhere over the rainbow: 
Deep Ecology and the undermining of green politics’ in 
Perspectives on the environment. Interdisciplinary 
Research Network on the Environment and Society 
conference proceedings, pp.43-57. University of Leeds,
396
Belsey, A.
Benda, J.
Benevolo, L.
Bennahmias, J.-L. & 
Roche, A.
Bernanos, G.
Berstein, S. et al
Bertrand, G.
Besset, J.-P, 
Beynon-Jolm, S.
Birkeland, J.
Birnbaum, P.
Bloch-Lainé, F. et al
14-15 September, 1993.
The hidden dimensions of green politics: The limits of the 
shallow and the deep. Unpublished paper, 1993.
‘Chaos and order, environment and anarchy’. Paper 
published in the proceedings of the Philosophy and the 
natural environment conference, Cardiff University, 20-22 
July 1993.
La trahison des clercs. Paris: Gallimard, 1927.
The European citv. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
Des Verts de toutes les couleurs. Histoire et sociologie du 
mouvement écologiste. Paris: Albin Michel, 1992.
Les grands cimetières sous la lune. Paris: Pion, 1938
L’encvclopédie du Xxe Siècle: Les années trente. Paris: 
France Loisirs, 1993
‘Pour une histoire écologique de la France rurale’, in , G. 
Duby & A. Wallon (eds.). Histoire de la France rurale: 
Tome L Paris, 1975, pp.39-118.
René Dumont, une vie saisie par l’écologie. Paris: Stock,
1992.
‘Vol de nuit’ and ‘Terre des hommes’. London: Grant and 
Cutler, 1990.
‘Saint-Exupéry’s Pilote de guerre: Testimony, art and 
ideology’ in R. Kedward & R. Austin (eds.), Vichv France 
and the Resistance: Culture and ideologv. Sydney: Croom 
Helm, pp.91-105, 1985.
‘Neutralizing gender’ in Environmental Ethics. Winter 
1995, vol. 17,110.4, pp.443-5.
‘Affaire Dreyfus, culture catholique et antisémitisme’ in 
M. Winock, Histoire de l’extrême droite en France, pp.83- 
124. Paris: Seuil, 1993.
La France en mai 1981 : Forces et faiblesses. Commission 
du Bilan: Rapport au Premier ministre. Paris: La
397
Blythe, C.
Bodin, L. & Touchard, J. 
Boisdeffre, P. de 
Bonduelle, A.
Bonnal, F.
Bookchin, M.
Boonin-Vail, D.
Borne, D.
Borne, D, & Dubief, H. 
Borne, E.
Bory, J.-L.
Bouchardeau, H.
Boussard, I. & Chiche, J.
Documentation française, 1982.
‘Friends of the Earth newsletter’ [Special report on les 
Amis de la Terre] in The Ecologist, vol.3, no.2, 1973, 
p.71.
Front Populaire 1936. Paris; Armand Colin, 1961.
Giono. Paris: Gallimard, 1965.
‘Lille, quatre ans après, ce n’est plus “idéal”’, in Ecologie 
Politique, vol.7, summer 1993, pp.140-143.
‘L’évolution de l’opinion publique à l’égard de l’écologie 
au travers des sondages’, in Ecologisme et Politique, 
vol.l, Paris: Association Française de Science Politique, 
1980 [n.p.].
‘Free Citizens’, interview in Social Ecologv Network 
Newsletter, no.2, January 1993, pp.8-10.
Urbanization without cities: The rise and decline of 
citizenship. Montreal, Quebec: Black Rose Books, 1992.
Toward an ecological societv. Montreal, Quebec: Black 
Rose Books, 1980 & 1988 (revised edition).
‘The vegetarian savage: Rousseau’s critique’ in 
Environmental Ethics, vol. 15, no.l, 1993, pp.75-85.
Histoire de la société française depuis 1945. Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1988.
La Crise des années 30. 1929-1938. Paris: Seuil, 1989.
Emmanuel Mounier ou le combat pour l’homme. Paris: 
Seghers, 1972.
‘Un Rabelais de F ère atomique’, in Magazine Littéraire.
110.116, September 1976, pp.33-36.
‘Consolidating the left advance in France: An inside 
view’, in Journal of Area Studies, no. 10, pp.46-7, 1984.
‘Les Elections présidentielles et législatives de 1988, 
européennes de 1989: Analyse écologique globale’ in 
Hervieu (éd.). Les Agriculteurs français aux urnes, pp.27-
398
Bowd, G.
Boy, D.
Bramouillé, G. 
Bramwell, A.
Brekillen, Y.
Brodhag, C.
Brunet, J.-P.
Buege, D J.
Bunyard, P.
Bunyard, P. & 
Goldsmith, E.
Calim, E.
45, Paris: L 'Harmattan, 1992.
‘France, la fracture sociale’, New Left Review, no.212, 
pp.94-100, 1995.
‘Ecologistes, les frères ennemis’, in P. Flabert et al, Le 
vote éclaté. Paris: Département d’études politiques du 
Figaro et Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences 
Politiques, 1992.
‘Les agriculteurs et l’écologie’ in B. Hervieu (éd.), Les 
agriculteurs français aux urnes. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1992.
‘L’électorat écologiste’ in Ecologisme et politique, vol.l, 
Paris: Association Française de Science Politique, 1980.
La peste verte. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1991.
Ecology in the 20^ century: a historv. New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1989.
‘The real regions of France’, in The Ecologist, vol. 12, 
no.5, 1982.
‘La chasse, un problème politique’, in Ecologie nolitique, 
vol.8, Autumn 1993, pp.71-6.
Objectif terre: Les Verts, de l’écologie à la politique. 
Paris: Editions du Félin, 1990.
Histoire du Front Populaire (1934-1938). Paris: PUF,
1991.
Histoire du Socialisme en France. Paris: PUF, 1989.
‘A defense of ecofeminist philosophy’, in K.J. Warren 
(éd.). Ecological feminism. London: Routledge, 1994, 
pp.42-63.
‘Dissidents - the true democrats’ in The Ecologist, vol. 13, 
no.l, 1983, pp.2-4.
‘France -  country of the atom’ in The Ecologist, vol. 11, 
no.6, 1981, pp.293-7.
Politics and society in contemporary France. 1789-1971. 
London: Harrap, 1972.
399
Caniou, D.
Cans, R.
Carité, J.-M.
Carson, R.
Carton, D.
Castoriadis, C., Cohn- 
Bendit, D. & le public de 
Louvain-la-neuve
Céline, L.-F.
Cépède, M.
Chapsal, M.
Chapuy, P.M.B.
Charbonneau, B.
Charlton, D.G.
Charrier, J.-B.
Chase, S. (ed.)
Chatelet, F. & Lapouge,
G.
Marginalisme et retour à la terre. Lys: Editions d’Utovie, 
1976.
La Passion de la terre: Bombard. Cousteau, Tazieff et 
Victor. Paris: FIRST, 1991.
Jean Giono, homme du Contadour. Lys: Editions 
d’Utovie, 1976.
Silent spring. Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1963.
‘Quand M. Balladur dîne avec Mme. Voynet % Le Monde. 
38/1/93, p.lO.
De TEcologie à F autonomie. Paris: Seuil, 1981.
‘Contributions de médecines sociale’ and ‘La vie et 
l’oeuvre de Philippe Ignace Semmelweis’ reproduced in 
Cahiers Céline. 3. 1977, pp.l 13-231.
‘Agriculture et ravitaillement’ In P. Arnoult et al. La 
France sous l’Occupation. Paris: PUF, 1959, pp.75-88.
Interview with J. Giono in Quinze écrivains. Paris: 
Julliard, 1963.
‘France’ in R.FI. Williams (éd.). Planning in Europe: 
Urban and regional planning in the EEC. London; George 
Allen and Unwin, 1984.
Le feu vert: autocritique du mouvement écologique. Paris: 
Editions Karthala, 1980.
New images of the natural in France. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Citadins et ruraux. Paris: PUF, 1964.
Defending the earth: A dialogue between Murray 
Bookchin and Dave Foreman. Boston: South End Press,
1991.
‘Actualité de l’utopie’ in Quelle crise? Quelle culture? 
Dialogues de France-Culture. Grenoble: Presses
300
Chenavier, R.
Cheshire, P.C. & Hay, 
D.G.
Chevallier, H.
Cini, M.
Citron, P.
Clark, S.R.L.
Clayre, A. (ed.) 
Coates, I.
Cochet, Y.
Cohn-Bendit, D. 
Commoner, B.
Cook, M. (ed.) 
Cook, R.
universitaires de Grenoble, 1974.
‘André Gorz, une philosophie de Porientation (et de la 
désorientation)’, Modem and contemporary France. Vol 4, 
1994, pp. 421-430.
Urban problems in Western Europe. London: Unwin 
Flyman, 1989.
Eléments pour une écologie politique. Fustérouau: Ende 
Doman, 1982.
‘Mentalités et révolutions scientifiques’ in Ecologie et 
politique, vol.l. Winter 1991-2, pp.47-62.
Giono. Paris: Seuil, 1990.
‘Préface’ to the Récits et essais volume of the Oeuvres 
complètes de J. Giono, pp.I-XXXIL Paris: Gallimard,
1989.
The theology of the environment. Unpublished paper 
presented at the Philosophy and the Natural Environment 
conference, University of Cardiff, July 1993.
Nature and industrialization. Oxford: OUP, 1977
‘A cuckoo in the nest: the National Front and green 
ideology’ in IRNES, Perspectives on the environment. 
Aldershot & Vermont: Avebury, 1993.
‘Environmental concern in Britain 1919-1949: Diversity 
and continuity’, paper presented at the IRNES conference, 
Environment and Society. September 1993.
‘Political ecology in France, 1974-1984’ in Journal of area 
studies, no. 10, 1984, pp.45-7.
Le grand bazar. Paris: Pierre Belfond, 1975.
‘Faire la paix avec la planète’ in Ecologie politique, vol.l. 
Winter 1991-2, pp.83-103.
French culture since 1945. New York: Longman, 1993.
‘Towards an alternative ecological strategy’ in New 
ground magazine, no,2, Spring 1984, pp. 11-14.
304
Coston, H.
Crié, H.
Dabezies, A.
Daly, H.
Darcanges, J. 
Darier, E.
Dauphin, J.-P. (ed.)
Davion, V.
Day, D. 
Decouan, C.
Defrasne, J.
Deléage, J.-P.
Non! L’Ecologie n ’est nas de gauche. Elle n’est d’aucun 
parti. Petite histoire de l’écologie de Geffrov à Lalonde et 
Waechter. Paris: Publications Henry Coston, 1995.
‘Après le nucléaire...’ in Libération, 3 January 1996, p. 15.
‘Du premier élan aux premières ruptures’ in Libération: 
Les écologistes (supp.). 1993, pp.16-17.
‘Le Hussai'd et Tristan: Giono et Rougemont’ in the 
proceedings of the Colloque Jean Giono. Aix-en- 
Provence: EDISUD, 1981.
‘The stationary-state economy’ in The Ecologist, vol.2, 
no.7, 1972, pp.4-12.
Contre le chômage, l’écologie au pouvoir. Paris: Editions 
de l’Orme, 1992.
‘Histoire de l’écologie’ in CNS. vol.3, no.4, December 
1992, pp.133-5.
Les critiques de notre temps et Céline. Paris: Garnier, 
1976.
‘De Courbevoie à Meudon, Biblio-biographie’ in 
Magazine littéraire, no.l 16, September 1976, pp.10-16.
‘Is ecofeminism feminist?’ in K.J. Warren (éd.), 
Ecological feminism. London: Routledge, 1994, pp.8-28.
The eco-wars. London: Methuen, 1992.
La dimension écologique de l’Europe. Paris: Editions 
entente, 1979.
La gauche en France de 1789 à nos jours. Paris: PUF, 
1972.
‘La vague verte en Europe’ in Ecologie politique, vol.7, 
Summer 1993, pp. 19-24.
‘L’avenir de l’écologie politique’ in Ecologie politique, 
vol. 6, Spring 1993, pp.5-14.
‘Ecologie: les nouvelles exigeances théoriques’ in 
Ecologie politique, vol.l. Winter 1991-2, pp. 1-12.
302
Derbyshire, I. 
Dobson, A.
Dreyfus, F.-G.
Drieu la Rochelle, P. 
Drouin, J.-M.
Diyzek, J.S.
Duhamel, A.
Duhamel, O.
Dumont, R.
Dumont, R. & Sauvy, A.
Dupoirier, E. & Jaffré, J.
Duverger, M.
Eaubonne, F. d’ 
Eckersley, R.
Histoire de P écologie. Une science de l’homme et de la 
nature. Paris: La Découverte, 1991.
Politics in France from Giscard to Mitterrand. Cambridge; 
W. & R. Chambers, 1987.
‘Proper place in nature’ in THES. 16 April 1993, p.23.
Green political thought. London: Harper Collins, 1990.
‘Le pacifisme en France, 1930-1940’ in M. Vaïsse (éd.),
Le pacifisme en Europe, des amiées 1920 aux aimées 
1950. Brussels: Bruylant, 1993, pp.137-144.
Gilles. Paris: Gallimard, 1939.
L’Ecologie et son histoire: Réinventer la nature. Paris: 
Flammarion, 1991.
‘Ecology and discursive democracy beyond liberal 
capitalism and the administrative state’ in CNS. vol.3, 
no.2, June 1992, p p .l8-42.
Rational ecology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
Les peurs françaises. Paris: Flammarion, 1993.
Les habits neufs de la politique. Paris: Folio, 1989.
‘Une anomalie en Europe’ in L'Express. 26 March 1992, 
pp.56-7.
Seule une écologie socialiste. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1977.
L’utopie ou la mort! Paris: Seuil, 1973.
‘Pour en finir avec la société de gaspillage! ’ in Quelle 
crise? Quelle société? Dialogues de France-Culture. 
Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1974.
‘Le vote écologiste’ in Ecologisme et politique, vol.l,
1980.
Le système politique français. Paris: Seuil, 1997 (revised 
edition).
Le féminisme ou la mort. Paris: Pierre Horay, 1974.
‘The road to ecotopia? Socialism versus
303
Faivret, J.-P. et al 
Ferdinand, J.
Fernex, S.
Ferré, F.
Ferro, M.
Ferry, L.
Flower, J. E.
Forbes, J. & Hewlett, N.
Forrest, A.
Frémont, A.
Friedman, Y.
Fromm, E. 
Gavignaiid, G.
Giono, J.
environmentalism’ in The Ecologist, vol. 18, no.4, 1988, 
pp. 142-7.
L’illusion écologique. Paris: Seuil, 1980.
Gionisme et panthéisme: La re-création de l’homme par 
Jean Giono. Sherbrook, Québec: Editions N A AM AN,
1987.
‘Non-violence triumphant’ in The Ecologist, vol.5, no. 10, 
1975,pp.372-385.
Personalistic organicism. Paper presented at the 
Philosophy and the Natural Environment conference. 
University of Cardiff, July 1993.
Pétain. Paris: Fayard, 1987.
‘Ecologie, le bien et le mal’, L’Express. 26/3/92, p.54.
Literature and the left in France. London: Methuen, 1983.
Contemporary France. London: Longman, 1995 
(paperback edition).
‘The French Popular Front and the politics of Jacques 
Doriot’ in M.S. Alexander & H. Graham (eds.). The 
French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative 
perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989, pp.145-155.
France, géographie d’une société. Paris: Falmmarion,
1988.
La civilsation paysanne modernisée. St. Jean de Braye: 
Editions Dangles, coll. Ecologie et survie, 1982.
To have or to be. London; Penguin, 1976/1981
Les campagnes en France au XXe siècle (1914-1989). 
Paris: Ophrys, 1990.
Interview, ‘Jean Giono ou le pluriel singulier’, Vie 
culturelle littéraire, no.72, August 1971, pp.6-10.
‘Giono avec l’AEAR’ in Commune. No.6, February 1934, 
pp.6-7.
304
Giovannini, F.
Goldsmith, E.
Goldsmith, E. et al 
Goodin, R. 
Goodrich, N.
Gorz, A.
Gravier, J.-F. 
Greenpeace France
Grosser, A.
Grover, F. J.
Grünen, die
‘Capitalisme, soeialisme, écologie’ in CNS, voL4, no.l, 
March 1993, pp. 125-9.
‘The Way: an ecological world-viev^’ in The Ecologist, 
vol.18, no.4, 1988, pp.160-185.
A blueprint for survival. Bungay, Suffolk: Penguin, 1972.
Green political theoi-y. London: Blackwell, 1989.
Jean Giono. master of fictional modes. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973.
‘Changer d’utopie’ in Partage, Paris, February 1997, pp. 
40-44.
Capitalisme, socialisme, écologie. Paris: Galilée, 1991.
Métamorphoses du travail. Paris:Galilée, 1988.
Les Chemins du paradis, l’agonie du capital. Paris: 
Galilée, 1984.
Ecologie et politique. Paris: Seuil, 1978 (revised edition).
‘La politique n’est plus dans la politique’ in Le Nouvel 
Observateur, no.704, 8 May 1978.
Critique de la division du travail. Paiis: Seuil, 1973.
Le socialisme difficile. Paris: Seuil, 1967.
Stratégie ouvrière et néocapitalisme. Paris: Seuil, 1964.
Paris et le désert français. Paris: Flammarion, 1947.
Recueil documents (posters, leaflets, newsletters etc), held 
at the Bibliothèque nationale, Paris.
‘Faut-il avoir peur de l’écologie?’ in Libération, les 
écologistes (supp.), 1993, p.65.
‘Sur Louis-Ferdinand Céline’, in Six entretiens avec 
André Malraux sur des écrivains de son temps. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1978, pp.86-102.
Programme of the German Green Partv. London: Heretic 
Books, 1983.
Gurin, D. Trance: making ecology political and politics ecological’
305
Habert, P., Perrineau, P. 
& Ysmal, C.
Plains worth, P.
Plalévy, D.
Handy, C.
Hanley, D., Kerr, P. & 
Waites, N.
Hardin, G.
Harding, J.
Heilman, J.
Hervieu, B. (ed.) 
Hobsbawm, E.J. 
Plolder, J. et al 
Illich, I.
Inch, P.
Ingram, N.
Contemporarv Crises (3), London:, 1979, pp. 149-169.
Le vote éclaté. Les élections régionales et cantonales des 
22 et 29 mars 1992. Paris: Département d’études 
politiques du Figaro et Presses de la Fondation nationale 
des Sciences politiques, 1992.
Breaking the mould. The Greens in the French partv 
system. (Unpublished paper), 1989.
Visite aux paysans du centre. Paris: Grasset, 1921.
The future of work. London: Blackwell, 1985.
Contemporarv France. Politics and society since 1945. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.
‘The tragedy of the commons’ in Science, vol. 162, 
December 1968, pp. 1243-8.
‘The French nuclear débâcle’ in The Ecologist, vol. 14, 
no.3, 1984, pp.101-9.
Emmanuel Mounier and the new catholic left. 1930-1950. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.
Les agriculteurs français aux urnes. Paris: L’Harmattan,
1992.
Industry and empire from 1750 to the present day. 
London: Penguin, 1968.
Perspectives on the environment. Aldershot, England & 
Vermont, USA: Avebury, 1993.
Le chômage créateur. Paris: Seuil, 1977.
La convivialité. Paris: Seuil, 1973.
‘Larzac occupied’ in The Ecologist, vol.3, no.6, 1973, 
p.205.
‘Pacifism and the Liberation’ in H.R. Kedward & N. 
Wood (eds.). The Liberation of France: image and event. 
Oxford: Berg, 1995.
‘L’envers de 1 ’entre-deux-guerres en France: ou à la 
recherche d’un passé pacifiste’ in M. Vaïsse (éd.). Le
306
Irvine, S & Ponton, A
Jackson, Julian
Jaffré, J.
Jahn, T. 
Jollivet, M.
Juquin, P.
Keane, J.
Pacifisme en Europe. Brussels: Bruylant, 1993, pp. 17-42.
The politics of dissent. Pacifism in France, 1919-1935. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
A green manifesto: Policies for a green future. London: 
Optima, 1988.
‘Le temps des loisirs: Popular tourism and mass leisure in 
the vision of the Front populaire’ in M.S. Alexander and 
H. Graham (eds.), The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: 
Comparative perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989.
The Popular Front in France: Defending democracy, 1934- 
38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
‘La baisse des grands partis’ in P. Habert et al, Le vote 
éclaté. Les élections régionales et cantonales des 22 et 29 
mars 1992. Paris: Département d’études politiques du 
Figaro et Presses de la Fondation nationale des Sciences 
politiques, 1992.
[No title] in Le Monde, 28/5/92, p.4.
[No title], in Le Figaro, 14/3/89, p.3.
‘Red green politics’ in CNS, vol.4, no.l, March 1993.
‘De la “question de la nature” à la “question de 
l’environnement” : Repères anciens pour des questions 
nouvelles’ in J.-L. Mathieu (éd.). Du rural à 
1 ’ environnement : La question de la nature aujourd’hui. 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989, pp.l 1-19.
‘Les écologistes face au national-populisme’ in Ecologie 
politique, vol.7, Summer 1993, pp.51-71.
Pour une alternative verte en Europe. Paris: La 
Découverte, 1990.
‘A land of Cockayne? Interview with André Gorz’, in 
New Statesman and Society, vol.2, no.49, May 1989, 
pp.26-31.
Kedward, H.R. The Dreyfus affair, catalyst for tensions in French society.
mKedward, H.R. & 
Austin, R. (eds.)
Kelly, M.H.
Kimmel, Alain 
Kofman, E.
Kuletz, V.
Lagarde, A. & Michard, 
L.
Lalande, B.
Lalonde, B.
Lalonde, B. & Simonnet, 
D.
Larkin, M.
Lattes, R. & Touraine, A.
Laubier, C. (ed.)
Lawson, K. & Merki, P.
Leff, E.
Oxford: OUP, 1965.
Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and ideology. 
London/Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985.
‘The fate of Emmanuel Mounier’, Journal of European 
Studies, 2, pp.256-267.
‘Qu’est-ce que le travail?’. Echos, 81, pp.4-7. Paris: 
CIEP, 1996.
‘Cities: A decade of la politique de la ville\ Modern and 
Contemporary France. NSU4). 1993, pp.379-83.
‘Eco-feminist philosophy’ in CNS, vol.3, no. 10, June 
1992,pp.63-78.
La littérature française, vol.IV: Les métamorphoses du 
XXe siècle. Paris: Bordas/Laffont, 1971.
Céline, Voyage au bout de la nuit. Paris: Hatier, 1976.
En vert et contre tous. Manifesto for the Presidential 
election, 1981.
Sur la vague verte. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1981.
Quand vous voudrez. Paris: Jean-Jacques Pauveit, 1978.
France since the Popular Front. Government and people, 
1936-1986. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
‘Au-delà de la société industrielle’ in Quelle crise? Quelle 
société? Dialogues de France-Culture. Grenoble: Presses 
Universitaires de Grenoble, 1974.
The condition of women in France, from 1945 to the 
present. London: Routledge, 1990.
When parties fail. Emerging alternative organisations. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.
‘Marxism and the environmental question: From the 
critical theory of production to an environmental 
rationality for sustainable development’ in CNS. vol.4,
110.13, March 1993.
308
Lepetit, B. & Pinol, J.-L.
Leroy, G. & Roche, A.
Levi, A.
Levine, M.P.
Levinson, C. & Maire, E.
Lewis, D.L.
Lhomeaii, J.-Y.
Lipietz, A.
Looseley, D.
Loubet del Bay le, J.-L.
Lovelock, J.
Maire, E. & Julliard, J. 
Malthus, T.R.
‘France’ in R. Rodger (ed.), European urban historv. 
London: Leicester University Press, 1993.
Les Ecrivains et le Front Populaire. Paris: Presses de la 
Fondation Nationale des Scienees Politiques, 1986
Guide to French literature, 1799-present Vol. 2. Chicago: 
St. James Press, 1992.
‘Pantheism, ethics and ecology’ in Environmental values, 
vol.3 ,110.2, 1994, pp.121-38.
‘La nouvelle crise du travail’ in Quelle crise? Quelle 
société? Dialogues de France-Culture. Grenoble: Presses 
Universitaires de Grenoble, 1974.
‘Emmanuel Mounier and the politics of moral revolution’, 
Catholic Review, vol.56, no.2, July 1970, pp.266-290.
‘L’âge d’or écologiste’, in Libération, les écologistes 
(supp.), p.3.
Vert espérance: l’avenir de l’écologie politique. Paris: La 
Découverte, 1993.
‘Les Verts: bleus, blancs, rouges... ou bruns?’ in 
Libération, les écologistes, (supp.), Paris, 1993, pp.64-5.
‘Paris versus the provinces. Cultural decentralisation 
since 1945’ in M. Cook (éd.), French Culture since 1945. 
New York: Longman, 1993, pp.217-40.
Les non-conformistes des années 30. Une tentative de 
renouvellement de la pensée politique française. Paris: 
Seuil, 1969.
La Terre est un être vivant. L’hypothèse Gaïa. Paris: 
Flammarion, 1990.
The Gaïa hypothesis. A new look at life on earth. 
London/New York: Penguin, 1979.
La CFDT d’aujourd’hui. Paris: Seuil, 1975.
‘Malthus’ law’ from ‘An essay on the principles of 
population’ (1798), reproduced in A. Clayre (ed.), Nature
309
Mancel, J.-F.
Martell, L.
Marx, K.
Marx, K. & Engels, F.
Mathieu, J.-L.
Mathieu, N. & Jollivet, 
M. (eds.)
MeConville, M. & 
Searle, P.
McHale, V.E. (ed.)
and industrialization. Oxford: OUP, 1977, pp.198-200.
Le Choix de F intérêt national: Programme du RPR pour 
P élection législative de 1997. Paris, 1997.
Ecology and society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
Selected works. Vols. I & IL London: Lauren & Wishaid, 
1942.
Manifesto of the Communist Partv. Moscow: Foreign 
Language Publishing House, 1888 (English edition).
La défense de 1 ’environnement en France. Paris: PUF,
1992.
Du rural à F environnement, la question de la nature 
aujourd’hui. Paris: L’FIarmattan, 1989.
French revolution 1968. London: Penguin, 1968.
The Greenwood historical encyclopedia of the world’s 
political parties. Vol. 1. Coimecticut, USA: Greenwood 
Press, 1983.
Meadows, D.H. et al Beyond the limits: Global collapse or a sustainable future.
London: Earthscan, 1992.
The Limits to Growth. London: Earthscan, 1971.
‘Ecofeminism and eco-socialism: dilemmas of 
essentialism and materialism’ in CNS, vol.3, no. 10, June 
1992, pp.43-62.
Jean Giono et le cinéma. Paris: Editions Ramsay, 1990.
Mellor, M.
Mény, J.
Mény, Y.
Michel, H.
Mies, M. & Shiva, V. 
Mill, J.S.
‘Urban planning in France: Dirigisme and pragmatism, 
1945-1980’ in D.H. McKay (ed.). Planning and politics in 
Western Europe. London: MacMillan, 1982.
Pétain et le régime de Vichy. Paris: PUF, 1978.
Ecofeminism. London: Zed Books, 1994.
‘Nature, the utility of religion and theism’ (1850-8), 
reproduced in A. Clayre (ed.), Nature and 
industrialization. Oxford: OUP, 1977, pp.303-12.
Miiza, Pierre
Moch, L.P.
More, T. 
Morelle, P. 
Morin, E.
Morris, W.
310
‘L’Ultra-Droite des années trente’ in Michel Winock, 
Histoire de l’extrême droite en France, pp. 157-90. Paris: 
Seuil, 1993.
Paths to the city. Regional migration in nineteenth- 
century France. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications 
Ltd./the Social Science Histoiy Association, 1983.
Utopia. London: Everyman classics edition, 1985 
(original date of publication: 1516)
‘Jean Giono on le pluriel singulier’ in Tendances -  vie 
culturelle littéraire, no.72, August 1971.
‘La pensée écologiste -  pour une nouvelle conscience 
planétaire in Le Monde Diplomatique, pp.l, 18-19, 
October 1989.
‘Two kinds of work’ (1884-5), reproduced in A. Clayre, 
Nature and industrialization. Oxford: OUP, 1977.
Mossuz-Lavau, J. & Rey, Les Fronts Populaires. Paris: Casterman/Guinti, 1994.
H.
Moulin, A.
Mounier, Emmanuel
Mouvement écologique
Les paysans dans la société française de la Révolution à 
nos jours. Paris: Seuil, 1988.
Le Personnalisme, (collection of articles originally 
published between 1935 and 1939) Paris: PUF, 1962 
(edition consulted).
Court Traité de la mythique de gauche. Paris: March
1938. Reproduced in J. Touchard, La Gauche en France 
depuis 1900, pp.211-222.
A Personalist manifesto. London: Longman’s, Grant & 
Co, 1938.
‘Les Catholiques et la défense nationale’. Esprit, no.21, 
April 1935.
‘Editorial’ in Esprit, no.l, October 1932.
Textes d ’orientation. Paris: Mouvement écologique, 
1979.
314
Naess, A.
Nicolon, A. 
Northcutt, W. (ed.) 
Nucéra, L. 
O’Connor, J.
O’Riordan, T.
OECD (Urban division)
Ophuls, W.P.
Ory, Pascal & Sirinelli, 
Jean-François
Pagnol, M.
Paré, J.-R.
Parkin, S.
Parodi, J.-L.
‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement’ in Inquiry, No. 16, 1996, pp.94-100.
‘Deep Ecology and ultimate premises’ in The Ecologist, 
vol.18, no.4, 1988, pp.128-131.
‘Intuition, intrinsic value and Deep Ecology’ in The 
Ecologist, vol.14,110.5, 1984, pp.201-3.
‘La défense de I’enviromiement et du cadre de vie’ in 
Ecologisme et politique, vol.l, Paris: AFSP, 1980.
Historical dictionary of the 4^ '^  and 5^ '^  Republics, 1946- 
1991. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992.
‘Un aventurier du langage’ in Magazine littéraire, no.l 16, 
September 1976, pp.36-8.
‘Un développement soutenable du capitalisme est-il 
possible?’ in Ecologie politique, vol.l, Winter 1991, 
pp.63-8.
‘Uneven and combined development and ecological crisis’ 
in Race and class, vol.30, no.3, 1989.
Environmentalism. London: Pion, 1981.
Environmental policies for cities in the 1990s. Paris: 
OECD Publications Service, 1990.
Ecology and the politics of scarcity. San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman, 1977.
Les Intellectuels en France, de l’Affaire Dreyfus à nos 
jours. Paris: Armand Colin, 1986
L’Eau des collines. Paris: Editions de Fallois, 1963.
‘L’histoire agraire, le nationalisme et les paysans’ in 
Revue Canadienne de Science Politique, vol.xxviii, no.3, 
September 1995, pp.437-454.
Green parties: An international guide. London: Heretic 
Books, 1989.
‘Essai de problématique du mouvement écologiste: Les 
écologistes et la tentation politique’ in Revue Politique et
312
Peccei, A.
Pellegrini, C.
Pelletier, D.
Pepper, D. 
Perrignon, J. 
Perrineau, P.
Pillement, G. 
Plant, J.
Plum wood, V.
Poirot-Delpech, B.
Porritt, J.
Prendiville, B.
Parlementaire, no.878, Januaiy 1979, pp.25-43.
One hundred pages for the future. Reflections of the 
President of the Club of Rome. Oxford: Pergamon Press 
Ltd., 1981.
One ma ioie demeure: Roman dionysiaque? Paris: 
Collection de P Ecole Normale SuiDérleure de Jeunes 
Filles, 1984.
‘Le “réenchantement” du monde -  les ehrétiens et 
P écologie’ in Ecologie politique, vol.3. Autumn 1992, 
pp.61-78.
The roots of modem environmentalism. Beckenham, 
Kent: Crook Helm Ltd., 1984.
‘Les Verts s’enracinent à gauche’ in Libération. 15 
November 1993, pp. 1-3.
‘Le Front National, 1972-1992’ in M. Winock (ed.), 
Histoire de l’extrême droite en France. Paris: Seuil, 1993, 
pp. 243-9 8.
France, ta beauté fout le camp! Paris: Editions Entente, 
1976.
Healing the wounds. The promise of ecofeminism. 
Philadelphia/Santa Cruz: New Society Publishers, 1989.
Feminism and the Mastery of nature. London/New York: 
Routledge, 1993.
‘Feminism and ecofeminism: Beyond the Dualistic 
assumptions of women, men and nature’ in The Ecologist, 
vol.22, no.l, January 1992, pp.8-13.
‘Le Faullcner de Manosque’ in Le Monde des livres, 10 
March 1995, p. 10.
Seeing green: the politics of ecology explained. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984.
L’écologie, la politique autrement? Culture, sociologie et 
histoire des écologistes. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1993.
Environmental politics in France. London: Routledge,
313
Prendiville, B. & Chafer, 
T.
Pronier, R. & Le 
Seigneur, V.J.
Prost, A.
Puill, G. Le 
Racine, N.
1992.
‘French ecologists at the crossroads’ in [n.a.]
Environmental politics, London: Franlc Cass, 1992, 
pp.448-457.
The political ecology movement in France. PhD thesis, 
University of Reading, March 1991.
‘Activists and ideas in the green movement in France’, 
Green Politics (1), pp.177-209.
Génération verte: Les écologistes en politique. Paris: 
Presses de la Renaissance, 1992.
Les Anciens Combattants et la société française, 1914-
1939. (3 vols.) Paris: FNSP, 1977.
‘Dominique Voynet: toute aventure collective suppose le 
débat’, L’FIumanité. 12 January 1998, p.8.
‘La revue Europe et le pacifisme dans les amiées vingt’ in 
M. Vaïsse (éd.), Le pacifisme en Europe, des années 1920 
aux années 1950. Brussels: Bruylant, 1993.
Ragache, G. & Robert, J. La vie quotidienne des écrivains et des artistes sous
l’occupation 1940-44. Paris: Hachette, 1988.
The private world of Jean Giono. Oxford: Basil" 
Blackwell, 1967.
La politique n’est plus ce qu’elle était. Paris: Seuil, 1993.
France between the wars: Gender and politics. London: 
Routledge, 1996.
‘Women, men and the 1936 strikes in France’ in M.S. 
Alexander & FI. Graham (eds.), The French and Spanish 
Popular Fronts: Comparative perspectives. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Pourquoi les écologistes font-ils delà politique?
Entretiens avec Brice Lalonde, Serge Moscovici, René 
Dumont. Paris: Seuil, 1978.
Redfern, W.
Rémond, R. 
Reynolds, Siân
Ribes, J.-P.
Richy, N. (ed.) Label France: Environnement. Magazine of the French
314
Robertson, D.
Roche, Anne & Leroy, 
Géraldi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no.8, September 1992. 
A dictionary of politics. London: Penguin, 1995. 
Les Ecrivains et le Front populaire
Roche, Anne & Tarting, Des Années trente: Groupes et ruptures. Actes du
Christian (eds) 
Rogers, S. C.
Rosnay, J. de 
Roszak, T.
Rousselet, J. 
Rubenstein, J.M.
Rüdig, W. et al
Ryle, M.
Sainteny, G.
S aux, J.-L.
colloque à P Université de Provence I, 5-7 mai 1983. 
Paris: CNRS, 1985
‘Natural histories: The rise and fall of French rural 
studies’ in French Flistorical Studies, vol. 19, no.2, 1995, 
pp.381-397.
Le Macro scope. Paris: Seuil, 1975.
L’Homme/Planète. La désintégration créative de la 
société industrielle. (French translation of Person:Planet) 
Paris: Stock, 1980.
L’allergie au travail. Paris: Seuil, 1974.
The French new towns. Baltimore, Maryland: Jolins 
Hopkins University Press, 1978.
Green Partv members: A profile. Glasgow: Delta 
Publications, 1991.
Ecology and socialism. London: Century Hutchinson,
1988.
L’écologisme. Paris: PUF, 1997.
‘Le Parti socialiste face à l’écologisme’. Revue française 
de science politique. Vol. 44, No.3, 1994, Paris: FNSP, 
pp.424-461.
‘L’écologisme en Allemagne et en France’ in Ecologie 
politique, vol.6, Spring 1993, pp. 15-28.
Les Verts. Paris: PUF, 1992.
‘L’Ecologisme est-il un centrisme?’. Libération, 30/3/89, 
p.64.
‘Un Entretien avec Dominique Voynef, Le Monde,
315
Schell, J.
Schumacher, F.
Secrétariat d’Etat auprès 
du Premier Ministre 
chargé de 
l’environnement
Seed, J. et al
Simonnet, D. 
Sirinelli, J.-F.
Slama, A.-G.
Spretnak, C. & Capra, F. 
Stanton, M.
Steel, J.
26/6/93,p.l0.
The Abolition. London: Picador, 1984.
The fate of the earth. London: Picador, 1982.
Good work. London: Abacus, 1979.
Ecologie et pouvoir. Paris: La Documentation française,
1990.
Thinking like a mountain: Twards a council of all beings. 
London; Heretic Books, 1988.
L’Ecologisme. Paris: PUF, 1996.
‘La France de l’entre-deux-guerres: Un “trend” pacifiste?’ 
in M. Vaïsse (éd.), Le Pacifisme en Europe. Brussels: 
Bruylant, 1993, pp.43-50.
Les droites françaises de la Révolution à nos jours. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1992.
Génération intellectuelle. Kliâgneux et Normaliens dans 
1 ’entre-deux-guerres. Paris:Fayard, 1988.
‘L ’écologisme: Histoire et idéologies’ in Ecologisme et 
politique, vol. 1, Paris: AFSP, 1980.
Green politics, the global promise. London: 
Paladin/Grafton Books, 1986.
‘French intellectual groups and the Popular Front: 
Traditional and innovative uses of the media’ in M.S. 
Alexander & H. Graham (eds.). The French and Spanish 
Popular Fronts: Comparative perspectives. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.254-269.
‘Céline, ses contemporains et le concept du travail’, in 
Colloque L.-F. Céline, 1988. Paris: Editions Du Lérot, 
1988,pp.247-266.
Paul Nizan: un révolutionnaire conformiste? Paris: 
Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques,
316
Sternhell, Z.
Taplin, K.
Tarlet, J.
Taylor, B.
Thomas, L.~V.
Thomson, D.(ed.)
Toffler, A.
Tokar, B.
Touraine, A.
Tozzi, M.
Trintzius, R.
Tzara, T.
1987.
Neither right nor left: fascist ideology in France.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
K. Taplin, Tongues in trees: Studies in literature and 
ecology. Bideford: Green Books, 1989.
La planification écologique: Méthodes et teclmiques.
Paris: Economica, 1985.
‘The religion and politics of Earth First!’ in The Ecologist. 
vol.21, no.6, November 1991, pp.258-266.
‘Le sentiment de la mort nucléaire’ in Communications. 
vol.57, pp.101-120, October 1993.
Political ideas, collected essays. Bungay, Suffolk: Pelican, 
1966.
The third wave. London: Collins, 1980.
‘Social ecology. Deep Ecology and the future of green 
political thought’ in The Ecologist, vol. 18, no.4, 1988, 
pp.132-141.
The green alternative. San Pedro: K. & E. Miles, 1987.
‘Vivre riches ou vivre ensemble?’ in Le Nouvel 
Observateur. November 1994, p.57.
‘La mort du socialisme’ in L’Express. 26 March 1992, 
pp.52-3.
L’après-socialisme. Paris: Grasset, 1980.
Syndicalisme et nouveaux mouvements sociaux: 
Régionalisme, féminisme, écologie. Paris: Editions 
ouvrières, 1982.
‘Louis-Ferdinand Céline: Voyage au bout de la nuit’, 
Europe. 15 December 1932, p. 19.
‘Un romancier de la lâcheté: Jean Giono’ in Les Lettres 
Françaises. 7 October 1944, [n.p.].
Vadrot, C.M. Historique des mouvements écologistes. Paris: AFSP,
317
Vaïsse, M. (ed.)
Vellacott, J.
Voynet, D.
Waechter, A.
Wall, Derek
Warren, K.J. (ed.) 
Weber, E.
Weston, J. (ed.) 
Williams, R. 
Wilson, E.
Winock, M.
1980.
Le pacifisme en Europe, des années 1920 aux années 
1950. Brussels: Bruylant, 1993.
‘Women, peace and internationalism, 1914-1920’, in C. 
Chatfield & P. van den Dungen (eds.), Peace movements 
and political cultures. Knoxville: University of Temiessee 
Press, 1988, pp. 106-112.
‘Rejoignons les Vert(e)s’, Vert-Contact. February 1998,
p.2.
Editorial, Vert-Contact. March 1997, p. 1.
Voter Dominique Vovnet. ça change tout!. Manifesto for 
the Presidential election, 1995.
Dessine-moi une planète. L’écologie maintenant ou 
jamais. Paris: Albin Michel, 1990.
Green historv. A reader in environmental literature, 
philosophv and politics. London: Routledge, 1994.
Getting there: Steps to a green societv. London: Green 
print, 1990.
Ecological feminism. London: Routledge, 1994.
The hollow years. France in the 1930s. London: Sinclair 
Stevenson, 1995.
Red and green. London: Pluto Press, 1986.
The long revolution. London: Pelican, 1961.
‘The rhetoric of urban space’ in New Left Review, vol. 
209, pp. 146-60, Januaiy 1995.
’22, v’ià les années 30’, Evénement du jeudi. 13-19 
February 1997, pp.54-58.
(Ed.) Histoire de l’extrême droite en France. Paris: Seuil,
1993.
‘L’esprit de Munich’ in F. Braudel (éd.). Les aimées 
trente, de la crise à la guerre. Paris: Seuil, 1983.
318
Worster, Donald
Wright, J.
Wright, V.
Ysmal, C.
Les Pionniers de l’Ecologie - Une histoire des idées 
écologiques. Paris: Editions Sang de la Terre, 1992
‘Emmanuel Mounier, Esprit and Vichy, 1940-1944: 
Ideology and anti-ideology’ in H.R. Kedward & R. Austin 
(eds.), Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and 
ideology. Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985.
The government and politics of France. London: 
Hutchinson, 1984.
Les Partis politiques sous la Cinquième République. 
Paris: FNSP, 1987.
